JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Canoerebel »

ORIGINAL: DivePac88
Yes Dan... you have a lot to answer for, as this Festung Sumatra that you perfected, has given a lot of JFBs sleepless nights. [:-]

Thanks, DivePac, but I am due almost no credit whatsoever. The concept was created by others, which I picked up on. As for perfecting it, I could claim that if others would be able to learn from what I had done and achieve similar results. But I don't think anybody will be able to. What I achieved was a result of an almost perfect storm that won't happen again. While the Allies were concentrating almost exclusively on Sumatra, Japan had decided (for reasons important to the IJ player) to focus almost exclusively elsewhere. Presto, we had a situation that is probably unique and which the Allies can take very little credit for.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Sardaukar »

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
No need for a HR, the situation you face is largely self inflicted.

You were adament that you would not read the relevant AARs. There are AARs which discuss in great detail how to take advantage of an Allied festung Palembang commitment. Even in your own dormant AAR, where you placed strict conditions on the kind of advice you wanted, you were advised in general terms how to avoid the problem from getting out of hand.

Now the situation might be too late too retrieve. Based on your post there remains a basic question which you have not yet addressed. You say to dent the festung Palembang defences you would have to stripping other theatres to the bone. Yet you also lament about the difficulties caused by the festung Palembang. Well the question is really quite simple.


Are these other theatres more important than Sumatra?


If the answer is in the affirmative, then carry on as you currently are. If the answer is in the negative, ie the overall health of the Japanese war effort is more adversely affected by the Allies retaining their current position in Sumatra, then you would be stripping to the bone the other theatres.

Bottom line, none of this requires a HR. As I said, the situation is largely self inflicted. Not a problem if you think there are more important objectives than eliminating the Allied position in Sumatra; not so benign if you believe Palembang is more important than the other objectives but refuse to allocate the resources to deal with Palembang.

Alfred

Alfred,

Thank you for your kind advice once again.

The reason I do not read other AARs for advice is because I don't play the same style game as others. I consider myself a historical player with certain self-imposed strategic and tactical restrictions. Most of these self-impositions are because certain strategies and tactics that are possible in the game were not politically or militarily acceptable during this time period. You see, my approach to the game is more from a historical dilemma viewpoint than it is from a game to be won viewpoint. I also tend to play with an eye towards limiting casualties.

That may sound like a contradiction considering that I agreed to a scenario 2 game. But looking over the OOB I found that scenario 2 is not really a major upgrade over scenario 1. There are a few more air units, most of which don't appear until mid 1944 and there are a few more land units, mostly garrison types and support units. Most of the few usable combat land units are restricted.

As I said, I look at myself as a historical player. I am not the kind of player that adds up every single assault point or combs through available leaders looking for that guy that has 1 more morale point. For that reason, I don't max out the Japanese economy trying to squeeze out that last engine or get that ship one day sooner.

As to the topic at hand, Palembang is crucial to Japan's long term survival. Without it, Japan will not survive very far into 1943. But a direct assault on a fortified Palembang would also cause it's destruction so the Japanese player must capture it before the Allied player can bring in additional troops from far flung lands. Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra, the Japanese player would be hard pressed to do so especially against an aggressive defender like Dan. Dan's strong counter attacks in China, Burma and Tarawa plus his invasion of the Kurile Islands (with a full division!) ensured that any available Japanese troops had to be sent to counter these thrusts. Once fortified, all the available combat forces in the 15th, 16th and 25th armies will not be enough to take the place.

Then there is the question of stopping the flow of troops and getting your own into the place. To date I have lost 2 CVs, 3 CVLs, 2 BBs, 8 CAs, 5 CLs and 19 DDs attempting to interdict his shipping in and out of Oosthaven. Dan has lost 5 BBs at Oosthaven along with 7 CA/CLs and 10 DDs (all losses include those reported under FOW). Most of these losses were in or around Oosthaven.

Now factor in the air power Dan has there. How do you propose to get your troops ashore (and where) without incurring excessive shipping and troop losses? Those transports would make nice, juicy targets approaching Oosthaven. Palembang is not a suitable landing point given the river restrictions (no BBs, CAs, large APs). And attempting a landing from the western side of Sumatra is pure suicide. I did attempt a few air raids early on also but found the air losses were prohibitive for little gain. Whole air units were wiped out. I tried night raids but was informed that I could expect major 4e raids if I were to continue.

The bottom line is that against an aggressive defender like Dan, the Japanese player is not going to be able to mount an offensive soon enough or large enough to capture Palembang without seeing its destruction.

I do want to be clear about something just in case people think I am calling out Dan because his style of play is different than mine. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am enjoying this game despite getting schooled hard and I have no intention of leaving it. While I do not believe his tactics would have been militarily or politically acceptable in a historical context, they are certainly well within the possibilities of the game and I do NOT consider them gamey in any way, shape or form. His style and my style are just different, nothing more.

Chez


You have Balikpapan, Miri & Brunei etc. Those and others should supply Japan a while. Just land behind him, march in and crush his troops before 1943. There is no need for frontal assault.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by ChezDaJez »

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I have a vested and ongoing interest in Festung Sumatra, so I don't want to comment in too much detail.  "Loose lips sink ships, and all that."

I will say a few things:

1)  Some very bright folks have looked at IJ oil needs in Scenario Two and determined that Japan has enough to do without Palembang for a very long time - perhaps deep into 1943.

2)  That gives Japan some options in dealing with a Festung Palembang or Festung Sumatra.  Nemo's AAR vs. 1 Eyed Jacks has a lengthy and helpful discussion.

3)  Either Festung gambit can be handled by Japan as long as the Japanese player attends to it reasonbly quickly.  One important item is to take and build some bases that give Japanese strike aircraft a decent shot at controlling entry into available Allied ports.

4)  The Allies are pretty much limited to "local/regional" units for the first four to eight weeks - Dutch units and some Commonwealth units from Singapore and perhaps a few from India.  That isn't enough to create a fortress that can withstand a well-organized and thought out IJ assault.

Bottom Line:  IJ players must pay attention to this region early in the game and make sure they have control of the ports by the end of December or early January.  Do that and the Allied player isn't going to accomplish anything meaningful.  A very, very clever and experienced IJ player can string things out much further, though, in hopes that the Allied player will stick his neck in the noose.  The IJ player will then make moves that will result in the Allied player hanging himself.


Allow me to reply to your points invidually.

1. According to my calculations based on usage rates from the last 6 months, I will be out of oil by mid-1943. Fuel will run out approximately 2-3 months later. Obviously, as fuel becomes scarce, my naval units will be parked and only those vessels needed to bring what little fuel and oil to the HI will be at sea. HI will shut down soon thereafter. The bottom line is that the loss of Palembang to the Japanese player is a game killer regardless of when it occurs. To never have captured it just ensures that the game will never see 1944 regardless og how careful or clever the Japanese player is.

2. I haven't read this AAR so I can not comment on it.

3. I would agree that the Japanese player would have to react very quickly to forestall any allied attempt at fortress building in Sumatra. But I believe that would mean abandoning any historical pretense and would certainly raise a howl amongst most AFBs if Japan made a dash for Palembang on day one. That is why I mentioned the possibility of a house rule or some other means of controlling it. It certainly would mean foregoing any concerted effort to take Malaya or the PI simultaneously which has serious drawbacks of its own for the Japanese player.

And as you mentioned, the Japanese player needs airbases nearby to interdict allied shipping if he is to control allied ports on Sumatra. To do that, he needs to take bases in western Borneo and/or Java. Its highly doubtful that the Japanese will have progressed far enough down the Malaya peninsula to make use of its airfields against Palembang. Even if they have, all the allied player need do is park some AKs in Singapore harbor and put a CAP over them and Japanese bombers will be drawn to them like a moth to flame. Even airfields in northwestern Borneo are unsuitable for the same reason.

So that leaves the airfields on Java. In most cases, the Japanese player is still fighting heavily in the PI and must wait for those forces to become available to take airfields in Java. He can't bypass the PI as that would leave sigificant air forces in his rear. Plus he has to take Tarakan and Balikpapn on the way or risk the same thing. He could forego any operations in the central Pacific but the number of forces that would free up is pretty small and it certainly would allow Australian forces a chance to build up Rabaul and the Solomons.

Then there is the problem of finding the aircraft to conduct the raids. Bettys and Nells are useless without torpedo equipped HQs and most of the Val and Kate units are restricted to the home islands. Idas, Marys and Sonias will barely dent a row boat let alone hit them. Plus the Japanese start the game with only 1000 fighters. Seems like a large number until you consider that the IJAAF has 630 fighters to start the war but only 100 of them are Oscars or Tojos. The rest are Nates and most of those are permanently restricted to the home islands or Manchuria. The same with the IJNAF though most of their 370 fighters are Zeros. Still 8 of 22 units fly the Claude.

4. The problem here is that no Japanese player is going to be able to conduct a well thought out and organized assault against Sumatra in the first 4-8 weeks. You say that they are limited to local/regional units. Are you including combat units that come from Java? Troops from Singapore are easily dispatched across the strait by ship and there isn't much the Japanese can do about it so long as the RAF remains a force in Malaya? All the allied player needs is 400+ AV and level 4 forts. The Japanese player will never be able to get 2:1 odds without stripping everything not tied down. And if those forts are in Palembang, the Japanese player is doomed anyways.

Bottom Line: IJ players must pay attention to this region early in the game and make sure they have control of the ports by the end of December or early January. Do that and the Allied player isn't going to accomplish anything meaningful.


The Japanese player can't stop a Sir Robin into Sumatra. Between ships and air transport, an allied player can get quite a force into Sumtra before the Japanese player knew what happened.

Control of Sumatran ports such as Oosthaven by the end of December? To control these ports means to take them. To do otherwise is to watch an allied player whittle down your air forces trying to keep them closed.

And to take them so early means employing a direct line of advance to northern Java and southern Sumatra from Indochina and Taiwan. It means forgoing any significant attacks on Malaya or the PI. Fail to take the PI and your lines of communication are cut. Fail to invade Malaya and you end up with a fortified Malaya that will prevent any oil from getting through with the added bonus of strong air forces flying in from Burma to bomb Palembang into rubble.

The tone of this is a bit harsher than I intended but it is late and I have to get up early so I'm sorry if the tone offends or angers. I do not mean to do so.

Chez
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by ChezDaJez »

You have Balikpapan, Miri & Brunei etc. Those and others should supply Japan a while. Just land behind him, march in and crush his troops before 1943. There is no need for frontal assault.

I have actually. The first attempt went very badly. I landed at Sabang and a place on the east coast and proceeded to attempt to move south. Dan landed troops behind my lines and cut me off. He took Sabang and decimated my forces. Took awhile to rebuild them but now I am trying it again. I have two divisions plus support attacking Padang but it is long and grueling. I will need a lot more and the going is very, very slow.

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by LoBaron »

Chez, interesting discussion, but if I reread this thread correctly the solution is simple.

In case players want to avoid the option of a fortress Palembang they can simply revert to
DaBabes(light).
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Bliztk »

I attack Manila as my opening,to interdict reinforcements to SRA, but if I were to attack PH, I would put mini KB with the battle wagons in Kuching. A well placed surface TF attacking the convoy to Palembang or Oosthaven can do wonders to Festung Palembang.

I`m not afraid of a Festung Java, because once I have secured Singapore and Manila, I can attack with 8 divisions Java, so even if I take it in June is a giant POW camp if KB is intact.

Just my two cents
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Miller »

ORIGINAL: Rusty1961

I've seen Palembang taken in the first two weeks of the game. It can, and is done.

This.

Very easy to capture no matter how many Allied units are rushed there. Ok, maybe not historical but who (apart from Chez) wants a 100% historic game, certainly not any IJN player who wants a shot at doing better than real life...........
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Mike Solli »

Forget it. Statement I responded to was in error....
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Ketza »

If one player plays this game "historical" and the other plays this like a "game" the result is a mismatch.

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Mike Solli »

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

ORIGINAL: obvert

If you have Palembang and a few of the ports nearby it's not that hard to bring in masses of supplies. The troops got there somehow afterall. Java is usually the last area captured by the Japanese, so that leaves lots of sealanes open unless teh KB camps outside of Oosthaven for a month. Yes Palembang makes some supply, but probably not enough for the kind of fortress that could withstand an attack with massed air attacks.

Refineries should make supplies in game terms if planes are flown based on supply. Where alse would aviation fuel come from?

It seems that if the Allies in the war had thought it important enought to bring in a few divisions to secure Palembang, they might have also been able to bring in a few ship loads of canned goods and bullets.

That's why Japanese player might consider using part of his CV forces in DEI to prevent both massive reinforcement and redeployment/evacuation. Could for example split of 2 CVs from Kido Butai and put them together with CVLs. That sort of "mini-KB" is usually enough to interdict sea lanes without actually even being there all the time. Mere threat of having divisions worth of troops sunk by it is usually enough to prevent Fortress strategies. And it'd still leave 4 CVs available to counter US carriers in Pacific.

Another alternative is to use that massive land based air force to interdict the sea lanes. The IJNAF has 3 Air Flotillas in the DEI. 22 Air Flotilla can steer toward Burma to interdict the RN. That leaves the 21 and 23 Air Flotillas. Once the Philippines are isolated, they are not needed there. The IJAAF 5 Air Division can bomb them to the stone age. Either of those two air flotillas can move to the Singkawang/Billiton/Tobali area and totally isolate southern Summatra from the sea. Add a portion of the IJAAF 3 Air Division for ground bombing and Japan is in business. I'm confident that Southern Summatra is effectively isolated. Palembang can be taken at the Japanese player's leisure.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Chickenboy »

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

ORIGINAL: obvert

If you have Palembang and a few of the ports nearby it's not that hard to bring in masses of supplies. The troops got there somehow afterall. Java is usually the last area captured by the Japanese, so that leaves lots of sealanes open unless teh KB camps outside of Oosthaven for a month. Yes Palembang makes some supply, but probably not enough for the kind of fortress that could withstand an attack with massed air attacks.

Refineries should make supplies in game terms if planes are flown based on supply. Where alse would aviation fuel come from?

It seems that if the Allies in the war had thought it important enought to bring in a few divisions to secure Palembang, they might have also been able to bring in a few ship loads of canned goods and bullets.

That's why Japanese player might consider using part of his CV forces in DEI to prevent both massive reinforcement and redeployment/evacuation. Could for example split of 2 CVs from Kido Butai and put them together with CVLs. That sort of "mini-KB" is usually enough to interdict sea lanes without actually even being there all the time. Mere threat of having divisions worth of troops sunk by it is usually enough to prevent Fortress strategies. And it'd still leave 4 CVs available to counter US carriers in Pacific.

Another alternative is to use that massive land based air force to interdict the sea lanes. The IJNAF has 3 Air Flotillas in the DEI. 22 Air Flotilla can steer toward Burma to interdict the RN. That leaves the 21 and 23 Air Flotillas. Once the Philippines are isolated, they are not needed there. The IJAAF 5 Air Division can bomb them to the stone age. Either of those two air flotillas can move to the Singkawang/Billiton/Tobali area and totally isolate southern Summatra from the sea. Add a portion of the IJAAF 3 Air Division for ground bombing and Japan is in business. I'm confident that Southern Summatra is effectively isolated. Palembang can be taken at the Japanese player's leisure.
I think what Chez intimated earlier, Mike, was that the Allied player in this case chose to use at least some of his carrier aircraft offloaded to Sumatra to buttress the existing meager land based units that he had. When combined with the comparative paucity of long range IJNAF and IJAAF escort units, this quickly made air interdiction of S. Sumatra sea lanes untenable. All but immediate introduction of the full KB would stack the air war in favor of the Allies.

Then again, if the Allies unloaded most or all of their carrier aircraft to back up Sumatra, that will impact their ability to make gains elsewhere in the SoPac or CentPac whilest the IJNAF eyes were fixed on Sumatra.

Nothing gamey, per se, but certainly not what half of the players had in mind for a game.

I agree with other posters that have indicated that this is a likely outcome between players with differing agendas for the game. This can be manipulated by either opponent-in this case the Allies manipulation of the game with the (assumed) foreknowledge of how the Japanese player wanted to play.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Mike Solli »

Ahh, I missed the part about the carrier aircraft. I still think it's doable with land based air. The 23 Air Flotilla has 126 fighters, including the crack Tainan daitai, along with 54 Betties. That's more fighters than KB can muster. I'm convinced that the Japanese have the appropriate tools early in the war to counter anything the Allies can dream up.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Canoerebel »

The comments about Allied carrier air in my game with Chez are incorrect.  Allied carriers were not in the DEI until well into 1942.  Readers of my AAR will know that they were posted in the Aluetians through the end of '41 and into '42 and only then slowly made the move into south, around Oz, and into the Indian Ocean.  They arrived sometime around February 20, 1942.  No carrier air was off-loaded until much, much later.

Also, lest readers get the impression that the Allies offloaded carrier air to Sumatra airfields, that only occurred in limited numbers for limited time periods. The Allies never offloaded even half of its carrier air, never did even that for any extended periods, and never had all carriers committed to the DEI. I don't want to give away any more, but rather refer readers to my AAR if they want to see how the Battle for Sumatra developed.

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Canoerebel »

After a sharp naval/air battle at Oosthaven following the 7/7/42 turn, Chez asked via email if I had all my carrier air on Sumatra.  Not wishing to provided classified info, I simply told him that I couldn't say specifically, but that I wouldn't have any problem doing so if I thought it was necessary.  See post # 1540 on page 52 of my AAR (written about two months ago both real time and game time for this discussion).
 
In actuality, the Allies had just transferred the aircraft from two carriers to Sumatra, because those two flattops were retiring to port to upgrade.
 
I wouldn't have any problem with employing all my carrier air from Sumatra, though.  The Allies took some really big chances in this game to heavily fortify a very forward base that was subject to isolation and destruction.  The Allies couldn't afford to lose a huge army, so they were naturally prepared to employ all available force to protect that position.  To my way of thinking, that is perfectly reasonable.  However, the Allies have never felt the need to employ that tactic.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Mike Solli »

Thanks CR. Now you've got my interest. Gotta read your AAR. [:)]

I think the key to Japanese success in the DEI is aggressive use of combat power to create air superiority around key bases, including Singapore, the PI, southern Summatra and Java. This starts with obtaining key bases for air power. Once fighters (and possibly IJNAF bombers) along with recon are established, naval power can proceed to the next wave of bases (within normal Zero range) which are taken by ground assault to allow land based air to move forward. This will isolate potential pockets of Allied ground power to be reduced by air/naval power and then invaded. And so on.....

I'm convinced (with much prodding from Chickenboy early in my last AAR), that speed is of the essence. Major Japanese LCUs are the spear aimed at the key bases and the smaller LCUs should clean up the empty and lightly held bases in the rear. It's all based on air superiority, IMO, and the Japanese have the pilot and plane quality to achieve that early in the war.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Mike Solli »

One additional thought: paratroopers are key.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Canoerebel »

I agree.  Speed is vital to Japan early in the war.  Also, Luzon is far less important early in the game than in real life.  Japan can bottle up the Allied army on the Phillipines with a reasonable but modest use of air and ground forces.  After attending to more vital areas - which certainly would include making sure an unwelcome Fortress Palembang didn't develop - Japan can readily attend to Luzon.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Canoerebel »

ORIGINAL: Mike Solli
One additional thought: paratroopers are key.

Absolutely. Use partroops to take a few island bases in the vicinity - Billiton and Toabali come readily to mind, but Japan should also take some bases that will be lightly defended or undefended for weeks into the game - perhaps Benkolen, Padang, Sibolga, and/or Djambi are the most obvious candidates.

The key to the entire campaign, though, is probably Oosthaven. If Japan takes Oosthaven in late '41 or early '42, Fortress Palembang isn't going anywhere. And Oosthaven is almost certain to be lightly defended that early in the game.

Oosthaven is the key.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by Mike Solli »

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I agree.  Speed is vital to Japan early in the war.  Also, Luzon is far less important early in the game than in real life.  Japan can bottle up the Allied army on the Phillipines with a reasonable but modest use of air and ground forces.  After attending to more vital areas - which certainly would include making sure an unwelcome Fortress Palembang didn't develop - Japan can readily attend to Luzon.

I agree with you about Luzon, after the US Air Force is destroyed/driven off. Initially, it can be a royal pain in the butt. You never know when it will hit an xAK loaded with something vital. Once it's gone, the IJNAF will move on (or will already be gone). Some bombers from the 5 Air Division will be sufficient for bombing to build their experience as well as cause Allied supply loss.
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Post by FatR »

My opinion on the Palembang problem.

1)Palembang is an absolutely indispensable for the Japanese war effort. Failure to take it means complete defeat by about early 1943 (not only you lose Palembang's oil, Allies will be within one step from cutting off the shipping from the rest of DEI). Failure to take it with minimal damage is also very crippling and can leave the Japanese unable to sustain both the economy and IJN operations in late 1942.

2)It is practically impossible to completely stop a determined attempt to reinforce it. Maybe one can prevent Fortress Sumatra, but not getting enough troops to Palembang to ensure heavy damgage on capture within a few weeks.

3)Therefore it is vital to capture Palembang within 10 days to, at most, two weeks from the opening of hostilities. A greater delay is basically asking your opponent to have mercy on you. In addition, there is no reason not to. A determined Japanese player can easily ensure naval and air superiority as soon as heavy units from Home Islands reach the theatre, even if Force Z is not destroyed on the first turn. The plan is not without risk, but playing Japan requires taking risks, and in this case you mostly just need to prevent Allied surface units from mauling the invasion convoy.
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