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Further Regarding the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne


The following is from the Offical Site of the 35th Infantry Division, Third Army:

"To secure the corridor, the 35th Division was ordered out of Metz on the same day and at 8 a.m. on December 27th, we attacked through knee deep snow to the East of the Arlon Road, with the 137th Regiment on the left, the 320th Regiment to the right, followed the next day by the 134th Regiment which went into line to the left and West of the 137th Regiment. To our right was the 26th Division.

Our line of departure was about nine miles from Bastogne and for the next two weeks we learned the meaning of freezing in hell for we ran into some of the bitterest and most difficult fighting of the war, the most wintry with temperatures dipping below zero, and the costliest in terms of casualties.

We attacked and so did the Germans, from assault to stalemate, from defense to counter-attack. Casualties were heavy on both sides, and men would be hit and fall and freeze to death before they could be gotten out. Corps men would have to keep blood plasma under their arms to keep it from freezing. Trench feet, frozen feet put men incapable of moving.

We did not know that Hitler had ordered some of his best remaining troops to cut off the Third Army’s relief of Bastogne at all costs. Now across our front from our right came the elite 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division, sent down from the German Sixth Army to break us – the 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 5th Parachute Division from the Seventh German Army.

Fighting see-sawed in and around towns like Lutrebois where we lost two companies of the 134th Regiment, Marvie, where we at last broke through to the 101st Airborne, Surre, Villers La Bonne where the 137th lost companies K and L, cut off and hit by the Germans with flame throwers, the survivors captured and marched into Germany to a prison camp, Boulaide, whose grateful citizens would welcome returning veterans in later years as tour groups, Tarchamps, and Harlange where a single farm, fortified, stopped the 320th Regiment.

Frostbite, illness and exhaustion, the freezing waters of the Sure River, waste deep, waded across by the 320th soldiers. Deep snow which slowed attack and bogged down G.I.s who were unable to move fast enough to evade the lethal fire of enemy machine guns, mortars and artillery shells, tree bursts and craters. The fields and woods became graveyards littered with dozens of destroyed tanks and assault guns, half tracks, trucks, equipment, and corpses. We saw the Adolph Hitler Division die before us. . .

Our casualties had rapidly mounted. For example, the bitter combat in and around the little village of Lutrebois, just four miles from Bastogne, cost the Third Battalion of the 134th Infantry Regiment 400 casualties alone, with 32 of these K.I.A.s. Grave registration teams reported a ratio of eight German dead for each American killed. Most rifle companies were reduced to one third normal strength. Our 100,000 artillery shells were fired into the woods just East of Lutrebois, only one small area of many similar sectors. . .

In our somewhat more than three weeks of fighting at Bastogne, the 35th Division counted 1,034 German prisoners and many more Germans killed and wounded. No G.I. could ever doubt the commitment, the courage, and the determination of the German soldier whom we met in the Ardennes."


http://www.35thinfdivassoc.com/Ardennes ... ry-1.shtml

More Information Regarding the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne and the Fierce Fighting that Occurred at the Bulge

From:


Presenting the 35th Infantry Division in World War II
1941 - 1945

The Beginning of the End

Ardennes Campaign, 16 Dec 44 - 25 Jan 45

Chapter 10

Bastogne

At 0800 on 27 December, the [35th] Division attacked in snow six inches deep. The 137th moved by truck along a road in the 4th Armored sector to a point southwest of Tintange in order to cross the river in friendly territory. Considerable gains were made until the town of Surre was reached. There the 137th met bitter resistance and only after a hard struggle was it able to capture the town.

The 320th ran into considerable difficulty in crossing the Sure River, but by wading in icy water waist deep, the 3rd Battalion got a company across in the afternoon. By dark the 2nd Battalion had captured the towns of Boulaide and Baaschleiden.

Next day little gain was made in any sector. The 3rd Battalion of the 137th drove to a hill southwest of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau where severe small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was encountered. The 320th took an important road junction. The 3rd Battalion of the 134th was brought up from reserve and relieved the 1st Battalion of the 318th Infantry Regiment, 80th Division.

On 29 December, the division continued to attack. The 137th made no gain. The 320th was locked in bitter battle for a farm southeast of the town of Harlange.

Then the division reserve, the 134th, was committed into cold, bleak, battle. Colonel Miltonberger attacked in column of battalions in order to give depth to his effort. The regiment fought with its usual tenacious Santa Fe spirit and soon the 1st Battalion moved into Marvie, three kilometers southeast of Bastogne, making contact with the 101st Airborne Division. This effort, coupled with that of the gallant 4th Armored, made certain that Bastogne was relieved of all encirclement.

The Germans launched a powerful counter-attack against the 134th and 137th on 30 December. Much credit for destroying the German armor around Lutrebois was due to the Santa Fe's 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion of the 4th Armored Division. In all they destroyed 11 tanks during this attack. The attacking forces were the 1st SS Panzer "Adolph Hitler" Division and the 167th Volksgrenadier Division. It was a brutal counter-attack and elements of Companies K and L of the 137th were cut off in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau.

The German objective in their counter-attack was to cut, at all costs, the Arlon-Bastogne Highway. All day and night the battle raged, finally with the assistance of the air corps and close proximity fuzed artillery, it was broken, and the elite 1st SS Panzer Division lay lifeless, broken and destroyed upon the field of battle.

On the last day of December, attempts to relieve the situation of K and L Companies, 137th, were in vain. They were finally given up for lost when it was learned from German prisoners that they had either been killed or captured. The Nazis blasted holes in the walls of the houses from which the men fought and then turned flame throwers on the men inside. This was a blow that the Division vowed to avenge. The majority of the 235 men missing from the regiment that day were believed lost in this action. Their bravery and intense devotion to duty gave impetus to the Santa Fe spirit and determination to finish the war quickly as possible.

The division was attacked again and again. Neither side gave quarter. But the Santa Fe did not budge. In the opinion of many veteran 35th Division soldiers the Battle of the Ardennes was even more fierce than St. Lo. From 3 to 7 January, Division artillery under the command of Brigadier General T. L. Futch fired 41,385 rounds into enemy positions.

Even in zero weather and waist-deep snow the Nazis fought with the most tenacity. The 1st SS Division committed many atrocities. Some of their soldiers were captured in complete American uniform and using American weapons and vehicles. Bottles of acid were also found on them, with instructions that the wax tops be broken and the contents thrown into the face of their capt[ors].

The Germans were fighting in excellent defensive terrain and good road networks. The entire area was filled with towns and villages and every house was transformed into a miniature fortress. Every hill and every small woods had to be taken separately. The 137th fought for 13 days before it battered down the defenses of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. It took five days of constant assault by the 134th to capture Lutrebois. Harlange was held by the Nazis even though the 320th put extreme pressure on it.

Units identified on the 134th Infantry front alone were the 901st Regiment of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division; the 2nd Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, and the 401st Artillery Brigade. Further identification were made of the 331st Regiment, 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 167th Division Artillery Brigade. Roughly, four German Divisions had attacked the Santa Fe and had been beaten off.

From 27 December to 17 January, the 35th took 1,034 prisoners and killed and wounded as many more. The Santa Fe, fighting in freezing and bitter cold against a ruthless enemy, had performed admirably and the Battle of Bastogne was closed. Now the enemy's Ardennes penetration was reduced to a defensive bulge from which the Germans could only continue to retire under pressure.

http://www.coulthart.com/134/35chapter_10.htm

More Information Regarding 1SS Panzer at Bastogne



[January] 1945 began with the Leibstandarte operating in the area to the Southeast of Bastogne, in the Ardennes, in Belgium. At this time the Leibstandarte was organized into two Kampfgruppen; KG Poetschke and KG Hansen. From January 1st to January 9th these formations were engaged in combat in the Lutremange -Lutrebois - Villers La Bonne Eau area. The Leibstandarte saw action against elements of both the U.S. 35th Infantry Division and U.S. 4th Armoured Division. On January 10th the Leibstandarte was ordered to withdraw from all engagements and the Division was in a new assembly area to the Southwest of St. Vith by January 15th.

By the 12th of February the Leibstandarte was in a staging area around Nove-Zamky in Hungary. During the time from the 12th of February to the 16th of February the Division was organized into a Panzer Kampfgruppe under Peiper and a Panzergrenadier Kampfgruppe under Hansen. On February 17th the Leibstandarte began it’s involvement in Operation Southwind, along with the Hitlerjugend Division in I SS Panzer Korps, an operation to destroy a Soviet bridgehead on the Gran River. By the 24th the bridgehead had been eliminated and the Leibstandarte had been withdrawn from the front to prepare for another offensive.

This is a compilation of notes taken from information contained in the books Men Of Steel by Michael Reynolds and The Leibstandarte Volume IV/2 by Ralf Tiemann.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 71&start=0

Kevinugly:

So as you can see from the above posts, Sabre George and Lucky Forward did indeed tangle with the Adolf Hitler at Bastogne.

Soooo. . . .

Where are your sources disputing the contrary?

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly
… those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too…

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.

Interesting. I disagree in some areas.

The Germans did well when they had air superiority and numerical/qualitative superiority, and when they didn’t they faired poorly. So what? Should the accomplishment of the Germans in 1940 against France be dismissed because they attacked second rate troops with overwhelming force, while having air superiority?

In my opinion, German commanders as a group are overrated by most people, and Erich von Manstein is no acceptation. He understood the nature of armored warfare during this period, a rarity among German commanders, but was not a miracle worker. When in a tactically disadvantages situation he achieve no radical victories, and while his handling of Panzer forces was very good, his command of infantry forces was adequate. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t brilliant, just that his victories were achieved under similar circumstances you dismiss so easily in your post.



1. He did well with 56th Panzer Corps in 1941 with a superior force and air superiority, against a surprised and poorly lead Soviet troops.

2. His handling of 11th Army in the Crimea can best be described as adequate, but before Sevastopol fell his Army was spent.

3. His action while commanding forces attacking Leningrad can hardly be called brilliant.

4. His command of Army Group Don was not successful.

5. The counter attack in the winter of 1942/43 was excellent, but it was concentrated German armor against an exhausted, strung out and poorly supplied Soviet force.

6. His commander of Army Group South consisted of a failed offense and endless retreat.



"Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in the German Army. He had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanised forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank army. In sum, he had military genius."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart


PS. I am not comparing the abilities of any general, just pointing out that the “circumstances” that are dismissed when helping an Allied victory were also used by the Germans.



Stirring the pot. [;)]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico]
Stirring the pot. [;)]

Trolling again I see [:'(]

Von Rom wrote

So please, in the future, remove sensational items from things you post, before you copy and post them, OK? Otherwise I will post similar items in return. And these are NOT the subject under discussion.

Correct. Thay are not the subject of discussion. So why make them so! Stop changing the subject.[:-] I posted the article as a timeline. It tallies with Williamson, MacDonald, Parker and Pimlott. In any case I thought you wanted to discuss Metz! We've already discussed the SS and the 'Bulge' into the ground and frankly the level of repetition is becoming excrutiatingly boring. Get over it, let's move on[:)]

[January] 1945 began with the Leibstandarte operating in the area to the Southeast of Bastogne, in the Ardennes, in Belgium. At this time the Leibstandarte was organized into two Kampfgruppen; KG Poetschke and KG Hansen. From January 1st to January 9th these formations were engaged in combat in the Lutremange -Lutrebois - Villers La Bonne Eau area. The Leibstandarte saw action against elements of both the U.S. 35th Infantry Division and U.S. 4th Armoured Division. On January 10th the Leibstandarte was ordered to withdraw from all engagements and the Division was in a new assembly area to the Southwest of St. Vith by January 15th.

By the 12th of February the Leibstandarte was in a staging area around Nove-Zamky in Hungary. During the time from the 12th of February to the 16th of February the Division was organized into a Panzer Kampfgruppe under Peiper and a Panzergrenadier Kampfgruppe under Hansen. On February 17th the Leibstandarte began it’s involvement in Operation Southwind, along with the Hitlerjugend Division in I SS Panzer Korps, an operation to destroy a Soviet bridgehead on the Gran River. By the 24th the bridgehead had been eliminated and the Leibstandarte had been withdrawn from the front to prepare for another offensive.

This is a compilation of notes taken from information contained in the books Men Of Steel by Michael Reynolds and The Leibstandarte Volume IV/2 by Ralf Tiemann.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 71&start=0

This is from a forum discussion. You 'copy and paste' this and then dare to criticise my sources. You jest sir![:D] It would be like me citing one of Iron Duke's posts as evidence! How can we have a meaningful discussion about anything if this is how you are going to treat the subject? No wonder the 'Duke bailed in frustration.

We did not know that Hitler had ordered some of his best remaining troops to cut off the Third Army’s relief of Bastogne at all costs. Now across our front from our right came the elite 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division, sent down from the German Sixth Army to break us – the 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 5th Parachute Division from the Seventh German Army.

Since this and the next post obviously derive from the same source (the author of the second has just changed the SS name) I can deal with this easily. There is no 'Der Fuhrer' division, if the source cannot correctly identify the attacking unit then its accuracy can be called into question. This is just another 'personal memoir' and we've already agreed that these cannot be taken at face value. In deference to your feelings I don't post from Whiting (not that I need to here[;)]), so kindly refrain from using 'personal memoirs'.

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly
… those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too…

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.

Interesting. I disagree in some areas.

The Germans did well when they had air superiority and numerical/qualitative superiority, and when they didn’t they faired poorly. So what? Should the accomplishment of the Germans in 1940 against France be dismissed because they attacked second rate troops with overwhelming force, while having air superiority?

In my opinion, German commanders as a group are overrated by most people, and Erich von Manstein is no acceptation. He understood the nature of armored warfare during this period, a rarity among German commanders, but was not a miracle worker. When in a tactically disadvantages situation he achieve no radical victories, and while his handling of Panzer forces was very good, his command of infantry forces was adequate. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t brilliant, just that his victories were achieved under similar circumstances you dismiss so easily in your post.



1. He did well with 56th Panzer Corps in 1941 with a superior force and air superiority, against a surprised and poorly lead Soviet troops.

2. His handling of 11th Army in the Crimea can best be described as adequate, but before Sevastopol fell his Army was spent.

3. His action while commanding forces attacking Leningrad can hardly be called brilliant.

4. His command of Army Group Don was not successful.

5. The counter attack in the winter of 1942/43 was excellent, but it was concentrated German armor against an exhausted, strung out and poorly supplied Soviet force.

6. His commander of Army Group South consisted of a failed offense and endless retreat.



"Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in the German Army. He had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanised forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank army. In sum, he had military genius."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart


PS. I am not comparing the abilities of any general, just pointing out that the “circumstances” that are dismissed when helping an Allied victory were also used by the Germans.



Stirring the pot. [;)]

Can't I tell. [;)]


Might be worth taking this to another thread. It is an interesting subject and one I'm sure several members here would like to debate but I fear it's going to be 'swept up' in Von Roms endless quest to prove Pattons brilliance[:D]

How about we see the temperature on this thread drop a little hmmmm? Also, knock off all the personal shots.

Now back to your regularly scheduled thread.

You guys that are argueing over the 1st SS panzer and what they did and where they did it can go in circles all day.

We all know that often KG's were pieced together from a company from here and platoon from there etc etc.

So it can seem that a division is "all over the place" but it is actualy just a few units pieced together and under the command of a SS officer.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Hertston

362 posts now. Surely that alone is vindication of Patton's greatness - who else would get such a response ! [:'(]

I can think of several criminals who would[:D]

I can think of a certain German battleship! [:'(]

You want to know the REAL reason Patton was so great? OK I'll tell you:

GEORGE C. SCOTT!!!


There, the riddle is solved. You're welcome. [:D]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly
… those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too…

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.

Interesting. I disagree in some areas.

The Germans did well when they had air superiority and numerical/qualitative superiority, and when they didn’t they faired poorly. So what? Should the accomplishment of the Germans in 1940 against France be dismissed because they attacked second rate troops with overwhelming force, while having air superiority?

In my opinion, German commanders as a group are overrated by most people, and Erich von Manstein is no acceptation. He understood the nature of armored warfare during this period, a rarity among German commanders, but was not a miracle worker. When in a tactically disadvantages situation he achieve no radical victories, and while his handling of Panzer forces was very good, his command of infantry forces was adequate. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t brilliant, just that his victories were achieved under similar circumstances you dismiss so easily in your post.



1. He did well with 56th Panzer Corps in 1941 with a superior force and air superiority, against a surprised and poorly lead Soviet troops.

2. His handling of 11th Army in the Crimea can best be described as adequate, but before Sevastopol fell his Army was spent.

3. His action while commanding forces attacking Leningrad can hardly be called brilliant.

4. His command of Army Group Don was not successful.

5. The counter attack in the winter of 1942/43 was excellent, but it was concentrated German armor against an exhausted, strung out and poorly supplied Soviet force.

6. His commander of Army Group South consisted of a failed offense and endless retreat.



"Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in the German Army. He had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanised forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank army. In sum, he had military genius."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart


PS. I am not comparing the abilities of any general, just pointing out that the “circumstances” that are dismissed when helping an Allied victory were also used by the Germans.



Stirring the pot. [;)]

Culiacan Mexico:

Excellent summary [:)]

And of course you make very valid points.

You are not stirrig the pot, when what you say is true.

Most of all the early German victories; most of all the fame the German armies gained; much of the reputation gained by German generals; was done against weaker, poorer, and inferior forces in Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Norway, etc, etc. . .

Cheers!

Correct. Thay are not the subject of discussion. So why make them so! Stop changing the subject. I posted the article as a timeline. It tallies with Williamson, MacDonald, Parker and Pimlott. In any case I thought you wanted to discuss Metz! We've already discussed the SS and the 'Bulge' into the ground and frankly the level of repetition is becoming excrutiatingly boring. Get over it, let's move on

Next time, read what you are posting BEFORE you post it and remove the sensationalist parts. Otherwise I am forced to reply to it.

That timeline stops at Dec 23.

Nope - we're not moving on until we settle the 1SS Panzer issue first.

Like I said - you are pitting that website timeline against the Official History? [8|]

Please. . .

This is from a forum discussion. You 'copy and paste' this and then dare to criticise my sources

Your sources? [8|]

Please. . .

Of course, I knew you wouldn't be able to figure out what I did.

I included that last bit of info because the author clearly uderstood what he was talking about, and indicated what happened to the 1SS Panzer after January, 1945. It was for information purposes only. The author also included his sources.

It also corroborates what happened with the official history.

I know it''s hard for you to sort out truth from fiction; to tell good sources from bad; but someday, hopefully, you'll be able too.

. There is no 'Der Fuhrer' division

It was called the "Adolf Hitler".

A rose by any other name. . .

This is just another 'personal memoir'

Where do you think most history comes from?

All those personal memoirs just back up and support and confirm what is already in the Official History.

Stop for a moment and think about what you are saying. . .

Are you really calling the Official History - unreliable? [8|]

Yet, you call Whiting a "distinquished" historian?

heheheh. . .

Oh, dear. . . I think I'm about to fall off my chair laughing. . .

heheheh

This is too much. . .

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly
… those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too…

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.

Interesting. I disagree in some areas.

The Germans did well when they had air superiority and numerical/qualitative superiority, and when they didn’t they faired poorly. So what? Should the accomplishment of the Germans in 1940 against France be dismissed because they attacked second rate troops with overwhelming force, while having air superiority?

In my opinion, German commanders as a group are overrated by most people, and Erich von Manstein is no acceptation. He understood the nature of armored warfare during this period, a rarity among German commanders, but was not a miracle worker. When in a tactically disadvantages situation he achieve no radical victories, and while his handling of Panzer forces was very good, his command of infantry forces was adequate. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t brilliant, just that his victories were achieved under similar circumstances you dismiss so easily in your post.



1. He did well with 56th Panzer Corps in 1941 with a superior force and air superiority, against a surprised and poorly lead Soviet troops.

2. His handling of 11th Army in the Crimea can best be described as adequate, but before Sevastopol fell his Army was spent.

3. His action while commanding forces attacking Leningrad can hardly be called brilliant.

4. His command of Army Group Don was not successful.

5. The counter attack in the winter of 1942/43 was excellent, but it was concentrated German armor against an exhausted, strung out and poorly supplied Soviet force.

6. His commander of Army Group South consisted of a failed offense and endless retreat.



"Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in the German Army. He had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanised forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank army. In sum, he had military genius."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart


PS. I am not comparing the abilities of any general, just pointing out that the “circumstances” that are dismissed when helping an Allied victory were also used by the Germans.



Stirring the pot. [;)]

Can't I tell. [;)]


Might be worth taking this to another thread. It is an interesting subject and one I'm sure several members here would like to debate but I fear it's going to be 'swept up' in Von Roms endless quest to prove Pattons brilliance[:D]

Kevinugly:

Might be worth taking this to another thread. It is an interesting subject and one I'm sure several members here would like to debate but I fear it's going to be 'swept up' in Von Roms endless quest to prove Pattons brilliance[:D]

Ah, yes this is the sort of analysis I was expecting from you.

ORIGINAL: CCB

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Hertston

362 posts now. Surely that alone is vindication of Patton's greatness - who else would get such a response ! [:'(]

I can think of several criminals who would[:D]

I can think of a certain German battleship! [:'(]

You want to know the REAL reason Patton was so great? OK I'll tell you:

GEORGE C. SCOTT!!!


There, the riddle is solved. You're welcome. [:D]

I couldn't agree more - Scott was brilliant [:D]

Cheers!

kevinugly:

Let's compare Whiting, whom you call a "distinquished" author, with that of the Official History of the United States Army of the Ardennes Battle.


Here are some readers' reviews of some of Whiting's books:

The Other Battle of the Bulge: Operation Northwind (West Wall Series) > Customer Review #1:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thoughts on Whiting

Reading the other posts about this book compels me to say a few things about the author. Charles Whiting is a popular, readable and prolific writer of WWII stories, but he is not a historian in any way, shape or form. If you have read more than one of his books you will recognize the following:

1) lack of any kind of endnotes and few footnotes: where is this material coming from?

2) quotes from interviews with the author, which are not in any way anotated at the end of the book

3) praise of the common US soldier but uniformly harsh criticism of all senior U.S. leadership, especially Eisenhower

4) comparisons with Vietnam which, while occasionally interesting (he points out that William Westmorland fought in the Huertgen Forest without learning its lessons) usually border on the ridiculous

5) plagarism from his own works, including entire chapters, some of which have not even been re-written, but simply included whole in different books

6) where are the @and*#and! maps?

This book, like his "Ardennes: The Secret War" posits that Operation Nordwind was a bigger threat than the Battle of the Bulge to the Allies because it nearly defeated the Alliance politically at a time when they had already won the war militarily. It is an interesting conjecture, but it is tainted by the half-hidden glee that Whiting seems to feel over any disaster involving American troops and particularly their leadership. Everything he writes is written through that distoring lens. In any endeavour, if you want to find fault, you will, and in war this is particularly easy. Eisenhower was an armchair warrior and a true mediocrity as a strategist, but he was a superb military politician, maybe the only man who could have kept such a contentious alliance together until final victory. He deserves credit for holding it all together.

I have read five of Whitings books and found most of them to be very entertaining, especially because he tends to focus on American disasters which naturally have not gotten much press since the war, and thus have not been written about extensively. He puts books together like a novel, and is far from a dry writer. But his scholarship would not have met the standards of my high school history teacher, much less those of a true historian. He seems to write about what interest him only, is careless with his statistics and dates, includes facts that suit his opinions, states his opinions as facts, and constantly recycles his own material. You could probably file his books under historical fiction before you could file them under history."


*****************************************8

Whiting, Charles. The Battle for Twelveland: An Account of Anglo-American Intelligence Operations Within Nazi Germany, 1939-1945. London, Leo Cooper, 1975. The Spymasters: The True Story of Anglo-American Intelligence Operations Within Nazi Germany, 1939-1945. New York: Dutton, 1976.

Constantinides says this is "a potpourri of fact and fiction, actuality and myth, assumptions, sketchy versions of certain events, contrived tie-ins, and a certain confusion." Nevertheless, the author is "sometimes so accurate as to indicate access to well-informed sources or successful combining of certain versions." There is also "a good segment on SIS's role and the basis of its intelligence successes against Germany."


*************************************

Whiting, Charles. Gehlen: Germany's Master Spy. New York: Ballantine, 1972.

NameBase: "Charles Whiting's book is somewhat sensational in tone and doesn't cite sources.... There are altogether too many exclamation points, along with direct quotes that appear to be added for effect rather than accuracy. Most of the book concerns Gehlen's career in Germany, particularly after the war, rather than his associations with U.S. intelligence."

http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_fol ... f-whz.html



********************************************

Now let's look at the OFFICIAL HISTORY


NOTE: NO historian has EVER criticized the Official History of the Ardennes Battle.



UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The European Theater of Operations

THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE by Hugh M. Cole



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1965


The OFFICIAL HISTORY:

This is what it says about the Ardennes Battle:


"This volume represents the most exhaustive collection of personal memoirs by leading participants ever attempted for a general staff history of a major campaign. The memoirs take two forms: interviews with American participants shortly after the action described, and written accounts prepared immediately after the end of World War II by the German officers who took part in the Ardennes Campaign. The use of the combat interview in the European Theater of Operations was organized by Col. William A. Ganoe, theater historian, but the specific initiation of an intensive effort to cover the Ardennes story while the battle itself was in progress must be credited to Col. S. L. A. Marshall. The enlistment of the German participants in the Ardennes, first as involuntary then as voluntary historians, was begun by Colonel Marshall and Capt. Kenneth Hechler, then developed into a fully organized research program by Col. Harold Potter, who was assisted by a very able group of young officers, notably Captains Howard Hudson, Frank Mahin, and James Scoggins."


Further: here are just some of the personal accounts included.

Sources:

The German sources contributing most directly to this chapter are MSS # B-23, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December 1944-12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann); # B-041, 167th Volks Grenadier Division, 24 December 1944-February 1945, Corps Hoecker, 2-10 March 1945 and 59th Infantry Division, 20 March-24 April 1945 (Generalleutnant Hans Hoecker); # B-068, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-151, Fifth Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-151a, sequel to MS # B-151 (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-235, Fifth Panzer Army, 2 November 1944-16 January 1945 (Generalmajor Carl Wagener); # B465, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 16-28 December 1944 (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-592, Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, 16 December 1944-26 January 1945 (Generalmajor Otto Remer); # B-701, Army Group B, 15 October 1944-1945 (Col Guenther Reichhelm); # B-799, LXXXIX Corps, 24 January-8 March 1945 (Lt Col Kurt Reschke).

See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Hoecker); and B-799 (Reschke).

The operations of the Third Army in the Bastogne counterattack are the subject of a special journal prepared by the TUSA 3 staff (in the author's possession). In addition the TUSA chief of staff, General Gay, kept an official Third Army diary (referred to hereafter as Gay Diary), a copy of which was used by the author. The personal data on General Patton is interesting but adds little to the official records. See also George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) and Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955).

Very detailed coverage of the 80th Division operation will be found in the combat interviews. The division records are less useful than the AAR's and journals of the three infantry regiments. See also, Capt. Roy T. McGrann, The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Pittsburgh, Pa.; Geyer Printing Company, 1946).

With the exception of those conducted with the 101st Airborne Division, the combat interviews with the 4th Armored Division are the most informative of all those bearing on the battle at Bastogne. The 4th Armored AAR and G-3 journal provide little exact or detailed information. The combat command AAR's and journals remedy this lack. Each battalion has either an AAR or unit journal. See also K. A. Koyen, The Fourth Armored Division (Munich, 1945); Lt. Col. D. M. Oden, 4th Armored Division-Relief of the 101st Airborne Division, Bastogne, Pamphlet Series, Command and General Staff College, 1947; History of the Ninety-Fourth Armored Field Artillery Battalion (n.d., n.p.); and The Armored School MS, Armor at Bastogne (May 1949).

Further: these sources represent information gathered from thousands of participants, including from Allied and German generals, from their staffs, from officers of all grades, as well as from the soldiers involved.

Further: these sources were cross-checked with official unit histories as well as general histories.

Further: this Official History was last updated in the year 2000. It is updated when NEW information is discovered.

Further: the Official History version of the Ardennes Battle took many years to write and runs over 900 pages

Von Rom, I never called Whiting 'distinguished' - I posted a review from another website that called him that to show you that the opinions of his work were not the only ones. Don't you understand this?

The above post regarding the 'Official History' and 'Whiting'. It's the fourth time you've posted it and we've already gone over that ground. I don't understand why you feel the necessity to keep repeating the same 'cut and paste's'[>:]


The cut and paste from the other forum because 'the author clearly knew what he was talking about' [:D] Seems you have a sense of humour since you are not taking this debate seriously at all.

Kevinugly:


quote:

Might be worth taking this to another thread. It is an interesting subject and one I'm sure several members here would like to debate but I fear it's going to be 'swept up' in Von Roms endless quest to prove Pattons brilliance


Ah, yes this is the sort of analysis I was expecting from you.

[&:]

Do you deny this has been what you have been doing for the last 14 pages? Surely not[;)]

ORIGINAL: VicKevlar

How about we see the temperature on this thread drop a little hmmmm? Also, knock off all the personal shots.

Now back to your regularly scheduled thread.

Or what?

Am I supposed to take that as a threat?

Kevinugly:

Using your sources:

Indicate to all of us where the 1SS Panzer Division was in the Battle of the Bulge AFTER December 25, 1944.

ORIGINAL: riverbravo

You guys that are argueing over the 1st SS panzer and what they did and where they did it can go in circles all day.

We all know that often KG's were pieced together from a company from here and platoon from there etc etc.

So it can seem that a division is "all over the place" but it is actualy just a few units pieced together and under the command of a SS officer.

I agree with you if we are talking about the views from a single source or two.

But the Official History of the Ardennes Battle includes the views of THOUSANDS of participants includng the Generals, their staffs, other officers, their memoirs, unit histories, general histories, etc.

The views from Peiper alone run over 3,000 transcript pages.

No historian disputes the Official History of the Ardennes Battle.

Why is this a difficult thing for anyone to see?

If we cannot distinquish between what is a credible source, from what is a questionable source, then we are indeed in a sorry state.

If our critical reasoning skills are in such a poor state, such that we think ALL authors and sources should be given equal weight - then what hope is there for any of us?

Surely we can evaluate authors and sources in an intelligent way. . .