Matrix Games Forums

Originally posted by Erik Rutins
In v1.00 player reports and my own PBEM experience, I did notice a tendency for certain areas to become quite clogged with mines. Even though deep water mines were very ineffective, they still worked well enough to encourage mass mining. Minelayers would mine the Slot for instance, run back to Shortlands and then mine some more.

I think everyone at Matrix realized that the mine rules were being exploited to a degree and that they needed a second look. Paul Vebber was certainly invaluable in this as he has a lot of experience in this field professionally and was happy to provide a lot of input to the public and development forums.

- Erik

Hi Erik,

I can understand the reason for concern but what I am not clear about is whether the objective is to discourage player strategies like Mining the slot because they are not historically feasible or because nobody actually did it.

Clearly, if players have merely discovered an alternative strategy for interdicting ships passing through the slot then there is no real reason why the game should be altered to stop them using it.

However, if in reality that strategy was not practical in then the reason it was not practical should be modelled into the program so that all mining operations are appropriately restricted.

From what I have read it would seem that, whether or not mining the slot should be a feasible strategy, the changes being proposed to stop it are not an accurate reflection of the actual limitations on the use of mines.

For instance the limitation of mine loading to Truk and Noumea seems to be just an arbitarty game mechanism to discourage players from using mines. And even if Truk and Noumea were the only bases historically to have a Mine loading facility the suggestion that players wishing to adopt a mine focused strategy should not be allowed to build one somewhere else would be no different than preventing them building an airbase at a location that never really had a one or adding a ship to to a TF with ships it never actually served with.

Personally, I would like to see the solution to this problem discussed in a bit more detail on this forum and a better understanding reached before any major changes are made to the way Mine Warfare works in the game.

Originally posted by Didz


Hi Erik,

I can understand the reason for concern but what I am not clear about is whether the objective is to discourage player strategies like Mining the slot because they are not historically feasible or because nobody actually did it.

Good post Didz. The Slot was mined by the US, and resulted in the loss of something like 4 DDs, damage to a CA, damage to a BB, probably sunk a sub or two, and damage / sinking of an indeterminate number of smaller ships and transports. Japanese mining doctrine was primarily defensive, they laid very few offensive minefields, so their mining was limited mostly to port protection. This caused immense problems later in the War as the US went over to the offensive in areas that had been held by the Japanese and heavily mined (such as in Indonesia, the PI, and Japan itself). Mines layed in WW2 accounted for losses of, or damage to, ships in the Pacific as late as 1950 according to my information.

I had more or less given up on Mines having laid a lot around Noumea without seeing any benefit and having realised that as a result my convoys were now making lengthy detours in and out of port. So, I decided to put my DM's in mothballs.

However, before this I had laid three minefields in the channel between Guadacanal and Malaita. (Hexes 39:41; 40:40; 40:41)

I must admit that this was mainly becuase I was getting bored with moving my DM's back and forth laying mines near my ports. And I've been regretting ever since.

With the Malaita channel mined my subs and PT boats heading for Iron Bottom Sound have been making enormous detours right round the island rather then risk the channel. I even considered trying to clear them again with MSW's but the distance and nearby enemy base discouraged me from risking my minesweepers.

Anyway, I'm glad I didn't because following The Third Battle of Guadacanal (see AAR thread) the IJN Super CV TF has been hovering about at the mouth of the slot frightening my replenishment convoys and bombarding the 1st Marine Div. on Rennel Island.

It appears that the AI's CV TF commanders are far more cautious than mine and carefully avoided coming with LBA range of Nevea during daylight hours. He did however like to nip into Iron Bottom Sound and Lunga at night.

This was getting really annoying until on 5/11/42 he decided to sail south of Guadacanal presumably in the hope of catching one of my convoys. That night instead of doubling back to the slot he decided to circumvent Guadacanal and return to Iron Bottom Sound via the Malaita Channel.

The first I heard of this was when there was a loud bang and a message appeared telling me that the Light Carrier Ryujo had hit a mine in 39:41. The enemy CV TF travelled on to 40:40 and stopped as if uncertain what to do next, in fact they were lucky there was a thunderstorm otherwise my LBA would have descended on them because they were well within range.

They launched another airstrike on Rennel the next day and then appear to have tried to double back again through hex 39:41 becuase on the night of the 6/11/42 I received not one but two messages reporting that both the CL Naton and DD Akitsuki had hit mines.

The TF then doubled back yet again sailing straight through the minefield at 40:40 and are now heading back to Truk with their tails between their legs.

A victory for mine warefare in my opinion. Probably saved the lives of hundreds of my Marines on Rennel.

Some of you might find this zipped spreadsheet interesting.

Originally posted by dgaad


Good post Didz. The Slot was mined by the US, and resulted in the loss of something like 4 DDs, damage to a CA, damage to a BB, probably sunk a sub or two, and damage / sinking of an indeterminate number of smaller ships and transports. Japanese

I can find no evidence the SLOT itself, per se, was mined by the US.

Three of those DDs were the famous Blackett Strait mining; Blackett Stait is a tiny, shallow gap between two of the Islands near New Georgia, not the actual slot.

There was an additional destroyer sunk by mining along the coast of Guadalcanal where the Tokyo Express attempted to land reinforcements.

What are the specifics of the CA and BB damage you're claiming?

The serious problem I have is people thinking you can lay mines ACROSS the Slot and have major units not specifically entering ports or landing troops, in a precise location, hit them. The slot is generally 2 hexes wide; that's 60 miles, or (very roughly) 1800 square miles.

Once again, I desperately am looking for a seafloor map of the slot but I suspect you'll find that most slot hexes only have a tiny fraction of the hex shallow enough for US mines.

What does a "mine field tender" do...besides tend minefields, LOL? Polish the mines with brasso?

Originally posted by JohnK


Three of those DDs were the famous Blackett Strait mining; Blackett Stait is a tiny, shallow gap between two of the Islands near New Georgia, not the actual slot.

There was an additional destroyer sunk by mining along the coast of Guadalcanal where the Tokyo Express attempted to land reinforcements.

The serious problem I have is people thinking you can lay mines ACROSS the Slot and have major units not specifically entering ports or landing troops, in a precise location, hit them. The slot is generally 2 hexes wide; that's 60 miles, or (very roughly) 1800 square miles.

Once again, I desperately am looking for a seafloor map of the slot but I suspect you'll find that most slot hexes only have a tiny fraction of the hex shallow enough for US mines.

JohnK : you are most likely correct with respect to the depth of the Slot being unsuitable for US mines. There were mines laid off Tasssafronga Point, which as you say did result in some damage to some resupply attempts, though the info either of us have on that is sketchy.

I am not interested in whether or not the Slot or other deep waters can be mined per se, however. Whatever is decided about WHERE mines can actually be laid will I'm sure be the correct decision, as we know for sure what the maximal depth limits were for US mines, and we also know that deep water mining is extremely inefficient (decay rate).

My major concern, once again, has to do with the concept of "operational flexibility". Tying either side down to mineloading only in Noumea or Truk does in large measure force players to use their resources in a certain way that is not justified by sound military judgement -- regardless of whether or not there is historical evidence that the "mine center" moved during the period simulated in the game.

Originally posted by juliet7bravo
"mine field tender"

That's a quote from a Japanese sailor in response to a question from a doctor who was at the moment pressing his hand against a gaping wound : "What happened?"

Hi, I would think mine field tenders looked after mines around friendly ports. Not mines laid around enemy bases.
I have found that 2 of the Aussie mine warfare ships in UV were sunk sweeping their own minefields (after the war so the crews were probably not as experianced as the war year crews.)
One was the Minelayer based out of Sidny (later Brisbane) the other a minesweeper.

I posted this earlier on a mine thread. It details the US mining activities in the context of the game.

SInce this whole argument seems to mostly boil down to limiting the location of the real world - NON MOBILE - mine assembly depot at Noumea, to Noumea, i would ask why there is then nto a cry to allow the NON-mobile infrastructure at Pearl to be moved? Or that the player control the upgrade path of aircraft, or teh arrival of ships into theater, or chooing not to focus on the Carrier but the submarine?

Because the game places you in the role of operational commander of teh SW Pacific and as him, you could not control these decisions.

WITP will allow STRATEGIC level decision making with more flexibilty, but there are some things, like the starting locations of major bases - including the Mine assembly base - that are being locatied where they where located. And not being mobile facilities, they can;t be moved!

Later in the war (the one link deals with Seabees building mine assembly depots in 1944 - after a more pro-mining strategic decision was made) one should get more flexibility, and you will have it in WITP.

But I and the otheres on the design and Beta teams feel the patch provides an historically justifiied limitation that reflects what the real commander, SWPAC had to deal with. Air mining was of arguable efficacy, being done altogether in numbers similar to surface mining, but spread out in "penny packets" that were easily countered. You can argue you might have used them differently, but it was really an immature capability that did not become effective until after teh time frame of the game.

It is no more "arbitrary" than any of a hundred other decisions ot based what was avalaible to the player on what was historically available...

When you are CINC PAC in WITP you will have more options (becasue you have the means at that level to influence them)

That's the decision that has been made. It may not be to the liking of those that want to use 10s of thousands of mines, but <3000 were used in real life in the Solomans because that was about all that could be used given the strategic decisions made above the players head.

You will just have to wait for WITP to play an ahistroically high "heavy mining" strategy.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note that "Mine tenders" tended minlayers - NOT minfields. Small baots were used to "tend minfields" (ie reseed defensive minefields to fill in holidays where mines broke free or sank.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

US WWII mines primarily consisted of WWI era moored type MKVI with the K-device. Use of aerial laid magnetic bottom mines offensively in enemy waters increased steadily as the war went on. Remote controlled bottom mines were also used defensively in many US ports between the wars, and were in place in a great many areas on Dec 7th 1941, including San Francisco, Boston, New York, Los Angles/Long Beach, Portland ME, the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, the Straits of Juan de Fuca and Columbia River entrance. Many more were laid during the war, mostly in US ports, but also at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Manila, Philippines, Puerto Rico and St. Thomas.

Against Surface ships the maximum depth bottom mines of that era are effective is about 20 fathoms (120 ft) they can cause damage to poorly constructed vessels to about 30 fm, but the magnetic coil sensors may not “see” the target signature properly the deeper the mine and slower the vessel goes. Moored mines could be effectively used down t about 100fm, below which depth internal currents made it almost impossible to keep them close enough to the surface to be effective.

The stockpiles of MKVI mines was of dubious quality, and it was late 43 before “new” generation mines were available in any numbers. Those used in the Uncommon Valor context were nearly all these WWI type.

Defensive minefields were laid off Manilla Bay and Subic Bay, by Bird calss minesweepers before the war started. in the Pacifc at Pago Pago by the Bird class KINGFISHER in late Dec 41 – 82 mines off Cape Faguaso and Taema Bank. These were the first mines laid by the USN in WWII.

In the Uncommon Valor Area of Operations the following Defensive mining ops of note ocured (many other smaller minelays occurred, but these described here represent those ordered as part of what the game would consider “Mine-laying Task forces”

In March 42 GAMBLE and RAMSEY planted six more minefield of Tuila for a total of 400 mines. These were still old WWI MKVI types as the newer WWII era mines were still yet to get out of production.

GAMBLE, RAMSEY and KINGFISHER then sailed to Fiji where they laid 26 mine fileds totaling 843 mines.

RAMSEY and MONTGOMERY laid fields in May and early June 42 at the entrance to Apra Harbor on the island of Efate

After the Efate mining op, MONTGOMERY sailed to the Tonga Group and laid some 551 mines around Tongatabu. Nature itself kept trying to sweep this field as on several occasions many explosions were observed form the field , shortly after which dozens of whale bodies floated into the harbor.

August 2 42 GAMBLE, TRACY and BREEZE laid fields at both ends of the Segond Channel between Espiritu Santo Island and Aore island. Unfortunatley USS Tucker (DD-374) escorting SS Nura Luckenback, struck a mine and sank within hours. BREESE made a mad dash through an uncharted channel it knew existed and picked up surviors. This field claimed a second friendly transitor in Oct 42, whenthe troop transport President Coolidge tried to deliver 5050 troops and heavy weapons to relieve Guadalcanal’s defenders. Despite repeated warnings she was standing into danger, the transport ignored the channel markings and plowed into several mines, ran aground on a reef and later sank. She is now one of the most dived wrecks in the area. Only four lives were lost, miraculously form the 5100+ aboard.

After patching the hole the President Coolidge left in the Segond Channel field in Dec 42, In Feb 43 GAMBLE laid a field at Nandi Waters, composition unknown.

Episodes like the Tucker and President Coolidge are why more extensive use of defensive minefields was not used more extensively.

Offensive mining

The vast majority of Offensive mining was Areial mining of Japan’s home waters in two zones. In the outer zone, 7762 magnetic, 960 acoustic, 124 mag.acoustic combination, 33 pressure/magnetic and 268 contact fdrifting mines (all in the Yangtze river) mines were laid. 106 dummymines were laid in the India Burma theater. In the inner zone 4291 magnetic, 3507 acoustic, 2959 acoustic/pressure combination, 748 low frequency acoustic. A total of 22,919 were loaded and 21389 deployed for an efficiency of 93.3% Mines laid per aircraft loss was 231. Less than half of those lost were to enemy fire. This caused 1,067,963 tons of Japanese shipping sunk and 1,221,453 damaged and later repaired. That likely represents only a fraction of what was actually lost, as most records were lost.

Despite this offensive mining was not part of any general plan or war plan, most were originated at a low level and sent up the chain were they were approved. Naval mines were generally deemed “orphaned weapons” of WWI. Despite its effectiveness it was “too little, too late” to affect overall strategic bombing resource allocation.

“Operational” level aerial minlaying occurred throughout the Uncommon Valor area and timeframe. The first aerial minelaying in the Solomons was done by TBF bombers from VT-11 and USMC VMSB-143. All told 10th Army Air Force flew 143 mining sorties with 505 mines on target at a cost of 2 planes, 14th AAF flew 32 sorties with 1092 mines laid and lost 4 planes. 20th Bomber command flew 162 sories laying 987 mines and lost no planes, 5th AAF, under the command of MacArthur, who had unusual derision for mines as a “losers weapon” flew only 4 sorties laying 24 mines (probably resulting the squadron commander being sacked…) The RAAF flew 1128 sorties with 2498 mines on target at a loss of 11 planes.

Submarine mining of Japanese home waters proved VERY efficient, with fewer than 700 mines sinking at least 27 ships and damaging some 30 others. IN the Uncommon Valor AOR, the following Offense minelays occurred:

Between Aug 7, 42 and may 44 DMs and LCI’s laid some 2817 moored contact mines and 12 magnetic ground mines in 17 fields in the Solomon Islands area from Guadalcanal to Bougainville. The first of these was Aug 8 42 when TRACY laid a string of 84 mines in Marimasike Passage along the East coast of Maliata Island. Though it produced no known results, it eliminated a short cut for japans Destroyers, and keep at least one peace of coastline occupied by the USMC, protected. For the next few months a few high speed minelayers, APD’s, old WWI destroyers converted to minelaying were the first line of defense for US forces in and around Guadalcanal. After the 3rd battle of Savo Ilsand most other US warships were withdrawn form the area to avoid being found by the large number of Japanese forces in the restricted waters of the Solomon chain.

The old WWI 4-stackers managed to get their licks in as GAMBLE 9DM-15) sank the I-123 on Aug 29 42. Oddly the GAMBLE carried the same hull number as the Japanese sub she sank, which was a designed minelayer, possibly engaged in the same activity as GAMBLE when sunk. SOUTHARD a DMS, happened upon the I-172 and managed to get a 4in round through her conning tower as she surfaced for a look around following a long chase.

On Feb1st 43 TRACY, MONTGOMERY and PREBLE left Noumea (where the mine depot for the entire theater was located and all minelaying missions had to leave from) and headed for Doma Reef, between New Georgia and Santo Isabel Islands. This was on the route generally taken by the Tokyo Express. A few hours before the scheduled minlay, coast watchers reported “a whole bunch” of warships headed for the area – actually 14 ships mostly destroyers, but with a handful of Cruisers. The MinDiv Commander LCDR J.L. Collis, also skipper of the Tracy, orders all ships to proceed at flank speed, by 1900 hours the group was charging through Lengo channel off the eastern end of Guadalcanal. All the other US ships were hightailing it the other direction. By now darkness at fallen and with it came a series of squalls that made it impossible to see from ship to ship. The group literally managed to lay their field, in nearly impossible conditions, right under the Japanese noses, and the Destroyer Makiguma, trying to sneak down the coast of Guadalcanal to harass the Marines, found one of Tracy’s mines to be the first Japanese vessel sunk by offensive minefields. Collis received the Legion of merit and promotion to Full Commander and the MIDIV was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

GAMBLE , BREEZE, and PREBLE again set out 4 MAY 43 and loade form the SS James McPherson, which was used to shuttle mines from the depot at Noumea. At Tulagi they met RADFORD, which was a new 2100 flush deck with radar. Beset by squalls once again and suffering leaky boiler on GAMBLE and a defective fireroom blower on BREESE the MINDIV managed to get the field in place. IT was found by the Japanese on May 8th as four destroyers tried to run the Blackett Straits. The next morning the coastwatcher on Guadalcanal reported 3 ships in the passage, one burning, one DIW and the other rendering assistance. Unknown to him the 4th had sunk in the night. This news was greeted at Hendeson field with a “Saddle up boys, we have STATIONARY TARGETS”. Within 2 hours 60 SBD’s, TBF’s, F4U’s and P-40s took off to deal with the fish in the barrel. Oyashio – the undamaged one took a 1000lb bomb, Kuroshio and Kagero were either abanonded from the straffing, or stranded on shoals. Remarkably, the Michisio’ profuse fire likely saved her as she seemed to be ignored by the wolves overhead who apparently thought here going down, and slipped away.

On May 12th James Mcpherson with RADFORD in the van led the MINDIV to the Kula Gulf between Kolombangara and New Georgia were they laid 255 mines again, right under the noses of the Japanese. ADM Halsey sent a personnel note of congratulations to the CO’s of the ships involved.

After a 10 day R&R in Brisbane, GAMBLE, PREBLE and BREESE once again met up in Noumea at the new mine depot at Duco Peninsula. They left 29 JUN 43 with new escort PRINGLE and headed for Efete to meet up with MONTGOMERY. They deployed several hundred mines off Shortland and returned to Purvis Bay.

The next major sortie f the MINDIV was 24 Aug 43. This was to be a “hot run” so upon leaving for Vella Lavella and the Japanese airfield at Kahili so the destroyers NICHOLAS, O’BANNON, TAYLOR, and CHEVALIER joined PRINGLE. They would drop a few shells on the airfield at Munda if they had no other action. 252 mines went in the water and the minelayers began to turn to head back for home when either PREBLE turned too late or MONTGOMERY turned too early. In any case despite MONTGMERY’s emergency maneuvering and PREBLE trying to maximize her turn rate, Preble sliced into the side of MONTGOMERY. Though no one was hurt, Montgomery was reduced t 10 knots and was taking on a dangerous amount of water. Despite 4 bombs being dropped but missing badly, she managed to find a Squall (Minelayeers semed particularly adept at attracting thunderheads!) and lipped away.

Supporting the planned invasion of Bougainville was the next minelaying event, begun 1 NOV 43. The minelay began 0100 on the 2nd and 176 mines off Otua Island. At 0230 as GAMBLE,BREESE, and SICARD were leaving they passed two destroyer squadrons and a cruiser division going the other way. The Battle of Emperor Augusta Bay commenced at 0247.

On 8 Nov TRACY, PRUITT, GAMBLE, and SICARD planted 350 ines near Otua to keep the Japanese form sneaking down the mortheast side of Bougainville. That was the largest single field planted in the Solomons.

Then on 24 Nov GAMBEL, TRACY, PRUITT, and SICARD laid 252 mines from Moila Point to the Turube Channel, closing off all access to the Shortland area.

In November 43 the forward Mine Assembly Depot #4 at Guadalcanal was operational and was used to supply aerial mines to Navy, Marine and RNZAF seaplanes which dropped 42 mines into the narrow pass between Buka Island and the extreme NW tip of Bougainville. Japanese supply barges were using the sheltered pass to ferry supplies, out of sight of US forces on the island. This did little to stem the flow of supplies however as the mostly wooden barges didn’t have the draft, speed or signature to actuate the mines.

SICARD and BREESE with the DD HALFORD planted 168 mines on May 2 1944 near Taiof Island and 168 more in the East Buka Passage. Still the supplies were getting through.

In a last ditch attempt to end the barge supply problem, a group of PT boats were sent up from the Treasury Is. To scout the coast and check the soundings (which turned out to be bad) and found the only way to block the channel was to do some very shallow water mining. LCI’s 59 and 68 carrying mines supplied and assembled at Torokino Depot #5 snuck into the very mouths of the Hongoria, Mobiai, Mibb, and Purita Rivers (from which the Japanese barges were operating) and left 3 MK 13-5 magnetic mines in each river entrance. That ended the mining efforts in the Solomons.

In total 13 fields were laid by DM's consisting of 2617 MKVI mines with the K device (an automated plumb bob for depth setting) were laid in 34 sorties. The 12 MK13-5’s laid by the LCI were the only magnetic mines used in the theater. LCIs also laid 200 MKVI's

Most of this was taken from "NAVAL MINESWEEPING: Where teh fleet goes, we've been" Published by the Naval Mine Warfare Association, written form the Oral historyies of its members who performed in the actions by Dick Hansen.

There is also an official slogan of the a different association that deals with MineLAYING, and it is : "No fleet goes where we've been."

I note that not a word is said about the Australian Minelaying and sweeping efforts.

Originally posted by Paul Vebber
GAMBLE , BREEZE, and PREBLE again set out 4 MAY 43 and loade form the SS James McPherson, which was used to shuttle mines from the depot at Noumea.

Let me say up front, that I don't see any problem with limiting loading from set ports. That said (and utiilizing the above exerpt), might it be possible (at least later on) for mines to have been assembled at Truk/Noumea and loaded on transports for forward deployment? This might satisfy many of those who don't like the idea of the fixed ports.

I never was enthused about the idea of high supply use translated into mines at the forward bases (or at least as high as I saw listed - 200 sp per mine equates to a 1500 ton capacity transport carrying an equivalent of 7½ mines - I'd rather load at Truk :p ).

But for transports to be able to carry mines, there would have to be a determination made on what the mine assembly depots could produce a day plus what stockpile (if any) they would have to start with. This number would be reduced by what was used by minelayers. Also, since it doesn't look like it was used until later on, this could be limited to only after a certain date. The addition of the Australian mine depot would tend to give the Allies an advantage over the Japanese. But I could sure use that Australian ML!

Just a thought . . .

Originally posted by Paul Vebber

WITP will allow STRATEGIC level decision making with more flexibilty, but there are some things, like the starting locations of major bases - including the Mine assembly base - that are being locatied where they where located. And not being mobile facilities, they can;t be moved!

Later in the war (the one link deals with Seabees building mine assembly depots in 1944 - after a more pro-mining strategic decision was made) one should get more flexibility, and you will have it in WITP.

These two statements contradict each other. If something can't be moved, how did it get there in the first place? If something can't be moved, how is it that it was possible to move after a "strategic decision" was made?

Originally posted by Paul Vebber

Air mining was of arguable efficacy, being done altogether in numbers similar to surface mining, but spread out in "penny packets" that were easily countered.

Are you referring to the massive air-mining effort in the last 5 months of the war, known as "Operation Starvation" which many historical contemporaries, including Japanese military figures, have stated virtually shut down all remaining merchant shipping? You call it of "arguable" efficency -- I haven't seen any arguements from any historical contemporary which says that it wasn't effective or easily countered.

I don't know why I bother responding.

I obviously stated that the section was about US mining in the Solomans...There is no Australian mining in a piece titled US mining in the Solomans by definition.

Are you really interested in sloganeering? or a game that deals with something real...

These two statements contradict each other. If something can't be moved, how did it get there in the first place? If something can't be moved, how is it that it was possible to move after a "strategic decision" was made?

Umm because if you are involved in the STRATEGIC decision to put it there in the first place, then you (as the CINC) get to decide where "there" is. At the operational level you don't.

The difference between being involved in the decision to build an immovable piece of infrastructure someplace and later building mobile equivalents should be obvious to anyone...

Are you referring to the massive air-mining effort in the last 5 months of the war, known as "Operation Starvation" which many historical contemporaries, including Japanese military figures, have stated virtually shut down all remaining merchant shipping? You call it of "arguable" efficency -- I haven't seen any arguements from any historical contemporary which says that it wasn't effective or easily countered.

Obviously not since that ocurred *AFTER THE GAME IS OVER*:rolleyes:

I'm talking about the 2500 or so mines I referred to in the piece as "operational level" aerial mining. Do you want to be able to execute operation Starvation in the Soloman's in 1943?.

You DID READ IT didn't you?

I don't no how many times I have to say it but...

UV and WITP WILL BE DIFFERENT and making UV the same as WITP is not warrented.

You can disagree all you want, but this is a pretty cut and dried case that has been decided.

Misquoting me to try to advance your point is...well...pointless and only succeeded in making yourself look childish trying vainly to get yout own way.

As far as I'm concernered you've demonstrated a lack any further pertinant argument and are simply being argumentative for arguments sake with these last comments...

Paul,

Please calm down. You sound strident.
Your point is made, we will learne to live with it. =)

All is subordinated to the quest for a good simulation.

Originally posted by Paul Vebber
I don't know why I bother responding.

I obviously stated that the section was about US mining in the Solomans...There is no Australian mining in a piece titled US mining in the Solomans by definition.

I thought you were using these comments to justify design decisions. If so, then the design decision needs to be based on data relating to mine warfare in this theater during this period -- and that include Aussie efforts. If not, thanks for the info provided by the text, it was extremely interesting and provides basis for further research.

Are you really interested in sloganeering? or a game that deals with something real...

I just thought it was an interesting tidbit.

Umm because if you are involved in the STRATEGIC decision to put it there in the first place, then you (as the CINC) get to decide where "there" is. At the operational level you don't.

I understand your frustration with having to say this over and over again. Believe me I do understand the difference. However, it wasn't clear to me that all of your comments were directed solely at UV design criteria. Some of your comments appeared to be saying that in WitP you will not be able to move "mine assembly" facilities there either, until after a certain time. I've stated in previous posts I don't have a huge problem with the fixed locations concept in UV, so long as it is viewed as a workaround here. My main concern is that this concept will be carried over to WitP, where it not appropriate IMO.

I do believe the basic disagreement here is whether or not the location of mine loading facilities is a strategic decision or an operational one.

The difference between being involved in the decision to build an immovable piece of infrastructure someplace and later building mobile equivalents should be obvious to anyone...

Again, it wasn't clear to me in your original comments whether these comments were being used to justify design decisions for WitP as well.

Obviously not since that ocurred *AFTER THE GAME IS OVER*:rolleyes:

I'm talking about the 2500 or so mines I referred to in the piece as "operational level" aerial mining. Do you want to be able to execute operation Starvation in the Soloman's in 1943?.

You DID READ IT didn't you?

Yes, I did read it, and again I wasn't sure if you said that mining was of questionable efficacy to justify WitP design, or UV design. Main concern is historical data being used to justify design criteria where the design results in fixed locations for facilities. About the only kind of facility that is not truely moveable are ship construction facilities. As you know, all kinds of facilities were in fact moved during WW2, including strategic bombing bases, factories of immense size and tool infrastructure, ship resupply facilities, and so forth.

I don't no how many times I have to say it but...

UV and WITP WILL BE DIFFERENT and making UV the same as WITP is not warrented.

You can disagree all you want, but this is a pretty cut and dried case that has been decided.

Misquoting me to try to advance your point is...well...pointless and only succeeded in making yourself look childish trying vainly to get yout own way.

Sorry you feel that way. My basic point is very simple : operational flexibility should be the baseline design criteria. The fact that something wasn't moved in a given timeframe is not solid evidence that it could not or would not have been moved had the operational situation been different. Different operational situations are in fact the goal of most wargame simulations.

Its too bad you characterise the situation as "cut and dried." UV was released with a certain scheme for mine warfare operations and features that support the original design in this area. Clearly, the REASON that FIXED LOCATIONS are now being IMPLEMENTED is because the PLAYERS started using MINES in huge numbers. The REASON for this change is NOT HISTORICAL, its a WORKAROUND to curtail something that is essentially an exploit.

In one of my VERY FIRST POSTs on this subject, I said that it would be better to find an easy to implement scheme that allows for operational flexibility, and I've even laid out that scheme in several posts. Now, I'm getting signals from some of you that "Oh, okay, well it turns out the Noumea mine facility was never moved and so this is our reason." Sorry if this strikes me as a bit too "convenient". I say again : its an operational decision as to where a facility like this is located, just like its an operational decision where you decide to locate a large airbase.

As far as I'm concernered you've demonstrated a lack any further pertinant argument and are simply being argumentative for arguments sake with these last comments...

I believe I am right, and therefore what I say may seem simply argumentative. I did not restate my basic premises from other posts as I assumed you had read them. Nothing that has been said is solid evidence that mine loading facilities cannot be moved. Where these facilities are located is not a strategic decision, but an operational one. Whether or not they are available at all to a theater commander is the strategic decision. If the Japanese had been bombing or shelling Noumea on a regular basis, the facility would have been located elsewhere due to operational concerns.

To further expound on this basic disagreement, I believe that there are essentially three layers to any decision in military matters : strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic level concerns the amount of resources directed to a theater and the general goals of all military operations (offensive, defensive, etc), Operational is concerned with the allotment, location and organization of force (we locate HERE and will be using carrier groups), Tactical concerns the method and manner of the use of forces (We will use two carrier groups and move to attack position at dawn).

I cannot accept that the location of a facility that supports purely tactical operations is a "strategic" decision as you have defined it. Where I place my mines (a tactical decision) is going to have alot to do with where the mine loading facility is placed. If its placed at Noumea, I'm going to be operationally and tactically constrained. No strategic level commander would desire their operational level (theater) commanders to be constrained in this way.

I think the best way to resolve this issue allowing the creation/movement of mine depots/base s with the editor.

In the game I'm still playing I've sunk 223 Jap ships (only seven were sunk by mines, many more damaged). This included 3 SS, 2 DD, 1 PG, and 1 CV. The carrier was a flaming wreck after a battle, detached and tried to take a short cut through a mine field.

Mines could be abused pre-patch because mines fields didn't decay and mine sweeping didn't work very well. I'm not totally happy with the current mine rules either but, think changing the editor is the way to go.

PS: Gee until I got my copy of UV I didn't know MacArthur was a mine supply office who had to oversee the loading all mines, this is why there is only one mine base (Right!) because MacArthur couldn't be two places at once, and why we have to dock the ships before we reload them, because the ships have to wait around for MacArthur to show up, now I get it:eek:

Hi

I am so happy about the mine fix in the new patch. Sure it was a nice feature but not the huge amount of mines that could be laid. In one turn four of my SS hit mines:eek: My poor heart never recovered:)

Please let us end this discussion on mines.
Dan

Originally posted by U2
Hi

I am so happy about the mine fix in the new patch. Sure it was a nice feature but not the huge amount of mines that could be laid. In one turn four of my SS hit mines:eek: My poor heart never recovered:)

Please let us end this discussion on mines.
Dan

This discussion has not been, from the very beginning, about letting people lay the number of mines that were laid pre-patch. I've said this a dozen times, I will say it again this time a little differently : implement a scheme which gives the players OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY on the location of mine loading facilities, then layer on limits to the numbers that can be laid (by limiting numbers available, increasing the cost of mines, etc, any one of a dozen ways).