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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Destroying x armoured divisions might be welcome but a Soviet commander who turned down an opportunity to blow the entire German front open by running for Arnhem and, instead, chose to carry out some lateral attack against 9th or 10th SS forces south of the river would have been taken out and shot - and rightfully so. If 9th or 10th SS units had been south of the river the Soviet commander would have detailed some of his independent sub-units to screen the flank while his main force pounded up the road towards Arnhem and his reserve sat somewhat centrally ready to either punch through Arnhem ( if the main force proved incapable of doing so ) or to stop the 9th or 10th SS from cutting the road ( the former would have been much preferred for obvious reasons ).

The next echelon ( another armoured division ) would then, ideally, have passed through the gap in the enemy lines at Arnhem and driven hell for leather for the next river line and set of bridges hoping that by breaking through at Arnhem whilst the 1st echelon was fully engaged with enemy operational reserves ( 9th and 10th SS ) they'd get an opportunity to break into the enemy's Strategic Depth and dislocate the entire enemy defensive line.

Arnhem was nice but since the enemy's operational reserves were located there it was actually not the place to stop. You have to punch past the operational reserves in order to get into the strategic depth. I used to play the Panther Games games of Arnhem and would handle the Allies as though they were Soviet - even though they weren't TO&Ed or OOBed for that - and the games invariably ended up with the German operational reserves (9th and 10th SS ) getting drawn into a battle around Arnhem while a Tank Division crossed the river elsewhere and raced past Arnhem towards deeper targets with independent sub-units split off to screen their left flank ( they usually passed Arnhem to its east ) against any attempt by German operational reserves to disentangle themselves from Arnhem.

Nemo,

while I agree with you and your points are well made, I want to quibble with some of your details which I feel are relevant to an analysis of Market Garden.

The bridges at Arnhem were chosen as the strategic objective because seizing them would dislocate the entire German defense.

The 9th and 10th SS Panzer were essentially sitting on the objective. There was no lateral attack from the main line of advance to attack and destroy these divisions during Market Garden of which I am aware. At the time XXX Corps had linked up with the 82nd at Nijmagen, these two SS Panzer "divisions" (they were very understrength) had secured the objective, pushed blocking forces to the south into the very restricted terrain between Nijmagen and Arnhem (along the main enemy axis of advance), and were attempting to destroy the British airborne troops in the vicinity. Thus, I would argue that even the presence of a reinforced airborne division was inadequate to fix the German reserves in any effective sense.

Although I have not studied the actual terrain in detail, the experienced Allied commanders on the ground did not identify a viable bypass across the the branches of the Rhine that they could exploit with the troops and time available, thus I caution lessons learned from gaming the campaign. the terrain in this region provided numerous choke points, and as all the Allies had come to learn, even small German armor units inthe defense were very difficult customers when they could not be effectively bypassed or destoyed from the air.

That being said, certainly Market Garden is an example of the risks of deep operations as part of deep battle and compares unfavorably to Bagration in terms of strategic and operational planning. The most basic differences being the lack of effective deception (maskirovka) and ignoring reconnaissance about the presence of enemy reserves all combined with the gamble on an attack along a very narrow front.

Mike

p.s. While not on many people's must read list, Urquhart's book, Arnhem , is a very quick read and a very frank account of the battle from his perspective as the Commander of the British 1st Airborne. Very tactical in its lessons learned though. Not really relevant to the topic of Deep Battle.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


Also I'd make the point that in Deep Battle the objective was pretty much always geographical. Destroying x armoured divisions might be welcome but a Soviet commander who turned down an opportunity to blow the entire German front open by running for Arnhem and, instead, chose to carry out some lateral attack against 9th or 10th SS forces south of the river would have been taken out and shot - and rightfully so.

Nemo, do you think the geographical focus was a strength of the Deep Battle doctrine? I have my reservations, although it provides a clear objective for subordinate commanders.

I'm not Nemo, but as I recall, it gave NATO the willies.

Harry, can you explain in more detail?
Mike

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace




Nemo, do you think the geographical focus was a strength of the Deep Battle doctrine? I have my reservations, although it provides a clear objective for subordinate commanders.

I'm not Nemo, but as I recall, it gave NATO the willies.

Harry, can you explain in more detail?
Mike

We didn't have the operational depth to stop a high-momentum WP attack if it got moving, and it would have moved. There would have been Soviet airborne, osnaz, and spetnaz troops throughout our zone. We had to kill the WP forces as fast as they moved within range of our weapons systems. We could, but we had no tolerance for error, and if the Soviets had gone NBC, it would have been spectacular. You have no idea how thankful I was for the end of the Cold War.

Herwin, I had a buddy in a recon unit posted in the Fulda Gap (their mission was to radio that the flag was up before they died) who expressed similar opinions. He was more confident after introduction of our latest gen tanks, but still very worried.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: herwin




I'm not Nemo, but as I recall, it gave NATO the willies.

Harry, can you explain in more detail?
Mike

We didn't have the operational depth to stop a high-momentum WP attack if it got moving, and it would have moved. There would have been Soviet airborne, osnaz, and spetnaz troops throughout our zone. We had to kill the WP forces as fast as they moved within range of our weapons systems. We could, but we had no tolerance for error, and if the Soviets had gone NBC, it would have been spectacular. You have no idea how thankful I was for the end of the Cold War.

Harry,

I agree that if the WP actually were able to implement their doctrine with anything even approximating the proficiency of the OPFOR at the NTC during the 80s, it would have been very ugly--even with the fielding of M1s and M2s. I did 8 rotations at the NTC in the post M60/M113 era and 29 at the JRTC, seeing something like 100 force-on-force engagements at the brigade level. Maybe 20% went to BlueFor, and that was with very favorable combat ratios by the standard of what one might have expected to see in Western Europe.

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace




Harry, can you explain in more detail?
Mike

We didn't have the operational depth to stop a high-momentum WP attack if it got moving, and it would have moved. There would have been Soviet airborne, osnaz, and spetnaz troops throughout our zone. We had to kill the WP forces as fast as they moved within range of our weapons systems. We could, but we had no tolerance for error, and if the Soviets had gone NBC, it would have been spectacular. You have no idea how thankful I was for the end of the Cold War.

Harry,

I agree that if the WP actually were able to implement their doctrine with anything even approximating the proficiency of the OPFOR at the NTC during the 80s, it would have been very ugly--even with the fielding of M1s and M2s. I did 8 rotations at the NTC in the post M60/M113 era and 29 at the JRTC, seeing something like 100 force-on-force engagements at the brigade level. Maybe 20% went to BlueFor, and that was with very favorable combat ratios by the standard of what one might have expected to see in Western Europe.

The OPFOR at the NTC was regarded as by far the most proficient and professional WP unit in the world.

vettim89,

Aye, the Suez counterattack was a pretty good example of an army striking deep for a strategically important geographical target which would dislocate the entire front line. It also featured elements of operational and quasi-strategic air usage but benefited significantly in that the Eqyptians didn't really ever get a mobile armoured strategic reserve going. But as an example of something quite resembling a Deep Battle I think it shows how cutting through operational lines of communication, preventing lateral movement along the front and disrupting command, communications, local and operational reserves etc worked together to collapse a front relatively cheaply ( once the initial breakthrough was made ).

As to the Syrians. Well the problem with the Syrians was that while they tried to strike deep they didn't actually follow Deep Battle doctrine because they really didn't do anything to stop the gathering and dispatching of Israeli operational and strategic reserves. When you look at that battle the committment of the Israeli tactical/operational reserves slowed the advance and stopped it in several places and their strategic reserves halted the breakthroughs which did occur. If Syria had dropped persistent nerve agents on the locations of stockpiles of Israeli armour which the reserves would mate up with the imposition of even a 12 hour delay in sending those forces forward would have allowed Syrian spearheads to reach those armour stockpiles and capture them.

Of course, rather amazingly, the Syrians didn't have any plans to target those armoured reserves ( while they were most vulnerable, sitting in warehouses etc waiting for their reservists to match up with them ) with either conventional or non-conventional means and didn't make armoured drives at those stockpiles ( even as contingencies ) a high priority. They left the enemy's strategic reserve utterly unbothered by anything - not even long-range artillery ( which they committed to the tactical and operational fight instead ) - and were, as one would expect, defeated by those reserves as they made it into action. They, instead, relied on their pace negating those reserves and, really, that's not a good idea. In Central Europe the Soviets weren't going to rely on pace to negate Operation Reforger. No, they were going to rely on pace backed up by GRU-guided Spetsnaz operations, massed FROG strikes, airstrikes and, in quite a lot of the variants of their warfighting plans, either a mix of non-persistent and persistent nerve gas agents or nukes. Nothing says "I don't want that Bn of tanks warehoused there to interfere with the OMG like a 20 Kt ground detonation in the middle of their warehouse."

Personally I think they'd have hit the warehouses with persistent agents and then intermittent additional dustings of agents which broke down the integrity of filters - guaranteeing a rapid attrition of the number of available gasmask filters and massed casualties in future intermittent strikes. As to how they'd have timed those intermittent raids? Well, 1 GRU agent or spetsnaz team holed up in an apartment nearby could fairly rapidly spot the arrival of troops trying to ready the warehoused vehicles and/or REFORGER units. I always, personally, felt that the ability to mate the REFORGER units up with their equipment free of interference once the chemical threshold had been crossed was overestimated by Western forces.


Hartwig,
I like the Triandafillov quote. I'd also point out that when he talks about operational shock or system paralysis he is talking of the military system's inability to react to the new situation and/or react as rapidly as the situation is changing. Sounds pretty familiar to Boyd's OODA loop doesn't it? Also when he talks of the disintegration of the operational system he is talking of the disintegration of the lines of communication, supply and command. An Army of 200,000 men split into 200 groups of 1,000 men each without communication to outside elements, access to resupply or reliable command is nothing but a rabble waiting to be pursued and run down or thrown into prison camps.


Wirraway_Ace,
Yes I do believe it was. I think it gave the model clarity and an ability to operate at a higher operational tempo with clearer and more rapid decision-making than a doctrine which focussed on enemy force destruction - which necessitated many halts while recon elements fed back enemy locations and HQ digested these, issued new orders and, basically, completed the Observation, Orientation and Decision portions of the OODA loop.

Don't forget though that the geographical objective was NOT an end in and of itself. Taking that geographical objective was the military objective which would bring about the paralysis and collapse of enemy command, supply and communication elements throughout the enemy's operational depth and the dislocation of the enemy front line forces. So, the graography was a means to an end, not the end in and of itself.

I think one way of illustrating the difference between Deep Battle and Blitzkrieg was that the Soviets were determined to avoid throwing away a potential strategic victory by allowing their exploitation forces to get caught up in the operational battle zone pocketing individual regiments and divisions ( sub-operational and sub-strategic level forces ) and delaying so long sewing them all up that by the time that issue was settled the potential for a drive into the strategic depth had been prevented by the redeployment of enemy operational and strategic reserves.

The Germans weren't, doctrinally, as bothered by the desire to prevent their exploitation forces fighting the break-in battle OR the need to prevent them from getting bogged down in the operational zone. The end result of this was that many German Panzer divisions wasted large portions of their armoured fighting power conducting the break-in and then ended getting caught up in sub-operational and operational level battles designed to pocket a regiment here, a Brigade there, a Division elsewhere. Sure it looked pretty good and ended up yielding large hauls of prisoners etc BUT at what opportunity cost? In much the same way as the Vietnamese replied to American statements that American soldiers had never lost a battle in Vietnam by stating, "That's true, it is also irrelevant." I believe the Soviets would have told the post-WW2 Wehrmacht that while the Wehrmacht acheived brillitant tactical and operational feats right up until the end of the war what mattered was the Strategic level, at which the Soviets excelled from mid-43 onwards. Brilliant tactics and operations win medals and get written about in books or docudramas on the History Channel. Good, solid, focused, relevant strategic objectives arrayed in a logical sequence designed to achieve viable national policy objectives win wars. The Germans had the former. The Soviets had the latter. We know which side won the war.

This is why I think Deep Battle was superior to Blitzkrieg. It kept its utter focus ruthlessly on the Strategic Objectives, never allowed its focus to waver and sacrificed operationally and tactically in order to maximise the possibility of achieving strategically decisive objectives. It also accepted the reality that to everything there is a cost and to achieve the requisite pinning actions and breaches in the enemy front lines the PBIs ( Poor Bloody Infantry - and more modern equivalents PBMIs ) would suffer huge losses. If it achieved a breach into which they could inject a cohesive, unattrited operational manoeuvre group tasked with clear, decisive objectives then that was a price they were willing to pay.


Echeloning with a clear focus on geographical objectives allowed greater clarity and rapidity of decision-making IMO through focussing on making the enemy react to what you did - immediately putting them on the back foot of the OODA cycle. In addition I think if you look at the Soviets they clearly had Europe divided up into "strategic leaps" - which isn't a doctrinal term but is a term I always found useful when discussing that distance which a Soviet Army reasonably expected to be able to/have to drive in order to gain the next significant strategic objective which would dislocate and collapse the enemy front.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

b] I always, personally, felt that the ability to mate the REFORGER units up with their equipment free of interference once the chemical threshold had been crossed was overestimated by Western forces[/b].

Nemo, I think nearly every Soldier and officer under the rank of Major in the US Army of the era would have agreed with you.

LOL! Under the rank of Major is the key phrase there [:D]

I'll reply to the rest later. Right now I've got to see the results of the death ride of the IJN in my Downfall PBEM. Just got the turn 1 minute ago [:D]

What of the thought that crossing that threshold meant crossing the tactical nuke threshold as well (it was at least a threat)?

ORIGINAL: witpqs

What of the thought that crossing that threshold meant crossing the tactical nuke threshold as well (it was at least a threat)?

The Soviets were planning to cross that threshold at the outbreak of war. They figured it would happen anyway, and taking the initiative would improve the outcome. Think Deep Battle.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Nemo, do you think the geographical focus was a strength of the Deep Battle doctrine? I have my reservations, although it provides a clear objective for subordinate commanders.

Wirraway_Ace,
Yes I do believe it was. I think it gave the model clarity and an ability to operate at a higher operational tempo with clearer and more rapid decision-making than a doctrine which focussed on enemy force destruction - which necessitated many halts while recon elements fed back enemy locations and HQ digested these, issued new orders and, basically, completed the Observation, Orientation and Decision portions of the OODA loop.

Don't forget though that the geographical objective was NOT an end in and of itself. Taking that geographical objective was the military objective which would bring about the paralysis and collapse of enemy command, supply and communication elements throughout the enemy's operational depth and the dislocation of the enemy front line forces. So, the graography was a means to an end, not the end in and of itself.

I think one way of illustrating the difference between Deep Battle and Blitzkrieg was that the Soviets were determined to avoid throwing away a potential strategic victory by allowing their exploitation forces to get caught up in the operational battle zone pocketing individual regiments and divisions ( sub-operational and sub-strategic level forces ) and delaying so long sewing them all up that by the time that issue was settled the potential for a drive into the strategic depth had been prevented by the redeployment of enemy operational and strategic reserves.

The Germans weren't, doctrinally, as bothered by the desire to prevent their exploitation forces fighting the break-in battle OR the need to prevent them from getting bogged down in the operational zone. The end result of this was that many German Panzer divisions wasted large portions of their armoured fighting power conducting the break-in and then ended getting caught up in sub-operational and operational level battles designed to pocket a regiment here, a Brigade there, a Division elsewhere. Sure it looked pretty good and ended up yielding large hauls of prisoners etc BUT at what opportunity cost? In much the same way as the Vietnamese replied to American statements that American soldiers had never lost a battle in Vietnam by stating, "That's true, it is also irrelevant." I believe the Soviets would have told the post-WW2 Wehrmacht that while the Wehrmacht acheived brillitant tactical and operational feats right up until the end of the war what mattered was the Strategic level, at which the Soviets excelled from mid-43 onwards. Brilliant tactics and operations win medals and get written about in books or docudramas on the History Channel. Good, solid, focused, relevant strategic objectives arrayed in a logical sequence designed to achieve viable national policy objectives win wars. The Germans had the former. The Soviets had the latter. We know which side won the war.

This is why I think Deep Battle was superior to Blitzkrieg. It kept its utter focus ruthlessly on the Strategic Objectives, never allowed its focus to waver and sacrificed operationally and tactically in order to maximise the possibility of achieving strategically decisive objectives. It also accepted the reality that to everything there is a cost and to achieve the requisite pinning actions and breaches in the enemy front lines the PBIs ( Poor Bloody Infantry - and more modern equivalents PBMIs ) would suffer huge losses. If it achieved a breach into which they could inject a cohesive, unattrited operational manoeuvre group tasked with clear, decisive objectives then that was a price they were willing to pay.


Echeloning with a clear focus on geographical objectives allowed greater clarity and rapidity of decision-making IMO through focussing on making the enemy react to what you did - immediately putting them on the back foot of the OODA cycle. In addition I think if you look at the Soviets they clearly had Europe divided up into "strategic leaps" - which isn't a doctrinal term but is a term I always found useful when discussing that distance which a Soviet Army reasonably expected to be able to/have to drive in order to gain the next significant strategic objective which would dislocate and collapse the enemy front.

Nemo,

Very nicely argued.

Mike

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: witpqs

What of the thought that crossing that threshold meant crossing the tactical nuke threshold as well (it was at least a threat)?

The Soviets were planning to cross that threshold at the outbreak of war. They figured it would happen anyway, and taking the initiative would improve the outcome. Think Deep Battle.

I am. But, that's quite a risk at further escalation.

Well the Soviets never believed America would allow itself to burn in order to save Western Germany. Based on their previous experiences they didn't believe in getting caught on the wrong side of an escalating series of exchanges. If the exchange is going to end with city-busting nuke then, by their logic, it was better to begin with city-busters ( in Germany + Benelux ) to show a willingness to use them, to damage NATO's ability to mobilise/organise whilst containing that implicit message that they were willing to keep the exchange geographically limited within Western and Eastern Europe and targeted on military and communications nexuses.

It is pretty much a case of the big bluff. Begin with city-busters in Western Europe and make your opening so big that the guy across the table decides not to even enter the game. 5 to 7 days was all they wanted. With those 7 days they would have been across the Rhine and they would have stopped after taking Benelux- no point antagonising France which had its own nuclear capability and could be easily subverted after the end of official hostilities. If they got the bluff wrong then they figured NATO would torch Prague, Warsaw etc - great, that eliminates centres of power within the satellite states, further weakens them and prevents them arising to threaten Mother Russia. I don't say they would have been hoping for this but they weren't blind to the benefits accruing due to the further weakening of those satellite states relative to Russia.

Don't forget that based on their own wargames from the late 70s this was their strategic thinking. Nuclear strikes on German military and comms/movement nexuses ( as well as German political leaders in order to sow confusion in the chain of command, Brussels ( important NATO C&C centre ) and Amsterdam / Zeebrugge - important ports capable of receiving REFORGER units by sea ) which would be responded to by a series of NATO strikes on similar nexuses ( which the Soviet expected to be much more easily able to survive due to the echeloning and structure and doctrine of their forces ( fight for 3 days without resupply then get passed by other echelons. Immediately get amalgamated with other survivors of other units in your echelon ( 3 x groups of 50 survivors makes a company of 150 men. That was their thinking. ) and after a couple of days of refit and resupply you now had the survivors of this echelon ready to move forward and attack again. ). So long as things were contained to West Germany and client states in the Warsaw Pact they'd have been more than happy and then in 7 days they'd have hit the Rhine + Benelux and stopped to digest what they'd taken.

For those unaware of the wargame I'm talking about it was a 1979 Warsaw Pact wargame in which they wargamed an attack to the Rhine. Of course their story was that it was provoked by a massive NATO pre-emptive nuclear strike all along the Vistula cutting the German Strategic Direction off from its reserves in depth in the various Russian military districts. Bottom line though they intended to go nuclear against discrete targets from H + 0 because if the fight ends up with guns being pulled they figured they might as well just pull the gun and shoot the other guy dead while he was still preparing to begin the fight with an honourable fist fight [:D]. This Soviet command wargame was released about 4 or 5 years ago by the Poles in order to piss off the Soviets [8D]


One other reason France would have escaped attack is that its nuclear strategy specifically supported counter-valuation insofar as an attack on a French Brigade moving to the front by FROGs or artillery shells was, doctrinally, supposed to be answered by a city-busting nuke on some Soviet city ( e.g. Kiev, Odessa etc ).

Out of interest: Anyone know a good strategic/operational level WW3 wargame? I used to play a fair bit of Decisive Action ( albeit that I found it very Western in what it allowed you to do ) but the more this discussion goes on the more I yearn for the plains of Northern Germany

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Well the Soviets never believed America would allow itself to burn in order to save Western Germany. Based on their previous experiences they didn't believe in getting caught on the wrong side of an escalating series of exchanges. If the exchange is going to end with city-busting nuke then, by their logic, it was better to begin with city-busters ( in Germany + Benelux ) to show a willingness to use them, to damage NATO's ability to mobilise/organise whilst containing that implicit message that they were willing to keep the exchange geographically limited within Western and Eastern Europe and targeted on military and communications nexuses.

It is pretty much a case of the big bluff. Begin with city-busters in Western Europe and make your opening so big that the guy across the table decides not to even enter the game. 5 to 7 days was all they wanted. With those 7 days they would have been across the Rhine and they would have stopped after taking Benelux- no point antagonising France which had its own nuclear capability and could be easily subverted after the end of official hostilities. If they got the bluff wrong then they figured NATO would torch Prague, Warsaw etc - great, that eliminates centres of power within the satellite states, further weakens them and prevents them arising to threaten Mother Russia. I don't say they would have been hoping for this but they weren't blind to the benefits accruing due to the further weakening of those satellite states relative to Russia.

Don't forget that based on their own wargames from the late 70s this was their strategic thinking. Nuclear strikes on German military and comms/movement nexuses ( as well as German political leaders in order to sow confusion in the chain of command, Brussels ( important NATO C&C centre ) and Amsterdam / Zeebrugge - important ports capable of receiving REFORGER units by sea ) which would be responded to by a series of NATO strikes on similar nexuses ( which the Soviet expected to be much more easily able to survive due to the echeloning and structure and doctrine of their forces ( fight for 3 days without resupply then get passed by other echelons. Immediately get amalgamated with other survivors of other units in your echelon ( 3 x groups of 50 survivors makes a company of 150 men. That was their thinking. ) and after a couple of days of refit and resupply you now had the survivors of this echelon ready to move forward and attack again. ). So long as things were contained to West Germany and client states in the Warsaw Pact they'd have been more than happy and then in 7 days they'd have hit the Rhine + Benelux and stopped to digest what they'd taken.

For those unaware of the wargame I'm talking about it was a 1979 Warsaw Pact wargame in which they wargamed an attack to the Rhine. Of course their story was that it was provoked by a massive NATO pre-emptive nuclear strike all along the Vistula cutting the German Strategic Direction off from its reserves in depth in the various Russian military districts. Bottom line though they intended to go nuclear against discrete targets from H + 0 because if the fight ends up with guns being pulled they figured they might as well just pull the gun and shoot the other guy dead while he was still preparing to begin the fight with an honourable fist fight [:D]. This Soviet command wargame was released about 4 or 5 years ago by the Poles in order to piss off the Soviets [8D]


One other reason France would have escaped attack is that its nuclear strategy specifically supported counter-valuation insofar as an attack on a French Brigade moving to the front by FROGs or artillery shells was, doctrinally, supposed to be answered by a city-busting nuke on some Soviet city ( e.g. Kiev, Odessa etc ).

circa 1979 - sounds like a bet to make against Carter but not Reagan.

Nemo, Great stuff in this thread - thanks.

Nemo,

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Hartwig,
I like the Triandafillov quote. I'd also point out that when he talks about operational shock or system paralysis he is talking of the military system's inability to react to the new situation and/or react as rapidly as the situation is changing. Sounds pretty familiar to Boyd's OODA loop doesn't it? Also when he talks of the disintegration of the operational system he is talking of the disintegration of the lines of communication, supply and command. An Army of 200,000 men split into 200 groups of 1,000 men each without communication to outside elements, access to resupply or reliable command is nothing but a rabble waiting to be pursued and run down or thrown into prison camps.

speaking of quotes, I recently came across a Boyd quote which explains your affinity to a "Soviet approach" perfectly well:

Western commanders are focused on winning the battle while Eastern commanders fight against the enemy's mind. [:D]

Speaking of Boyd, actually I would say that the OODA loop is a perfect illustration of the element of tempo in the context of a doctrine.

Getting back to your interpretation of the Triandafillov quote - well, isn't that the essence of maneuver warfare in general? Preempt, dislocate and disrupt the enemy rather than attriting enemy mass?

Hartwig

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: witpqs

What of the thought that crossing that threshold meant crossing the tactical nuke threshold as well (it was at least a threat)?

The Soviets were planning to cross that threshold at the outbreak of war. They figured it would happen anyway, and taking the initiative would improve the outcome. Think Deep Battle.

I am. But, that's quite a risk at further escalation.

They expected escalation. They also planned to win if it came to that. As long as they weren't reasonably sure of it, they were deterred. Ah, those were interesting days!

JeffK,

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Hartwig

IFF the campaign in Poland ended the war, would Blitzkrieg  be a sound strategy.

Does the fact it was only 1 campaign in a long war lessen its credibility?

Arguably, the 6 Day War was a "Lightning War" in that it was a complete war rather than just a small part.

well, first of all if the campaign in Poland would have ended the war, IMHO there would have been no example of Blitzkrieg in WWII. Tanks and mechanized forces were used in a distributed way, not concentrated and independently; as a support for infantry (thus on a tactical level and not beyond that).

IMHO the problems with accepting "Blitzkrieg" as a doctrine are nicely summarized on

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg

which seems to me reasonably well researched.

But as always, this is just my 2 cents.

Hartwig