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A commanding officer can delegate authority, however he remains responsable for the actions and performace of those he delegates to. I think we have confused Yamishita 25th Army Singapore with Homma 14th Army PI. However Lt Gen Homma was convicted for warcrimes dealing with the treatment of POW's being moved from Bataan, for the bombing of Manila after Dec 26 (when it had been declared an open city and undefended, and with mistreatment of the population in general afterwards. It does not matter that a subordinate actually commited the crime he was in COMMAND.

Yamashita commanded the Japanese troops on PI during the liberation by MacArthur he too was executed after the war for crimes commited by troops under his command both in Malaya and in PI

Thats what I get for posting on topics while at work. Now I am transposing Homma/Yamashita. I cant stay away from the site though. Come on guys! I need a UV fix!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

As to the command issue I would have to agree. However, the true definition of "war crimes" is subjective at best. Do you think the fire bombing of Dresden or Tokyo was criminal?

"(1) He kicked MacArthurs stupid, incompetent, self-serving, cowardly, treasonous, war profitteering, egotistic butt out of the P.I."

You seem to have misplaced your medications or your tinfoil hat, because your post is so far out of line that you have forever forfeited your privilege to the assumption that you are sane.

Originally posted by juliet7bravo
Yamashita got hisself hung for two very serious crimes against humanity and violations of the law of war...

(1) He kicked MacArthurs stupid, incompetent, self-serving, cowardly, treasonous, war profitteering, egotistic butt out of the P.I.

(2) He moved into MacArthurs penthouse (and associated property, wink wink) in Manilla after capturing the place.

Those 2 heinious crimes were enough to garuantee him a death sentence.

First of all Yamashita didnt kick MacArthur out of anywhere. That would be Gen. Homma. So if your theory is correct. Why didnt he hang Homma?

MacArthur certainly was self-serving and egostiscal

"incompetent" He was no genius, but neither was he incompetent

"Cowardly" Definitely not

"Treasonous" No, insubordinate Yes

"Profiteering" How so?

I personally feel Yamashita did not deserve to be excecuted, but the facts are that even though he was not directly responsible. Twice in the war troops directly under his command were responsible for horrendous war crimes. First in Malaya and Singapore and then the Rape of Manila. A commanding General is responsible for the conduct of the troops under his command. German generals where held to that standard so why not the Japanese. My only problem is the standard was not always meeted out evenly due to post-war political considerations.

Originally posted by Jason629
Thats what I get for posting on topics while at work. Now I am transposing Homma/Yamashita. I cant stay away from the site though. Come on guys! I need a UV fix!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

As to the command issue I would have to agree. However, the true definition of "war crimes" is subjective at best. Do you think the fire bombing of Dresden or Tokyo was criminal?

Well, neither Dresden or Tokyo were "open cities". Then again I wouldnt consider the bombing of Manila a war crime either. What were war crimes. Was the summary execution of prisoners during the Bataan death march the rape and murder of Philipino civilians and sex slavary. Likewise the execution of prisoners, civilians and doctors and nurses in Malaya and Singapore.

Yes, plausible denial is not a recognized defense. I think Homma has more of a case in that I dont think the bombing of "open" Manilla was criminal and although Horrific, Bataan was seemingly isolated in his command history. Wheras Yamashitas troops ran amuck on multiple occaisions.
But back to Dresden, if for some reason the Axis had won the war.....do you think there would be trials for the Army Air Force command and all related to these raids? Instead, we watch programs on the History Channel about their effectiveness and the brave air crews. (Not taking anything away from them). Its just a very subjective/political thing.

Perhaps I read your post wrong, but I came away with the idea that you think the Bataan Death March wasn't enough to justify Homma's post-war treatment as it was "isolated in his command"... If I misunderstood you, I apologize, but that single isolated event is worthy of a death sentence no matter how you cut it. (Unless you're against the death penalty) Thousands of troops were tortured, starved, left for dead and murdered in the most gruesome of ways. I sincerely hope I misread your post, otherwise you're dead wrong.

In regards to Dresden, etc... I agree that the fact we won the war likely had a lot to do with the lack of a severe backlash. However, I will point out that Bomber Harris was the only major commander on the Brit side not to be knighted - many say it was the result of a distaste for his area bombing tactics during the war...

My two cents, I apologize if I took your post the wrong way...

Remember, I prefaced my post with (Plausible Denial is not a viable defense). The Bataan Death March was certainly more than enough to warrant the most severe punishment available. I was simply saying that I honestly believe that Homma did not directly order or condone that horror wheras Yamashita seems to have had several instances of shall we say "lack of institutional control". To me this indicates approval on his part, be tacit approval, implied or what have you.

Gotcha. I understand now - sorry for barking!

Homma was aware of the condition of the POW's prior to ordering them to march 100 miles without water or rations. He could have kept them where they where itill transport was available (at lest for the more serious cases) but scoffed at the idea. (and simply had them bayoneted). The Japanese started executing American POW's within minutes of their surrender. (starting with all Americans found with Japanese equippment/currencey)
If a commanding general is not to blame for the disapline of his troops then just who is?.

A couple of things. Nowhere will you find any orders or even heresay of Homma ordering POW's bayoneted. If you look at what happened, there was a great discrepency as to the manner in which the Bataan POW's were treated. Some where bayoneted, beaten, etc while others...just a quarter of a mile further up and down the road were treated decently. I think the total breakdown in the logistics supporting this move caused the chaos that we saw. It was left to individual soldiers and junior officers, quite often these junior grades were very brutal in thier disposition and manner. As for leaving the POW's where they were, it was technically still a war zone as Corregidor was still resisting. I think this brings an additional level of frustration in terms of the Japanese, they were looking for a complete surrender of the PI...including Corregidor and Mindanao..........With all this being said, Homma IS responsible for the conduct of his command. Be it direct or not.

The vast majority of deaths of US and Philippine troops occurred during the first few weeks/months was due to their physical condition after surrender. There were no deaths of thousands of US troops by bayonetting, they were local incidents with the responsibility being in the hands of individual soldiers or smaller units. The death march occurred because not only were the US troops under/malnourished, the Japanese supply system was worse then the American. The main reason the siege went on so long was because the same percentage of Japanese troops were incapacitated as US troops. The Japanese could little supply their own troops, let alone a sudden 80 000 extra. Bataan is a mountainous region, good for defence, but horrible for growing food and transportation. If the troops would have stayed, then the supply system would have broken down, and Corregidor attack delayed.

The Bataan peninsula was horrible for transportation and movement of troops and supplies. The Luzon plain held most of the supplies. Since there was little transportation left on the Island, the only way in getting the POW's from the Bataan peninsula to the camps in the Luzon plane was by marching. (Shipping was needed elsewhere).

Homma was just another Captain Wirz (CS Commander of Andersonville), the commander of a situation that resulted in the deaths of thousands beyond his control. There was nother Homma could do to stop the death march (since he could not leave them where they were, nor move them any other way, nor could he expect any more needed supplies or transportation as they were needed in the East Indies). Captain Wirz was convicted and executed, like Homma, even though there was a lot of evidence that they were both innocent of the charges, since the events were beyond their control. Both Homma and Wirz's men were just as bad off as their prisoners. Homma experienced very high numbers of deaths due to mal/undernutrition of his own men.

If you notice, most of these physical attacks on POWs appear to be a spur of the moment, close range. They were not planned well in advance, nor were they always done within the open. Name me any military that would reprimand their soldiers for bruitality, unless found out by the civilian media.

Greetings. This is a disturbing subject and I certainly do not want to give the wrong impression. War is a dirty business and once begun the forces of stress, frustration, anger, etc., begin working on all participants. The Japanese soldier had been enduring brutal conditions for much longer then most Westerners realize. Later both German and Russian personnel under very harsh conditions displayed the same behavior. The Japanese/German/Russian command structure adopted a (abeit unwritten) policey of letting their troops 'vent' on enemy civilian/POW's without punishment while maintaining ruthless punishment for breaches of 'Combat discipline.' In all armies where ideology has to subsitute for training or equipment shortcomings you find this allowance of non-combat venting going hand in hand with firing squads conducting summary executions on troops failing in combat. Not every soldier resorts to this but enough to make it a recognizable factor.
It is not suprising that people who have had to endure the stress/terror of combat and brutal conditions resort to 'dishing' some back when opportunity allows. Nor is it suprising some maintain a humane behavior. The question really is, should there be persons held accountable? Maintaining discipline in combat units is a product of many things. Even the much more good natured American fighting man has had instance of this 'venting' (especially in units during intensity high combat)
There is no doubt that even the less politically indoctrinated Western Armies overlooked the shooting or mistreatment of POW's in the immediate combat area. I am unaware of any court martial resulting from shooting Japanese or German POW's before they got to rear areas.
I don't want a 'glass house' debate to evolve here, only to point out that it is the officers who must ultimately be held accountable. This behavior is not unique to WW2. It is found in every human conflict. I am a wargamer. I have to detach my self from this side of the historical events I am simulating. I treat my units as chess pieces and the maps as a chess board. There is no suffering in a war game (well not that kind) War games tend to produce higher casualties then the actual event since the player does not have to view the carnage. I enjoy playing Japan/Germany in War games. I do not think I would have enjoyed being a member of the command structure of these nations in WW2. From their point of view allowing this behavior was nessary to maintain the units combat effectiveness. Fear of punishment for combat breeches of discipline and ignoring the brutal treatment of non combatants/POW are hallmarks of all the armies engaged in the long campaigns of WW2.
The Japanese units fighting in PI had suffered terrible combat losses.
The victors always decide what the crimes are and who the crimminals are. Is this fair? Perhaps not, however it has always been so and will no doubt prove to be the case in the future conflicts.

First, I would just like to say that everyone is responsible for their own actions. Second, if you want some good solid information on this subject, I recommend reading "The Rape of Nankng" by Iris Chang. It is a real eye opener. Off subject a little bit but still about man's inhumanity to man I also recommend "Execution by Hunger The Hidden Holocaust" by Miron Dolot.

Rick

3 things:
1- quote from The Pacific War by Costello:
The fanatical Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabachi had discounted Yamashita's order making Manila an open city. (page 533)
2- 6th Division (responsible for Rape of Nanking) was decimated on Bougainville
3- Russians requested bombing of Dresden because they thought (incorrectly) it was a staging area for german troops on eastern front)

Originally posted by Mogami
Greetings. This is a disturbing subject and I certainly do not want to give the wrong impression. War is a dirty business and once begun the forces of stress, frustration, anger, etc., ...

This may be too disturbing! Perhaps this is 'urban legend' material but I have heard from relatives and other Filipino-Americans that during the Bata'an death march some of the Japanese guards or troops would take crying babies away from mothers and toss them into the air, then catch them w/bayonet on the way back down. Sorry if this imagery is too much but I have never heard any of the Phils I have asked deny this. Supposedly there are 'historical' markers along the route of the death march that state this. Has anyone ever toured the death march route and if so did you read any markers?
curious,
rhj

Look at any great military leader and you will find a commander who knew the breadth and depth of the organization in his charge. Intimate knowledge of it's capabilities, morale, and the environment under which it executed his instructuions. Those who fail failed to understand the strengths, weaknesses and the situation of their own organization depended on the competence of his subordinate leaders and/or the stupidity of his enemy.

Command is total authority and responsibility. Plausible deniability is nothing more than admitting incomptence. Successful organizations fix responsibility and hold those responsible accountable. Being a victim of your own incomptence is a poor defence for misconduct of your subordinates.

"What is the effective range of an excuse? 0 meters."

Originally posted by denisonh
Look at any great military leader and you will find a commander who knew the breadth and depth of the organization in his charge. Intimate knowledge of it's capabilities, morale, and the environment under which it executed his instructuions. Those who fail failed to understand the strengths, weaknesses and the situation of their own organization depended on the competence of his subordinate leaders and/or the stupidity of his enemy.

Command is total authority and responsibility. Plausible deniability is nothing more than admitting incomptence. Successful organizations fix responsibility and hold those responsible accountable. Being a victim of your own incomptence is a poor defence for misconduct of your subordinates.

"What is the effective range of an excuse? 0 meters."

If you REALLY look at a great military leader you will find plausible deniability, the main difference is that they were never caught, or their military won. These 'great military leaders' were not perfect, and in fact were great by their ability to plausibly deny any act of wrong doing. Montgomery was one, so was Patton, MacArthur, the same with Rommel. They were willing to accept responsibility for victory, but never in defeat or costly victory. The reason that they remained 'great' in the public eye was that they WERE ABLE to shift responsibility lower down the ranks. If you look closely at these, and other, great generals, you will see complacency with autrocity, inability to accept responsibility, as well as willingness to let someone else take the blame (and them the credit).

Name me one institution that ever, on their own (without outside or media pressure) who have ever fixed responsibility on those responsible. Scapegoats exist all over, and in every military.

As usual, the truth lies somewhere in between. I think you would both agree that you have made absolute statements so sweeping in their scope that they cannot possibly be true.

The maxim that a commander is responsible at all times for the actions of his subordinates is not correctly applied in all circumstances. While I'm not particularly familiar with the circumstances in the Philippines at the time, any commander - including so-called great ones - can lose control of their subordinates in a deteriorating situation. By the end of World War II, I can't imagine the conditions under which the Japanese soldier was living. They were hungry, tired, diseased, frustrated, and doomed. They were greatly outnumbered in men and materiel. Communications would have been difficult considering the size of the Philippines and the fact that it consists of thousands of islands while your opponent has control of the skies and the seas. At some point, any military's discipline breaks down under the pressure, and I cannot hold a commander responsible when direct orders are not obeyed.

Let's face it, people crack at unpredictable times and in unpredictable ways. I cannot hold a commander responsible for events that are not reasonably foreseeable - despite the dictates of the maxim.

On the other hand, I wouldn't expect commanders to willingly and publicly take the blame for disasters. Some who personally understand the magnitude of their errors have committed suicide. A good commander is one that gets the most out of his subordinates, so it is their job to fire people below him if that will improve the unit. It really isn't their job to affix the blame on themselves - that is the responsibility of the next one up in the chain of command. That next senior person must weigh whether the "guilty" commander is an asset or a liability, whether there is someone available that could do the job better, etc. I the guilty commander is an asset, publicly blaming him will simply render that otherwise valuable asset useless.

Name an institution that fixes responsibility on someone? If you're saying name a commander that blamed himself and resigned, it doesn't happen much at higher levels, but it has happened. At the higher levels, there are more important considerations that it is the duty of superiors to consider. If you're asking to name an institution - such as the Army as a whole - that affixes the responsibility for something, it happens all the time. Commanders are relieved on a regular basis for incompetence. MacArthur was relieved by President Truman. Rommel had few defeats and you would be a fool to believe that losing North Africa was his fault. Montgomery was the best commander the British had in North Africa and was generally successful, so the British could not relieve him there. Montgomery's bigger errors were in Northern Europe where it was politically impossible to relieve him. I'm sure Eisenhower would never have allowed him to be one of his commanders to begin with if he had had a choice. Assigning real blame is usually tough because there are always mitigating circumstances such as misunderstood orders, poor intelligence, equipment failures at key times, and the simple intervention of fate and chance.

I guess I haven't added much to the conversation, but the truth really is in between there somewhere. Commanders should be held responsible for the actions of their subordinates, but there are circumstances in which that cannot reasonably or ethically be done, and there are other time when it should not be done for the greater good.

Originally posted by Kid
"...if you want some good solid information on this subject, I recommend reading "The Rape of Nankng" by Iris Chang. It is a real eye opener..."

Forgive me, but I find this lamentable, but certainly for reasons that differ from Kid's incorrect impression.

Iris Chang's book indeed is an eye opener precisely because it suffers from many unforgivable flaws. Among the most damaging problems are its innumerable factual errors, and a very noticeable bias toward the sensational. She told me to my face that when it came to evaluating source material, she had no consistent criteria and subscribed to no formal methodology at all; even more, she didn't see why this was a problem. Simply picking and choosing from among the most grotesque, outrageous tales available is hardlly the hallmark of reputable, scholarly research.

As a history, the book is subpar at best and, no offense, only meant to be read by people who have absolutely no background on the subject -- people who predictably parrot its "message" and only further muddy what is a very complex case of wartime atrocity. It's no exaggeration to say Chang's book is as bad as Masaaki Tanaka's latest book, "What Really Happened at Nanking". Indeed, they're basically the mirror images of each other, diametrically opposed and equally silly. As others have said above, the truth is somewhere in the middle. In this case, deniers and massive death toll proponents alike are equally incorrect.

-=-

Now, as far as UV goes, I am curious about the soundtrack -- will it exist at all, and if so, will be be made up of WAV files, MP3 files, or something else? If it is WAVs or MP3s, will it be customizable?

Does anyone here, beta testers or development, know the answer to this? If it is customizable, I've got a nice collection of very rare American and Japanese period propaganda/war songs that would make a fitting "unofficial soundtrack patch" if it were possible to apply such a thing.

-k