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What would I do to counter such a huge allied force in Sumatra?
 
Not let it set up to begin with. You need a very fast forward tempo as Japan to keep such a beast from growing. You got to know when its time to bypass areas and come back for them later such as Bataan. You need a long range plan that takes into account protecting "quiet" areas while you push forward in other areas. Many Japanese players fail to garrison places such as the Kuriles with even a speed bump of forces. Many neglect setting up a defence of the Marshalls with enough force to keep an allied player thinking twice before commiting large surface units within Nettie/Zero range.
 
You have taken advantage of his huge errors and he has fallen for multiple traps you have set for him. I have pondered what his options are in this game and I cannot come up with anything that he can do to salvage the situation he finds himself in. You are sitting on top of his lifeblood and every turn you sit you grow stronger. He has no option at this juncture except to come at you and take horrendous casualties. He will have no navy left and his air force will be battered after what will at a minimum a 3-4 month struggle. If he is able to clear you out before the end of July he will be in no position to push any further.
 
He has lost the game but the battle that may come would be fun to read about. 
 
 

ORIGINAL: Ketza

What would I do to counter such a huge allied force in Sumatra?

Not let it set up to begin with. You need a very fast forward tempo as Japan to keep such a beast from growing. You got to know when its time to bypass areas and come back for them later such as Bataan. You need a long range plan that takes into account protecting "quiet" areas while you push forward in other areas. Many Japanese players fail to garrison places such as the Kuriles with even a speed bump of forces. Many neglect setting up a defence of the Marshalls with enough force to keep an allied player thinking twice before commiting large surface units within Nettie/Zero range.

You have taken advantage of his huge errors and he has fallen for multiple traps you have set for him. I have pondered what his options are in this game and I cannot come up with anything that he can do to salvage the situation he finds himself in. You are sitting on top of his lifeblood and every turn you sit you grow stronger. He has no option at this juncture except to come at you and take horrendous casualties. He will have no navy left and his air force will be battered after what will at a minimum a 3-4 month struggle. If he is able to clear you out before the end of July he will be in no position to push any further.

He has lost the game but the battle that may come would be fun to read about. 

That is far too defeatist an attitude for two basic reasons.

Firstly it doesn't appear to be based on a detached assessment of what assets remain to Japan. From this distance it seems to me that Japan still has:

(a) oodles of reserves in Manchukuo for which PPs do not have to be paid for their use outside of Manchukuo. They could be used in China or Burma or even India
(b) the KB remains intact. Surely Japan has been engaged in appropriate pilot training. I would be very surprised to discover it to be incapable of dominating any naval encounter involving it.
(c) Japan still retains interior lines so it can still descend on any Allied "box" and obliterate it.
(d) in terms of first class materiel Japan should still be outproducing the Allies hence it should not yet fear becoming entangled in attrition
(e) the at start Southern Army remains largely intact and overall still retains its overall qualitative edge over the Allied field armies. The breathing space accorded to the Allies to date will have allowed them to improve their quality to a degree, but not to the degree that should adversely affect the Japanese commander's morale
(f) effective deployment of IJA air assets is yet to occur. They should still be largely intact.

Secondly, what exactly do you mean to be his lifeblood. What exactly do you think Japan must do or have in order to prosper? If your answer is oil/fuel then that is a pretty conventional approach which overlooks some important factors:

(i) as I said in my previous post, I assume Japan starts off with a substantial stockpile of raw materials which together with continued production from Manchukuo/Hokkaido/China should be sufficient to see it through 1942. Palembang is certainly the jewel in the crown of oil/fuel production but there are certainly plenty of other sources which can be conquered independently. Provided Japan does not become fixated on Palembang to the exclusion of other just as valuable sites, Japan could still prosper.
(ii) due to the Allied concentration on southern Sumatra this means that important secondary raw material production sites will be subjected to much reduced Allied pressure. Thus Japanese investment in repairing those sites will make much more economical sense than usual.
(iii) the Allied head on southern Sumatra has been considerably strengthened, but what about the shoulders. Immediately fighting on southern Sumatra is playing into Nemo's strength but what if you strike elsewhere which is just as important, albeit for slightly different reasons. How quickly and effectively do you think the Allies can redeploy if they lack control over their SLOCs.

If Japan approaches the situation along conventional grounds, then yes I expect it to be resoundingly defeated. It's reaction to the action in the Mandates has also unnecessarily weakened Japan. But to say it is already defeated, well then the same could have been said of Japan on 7 December 1941, particularly as it failed to strike at Pearl Harbor. It is possible that my cunning plan would not be good enough to deliver victory to Japan in the long run, but it is most definitely wrong to say that whatever it does now will be a failure.

Alfred

Not having played the game - I only read some AARs - here are my thoughts:

1) The Allied player has a massive force at Sumatra - a force that is missing elsewhere (ignoring the fact that some of it is from a successfully evacuated Singapore). This means that invasions unthinkable in a normal game might actually be possible here.

2) Is Sumatra self-sufficient concerning supplies? If not, it might be possible to isolate and starve it. Isolating it also makes it impossible for the Allied player to move the oil/fuel out of Sumatra, which could make it possible to capture those stockpiles once the supplies run out.

3) So, I would let Sumatra stand (for now) and finally invade Java and Burma.

4) To complete the isolation of Sumatra and take advantage of the massive concentration of forces there, I would invade Sri Lanka at the very least and possible attempt an invasion of India itself. At this point in time the Japanese Navy is still strong enough to support such an undertaking.

[Edit]Having found a better world map, point 4 is probably impossible because of the various straights, and going the long way around Java and through the Indian Ocean is too long for any major invasions by sea. I do not know how viable an overland invasion via Burma is, but Sumatra is a thorn in the side for this theater.

The other possibility is moving on Australia - I expect the reinforcements for Sumatra mostly came from here. This might make it possible to try what PZB blew off at the last moment in his game: A complete conquest of Australia. I do not know how many Resources Australia includes, though I do recall Allied players having major fuel troubles in Australia.

However, there are very capable players here who can definitely give a lot better ideas.
[/Edit]

However, I seriously doubt that your opponent will do anything like this. He has so far done very little given the large leeway given in your house rules.

Frankly, I as a spectator would absolutely love it if someone else would take over the Japanese Forces at this point, as you have shown that you completely outclass your opponent. Your talent is going to waste against such an opponent. Your planning and the thoughts behind it are very illuminating and entertaining - it would be nice to see you go up against an opponent who forces you to your limit. Everyone - including, I think, you - would profit from this.

Watching sheep go to the slaughter might be interesting for a while and include quite a few intellectual challenges, but a real fight is better for all.

Oops, posted in error.

Interesting, I think Alfred and I would not view Palembang as being as essential as most here seem to think. It certainly is the biggest OIL producing centre on the map but when all of the other easily-taken OIL centres are added together Japan has enough to run its HI in Scenario 2 at full strength. So, Palembang is really only necessary if the other sources of OIL don't fall ( and since most of those are in Borneo or Malaysia and |Burma that's pretty much unthinkable ) OR Japan wants to expand its economy ( which it can get away without doing ).

So, I would suggest we really need two strands here:
1. Ways to actually take Palembang relatively intact now and
2. Things to do if you don't actually try to take Palembang intact, or at all.

That should result in more options revealing themselves. The key is too not just accept the conventional wisdom and say "Palembang must be taken"... That's fine at one level of analysis but on a deeper level while hugely important it may not be worth the price being asked. E.g. Right now it would take the entire SRA for a period of a month to take Sumatra and by the end of that month the SRA would be incapable of further offensive action toward Oz or India at all. The act of taking SUmatra ( which Japan can still do with the forces at its disposal now ) would consign it to being on the strategic defensive for the rest of the war - fulfilling my prime strategic goal in pouring those troops into Sumatra.

Now, what we need to ask ourselves is whether or not Palembang is worth THAT or could we do something with the SRA during the rest of 1942 which would be worth leaving Palembang untaken or destroyed in our rear?

Personally if I were Japan right now I would launch two major strategic offensives, at least one of which would only have been made possible by the fact that my lack of interdiction aided the Allies in pouring their forces into Sumatra. The goal would be to gain the strategic depth to buy another 12 to 18 months of survival.


I will also point out that given our HRs in this game India is UTTERLY doable. In fact not only is it doable, it would actually be hard NOT to take it if you were the Japanese player and took the indirect approach with combined IJA/IJN operations. And I'm not talking about taking a small portion of south-east India, I'm talking about capturing and holding the whole country whilst still maintaining the strategic availability of the SRA.

So, add that to your analyses and let's see what you come up with [8D]




DTurtle,
Sumatra makes about 1,000 tons of supplies per day so it is pretty self-sufficient.

Nemo121,

Hmn...at the risk of disclosing too much of my "cunning plan" (and thank you v..e..r..y m..u..c..h for starting to expose to the public my hidden "cunning plan"), I will confirm that yes I do not consider the capture of Palembang to be as indispensable as most players do. Nor am I particularly concerned if it is completely in ruins when captured provided other important objectives in compensation have been achieved. The oil of Palembang is only important if it is needed and that ultimately depends on what the Allies do or are capable of doing. There is no prize awarded to Japan simply for building up its GDP, the important thing is for what purpose does it need that GDP.

As to Japan having two strategic offensives. I can see several, not just two, very promising actions but the loses incurred in the Mandates would almost certainly limit his realistic options. Irrespective of what Japan has to hand, the situation on southern Sumatra makes one particular objective an imperative which Japan simply cannot overlook.

You might care to consider posting some screenshots with your estimates of enemy and Allied theatre forces to assist others to frame operational plans as per your last post. Otherwise you might just get some wishful thinking.

Alfred

No need to thank me [:D]. I just didn't wantbto have to sit through Palembang only options. Don't get me wrong though, i think there are ways in which Sumatra can be taken without wrecking the SRA too much.

I'll give that data tonight.

Very interesting discussion here.
 
If I may I´d like to add some points to it:
 
While I agree that Palembang and its oil varies in importance depending on the expansion of Japanese industry,
Sumatra (and Java, Timor etc.) are needed for a working definsive perimeter. This is something I would rate the
primary goal of conquering the DEI´s anyway.
As with Darwin, many of the Japanese offensives should be viewed as denial of bases to the Allies that have the
potential to act as staging areas for later war counteroffensives.
From this perspective conquering Sumatra is vital to Japanese survival.
 
That said, a massed Allied army in any of those areas just makes the neccessity to conquer them more important
for the Japanese player - if this is at all possible.
 
So the basic question for the Allied player is:
 
- Should the forces committed for defensive operations in Sumatra include units that could be of value later
in the war? 
- If the answer is yes, is the loss of those units something that outweights the gain in delaying the Japanese advance in the area?
- Is the benefit that comes with forcing the Japanese player to committ more forces for the conquest and the resulting delay in other strategic regions
worth the price of exposing units that could be later used for other operations?
 
And most important:
- With the above implications that Sumatra is a must-have and that its obvious that the Japanese player simply
has to use the forces to conquer it, but without the added pressure of performing this operation as fast as possible (because raw materials
don´t dictate your op tempo there), is Sumatra tenable?
 
My "stomach" answer would be no, which would lead me to the conclusion that the Allies should committ, if possible, enough forces to delay the
advance, but not invest in blocking an offensive completely.
 

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Nemo121,

Hmn...at the risk of disclosing too much of my "cunning plan" (and thank you v..e..r..y m..u..c..h for starting to expose to the public my hidden "cunning plan"), I will confirm that yes I do not consider the capture of Palembang to be as indispensable as most players do. Nor am I particularly concerned if it is completely in ruins when captured provided other important objectives in compensation have been achieved. The oil of Palembang is only important if it is needed and that ultimately depends on what the Allies do or are capable of doing. There is no prize awarded to Japan simply for building up its GDP, the important thing is for what purpose does it need that GDP.

While I agree that capturing Palembang intact is not indispensable, leaving intact airbases with adequate supply from which the Allies can operate 4Es against your oil and refinery centers throughout much of the DEI is simply not viable. That being said, bottling up a large Allied Army in Palembang (similiar to Bataan), is an option for Japan, but it would tie down a significant force.

Nemo's strategy has combined the Brits and the Dutch in good terrain astride a key strategic objective for Japan. Bypassing this salient is not an option. It must be squeezed down to Palembang in my opinion. It might work to rapidly complete the take-over of all the remaining DEI and then hit Ceylon and much of India to isolate the salient, but I still think Nemo could use resupply from Cape Town or Perth and employ 4Es against oil/refineries, making the situation intollerable for Japan. I think the likelyhood that Japan could occupy all the airfields in 4E transfer range is slight, although I have not done the math.

Well if my opinion is deemed as "defeatest" its because this particular player in my humble opinion has been defeated and the fat lady is on her way to the stage. [:)] I do however have great respect for players such as Alfred and Nemo and look forward to reading thier opinions and theories concerning this great game. So why do I feel he is beaten?

He really has not shown the ability so far in this game to compete with Nemo and honestly it does not appear that will change. He will have to overcome some serious hurdles that would challenge even the most experienced player. Losing the Marshalls in early 1942 and having a very potent allied force in Sumatra/Java through 1942? Its a nightmare. Throw in the fact his surface units have taken a hard hit and the problems are compounded.

His aces up his sleeve are of course KB, LBA and a very effective ground force. Surely he could push where the allies arent but if he does so two very dangerous thorns in his side continue to grow. One of those thorns will allow the staging of 4E bombers into the heart of the SRA. Nemo is already planning an offensive in China as well.

I am really looking forward to seeing what these plans are for potentially getting him out of this mess. Maybe I will learn a few things along the way.

Changing the thread subject title so it is not so obvious to Nemo's opponent what is being discussed.  Of course, with Nemo, he was probably planning on using it as part of psychological ops.

I have to feel that you must be engaging in a little psyops with your readers in bringing up an Indian invasion, or indeed any strategy that didn't plan on at least neutralizing Sumatra by the end of '42. And I Have a hard time seeing that happening with the India option though I haven't tried to come up with detailed estimates of time and motion requirements. (This analysis is based upon equal players which isn't present in this game).

India

Sure, you might be able to roll up India, but what happens in the meantime. Although one might profit from an invasion of Ceylon, to cut off/conquer Empire supplies, there seems little point in invading the sub-continent unless one is going to conquer the whole subcontinent - otherwise you just strengthen your opponent. If you bring too little force to deal with a reinforced India, you find yourself fighting the Battle of Sian in India. If you're not neutralizing southern Sumatra as a potential offensive base before hand, it seems to me that you would have to be prepared to conquer Northwest Australia and be prepared to hold it for the duration of the conquest of India and time to return the Indian Army into the Pacific. Given your positioning in the theater, the IJ player would have to defend against at least 3 very threatening lines of attack simulataneously - conquest of the Marianas outside of Saipan and air-connective islands to the Marshalls, conquest of Hokaido and S. Sakhalin as mutually supportive bases, and of course, NW Australia. Given the previous fighting, the IJ player almost has to defend with air/CV forces without either substantial surface force attrition or CV trapping with surface forces, which herwin did repeatedly in his game and can easily happen if tied to predictable presence near islands, ports and places where your opponent can obtain air parity. Further, if you break up your CV force the USN can get decisive local superiority and seize mutually supportive bases while winning any CV conflict. If the IJN concentrates, how do they defend against a sudden swoop like Q-ball did in the DEI or you did in the Marshalls.

Australia

Similar considerations would, I think, apply to an attempted conquest of Australia. If you get into the part of Australia which triggers reinforcements, you need to conquer the whole thing, or you would regret the battle of attrition. And it would seem like you would need to tie down KB in support to avoid reinforcements that would bog you down into a losing land battle of attrition.

Normal play
It seems to me a more pedestrian line of play would do better for Japan - seize the rest of the DEI and the other areas you need, then come back and isolate Palemb so that there are no mutually supporting bases, then at least neutralize the airfield. Prepare land defenses and be ready to counterattack. Hopefully the USN tries to do something with their cut-off forces in Sumatra in a way that is logistically hard to support and you can counterattack. But if the USN fails to overcommit early in a way that allows a riposte, I think the IJ player has long term problems, and has bad troubles in 1944.

Wirraway Ace,

Now do I look like the sneaky sort of player who would do such a thing? You're the second person to point the OPSEC issues of the post title out but the first who actually took the initiative to change it... without even asking *chuckle*. I may not engage in PSYOPS in email anymore but if he wants to read a forum thread title and draw the wrong conclusions from it then I'm not averse to helping misdirect him a little .... but now I'm foiled, foiled by my own readers [:D]


As to his current situation....
India: No, not at all. At this point in time I think an invasion of India with the aim of capturing all of it ( I don't think there's all that much point going for India unless you are going to make a good effort at taking all of it ) makes use of his main strengths ( a strong IJA), minimises the impact of his current weaknesses ( his loss of 40% of his battleline ), solves the Burmese problem in its entirety rather rapidly and creates a medium-term solution for the destruction of China. I think it can do this without risking additional loss in China and can use manoeuvrist approaches along a subsidiary axis to neutralise southern Sumatra all while using this offensive to create the defensive perimeter Japan needs for defence in 1943. I think it would also allow the phasing of operations by the IJN and previously allocated assets to the Pacific theatre so as to achieve the front line trace he should have been going for all along.

All in all I think that India isn't actually an over-reach. Again it is the sort of thing I do which goes against the conventional wisdom and looks ueber-risky but when you bore down into the details it actually minimises risks and maximises the effect of my most over-matching assets. It just mightn't be obvious initially.



So, here's the assumptions and the plan I'd undertake... I'm assuming he is ready to invade now and could be at Sumatra by the end of March 42 with 5,000 AV ( the SRA plus a few odds and ends ).

1. Massive cull of the Chinese front, accepting an inability to advance further in order to remove forces committed to the front line which are in excess of purely defensive requirements. At Changsha alone that would allow him to free 3,500 AV. In the very south of the country A minimum of another 500 AV could be freed. Keep the artillery in China and bombard every turn in order to: a) use up Chinese supplies and b ) kill 200 Chinese Infantry Squads per month - the extent of their replacements.

2. Committment of the IJAAF to a massive two week bombing campaign of the CHinese front, starting with rear echelon bases and working back towards the front ( maximising the effect of surprise to allow the raids which are most likely to be intercepted to be those which will have the least fatigued escorts ). Targets will be RESOURCES and the aim is to prevent supply production for the Chinese Army.

3. It should take roughly 3 months for the IJA forces from China to march to and through Burma and into position ready to cross the jungle into India. So, that's 4,000 AV from China + 1,000 AV already facing Burma = 5,000 AV available to cross into India in 3 months from today ( so they are ready June 15th ).


So, what can we make happen in those 3 months to support this?

4. Immediate invasion of Java in 2/52 time. With 4,000+ AV in the SRA the IJA can invade Java and the southern DEI all at the same time and commit 1000 AV to each invasion whilst maintaining a floating reserve of 1,000 AV. So, they invade at the end of March 1942. By mid-April Java, Kendari, AMbon and Makassar should all have fallen. Recon would, at this point, show me the buildup around Cocos and once Soerabaja etc fell I'd clear that nest out with carrier raids. Since none of the 2nd wave invasions would be on heavily defended targets I wouldn't present the stationary, unloading TFs that the RN battlegroups are designed to prey off and am quite confident that the RN would either have to retreat to Capetown, Oz or Ceylon and wouldn't materially intervene in the 2nd wave of invasions in support of DEI operations.

5. 2nd wave invasions then occur and are focussed not on Sumatra but on Padang, Port Hedland, Horn Island, the Cocos Islands and Eggano. The capture of these bases provides the cheapest way possible to isolate both Darwin and Southern Sumatra from Allied supply and reinforcement convoys. It will also mean that IF the Allies do want to reinforce/resupply the southern DEI, Darwin or Sumatra they'll need their CVs along. This will draw USN CVs out of position for the IJN's 2nd phase of action ( 1st phase is the taking of the southern DEI, 3rd phase is the invasion of south-eastern India ). By the end of the 2nd wave of reinforcements Southern Sumatra is isolated as is Darwin and there is NO way for the overwhelming numbers of the Allied armies to retake those bases overland as either they are utterly unreachable or the supply lines simply won't hold up. Retaking those bases will require a committment of naval forces - and that means a delay in recapture until the end of 1942 at the earliest ( which is fine by me ).

6. So, by mid-April Java and the Southern DEI or fully taken and lots of IJAAF and IJNAF flights are occurring over Southern Sumatra. Since I wouldn't be planning on needing the Palembang OIL I'd commence an REFINERY and RESOURCE bombing campaign at this point using my recently captured bases. The end result would be to rob Southern Sumatra of the 1,000 tons of supplies it makes per day. OIL could continue being made and stored ready for me to ship it to Japan once Palembang falls ( near the end of 1942 ). This plan would, effectively, not cost me a single ton of Palembang's OIL produced since 7th December 1941 and would play into my late-war strategy by giving an unexpanded Japanese industrial base a huge increase in reserves. Plus, for the rest of the war Palembang's OIL would be surplus to requirements and thus go directly into that reserve and be stockpiled in order to make the Allied end-game as difficult as possible. Long-term planning is key and often, as shown above, allows one to turn what seems disastrous into an opportunity - once a little discipline is exercised and you accept short and medium-term weaknesses in order to achieve long-term benefits.

7. In the beginning of May the objectives in Java will have been taken and the neutralisation of China and Southern Sumatra will be well under way. The phasing and choice of objectives will minimise the necessary garrisons, freeing the maximum number of SRA troops for further action. Assume 5,000 AV were committed and 1,000 AV are for garrison duty that leaves 4,000 AV for further action. I would then take those 4,000 AV and land then south of Calcutta with a view to taking the Indian bases just north of Burma and, ideally, |Calcutta and its environs. The Allied inability to reinforce Sumatra now also is recognised as an inability to pull troops out of there and into India... but it is too late for the Allied commander at this stage. At the same time the IJA troops from China are actively pushing north through Burma. When they reach the jungle to cross into India they find the bases to their north held by other IJA formations and thus the lack of supply which normally crucifies the movement north from Burma into India doesn't occur and the IJA forces from China etc make good progress into India.

8. At this point in time I'd fight a relatively conventional ground war through India with some 9,000 AV - which I believe should be sufficient to take it given the 5,000 AV trapped in Sumatra.


9. Once the IJA was landed in Southern India the need for major battlegroups in the region would be removed and I'd remove the IJN from action, transition it into the Marshalls whilst completing the forming up of the 500+ AV Mike has shown he can commit to the Aleutians ( they are currently there in this game - I think it is a waste but I have to make a plan based on his position, not on what I would actually have done up until now ). I would make a show of force in the Marshalls, fixing attention there , running recon etc etc etc. The aims would be to focus attention on the Marshalls and encourage the basing of Allied SC TFs into Rabaul, Suva and PH - 2nd echelon bases from which they can run into the Marshalls, fight their actions and then retire back to safety.

Meanwhile the IJN would shut down all search missions, radars etc and transition into the north pacific, meeting up with the 500 AV from the Aleutians + LOTS of support troops ( AAA, CD guns, Base Forces, HQs etc as well as hundreds of crated IJAAF and IJNAF fighters and bombers ).


10. Pearl Harbour gets hit again with the full might of KB. A single strike aims to catch shipping being repaired and planes on the ground. Once that's done the invasion TF hoves into view and begins unloading on the islands around PH itself, uncrating fighters and bombers and setting up a Netty Nest which will remove Hawaii's utility to the Allies. The Pearl Harbour operation could happen by the end of June. It would only take that long to occur because the IJN is more needed to support the Indian invasion.

11. Very boring, conventional but necessary recaptures of Wake, Marcus, Midway and the Marshalls carried out over the rest of the year.


At no point does this require a meeting engagement with the RN or USN battlefleets. In face it seeks to draw them into range away from their own bases and under cover of KB - which should crush any Allied fleet under such circumstances in 1942.


This might all seem like a lot - E.g invading Java and the whole southern DEI at the same time and then expanding out to Horn Island, Port Hedland, Eggano and Cocos Islands but ask yourself how many troops you normally put on those 4 bases normally? Not a hell of a lot, right? Well, just because it is deep in enemy territory doesn't make it difficult to take. What makes it difficult to take are enemy defences. If they aren't there then it is easy meat.


Basically India requires one "short haul" invasion and then the rest of any Indian operation just relies on IJA troops marching overland - something they can do quite easily no matter the state of the IJN. PH - Well I'm banking on the initial strike to achieve surprise and hit the BBs and CAs in port. I think that's a reasonably good bet to take given the situation Mike is currently in. I am confident that an initial surprise strike combined with some deceptive footwork by the invasion TFs would let me hit SC TFs with KB whilst dodging them with my own transport TFs. I've done such footwork before and it has always worked pretty well so I think it should work again now.

KB is required to mount 3 significant combat operations ( Java + neutralising Cocos, India and PH ) but I think it has the strength to do that. It will be pretty spent then but by the time those ops are done it would be transititioning to a slower pace anyways so that's acceptable.


Down the line the idea would, obviously, be to land at Benkoenen sometime near the end of 1942 once the Allies are out of supplies and starving and march through Sumatra destroying those Allied forces. If destroyed they would only came back into action in mid-44 which suits me fine too.


That's only a sketch and there's lot of grey areas which I've considered but can't put down since I don't have 10 hours to outline an ops plan. If I was in Mike's situation that is roughly what I'd do over the next 6 months ( 9 months including the Marshalls reduction ) in order to create a situation I'd want for 1943.

As to the whole thing about equal players etc... While I'd hesitate to say I'm a good player ( I would agree I'm good strategically but I utterly suck at naval combat and carrier battles. I would also say I think for myself and don't just go with the conventional wisdom as so many do ) I would suggest that Mike is around the average for the forum from what I've seen. I think putting him down as a bad player ( as some here are doing ) is a disservice.

I think I've gotten him on the ropes here but amn't sure if he realises that yet. With that said I think that what we are talking about isn't "good" or "bad" play per se but, rather, conventional vs innovative play. I think that if Mike played others on the forum he'd create just the sort of AARs we see with Canoerebel, Cuttlefish etc in which two very conventional players play eachother and find themselves well-matched because both sides think very much alike. I mean how many AARs would you find in which a player who can't capture a major strategic target ( in this case Palembang ) truly believes their analysis leads them to decide that an even larger deeper strike at an even larger strategic target ( in this case India ) is the best answer? VERY few. Mostly what we see is either a doomed to failure attempt to take the first target or an acceptance of defeat along that axis and the assumption of the defensive role ( which isn't necessary ).

So, I don't think he's a bad player at all. I do think, however, that his conventional approach is finding it difficult to deal with what I think of as the "think for myself"/innovative approach. I think most of my opponents would probably find that I run operations they could conceive but would have turned down as crazy out of hand. When that happens you don't fully prepare to counter such an op and can quickly find yourself stubmbling from one "I didn't see that coming" moment to another. This can lead others to view one as a bad player but I think that it is much more an issue of conventionality vs rational analysis/thinking for oneself.

I think that if you look at one of my longest-running games you could see Damian initially thought many of my ops were utter craziness but, after a while, starting analysing options deeply and properly, not accepting conventional wisdom as the arbiter of whether something was possible or not and became very good at figuring out what I might do and preparing against it. The end result was that I could still move forward in spite of various inferiorities but the days of rapid strikes into the enemy rear and leap-frogging operations was over. In common parlance did he become a better player? Well, in common parlance that's what people would say. What I would say though is that he just learnt to really analyse things without preconceptions and simply began having a wider range of operations to choose from and, as such, can now end up choosing ops which will surprise and catch his opponents unprepared.


So, I think labelling Mike as a poor player or whatever isn't really fair and I'd ask it to cease please. It isn't my intention for an AAR to become something nasty for any player to read after the game is concluded. He is ( and I strongly believe this ) very much representative of the calibre of the forum in terms of play and is pretty conventional in his planning. I think it is just his misfortune to run into someone who is significantly less conventional and it is taking him time to adjust. The Javan operation will show how well he is adjusting... I am assuming he will adjust somewhat and so am changing my means of interacting with his forces a little so as to minimise the impact of some of those adjustements he might be making.

ORIGINAL: Ketza

Well if my opinion is deemed as "defeatest" its because this particular player in my humble opinion has been defeated and the fat lady is on her way to the stage. [:)] I do however have great respect for players such as Alfred and Nemo and look forward to reading thier opinions and theories concerning this great game. So why do I feel he is beaten?

He really has not shown the ability so far in this game to compete with Nemo and honestly it does not appear that will change. He will have to overcome some serious hurdles that would challenge even the most experienced player. Losing the Marshalls in early 1942 and having a very potent allied force in Sumatra/Java through 1942? Its a nightmare. Throw in the fact his surface units have taken a hard hit and the problems are compounded.

His aces up his sleeve are of course KB, LBA and a very effective ground force. Surely he could push where the allies arent but if he does so two very dangerous thorns in his side continue to grow. One of those thorns will allow the staging of 4E bombers into the heart of the SRA. Nemo is already planning an offensive in China as well.

I am really looking forward to seeing what these plans are for potentially getting him out of this mess. Maybe I will learn a few things along the way.

True, one does have to distinguish between the player and Japan. I do agree that if Japan adopts a conventional approach to the problem set by Nemo, I would expect his opponent to suffer a staggering defeat. What I maintain is that a player of Nemo's skill and imagination, given the Japanese position would have quite good prospects.

A few observations concerning some points made by various posters.

(1) I certainly have not said that it would be OK for Palembang to remain Allied until the end. The game however is only around March 1942. Provided Japan maintains progress elsewhere, Palembang remaining in Allied hands can be tolerated because there is more than one possible strategy for victory. In my estimate Japan has at least 6-9 months, probably more depending on how well she quarantines the bacillus Palembang.

(2) I have on purpose referred to southern Sumatra whereas most posters appear to view the whole of Sumatra. There as some very significant differences between the south and the north, primarily in terms of terrain, facilities and geography. These differences can be used to both assist in quarantining southern Sumatra and moving onto other vulnerable "boxes".

(3) Nemo has considerably strengthened southern Sumatra. However, based on the information he has provided, which everyone appears to have accepted at face value, I think he has started to overstretch the capacity of southern Sumatra to sustain Allied operations. Apparently there are some 5000 AV + 800 aircraft + the entire British and Dutch navies. To this total I suspect one has to add a substantial number of independent LCUs which do not have an AV (eg flak units, engineers etc) and therefore are not captured by the disclosed 5000 AV. So why do I think the limit of sustainability may have been reached?

(a) Palembang can only generate 900 supplies daily. To keep its refineries fully occupied and thus maintaining a daily production of 1080 supplies, it needs to draw in oil from Djambi. That is a potential weak point.

(b) 5000 AV alone represents about 13-15 division equivalents. As a common rule of thumb, each Allied division consumes about 50 supply tons daily. Thus even at rest, this Allied land force is consuming 650-750 supply tons daily. This is without taking into account the consumption of all those non AV units.

(c) Assume that all the 800 aircraft present in southern Sumatra are fighters. If on average only 50% are put on CAP, then that is another 133 supply tons consumed daily (400 * 1/3). But of course they are not all fighters. On offensive missions, non level bombers consume 1 supply ton per plane, level bombers consume at the rate of (Max Load/1000). Hence an 8 plane squadron of B-17Es consumes a minimum of 48 tons, 8xLB-30 Liberators will consume 64 tons.

(d) There are no suitable ports on southern Sumatra to rearm the capital ships. Nothing above 15000 tons can sail up river to Palembang for refueling. Even if tenders and naval support squads have been sent to southern Sumatra to increase the capacity of the local ports to service the fleet, there will not be sufficient supply available after the needs of the army and airforce have been met. The on paper very impressive fleet which has been assembled is essentially a one shot fleet (a bit like the Soviet Cold War navy, but I digress). There are ways a Japanese player can take advantage of this.

(e) I keep on hearing about Allied 4E (implied operating out of southern Sumatra) but have people really considered the logistics. Besides the consumption of supplies which are touched upon in (c) above there is the question of having suitable airbases. It is not possible to deal with 4E entirely separate from the rest of the Allied airforce.
(e)(i) So we go back to there being 800 aircraft present. If they were all single engine fighters, then an aggregate of 16 airfield levels is required to avoid overstacking penalties. The more 2E and 4E planes there are, the greater pressure on airfield levels there is. Sure the presence of Air HQs alleviates the pressure to a certain degree, but that assistance is limited. Furthermore, if we consider only the southern Sumatran airfields (Djambi, Palembang, Prahoemoeli, Osthaven and Benkoelen) they have only an aggregate of 10 levels. Nemo has not mentioned it but in view of his comments regarding the building of fortifications, the logical course of action is that he has been building forts, not airbases (or ports for that matter - see point (d) above)
(e)(ii) A great number of the air units stationed in southern Sumatra must be the Dutch airforce and the British 223 and 224 Groups initially located in Malaya. These are small units most comprised of only 9-12 aircraft. So many units add to the difficulties of avoiding administrative overstacking. Currently many are probably on training, thereby reducing the administrative pressure, but once the "balloon goes up" and they become active it will be very difficult to avoid administrative overstacking even with Air HQs being present
(e)(iii) Then there is the question of having large enough bases for the 4E to operate from without penalties. The largest airbase on southern Sumatra is Palembang's level 4. That is too small for efficient B-17 operation, the result being smaller raids. Added to this is the limited Allied 4E replacement rate in 1942 and one can see only pin prick 4E strikes from southern Sumatra.

(4) Some have suggested that Japan will need to deploy most of its assests to keep Palembang subdues. Well the fact is that currently there are no Japanese assets used to suppress southern Sumatra and the Allied force there is not active. That state of affairs can be largely maintained if Japan controls the SLOCs, and the necessary Japanese forces to achieve that are much less once the overall quarantining plan is completed.

(5) I reiterate Japan has oodles of unused assets tucked away in Manchukuo.

I reiterate, a conventional Japanese approach should result in a staggering defeat. There are however several enticing possibilities open to Japan. Whether or not his opponent will be creative is something yet to be ascertained.

Alfred

Interesting post Alfred... I will post some more detail about Southern Sumatra later to clarify some of it - almost 3am here so time for bed -... Suffice it to address the following points:

1. The RN TFs ( well, anything bigger than a CL ) are very much a one shot deal... They are to go in, disrupt the invasion fleet and force it out of the invasion hex and then act as a magnet for IJNAF raids such that my fighters can slaughter KB's strike groups. On Day 2 the RN TFs will pretty much begin to egress the area, except for lighter units which will stay to fight... and die. I do have ARs, ADs, AGs and AEs in the area to provide enough support for light and medium units ( CLs ) to operate continuously in the Southern Sumatran region. CAs and BBs will have to move a long way for replenishment though but that's OK, I never envisioned the RN battleline living to survive the battle for Oosthaven.


2. Airfields: I have 2 Level 5 airfields ( Palembang and Oosthaven ) and a Level 7 airfield ( Lahat ), in addition to a Level 2 just east of Lahat called Praboeloelih and a Level 1 at Benkoenen ( for local CAP of unloading ships ). Basically I budgeted for 1,000 planes. I traded Level 6 forts at Palembang and Oosthaven for these airfields and think the investment will prove worthwhile. Basically the plan is that when the invasion comes I will base 200 fighters at either Palembang or Oosthaven ( assuming he invades one of them ) and then base the bombers ( with suitable defensive CAP ) at Lahat. PBYs will base at Benkoenen ( and have enough HQ support to fly with torpedoes from there ) while the Level 2 airbase at Praboeloelih will be used to base my British torpedo bombers ( Swordfish etc ). I will rotate fighters into and out of Lahat as losses require replacement and rebuilding of the squadrons contributing to the 200 fighter CAP over Oosthaven or Palembang. I don't expect the 1,000 planes to survive for more than 4 days but that's all I will need. At the end of 4 days the invasion TFs will be either sent into disarray or will have landed pretty much all of their troops.

Overstacking - This WILL occur but I'm making it work for me by ensuring my bomber streams don't fully commit on any given day. If only half the bombers fly due to admin issues only 50% of them can be shot down if something goes wrong... It all adds up to artificially increase the longevity of my force by limiting total committment on any given day. I don't personally think that the in-game model of this is that accurate but if that's its in-game impact then I'm not going to quibble, I'm just going to try to figure out if there's any possible up-side for me.

B17s.. I built Lahat to Level 7 purely as a B-17 base ( well, that and just to act as my reserve and reconstitution nexus ). Some of that role is going to be taken by the Cocos Islands now as I've made some preps to prepare it for that role.


3. I don't consider Southern Sumatra to be more than a minor nuisance to the Japanese in terms of B-17 bases. On ther other hand if he leaves Southern Sumatra in my hands then I'll crucify him with Beaufighters at 100 feet and rapid counter-invasions/ surface raiding TFs all the way to Formosa and Badeldoab. That's the real threat. Even if I could fully supply those 4-engined bombers ( not entirely certain ) they just don't do enough damage to be decisive.


4. Manchukuo forces... He has committed a lot of them to China actually... but with that said they could be at the ocean ports within 2 weeks and at PH or Java 2 weeks after that if he wanted. His entire strategic posture can be entirely redirected within the month if he wishes.



Yes, as you say, we'll see if he, to paraphrase Wellington, comes in the same old way or tries something indirect. I'm betting ( and somewhat subtly influencing him ) that he'll go for Java and Sumatra in that order and come in pretty conventionally. My plan is designed to defeat that sort of intervention. If he comes in with a few extraordinary ( in the Soviet doctrinal sense of the word ) wrinkles / force allocations then things will get much more fluid and my losses will rise and my impact on his operations decrease. Either way though I'm confident of utterly gutting the IJN if I choose to bring it into combat and gutting the IJN battleline of most of its BBs and CAs pretty much guarantees the cessation of any future invasions - well, it does when one faces a conventional player. Personally I think one could still invade India with a covering force of nothing but DDs, CLs and CVs but BBs and CAs do give a greater sense of comfort to such planning.



P.s. Supplies: I've been robbing Sumatra of supplies to supply Darwin and the southern DEI bases ( which now have about 150,000 tons supply between the 3 of them ) but am about to bring about 100,000 tons of supplies into Southern Sumatra as I finish my transition from a delaying/facility destruction force designed to force the committment of the IJN battleline to unfavourable combat to a stance in which I intend to hold all of Southern Sumatra and attempt the de facto destruction of the SRA as an offensive force.

I've also begun salting a few ships away for counter-invasions if he gets stuck in Southern Sumatra.

Nice work Nemo. This AAR is very innovative and entertaining. I guess every IJ player read this will really consider a quick capture of Palembang to avoid this dilemma.[8|]
 
I read your "Striking from Heaven" in old WitP days, very impressive play[&o]. Maybe you should start a IJ campaign in AE again, the Allied is just too easy for you to fully utilize your strategical capacity. Come on bring us more.[:D]

Nemo,

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
So, I don't think he's a bad player at all. I do think, however, that his conventional approach is finding it difficult to deal with what I think of as the "think for myself"/innovative approach. I think most of my opponents would probably find that I run operations they could conceive but would have turned down as crazy out of hand. When that happens you don't fully prepare to counter such an op and can quickly find yourself stubmbling from one "I didn't see that coming" moment to another. This can lead others to view one as a bad player but I think that it is much more an issue of conventionality vs rational analysis/thinking for oneself.

You really overestimate the value of innovation. There's two aspects I would like to mention briefly:

a) you mess up your opponent's OODA loop. The above quote illustrates it nicely: by "crazy" ops you expand the possibilities you opponent tends to consider, and if you get him to comment to himself "I did not see that coming" that just reinforces the effect.
So you just outperform him. As a matter of fact, your forum personality will already start that process - whoever plays you will be convinced that he has to factor in innovation, so he will start to try to preempt, which gives you a first advantage.

Conventional, but cold analytical gameplay will take away that advantage. On the contrary, it can even be advantageous because it speeds up your OODA cycle.

b) I do not think one should focus on how to counter an operation and the need to be fully prepared for it (as a matter of fact, for any future opponent of yours to derive from the above statement that one should prepare for everything when playing against you may be the start of his downfall). This would cause the operational level to dictate the gameplay, which it should not. Rather, invest your thoughts to develop a relevant strategy to realize your defined national goal, and define what is necessary to realize that strategy. If you do that correctly, what needs to be prepared will become evident.

If an innovative operation is not strategically relevant, it should be encouraged, not encountered.

If it is strategically relevant and you are not prepared for a response, this may indicate that your strategic planning was deficient and should be improved.

What I am willing to admit though is that a lot of the "conventional" approaches we see in our games are not based on a sound strategic analysis. However, the reason why they fail is not that they are "conventional" in contrast to "innovative", but that the required level of strategic analysis is difficult to achieve. E.g. I would be interested in the "innovative" aspects of jrcar's and tony's game as described in their AAR, which I would consider to be rather analytical, methodical and -not at all meant in a depreciative way- conventional.

As always just my 2 cts

Hartwig

I dont think Resources is the crux of the problem oil is. Without oil you wont be able to run heavy industry without which you wont be able to build enough planes to even provide a pittiful resitance in the air.

IN terms of Vps and options a major assault on Australia will secure Resources and VPs.

And since Palembang cant be shut down since its a flak trap the 4E will wreak havock in early 43.  

Prob best option is to take Australia , and use KB to recapture the Marshals .  Your opponent is still gone though since  you can shut down  Truk and singapore can be taken early if he does not keep a big garrison there.. Not mention some nasty bulges in his shipping space..

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

As to the whole thing about equal players etc... While I'd hesitate to say I'm a good player ( I would agree I'm good strategically but I utterly suck at naval combat and carrier battles. I would also say I think for myself and don't just go with the conventional wisdom as so many do ) I would suggest that Mike is around the average for the forum from what I've seen. I think putting him down as a bad player ( as some here are doing ) is a disservice.

I think I've gotten him on the ropes here but amn't sure if he realises that yet. With that said I think that what we are talking about isn't "good" or "bad" play per se but, rather, conventional vs innovative play. I think that if Mike played others on the forum he'd create just the sort of AARs we see with Canoerebel, Cuttlefish etc in which two very conventional players play eachother and find themselves well-matched because both sides think very much alike. I mean how many AARs would you find in which a player who can't capture a major strategic target ( in this case Palembang ) truly believes their analysis leads them to decide that an even larger deeper strike at an even larger strategic target ( in this case India ) is the best answer? VERY few. Mostly what we see is either a doomed to failure attempt to take the first target or an acceptance of defeat along that axis and the assumption of the defensive role ( which isn't necessary ).

So, I don't think he's a bad player at all. I do think, however, that his conventional approach is finding it difficult to deal with what I think of as the "think for myself"/innovative approach. I think most of my opponents would probably find that I run operations they could conceive but would have turned down as crazy out of hand. When that happens you don't fully prepare to counter such an op and can quickly find yourself stubmbling from one "I didn't see that coming" moment to another. This can lead others to view one as a bad player but I think that it is much more an issue of conventionality vs rational analysis/thinking for oneself.

I think that if you look at one of my longest-running games you could see Damian initially thought many of my ops were utter craziness but, after a while, starting analysing options deeply and properly, not accepting conventional wisdom as the arbiter of whether something was possible or not and became very good at figuring out what I might do and preparing against it. The end result was that I could still move forward in spite of various inferiorities but the days of rapid strikes into the enemy rear and leap-frogging operations was over. In common parlance did he become a better player? Well, in common parlance that's what people would say. What I would say though is that he just learnt to really analyse things without preconceptions and simply began having a wider range of operations to choose from and, as such, can now end up choosing ops which will surprise and catch his opponents unprepared.


So, I think labelling Mike as a poor player or whatever isn't really fair and I'd ask it to cease please. It isn't my intention for an AAR to become something nasty for any player to read after the game is concluded. He is ( and I strongly believe this ) very much representative of the calibre of the forum in terms of play and is pretty conventional in his planning. I think it is just his misfortune to run into someone who is significantly less conventional and it is taking him time to adjust. The Javan operation will show how well he is adjusting... I am assuming he will adjust somewhat and so am changing my means of interacting with his forces a little so as to minimise the impact of some of those adjustements he might be making.

To distinguish between conventional and unconventional style of play is purely superficial in my opinion.

There are two main interactions between two players on a strategic level: Initiative and adaption.
How the result looks like and how you adapt to an opponent who has grabbed the initiative (by adapt I generally mean to find ways to take the initiative away again,
and initiative naturally does not always mean staging an offensive), or how you use the initiative to profit from it is mostly a two way decision:
Apply the pressure in another area than the currently focused on (gamewise) or change the balance of power in the area in focus (either by numbers, by changing
tactics, by producing new threats in this area, or by pulling out of the area in focus).

Neither of those strategies is more conventional than the other. Theres only good or bad strategies depending on the situation, and a good or bad execution of this strategy.

Grabbing or holding targets that serve a purpose (either because of the target itself or the benefits of owning the target to your further progress) is never unconventional.
Defining unconventional as performing an action out of the usual timeline would be defining every strategy which includes the element of surprize for execution as unconventional
and this streches the term a bit far.
Defining unconventional as an method of deception, which again serves the element of surprize is in the same league.
And defining unconventional operations as executing a strategy that serves no other purpose than being unconventional is simply a bad strategy.

This is why I have a hard time understanding discussions that include conventional and it counterpart.

And for the same reason I would definitely not rate you an unconventional player.
You are creative, know of the advantages of obtaining and keeping the initiative, and adapt fast to elements of surprize or flaws in your strategy.
Backed up by a notable ammount of confidence and experience this makes you a very dangerous opponent. Even more dangerous to a player who does not
adapt to this style of play to again get into a position from where he could obtain the initiative.
Because of the same reason I think that Mike is a player with real potential. He came up with a decision how to best adapt to your strategy and it is a very interesting one.