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ORIGINAL: wdolson


Flak only accounted for 54 planes. The 20th AF switched over to low altitude bombing in March 1945. 39 of the loses from flak were after March 1945. 17 of the 19 combined losses from aircraft and AA were after March.

I think it's obvious that large caliber Japanese flak was not a concern to the B-29s. Switching over to low altitude caused more flak losses.


Bill

I lived (until his death) near the retirement home of one of the few Naval members of the USSBS. I suggest you read the USSBS itself - and if you can get them - the supporting analysis materials. Losses to flak were as high as 4% per raid - and often caused revision (or at least consideration of revision) of changes in tactics. It appears many flak losses in your data are classified as "other" - probably because the compiler has too many "unknown" causes. We don't always know the cause - and what the cause is when we do know is sometimes a judgement call. All data can be quibbled. But the USSBS study is the best we have - and it was made in part with data provided by the other side. Data from only one side is notoriously bad - in all wars - in all eras. We long claimed (and many still believe) an 11:1 kill rate in Korea - but it was not. We claim only about 1:1 in Viet Nam - and even that is an exaggeration. That for air : air - but the point is - one sided data is never good. You can only build an integrated picture when you include data from all sources - and from crash sites.

Air defense theory is a bit counterintuitive and it is very easy to make invalid assumptions when looking at data. The date you have provided us is essentially useless and not at all indicative of what we need to build a proper model. Consider, for example, the tactics used by B-29s before the switch to low altitude bombing. The typical mission was flown at 32,000 feet. This is above the effective reach of almost all AAA systems and casualty rates do not indicate anything at all about what would be achieved if the raids were flown below the effective ceilings of the guns. More than that - and this is a surprise for nonspecialists - we AA guys call the choice to fly at that altitude a victory for the defense. Consider that as altitude increases accuracy declines - even sans winds. In this case, the winds made it utterly impossible to hit the target. Targets not hit = victories for the defense. AA is not measured in terms of planes shot down, but in terms of targets not hit. That in turn is a function of how many targets could have been hit had there been no air defense at all - so you could hit any number of targets at optimum altitude for the bombers - whatever that is for any given mission type.
It is more complicated than that as well: we cannot build a model based on gross data without technical details because - for example - if a jammer was used against enemy radars - that may have degraded AAA effectiveness - and we cannot derive the base case without knowing to what extent that is the case? But even more important are the targets not engaged at all. We need to know that they didn't target this factory - or that town - because the AAA was too well placed and we wanted to avoid the consequences. Naval air defense is easier - the ship carries the guns with it. On land, you don't know what target will be aimed at - so you may have to engage targets which are not closing (the optimum case for the defense). Looking at gross numbers tells you nothing about the base effectiveness of the very same weapons if the attackers were closing.

For a good description of the way AAA is evaluated, see Weapons and Hope by Freeman Dyson - although it is only a small part of the material in the book it is well written for laymen by a man who was intimately involved with the WWII case. For a more general history, see On Air Defense. Air defenses are used to minimize the amount of damage any given enemy force can inflict. It is a dynamic and never ending tactical game in which both sides vary what they do. Our game is remarkable insofar as it does model this to a degree: if you fly low you will pay a higher price in losses; if you fly you will inflict less damage. In a very basic sense, that is quite right. We also have some ability to influcence what happens. Messing with ceilings for guns as well as aircraft (effective ceiling for guns and operational ceilings for aircraft), gun lethality, bomb accuracy, and a number of other factors, RHS has been able to create a situation in which early and mid war raids generate about the right results for any given tactical situation. But that is new, and not the norm, and it is not clear if the late war period is properly modeled or not even with these changes?

A more complex system might not work as well. In many ways Gary Grigsby's attitude about dice rolls (lots of em) is right - and as theater or area commanders we would not control the defenses in a tactical sense - so it produces a relatively correct (if not absolutely statistically valid) outcomes. If we had more factors under our control - I for one would love it - but in manual games where complexity isn't limited - this confirs a strong advantage to the technical players over the more general ones. That might not serve the general community as well. And there is a practical limit to what can be done: that limit is ultimately a cost limit - how much programming time can we afford to invest before the product loses marketability? The answers to such questions properly belong to those with the capital - which is to say not with us.

I wonder if there has been any analysis done on target types for skip bombers... I imagine it would be slightly harder for the bigger planes to stay aligned on target with a fast maneuverable warship which may be firing back as opposed to a slow not very manueverable merchie...

 
Since they are released even shorter than torpedos a big ship would not be able to escape since it was already dificult for a destroyer .
 
 
 

They were not used vs larger ships mainly due to a lack of them to be used against 

 
Well look at dates, US had many times chances to  use skip bombing against heavies it choosed not, and my opinion is that casualities would be too heavy or they tought it would.
 

ORIGINAL: Dili

I wonder if there has been any analysis done on target types for skip bombers... I imagine it would be slightly harder for the bigger planes to stay aligned on target with a fast maneuverable warship which may be firing back as opposed to a slow not very manueverable merchie...

Since they are released even shorter than torpedos a big ship would not be able to escape since it was already dificult for a destroyer .

They were not used vs larger ships mainly due to a lack of them to be used against 

Well look at dates, US had many times chances to  use skip bombing against heavies it choosed not, and my opinion is that casualities would be too heavy or they tought it would.

There's an analysis of kamikazes in Morse and Kimball, Methods of Operations Research. It can probably be adapted.

The Battle of the Bismark Sea would be impossible in the game. Those B-25s and A-20s flew several sorties a day for 2 or 3 days in a row. If any unit skipped bombed that much in the game, their moral would be 10, their fatigue 90, and 2/3 of the unit would be gone.

Skip bombing is not modeled correctly.

Bill

Bill, B-17's also were in the Bismark Sea Battle, and they used 4 1000lb bombs sropped in a single pass at around 5000 feet and managed to hit targets. It was not an entirly B-25/A-20 affair.

Though I know of no instance of skip-bombing of capital ships I believe the Yamato and its Task Force (in April 45) was subjected to repeated low level strafing attacks by F6Fs (for flak suppression)which would have faced the same high volume of flak as skip bombers. IIRC recall the losses suffered in these attacks by the attacking a/c were not exceptionally high. Further, according to "A Glorious Way to Die" (written by the ranking survivor of Yamato I think) the strafing and small antipersonnel bombs used in the attacks slaughtered the AAA gun crews in their exposed mounts opening the way for the torpedo bombers which actually sank Yamato.

Pretty sure the same sort of thing occurred against Kurita's Fleet at Leyte Gulf on an ad hoc basis.

Just an interesting picture relating to skip bombing. The bow of this ship is already blown off...and a skipping bomb is visible above and to the right of the gun crew.

Yes, the bean field criterion. Amen, brother.

ORIGINAL: spence

Though I know of no instance of skip-bombing of capital ships I believe the Yamato and its Task Force (in April 45) was subjected to repeated low level strafing attacks by F6Fs (for flak suppression)which would have faced the same high volume of flak as skip bombers. IIRC recall the losses suffered in these attacks by the attacking a/c were not exceptionally high. Further, according to "A Glorious Way to Die" (written by the ranking survivor of Yamato I think) the strafing and small antipersonnel bombs used in the attacks slaughtered the AAA gun crews in their exposed mounts opening the way for the torpedo bombers which actually sank Yamato.

Pretty sure the same sort of thing occurred against Kurita's Fleet at Leyte Gulf on an ad hoc basis.

This is all correct. It omits, however, that by the time of these actions the IJN was not at its best. Gunnery at Leyte Gulf was amazingly poor vs surface targets - and aircraft are much more difficult to shoot than ships are. Further, IJN AAA doctrine at sea was not very good - the standard tactic was to circle - and this does not permit the guns or the computers to work at their best (indeed prevents them from success except by accident). This is compounded by the long 5s on many Japanese destroyers - which while nominally DP were unable to traverse fast enough - so they could only be used with effect if the ship did NOT turn (as in the case of Hara's destroyer - probably Shiguri). Wether or not these factors should be used in a game is an interesting question: are you going to force players to use less than optimum tactics because they were doctrinal? It appears WITP does that - giving IJN lower ratings than the Allies. So if you like it - you also have it.

was subjected to repeated low level strafing attacks by F6Fs

 
and F6Fs are more dificult to hit than 2 engine bombers

are you going to force players to use less than optimum tactics because they were doctrinal?

Actually no. The whole 4E bomber against ship controversy appears to me to be an attempt by some to impose doctrinal limitations on 4E bombers. As I said at the beginning of the thread, inventing new doctrines seems inherent in this or any other game.

If doctrine (and some ability to change same) is supposed to be simulated/incorporated into the game then it should then be imposed on both sides. There are drawbacks in the game to operating 4E bombers against shipping at low altitude. I think it should be the US Player's choice to balance the advantages with the disadvantages.

ORIGINAL: spence

are you going to force players to use less than optimum tactics because they were doctrinal?

Actually no. The whole 4E bomber against ship controversy appears to me to be an attempt by some to impose doctrinal limitations on 4E bombers. As I said at the beginning of the thread, inventing new doctrines seems inherent in this or any other game.

If doctrine (and some ability to change same) is supposed to be simulated/incorporated into the game then it should then be imposed on both sides. There are drawbacks in the game to operating 4E bombers against shipping at low altitude. I think it should be the US Player's choice to balance the advantages with the disadvantages.

Problem is the 20-20 hind sight of history....Players don't have to wait till September of 1942 to start testing skip bombing because they already know it was an effective tactic so they try to use it from the beginning. Whereas IRL B-17's were achieving only a 1% hit rate prior to the introduction of skip bombing in September of 42.

In any event the game in its current form has many other problems than just the overabundnace of B-17s or the supposed lethality of skip-bombing by them....



I'm not suggesting the game is correct for the japanese or shouldn't be changed either ... hence the reason for the mod i worked on to try and reduce the prevalence of Japanese torpedo armed Betty's.

and that kiddies, is why the morale penalty was added and why the exp penalty was added because thats exactly what UV players did from day 1. (institute mass skip bombing tactics)

both sides.

ORIGINAL: spence

Actually no. The whole 4E bomber against ship controversy appears to me to be an attempt by some to impose doctrinal limitations on 4E bombers. As I said at the beginning of the thread, inventing new doctrines seems inherent in this or any other game.

If doctrine (and some ability to change same) is supposed to be simulated/incorporated into the game then it should then be imposed on both sides. There are drawbacks in the game to operating 4E bombers against shipping at low altitude. I think it should be the US Player's choice to balance the advantages with the disadvantages.

The Allies didn't stick with the early war doctrine using 4e bombers at high altitude for shipping strikes either. B-17s were withdrawn from the Pacific as B-24s became available. The USAAF didn't use B-24s for anti shipping, except in attacks on ports (where they were very effective), but the Navy used the PB4Y as a long range anti submarine and anti shipping plane. They flew single patrol missions, so they didn't make mass attacks on convoys, but they were used down on the deck. The ultimate PB4Y, the Privateer had the turbos removed because they never went above 10,000 feet.

The Japanese tended to stick with obsolete doctrine past their effective date, but all services of the US were very quick to adopt new doctrine as conditions warrented. In a few cases the US stuck to old doctrine past its pull date, but in aerial tactics especially they were very adaptive.

The US had massive abundance of material by 1944, but it also had developed effective doctrines to use it by then too. Material superiority doesn't grant you automatic victory if you're using bad strategy and tactics.

Bill

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

and that kiddies, is why the morale penalty was added and why the exp penalty was added because thats exactly what UV players did from day 1. (institute mass skip bombing tactics)

both sides.

That is a point.

WitP II, if it ever happens, needs to do something to realistically limit Allied air power. I still contend that the biggest problem with the uber land based air is the number of aircraft you end up with. The Allies always had a significant number of units in rear areas resting and refitting and many units were withdrawn or disbanded, but the game doesn't reflect this at all. It allows you to put everything on the front line all the time. Hence the death stars of 4e bombers.

Bill

This is not the germane question. The germane question is "would it work better"? Unless you have a heavy target to attack, you could not use it against one. Unless you had a skip bombing tactical option, you also could not use it. Only if both options exist at the same point and time might you use it. Then the question becomes - is it a better way to attack? For the types of planes that used it, the answer is "yes" - so it would probably be used. For dive bombers (consider the attack on the Yamato for example) it might well not be used. Another factor might be doctrinal: do you use two or four engine bombers vs ships at all in these conditions? If you have plenty of carrier planes, maybe you don't? But if something - say range - dictated no carrier aircraft were an option - you might still do so: it might be a judgement call even if the doctrine was not to use the big planes in that way. Strategic air power advocates believed (and some still believe) that ANY divation from strategic bombing is a "waste of resources." That is why they want total control of all air power - ultimately to insure that only bombers are built - and none get diverted to such "wasteful" things as minelaying, tactical air support, naval attacks, and so on. But often this theory lost out in operational situations, and bombers did do minelaying, tactical air support or even carpet bombing of land targets, or naval attacks. In short, what matters is a combination of (a) what you know how to do; (b) what other options exist to do it; and (c) how you think you should allocate the type of aircraft that use this sort of attack?

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

and that kiddies, is why the morale penalty was added and why the exp penalty was added because thats exactly what UV players did from day 1. (institute mass skip bombing tactics)

both sides.

If the slots were available, I feel certain historic UNITS should be allowed to skip-bomb, with an accuracy bonus, and trash that morale limiter by identifying them as "torpedo bombers"?