Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: hueglin

Now consider direct fire. Basically, a direct fire weapon has a narrow zone over which it dominates. The effective width dominated is proportional to the sustained rate of fire (10 for bolt action rifle, 20 for semiautomatic, 60 for BAR, 120 for light MG, 240 for tripod-mounted MG). Infantry exists to serve and protect its automatic weapons. As a calibration point, a full-strength UK infantry platoon was able to dominate 250 meters of front in rolling terrain to a depth of about 300 meters using three Bren guns and a light mortar. That's a continuous lethal area of about 75,000 square meters/minute.

How was the value of 250 m by 300 m arrived at? Is it possible to break it down into smaller elements? For example, how would you calculate the area dominated by a 10 man section firing bolt action rifles?

Actually, the consideration is whether the direct fire element can bring down the targets as rapidly as they enter that zone. The distance out is determined by two things: how far the firers can see the targets, and how rapidly the targets can close with the firers. In WWII, in terrain where the average range of engagement was 200-300 meters, a unit in a hasty defense that could reliably generate 5 rpm per meter of front could defend itself against a determined infantry attack.

ORIGINAL: JeffK

It doesnt have to be bolt action, the Self Loading Rifle (FN FAL) used by Australians in Vietnam and up to the Steyr being used was a far better Infantry weapon than the M16.

Firing single shots makes the soldier think and aim, have auto fire sees them (natuarally) want to get off as many rounds as they can.

Plus, IMHO, the 30cal/7.62mm/.303 round is far more lethal than the 5.66mm. So what if I carry less ammo, I'll be more careful with it!!

The Marines stress "fire discipline and fire control" - and note that you need to end each firefight "with enough ammunition to fight and win another firefight if you are not resupplied." Further, they believe that not carefully expending ammunition leads to very ineffecient tactical effects. The Marines also train on the basis that they expect to be outnumbered and outgunned, and flanked ("defend 360" is the norm even for the smallest units) - and the ultimate expression of this doctrine is its application to naval landing parties (which in the post war era became standardized as independent squad sized organizations). No matter the mission - you get 14 men (or 15 if they attach an officer).
These need to go there, do that, and return, no matter the size of the opposing force, no matter the details of the mission.
The focus is the mission - and not on fighting for its own sake. It may be counter productive to engage an enemy unit - and there are lots of reasons for that - starting with ammunition expendature and the risk of casualties. [Each casualty greatly impacts your mobility and the possibilty of mission failure] While a naval landing party has some significant advantages over normal infantry squads - including

1) it is composed of specialists, and has its own radio operator, its own medical corpsman trained to higher than Army standards, and typically gunners mates and specialists of other sorts - so it has more techincal prowess than is normal in a squad

2) it can call on heavy firepower in the form of naval gunfire support or naval air support - because normally at least several - and possibly all - members are trained spotters

nevertheless the key factors to success are psychological rather than physical (or arms as such). The significant points here are

1) Trained to Marine standards, these infantry EXPECT to be outnumbered WITHOUT friends on the flanks and in rear, and this does not disorient or demoralize them;

2) Trained to focus on the current mission, these infantry do not engage any enemy without mission oriented cause or as a last resort when the mission has failed; this focus inherantly supports fire discipline and limits ammunition expendature and combat risks - mitigating the "behind hostile lines" and "no supporting units" aspects of the situation

3) Trained to work with just a few weapons, not including even hand grenades, and in company with the specialists who care for those weapons all the time, they tend to understand all the tactical options associated with them; The Marines explicitly teach "it does not matter how modern the weapons are, but rather how familiar you are with them and how well you use them."

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: hueglin

Now consider direct fire. Basically, a direct fire weapon has a narrow zone over which it dominates. The effective width dominated is proportional to the sustained rate of fire (10 for bolt action rifle, 20 for semiautomatic, 60 for BAR, 120 for light MG, 240 for tripod-mounted MG). Infantry exists to serve and protect its automatic weapons. As a calibration point, a full-strength UK infantry platoon was able to dominate 250 meters of front in rolling terrain to a depth of about 300 meters using three Bren guns and a light mortar. That's a continuous lethal area of about 75,000 square meters/minute.

How was the value of 250 m by 300 m arrived at? Is it possible to break it down into smaller elements? For example, how would you calculate the area dominated by a 10 man section firing bolt action rifles?

Actually, the consideration is whether the direct fire element can bring down the targets as rapidly as they enter that zone. The distance out is determined by two things: how far the firers can see the targets, and how rapidly the targets can close with the firers. In WWII, in terrain where the average range of engagement was 200-300 meters, a unit in a hasty defense that could reliably generate 5 rpm per meter of front could defend itself against a determined infantry attack.

Would the following be a reasonable approximation of capability:

BA Rifle 2m by 200m for a lethal area of 400 sq m
LMG 6m by 300m for a lethal area of 1,800 sq m
MMG 8m by 600m for a lethal area of 4,800 sq m

A 10 man BA rifle section would therefore have a lethal area of 4000 sq m

I am thinking in terms of the approximate field of fire and effective range of engagement of each weapon. I realize the FoF is a really a pie piece (or cone) shape, with the pie point being the position of the firer, rather than a rectangular shape. I'm only trying to get a theoretical approximation to use as the anti-soft value though.

All opinions are welcome.

ps. These would produce values that are similar to the firepower factors in the board game Squad Leader where an LMG is 2, a squad is 4 and a MMG is 4.

pps. Used with herwin's formula for artillery this would give the following anti-soft values (anti-soft = lethality in sq m divided by 400

BA Section...........10
LMG...................5
MMG..................12
25 pdr (5rpm).........5
105mm how(6rpm)......10
75mm gun (15rpm)......6
81mm mor (10rpm).....14

I am assuming that the separate value of "range" in WITP gives some increased effectiveness for weapons with longer range. I am not sure about the "accuracy" value and how to integrate it. Again, any suggestions are welcome.

I am thinking to make HMG squads for my WITM flavour with 1 range. I dont know if this will unbalance the land combat or not. Any opinion?

ORIGINAL: hueglin

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: hueglin



How was the value of 250 m by 300 m arrived at? Is it possible to break it down into smaller elements? For example, how would you calculate the area dominated by a 10 man section firing bolt action rifles?

Actually, the consideration is whether the direct fire element can bring down the targets as rapidly as they enter that zone. The distance out is determined by two things: how far the firers can see the targets, and how rapidly the targets can close with the firers. In WWII, in terrain where the average range of engagement was 200-300 meters, a unit in a hasty defense that could reliably generate 5 rpm per meter of front could defend itself against a determined infantry attack.

Would the following be a reasonable approximation of capability:

BA Rifle 2m by 200m for a lethal area of 400 sq m
LMG 6m by 300m for a lethal area of 1,800 sq m
MMG 8m by 600m for a lethal area of 4,800 sq m

A 10 man BA rifle section would therefore have a lethal area of 4000 sq m

I am thinking in terms of the approximate field of fire and effective range of engagement of each weapon. I realize the FoF is a really a pie piece (or cone) shape, with the pie point being the position of the firer, rather than a rectangular shape. I'm only trying to get a theoretical approximation to use as the anti-soft value though.

All opinions are welcome.

ps. These would produce values that are similar to the firepower factors in the board game Squad Leader where an LMG is 2, a squad is 4 and a MMG is 4.

pps. Used with herwin's formula for artillery this would give the following anti-soft values (anti-soft = lethality in sq m divided by 400

BA Section...........10
LMG...................5
MMG..................12
25 pdr (5rpm).........5
105mm how(6rpm)......10
75mm gun (15rpm)......6
81mm mor (10rpm).....14

I am assuming that the separate value of "range" in WITP gives some increased effectiveness for weapons with longer range. I am not sure about the "accuracy" value and how to integrate it. Again, any suggestions are welcome.

According to the US Army, the effectiveness tables, normanlized to WiTP numerics is:
Rifle .48-.53 (Arisaka 6.6 & 7.7, Enfields, Dutch M93, Soviet M91/30, etc.)
Garrand 1 (also Soviet SVT)
BAR 7
Mag LMG 8-10 (Dutch M20, Lewis, T-11, T-96, T-99, Bren, Soviet DP/DPM etc.)
Belt LMG 12 (M1919, etc.)
Mag MMG 12 (T-92, T-99)
Belt MMG 15 (Vickers, Dutch M18, M1917, Soviet SG/SPM, etc.)

The game is relatively good on the arty tables, but if you wish precision, check with Nigel F. Evans (http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/ArtySyst.htm). He's good with responses and I've sensitized him to Japanese-type weapons. E-mails work.

The above numerics are normalized (with respect to Nigel's effectivity data) from the US Army Research and Operations Division, Korean Operations Study KS 1447-07 (42-724-76)1953; Canadian Military Studies, 33-41774, 1955; Military Analysis (CCCA-OGRU-07, AKM-61) Moscow, 1954; Weapon Studies (SAOAR S411-714) Shanghai, 1955.

Neither the US nor the Soviets (sorry, the Russians), nor the Chinese, recognize the concept of 'tactical area domination'. I've never heard of this before. This seems to be something that wargamers like to think about. It has no relevance in practical tactical consideration.

ORIGINAL: Dili

I am thinking to make HMG squads for my WITM flavour with 1 range. I dont know if this will unbalance the land combat or not. Any opinion?

Won't unbalance anything. [;)] Forget the range, because the game is only concerned with arty > 3. Are you seriously considering an infantry weapon with an effictive range > 1000m???

See my previous post. MMG 'squads' should be MMG 'sections', i.e., 2 MMGs, size (load factor) 10, anti soft 30 (normalized against a US Inf Squad of 24), anti armor 5, unless you want to give them a Bazooka team, then anti armor of 35. Japan T-92/99 Woodpecker team is size 12, anti soft 24, again 2 guns in a 'section'.

No worries; call em squads, forget the 'range' bullsh*t.

Ciao.

Thanks for the info and references JWE. They will help. The Arty site is interesting, although I am actually doing a War in the West - 1914 mod for WPO . I have most of the real world references I need (I've been saving data for years), I'm just trying to figure out how the different values in WITP work and how best to add the needed weapons into the database in a consistent and, hopefully, realistic manner.

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Dili

I am thinking to make HMG squads for my WITM flavour with 1 range. I dont know if this will unbalance the land combat or not. Any opinion?

Won't unbalance anything. [;)] Forget the range, because the game is only concerned with arty > 3. Are you seriously considering an infantry weapon with an effictive range > 1000m???

See my previous post. MMG 'squads' should be MMG 'sections', i.e., 2 MMGs, size (load factor) 10, anti soft 30 (normalized against a US Inf Squad of 24), anti armor 5, unless you want to give them a Bazooka team, then anti armor of 35. Japan T-92/99 Woodpecker team is size 12, anti soft 24, again 2 guns in a 'section'.

No worries; call em squads, forget the 'range' bullsh*t.

Ciao.

Don't know what unbalance means in an awful land combat system like we use here? But range probably does matter for AFV combat. IT appears that some AFVs have ranges of 1, 2 or 3 (some each) - and none at all >3 - and it does appear to make things better for the AFV or anti-tank units if the range goes up (below that 4 value). Many AFVs have so little armor that quite small weapons count - and I bet you will take out some with a .50 and a range = 1.

For the record in RHS ALL MG - including .30 cals - have range = 1 - and always have. Many feel the land combat model is somewhat better than it used to be - so 1 does not seem to "break" it.

I'm not sure what wargamers mean by 'tactical area domination'. For me, it's just a way of looking at the force needed to defend a front against an attack. I've seen it used by a number of analysts. It reflects a model of weapons engagement where a target has to be acquired before it can be fired on.

The term should imply a killing space so covered that 100% of enemy units entering the space will be destroyed. It certainly does have meaning IRL - but it is very hard to know for sure what can enter your immediate killing space - so you are always a bit uncertain. Further - the term probably implies an enemy entering in good visibility conditions. If the area is obscured by darkness, smoke, countermeasures, etc it may not mean all targets are engaged. But it would mean that the space was covered by overlapping fields of fire with weapons lethal to all available enemy systems in such quantity they could not be saturated by the enemy forces available. It would be battle space expensive to cross - and in many instances impossible to cross. It would not be normal for a unit to have any such space except with respect to a very small opposition.

It is doctrine in many armies to create such zones (in the defense) - the Canadian Forces (it may be a NATO term) using the designation KZ or Kill Zone for an area where it is planned (hoped) to engage and destroy a maximum amount of the advancing force with the as much fire as is deemed necessary.

Typically this would be an area, with canalizing terrain and good fields of fire, where it is assessed that the enemy is highly likely to pass through in its advance (of course things do not always go according to plan).

Thank you both, since this is for WITM in desert i think it warrants the HMG(note that is only for tripod MGs) 1 range rule.
 
If i can be a little offtopic what's diference between vehicle and AFV for game proposes?

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The term should imply a killing space so covered that 100% of enemy units entering the space will be destroyed. It certainly does have meaning IRL - but it is very hard to know for sure what can enter your immediate killing space - so you are always a bit uncertain. Further - the term probably implies an enemy entering in good visibility conditions. If the area is obscured by darkness, smoke, countermeasures, etc it may not mean all targets are engaged. But it would mean that the space was covered by overlapping fields of fire with weapons lethal to all available enemy systems in such quantity they could not be saturated by the enemy forces available. It would be battle space expensive to cross - and in many instances impossible to cross. It would not be normal for a unit to have any such space except with respect to a very small opposition.

That's exactly what I mean. It happens to be a good description of the conditions to the front of a WWII infantry unit deployed at normal density in an organised position. The basic idea is that neither unsupported infiltration tactics nor an unsupported frontal attack can take the position. Poor visibility is an issue--but it counts against the attacker even more than the defender. I've participated in a night attack exercise as a rifleman, and it would have been a total disaster if we had gone up against someone with live ammo.

In the WWII era visibility was far more important for the defense. The IJA was a generation or two ahead of its time in believeing in night battle - and indeed it was normal to attack at night - but the technology of the era made it problematical to achieve coordination or a good picture of the enemy situation. Even so, all armies of note since have moved in that direction, aided more and more as time passed by technical toys.


In the classical 20 th century battlefield (there are exceptions) the defense has the time to clear a killing zone and to set up for illumination and observation of it even at night. That does not prevent the enemy from using smoke, or mama nature from providing fog. But absent significant smoke or fog, or really unusual countermeasures, an attacking force is in far more trouble entering a prepared kill zone than it would be with their help. In that sense, visibility favors the defense, and lack of it favors the offense. If the offense was set up based on information developed immediately before the action began, it may be able to achieve significant results when, with visibility, it could only be defeated.

Also, the smoke/fog had better be on the defensive position, because if it's covering the attack, the attackers will be disoriented and silhouetted as they emerge from it. That also implies any AFVs will be at serious risk, since target acquisition is even worse than usual.