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Maybe I did go from a one to an eleven with the response here.

Part of that is coming from work and having to deal with a co-worker is has been called out on plagrisim, shoddy research and then have the gall to say when called on it that all of thier sources were impeciable. While trying to clean up the mess, which has been my project of the week, about half of the sources exsisted in real life and the other half were fictional journals. Then while diving in to the actual meat and potatoes of the topic of the paper found out that not only was the math and science was wrong but if actually implemented would have been a hazard. So at my work I was dealing with that and while trying to complete my degree program at school I spent the week in a class where we were reviewing history research papers as part of an English course on research/debate/rethoric, I ran across a classmate who went full on "Trutherism" producing a 60 page report on it all as a pro-truther. When I challenged this classmate in debate, I couldn't get in a word edge wise because it seemed like for every logical and honest reponse that contradicted what went on that day and the research in thier paper, this person went further down the rabbit hole and was taking the class with him. So I guess when I bounced into here and saw this posting my logic circuit shorted because I had had my fill of the week from shoddy research, tin foil hat stuff and into wackyland by folks. So I am sorry that I have offended any and erupted against you El Cid

I am but one person and think that there should be allowed for honest debate about interesting and strange topics on the subject of WW2. I am also more then willing to give room to listen to any idea if there is evidence to support that it could have happened or even had a remote chance of happening. I just need to see real information and not hearsay. I am also one who believe in the concept of "sharp elbows" as it comes to debate, for without that concept in mind it makes it hard to stand by your principles, information or even your topic. A number of times there have been debates here which have opened up minds and even opened up thoughts with regards to "maybes, could haves, or should haves". However, it is hard to open minds when you present a weak case with circumstantial evidence or evidence that all refers back to each other in a daisy chain of happyness.

That said, El Cid; it was hard to find your sources because in all of your eleven posts you buried them around sea stories and "I heard..." or "I had letter interviews with...." or so on and so forth. I skimmed them intially and even after post number ten I tried to hard to get past your smoke & mirrors to find the sources It would make things a billion times clear to most everyone I am sure that if you have information and you have sources of some sort that are published I am sure, put them up front so that others can review them. Just don't dangle these little bits of sensationalism without coming out first off how you found this nugget of trivia. At times some of your posts have lead to interesting discussions amongst people about the game, about history and about the events. I would also highly suggest to you, since you appear to in your writings to want to be a historian, that you need to present point vs counter-point about any information out there. You just can't come out and say for example that the in the Battle of LA that it was secretly a German U-boat which actually fired on the city as stated in the book "Weird History of the Pacific" by M. G. Oose in the 2007 edition, so we need to add U-Boat LVI Pennant 999 to the game. It would probably be better to say "I read X by author Y, but Author Z and Author D have a retort to that item..anyone else have anything to add..." A good historian tries very very hard to present a balance picture and will present over a highly debated topic such as nuclear weapons and their development during the Second World War.

As to your sources, the ones that I found most troubling simply because they don't have a verifiable sources or they themselves have down shoddy research are Bruce Cummings, Robert K. Wilcox and Phillip Henshall. Cummings has been viewed as an apologist for North Korea as you have noticed, but also one who has willfully taken contrary evidence that his information is wrong as proof positive that he is right or outright ignored new evidence. Cummings made his bones in the 80's with his Korean War history books blaming the whole thing on the UN and even taking in the Chinese and North Korean claims of chemical warfare and biological warfare useage on face value. Even when evidence came out after the call of the USSR he still stood by his work.

As to Wilcox, I have read some of his aviation history books; he loves to take interviews, but as others in this thread have noted official witness can get things wrong and will do. That is why they are most commonly referred to as secondary sources for research purposes which need to be backed up by primary sources. In his books too he has been in desperate need of an editor for the technical material that he is writing, getting public information (such as fuel ranges on aircraft, weapons and even names of ships) wrong. For both of his books that are historical (Target Patton and the Japanese Secret War) he favors using "unnamed sources" or a "I heard from the grapevine" type of information which is hard to verify. All of which again makes for an interesting read, but begs the question is is history.

As to Henshall, he too is in desperate need of an editor from most of the reviews that I have read of his book. Between typos in his books about the V-weapons to English Grammer mistakes (even if you forgive him for using British English). I personally haven't seen nor read his books in any of my public libraries nor at any of the university libraries near me. Nor have I seen them at any of the book stores, both new and used style.

I use to have a copies of Rhodes book "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" on my shelves for many years at it was well worn. I had to give it up a few years back to make weight for a move. That said, I will have to hit it again if you claim that he cites the Japanese being further along or even have tested a nuclear weapon.

Apology accepted.

This paragraph is from A Brief History of MAD

The Evolution of MAD, Page 37, Rev. 1.1

7.B Nuclear Policy of the Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan: The strong anti-nuclear movement in Japan and the attitude of US occupation authorities,* made public disclosure about Japanese nuclear weapons research, either during WWII or after, a political anathema. For that reason, it is not well known. Bundy is dismissive of the wartime program, saying “It was small and divided, and wartime understanding of the pathways to a nuclear weapon never reached the levels attained in Washington before Pearl Harbor.” [Danger & Survival, p.53, supported by 2 citations] But there were serious efforts to destroy Japanese documentation, by Japan in 1945 [John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace, 60] and by the United States then* and decades later [official responses to attempts by myself, Robert Wilcox and Charles Stone to declassify certain archives]. In fact Japan had a comprehensive atomic research program, including extensive intelligence about the US Manhattan Project, which only excluded an effort to build an implosion type plutonium bomb. Japanese plans for a gun type, “uranium bomb” were intercepted after the war, en route to the Russians, and US physicists described them as “just like ours” [meaning a gun type weapon based on a 3 inch anti-aircraft weapon]. Because of severely limited sources of uranium, and the cost and time involved in separating it to weapons grade in quantity, the Japanese put more emphasis on radiological bombs, which seem to have been tested, and on small reactors for submarine propulsion. The best published account remains Japan’s Secret War by Robert K. Wilcox. A British nuclear engineer also records “By 1943-4 they were also designing nuclear power plants for installation in their larger submarines, especially the I-400 class of submersible aircraft carriers.”[Philip Henshall, Vengeance, 1998 edition, p. ix.] Korea specialist Bruce Cumings describes “an antique but potent version of the atomic bomb” (which presumably refers to a gun type assembly fission weapon) using fuel processed from Korean monazite ores. He explains: “Korea was the center of Japanese attempts to acquire fissionable material and build a bomb.” He says the project “…centered on the great chemical factories of Noguchi Jun in Hungnam; here the Japanese processed more than 90 percent of the monazite…the Noguchi complex…fell into North Korean and Russian hands after 1945, but the Americans got the documents on Japan’s atomic bomb project…it would appear that intelligence circles were convinced that the Soviet atomic bomb program was build in part on Japanese efforts.” [The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, Pp.150-151] Historian Don Orberderfer writes “During World War II, Japan was vigorously pursuing a nuclear weapons program…Japan moved its secret weapons program to the northern part of its Korean colony.” [Don Orberderfer, The Two Koreas, p. 251]

* “SWNCC 52/9 states that…Policy presently in effect in Japan is that all research activities on atomic energy and related matters is forbidden.” [Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, 6 APR 46,p.1]

A Brief History of MAD was written by me in 1998 for the purpose of backgrounding authors and others interested in various national nuclear R&D programs in history. It is mainly quotes from cited material merely organized into national and topical sections by me. Unusually, it imbeds the cite right in the text, immediately following each report. The Table of Contents below should indicate the comprehensive nature of the review. I have 100% of the quoted books, magazine articles and documents in my possession. The paper has no agenda other than to survey the open source material available at the time it was written (there is enough new material it needs to be amplified and revised). I do not try to sell a point of view to researchers or authors - merely make available things from many points of view from which they may draw any conclusions they wish.

The Evolution of MAD
A Brief History of the Development of US Deterrence Theory
Revision 1.1
Table of Contents

Subject Page

1. Introduction 1
2.A Roots: Hiroshima & Nagasaki 1
2.B Roots: The FIRST American Strategic Bombing Policy 2
2.C Roots: The Wartime Allied Strategic Bombing Policy 2
2.D Roots: The Decision to Use Atomic Bombs on Japanese Cities 3
2.E Roots: The Conception and Failure of International Control 7
2.F Roots: The FIRST American ATOMIC Bombing Policy 12
3.A Truman Era Policy: The Beginning of the Cold War 13
3.B Truman Era Policy: The Decision to Develop the Super (H-Bomb) 15
3.C The Harmon Report and the SAC Emergency War Plan 17
3.D Truman Era Nuclear Policy Evolution 18
4.A Eisenhower Atomic Diplomacy: Korea 19
4.B Eisenhower Atomic Diplomacy: Indochina 21
4.C Eisenhower Atomic Diplomacy: The Taiwan Straits Crises 23
4.D Eisenhower Era Nuclear Policy Evolution 25
5.A Russian Atomic Diplomacy: Khrushchev’s Berlin Crisis 27
5.B The Early SIOP 28
5.C Russian Atomic Diplomacy: The Cuban Missile Crisis 30
6.A Nuclear Policy of the Lesser Nuclear Powers: Britain & France 32
6.B Nuclear Policy of the Lesser Nuclear Powers: Israel 33
6.C Nuclear Policy of the Lesser Nuclear Powers: China 33
6.D Nuclear Policy of the Lesser Nuclear Powers: South Africa 34
6.E Nuclear Policy of the Lesser Nuclear Powers: India & Pakistan 34
7.A Nuclear Policy of the Latent Nuclear Powers: Sweden 36
7.B Nuclear Policy of the Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan 37
7.C Nuclear Policy of the Latent Nuclear Powers: Germany 38
8.A Nuclear Policy in Aspiring Nuclear Powers: General 39
8.B Nuclear Policy in Aspiring Nuclear Powers: Iraq 39
8.C Nuclear Policy in Aspiring Nuclear Powers: Iran 42
8.D Nuclear Policy in Aspiring Nuclear Powers: Taiwan 42
8.E Nuclear Policy in Aspiring Nuclear Powers: The Two Koreas 43
9.A MAD in Practice: The Sino-Soviet Crisis 46
9.B MAD in Practice: Viet Nam 50
9.C MAD in Practice: The 1973 Mideast War 51
9.D MAD in Practice: The War Scare of 1983 53
9.E MAD in Practice: The 1990-91 Gulf War 56
9.F MAD in Practice: The 1993-94 Korean Crisis 60
10. The Modern SIOP and the Current US Nuclear Arsenal 63
11. Legal Considerations: Arms Control and More 65
12. Conclusion 66

That said, El Cid; it was hard to find your sources because in all of your eleven posts you buried them around sea stories and "I heard..." or "I had letter interviews with...." or so on and so forth. I skimmed them intially and even after post number ten I tried to hard to get past your smoke & mirrors to find the sources It would make things a billion times clear to most everyone I am sure that if you have information and you have sources of some sort that are published I am sure, put them up front so that others can review them.

Once upon a time, in what many consider to be ancient history, before most people who know me were born, I was subject to a psychiatric examination as part of a process to determine if I could be issued a security clearance? There were only two vaguely derogatory findings. One of those was that I am "slightly verbose." A medical doctor who has known me for half a century wonders "why the qualifier 'slightly'? Surely it is true I throw a lot of words out - particularly when writing informally. And I do tell sea stories - of which I have many. So I am guilty as charged. I was acting as if I were under oath, to tell the truth, the whole truth (etc) - and to outline the epistomology (how I know what I know) on the topic. My intent was to allow a reader to understand that process - so they could evaluate the facts in the context of how I came across them.

But your suggestion is a good one. And I accept that as well.

REVISION AND APOLOGY BELOW

Cummings has been viewed as an apologist for North Korea as you have noticed, but also one who has willfully taken contrary evidence that his information is wrong as proof positive that he is right or outright ignored new evidence. Cummings made his bones in the 80's with his Korean War history books blaming the whole thing on the UN and even taking in the Chinese and North Korean claims of chemical warfare and biological warfare useage on face value. Even when evidence came out after the call of the USSR he still stood by his work.

I did summarize this. Cumings lost his post at SIS (The Henry M Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington) where I met him because his Origins of the Korean War was substantially discredited by the publication of materials from the records of the Soviet Union. I regret - as does every researcher (I am a specialist, a backgrounder who reads books, articles and documents and summarizes what is in them) - that if looking into matters of certain kinds, one must use the material available - and would prefer a magic want to simply materialize the original materials in complete form in a way no one could contest. That Cumings is an apologist, and not a technically competent researcher, however, does not change the fact he discovered things and reported them. I don't doubt he told the truth as he understood it. I wish I had his notes, or papers, in support - and I asked him in writing - two or three times - on what basis did he write the words of interest in this matter. But he does not reply to my letters (unusual for authors - but his pro communist politics and my conservative appearance are likely the cause). What is germane to me as a researcher is that here is independent confirmation no doubt from Korean sources there was atomic research for Japan in wartime Korea. I like getting confirmation from wholly different sources, and I myself will not regard something as "probably true" unless there is confirmation from a completely different path.

REVISION: I am advised to retract the allegation that "Cumings lost his post at SIS" by a UW alumnus. It was widely speculate this was the case, but we do not officially know why he left? For this reason, I apologize to Cumings. That I differ from his pro communist point of view notwithstanding, and that Russian archival material now available shows he was wrong to write he suspected the war was planned by the US and South Korea also notwithstanding - I should not have said it is why he left SIS. And, to be completely fair, he did use qualifying language rather than flat "I know the war was planned by ROK" - and also he could not have seen the still classified Soviet documents showing the war was planned by the Russian General Staff. Anyone can be upstaged by later information not available at the time of writing. It is wrong to say more than I know, or to hold anyone responsible for what they could not have known at the time they wrote. He made a bad evaluation, and was too persuaded by DPRK propaganda, but that does not mean he deliberately lied - and in fact I don't think he did. He is a far left academic who passionately believes what he says. There are hundreds or thousands of points in which his massive volumes got things right. The fact his politics differ from mine does not mean I have a right to insult him or to be more critical than the simple truth can justify.

And I did not notice your charge about bw against Cumings. I long agreed with you on the matter, but I have seen scholarly material indicating both USAF and USN flew thousands of sortees in these tests - which were not intended to win the war but merely to gather data on a potential Cold War weapon to be used on the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries on a clandestine basis. The program failed for some reason - probably technical - but also perhaps political: the campaign vs the USSR and its allies never happened. But the TESTS did happen, and communist progaganda alleging there was bw attacks may have been, at least in part, based on a correct interpretation of evidence they had. I do not at this moment remember the name of the book - and I don't think I bought it - but if I nail it down I will post it. That charge may be unjustified. Note that the US formally blasted Soviet bw trials (at Khabarovsk I think) of Japanese bw scientists, claiming it was a show trial, when we knew perfectly well it was true. We had cut a deal to get the bw technology and were covering it up. [See Unit 731 and Factories of Death]

As to Wilcox, I have read some of his aviation history books; he loves to take interviews, but as others in this thread have noted official witness can get things wrong and will do. That is why they are most commonly referred to as secondary sources for research purposes which need to be backed up by primary sources. In his books too he has been in desperate need of an editor for the technical material that he is writing

This is how I met him. He found trying to understand nuclear technical material difficult. He also does not read Japanese or German. Originally I wrote to ask for his sources and his original documents from archives, complaining slightly that I could not find them because he didn't cite them. [I wanted to examine the documents directly, and translate myself, etc what they say, to create an independent assessment of the information] He replied that popular history and journalism do not require scholarly documentation, merely that one establish and confirm material is true before printing it. He said he would open his (freight container sized) archive to me any time I wanted to visit, and that it was for researchers like me to produce documented reports of the materials he had collected. He sent me an autographed copy of his second edition - with kind words about how I am an "intrepid researcher" - and I have retained his correspondence in a file - which is my SOP with all authors. That way if I need to I can get at things discussed but not in publication. Years later he asked me to help him with a different matter, related in that it involved wartime atomic research, but it was to help official researchers - not to produce a book or article for publication. This isn't the first time I have been asked to help, directly or indirectly, with an official investigation - and I always do it without asking for compensation. One always learns from the process - simply what they want to know and how they know what they know help me understand more. Seekers of truth are after knowledge - not glory or pay. Wilcox wrote to me last night that he wants to do a third edition of Japan's Secret War - and if he does one - I will suggest that images of certain documents should be included, as well as certain citations - to lend credibility to his thesis.

As to Henshall, he too is in desperate need of an editor from most of the reviews that I have read of his book. Between typos in his books about the V-weapons to English Grammer mistakes (even if you forgive him for using British English). I personally haven't seen nor read his books in any of my public libraries nor at any of the university libraries near me. Nor have I seen them at any of the book stores, both new and used style.

I do not expect an old Englishman to use anything but the King's English. I am not a particularly expert grammarian - even if I am a skilled wordsmith - so I didn't notice any technical errors in grammer. I have all his books - if you want I can give you ISBNs - or pictures (he is good at site photos and images of documents from really good sources like MAGIC) as well as line drawings to help organize what he finds when he examines sites (he travels and he is an engineer and he documented the German V weapons sites better than anyone else has done). I do not agree with all of his techincal opinions - but at least once or twice he was right and I was wrong - when in the fullness of time more evidence has turned up. We do not get along and he no longer writes to me - because he is upset I disclosed what he wrote in letters before he published the ideas (his meal ticket he says). Even if I didn't do it in publication - he regards horse trading information - which is what researchers do - as unacceptable. And I have that in writing - he hates computers and uses classical physical mail. His main focus is on Germany - and Japan is involved only insofar at it was involved in exchanges of materials and information with Germany. But he did demonstrate - mainly from MAGIC - that the scale of materials trade was much greater than I (or almost anyone else) was aware of. I do not require that I agree with everything an author says to take specific facts and documents from his thesis to help me understand a matter.

I use to have a copies of Rhodes book "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" on my shelves for many years at it was well worn. I had to give it up a few years back to make weight for a move. That said, I will have to hit it again if you claim that he cites the Japanese being further along or even have tested a nuclear weapon.

In spite of its nominal topic, the companion volume, nominally on the Hydrogen Bomb history, Dark Sun, also has considerable material on the history of the atomic bomb itself. Rhodes did reply to my letters (in spite of being an academic, his documentation is lousy, and if you want to know where he got this or that - you must ask. But he does answer if you do).

I have both books so if you want an ISBN or a topical quote - send a PM request. I have several feet of scholarly books on these matters.

Since this is a brief response - I will let it go here

Brief indeed: 6,823 words. 38,308 characters.

Below is the distilled "citations" that Sid....a man of few words vaguely referred to:


Apparently the main Japanese research site at Hungnam was bombed - and it was identified as an atomic industrial target. And that is pretty clearly documented in Japan's Secret War by Robert K Wilcox

Philip Henshall is one - and he has several books on the matter

There is also a formal reference in The Origins of the Korean War - Vol 2 I think - by an author I have met in person - but do not get along with (Believe Mr. Man of Few words is referring to Bruce Cumings. I've read his most recent book on Korea. That would be "The Korean War: A History" Suprise suprise.....Mr Cumings makes no indications, hints or references to a secret Japanese nuclear program in Korea. I do however believe Sid when he says he doesn't get along with this author.......since he's published.)


Taken as another indicator - you have Japan's Secret War, the Two Korea's, and The Origins of the Korean War - there is clear evidence in English easy to access
So easy to access Sid doesn't feel the need to show said evidence. He did say he would be brief.


Anyway - your position is the conventional one. It just happens not to consider the evidence. The evidence is compelling
So compelling, Sid doesn't need to waste any of his 6,823 words printing it.


One path was via a Spanish agent - who has published a book about it. Interviewed by the FBI - he was released and his intelligence (among other things about Pearl Harbor) was disregarded because Hoover didn't believe him. And you might not believe him either - Dusko Popov is a controversial sort of guy - who no doubt likes to look better in history than he should - and to make money selling his biography

this one (atomic history) were still taboo subjects in Japan. In any case, the "author" (listed as such even in reference materials) is Pacific War Research Society. The book is called The Day Man Lost. Its focus is clearly Hiroshima, and its writers are probably anti-nuclear in general. (Huh? no....don't try to figure it out. You'll only hurt yourself)


As mentioned....an impressively concise and succinct supporting set of statements by Sid. Douglas Dietrich couldn't have worded it better.....or longer. I'm convinced. My only critique would be that if Sid could somehow, someway refrain from continually talking about himself and his long list of alleged acomplishments, skill sets and personal relationships, he might actually be able to cut his diseration down by say......90% or more.

1. The above comment by JWE almost made me make a post in objection earlier today, but I held my comment wondering if EL Cid has leaked any secret or top secret information by accident. I would think any restricted info will be dealt w/ in the next day or so.

While the matters presented are esoteric (not widely known) and not officially accepted (particularly in Japan),
all are from open source materials - see the quote from A Brief History of MAD which has the key words from several authors above.
It would be entirely foolish to write on the web any classified material. It isn't even easy to have any classified material on this stuff:
automatic downgrading by law means virtually everything that was classified is no longer (although technical numbers may not be
disclosed where a formal decision was made not to disclose them, and redacted names and passages may not be quoted unless later
declassified material shows what they are). The two reasons I have one of the largest strategic studies collections in the USA is
(a) convenience - one need not travel or wait to get at a book or paper and (b) when a security question arises, and some agency or
FBI person appears at my door - I can show that my source was indeed open and declassified. [I have done that more than once or
twice.] It is my habit only to write what I can show with material I have in my possession - for safety sake.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

While the matters presented are esoteric (not widely known) and not officially accepted (particularly in Japan),
all are from open source materials - see the quote from A Brief History of MAD which has the key words from several authors above.
It would be entirely foolish to write on the web any classified material. It isn't even easy to have any classified material on this stuff:
automatic downgrading by law means virtually everything that was classified is no longer (although technical numbers may not be
disclosed where a formal decision was made not to disclose them, and redacted names and passages may not be quoted unless later
declassified material shows what they are). The two reasons I have one of the largest strategic studies collections in the USA is
(a) convenience - one need not travel or wait to get at a book or paper and (b) when a security question arises, and some agency or
FBI person appears at my door - I can show that my source was indeed open and declassified. [I have done that more than once or
twice.] It is my habit only to write what I can show with material I have in my possession - for safety sake.

A simple, specific citation would take care of that.

Sorry BigRed, if you are just looking to stir the pot, no joy here. Our issue with Sidney is a private one. Don't care if Cid says Japan invented the Bomb. Cid can say whatever he wants to say about anything he wants to present pronunciamento about.

There's only one thing he can't do. He cannot pretend to know things by virtue of a non-existent military record. That's it. It's really that simple. One does not tell newbies that they know all because they were "this, that, the other thing". Cid has a history of telling people he was an expert in various areas and therefore his knowledge takes precedence.

For all I know, it does. But veterans who read these forums take a different view. They are offended. Matt Norton was so offended he pulled down Cid's records and wanted to post them. Cooler heads prevailed, so they were shown to Cid and Cid was told he was not ever to play that game again. So far, so good for about 4 years now, but this thread is pushing the boundary.

That's the only reason we are here. Cid backs off, we back off, too. There's aboslutely nothing more for you, or anybody else to comment on or whine about. It is private.

btw, both Matt and I publically posted our DD-214s a couple years ago, when this first came up with Cid. We know what we did and are proud of what we did. Anyone who needs to see our service sheets can simply send an email.

Cid, when you throw stuff out there with such flimsy pretenses of "knowing stuff others don't", you can't expect people to just take your word for it.

ORIGINAL: JWE

For all I know, it does. But veterans who read these forums take a different view. They are offended. Matt Norton was so offended he pulled down Cid's records and wanted to post them. Cooler heads prevailed, so they were shown to Cid and Cid was told he was not ever to play that game again. So far, so good for about 4 years now, but this thread is pushing the boundary.

That's the only reason we are here. Cid backs off, we back off, too. There's aboslutely nothing more for you, or anybody else to comment on or whine about. It is private.

btw, both Matt and I publically posted our DD-214s a couple years ago, when this first came up with Cid. We know what we did and are proud of what we did. Anyone who needs to see our service sheets can simply send an email.

I'm a veteran of these forums, from way back when Matrix was just starting out and re-doing Pacific War and War in Russia. I do not take a different view, contrary to what you think. You are simply attempting to use your "status" as a member of the AE team to bully someone.

If this is, as you say, private, then by all means, keep it private - but you would rather keep it as public as possible in order to promote the conflict between you (and Terminus) and El Cid.

I am proud of what I did in the United States Marine Corps. Do you want my DD-214(s)?

Ya know, Sid, if you would stop the pretentious horse manure, that everybody out there knows is just that, you might, just might, get a bit of traction.

On re-reading this, I have a different reaction than the first time: I think you may be trying to make a suggestion - in a fuzzy and unclear kind of way. You might be saying - use fewer words (which is how I got in trouble in the first place it seems) and give some source material (which I didn't do) and let it go at that. If that is the case, I think it may have been a sincere and unusual change from your usual criticism, and that I should have taken it seriously. But I can do that now - so I shall. And - if this interpretation isn't wildly off base and wrong - and you were trying for a moment to outline what migtht work better - then - well - ignoring all the hostility and threats: thanks.

Background: WWII era nuclear propulsion is a great deal more practical than it sounds. The US Navy began research in 1939 on uranium as a potential fuel for an SSN. The UK began an actual SSN design in 1943, the same year Japan did. (Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1947-1982, Part I, comments on SSN HMS Dreadnaught). While the US did not begin serious SSN research until 1945, this was because of a decision to concentrate on the atom bomb first. In fact every nuclear program in the first generation built reactors first. In fact, the best organized nuclear program in 1940 was that of France: it is stated that it’s ONLY goal was atomic power. “As Halban later recalled their mood, ‘We were absolutely bent on creating a nuclear chain reaction which could be used for industrial power.’ In this highly practical objective there is something characteristic of the culture of French science in those years...The French military did not have good connections to French science...By the spring of 1940 the French team was preparing for an expansion of its work...At the time this was the most purposive and best focused program of uranium research in the world...” (Danger and Survival, McGeorge Bundy, Random House, 1988, Pp. 6-14). One Japanese physicist, Prof. (Physics) P.K. Kurada of Tokyo Imperial University, was able to correctly predict, on a theoretical basis, that 2% Uranium enrichment was the level needed for a sustained chain reaction in a reactor not using heavy moderators. Because other physicists were unable to do this on the basis of theory (it was derived from observed events in early reactor experiments) this is an indication that Japanese atomic science was not as inferior as was believed at the time.

In the USA the Naval Research Laboratory began doing basic research on Uranium in 1939 evaluating the concept of an SSN four months before the beginning of the Manhattan Project! They concluded it was MORE likely to be feasible than a bomb. This was true. It is much easier to enrich Uranium-235 to reactor grade than to bomb grade. Actually, it is possible to build a reactor without any enriched Uranium-235 at all! (For example, all Canadian reactors use natural uranium). The US Navy was basically forced out of the nuclear propulsion business in 1940 by the Manhattan Project because there was a feeling bombs should get priority. But General Groves did initiate exploration of “non-explosive uses” of atomic energy in August, 1944 leading to some serious work on power reactor prototypes in 1945. General Groves appointed ONLY navy officers and civilians to the 1944 board “...to have on record a formal recommendation that a vigorous program looking towards an atomic powered submarine should be initiated when available personnel permitted.” In December, 1944 the board recommended that “the government should initiate and push, as an urgent project, research and development studies to provide power from nuclear sources for the propulsion of naval vessels.” It did not happen. But it did not happen for reasons of policy, not because it was beyond the state of the art.

After the war, the two officers from General Groves’ original committee took a German submarine design (one assumes a Type XXI) and “developed a scheme for a nuclear ‘pile’ that could fit into the existing spaces with only minor changes in the basic submarine design.” It was submitted at the end of March, 1946. This approach indicates that the Japanese concept of modifying existing conventional designs was reasonable. The US officers did it because “This approach...would accelerate the development of a nuclear submarine.” Their report concluded “A technical survey conducted at the Naval Research Laboratory indicates that, with a proper program, only about two years would be required to put into operation an atomic powered submarine...” which is exactly the construction time estimate of the Japanese “steam” submarines. The US 1944 and 1946 recommendations still didn’t happen, because General Groves restricted information transfer to the Navy.

Japanese SSNs, Page 4, Rev. 7

The French SSN program, described by Conway’s All the Worlds Fighting Ships, 1947-1982, Part I, under the entry for Gymnote, began in 1954. At that time they could not enrich uranium and the US refused to sell either a reactor or enriched uranium for use at sea. The French decided to build a heavy water reactor without using enriched uranium as a power plant for hull Q244 (which eventually became Gymnote as Q251). They actually built the plant, but it was too heavy for the boat. After this they developed a more typical enriched uranium plant on land so the US would supply the fuel. (Apparently this was a technical evasion of our restriction). Because the Q244 had a design surface displacement of 4000 tons, and because early French reactors were of 15,000 hp, it appears that Japanese reactors of about 10,000 hp were in the right size range to fit on the 3,000-4,500 ton hulls selected even if they were fueled with natural uranium. It appears the British also experimented unsuccessfully with a similar reactor technology.

Japanese Atomic Industry Infrastructure: There are a number of indications the Japanese had the scientific and industrial foundation for serious development of nuclear science and nuclear reactors. At the beginning of its research Japan had three cyclotrons and was working on two more. By comparison, Germany had none at all at that time. Japan actually had more of these tools for exploring subatomic physics than the US (which had two)! Also, wholly unknown to the Allies until after the war, Japan built the largest production facilities for heavy water in the world. [After the war, the greatest technical problem which had to be solved by the Canadian nuclear power industry was large scale production of heavy water. Japan had already solved this problem.]

There was a significant Japanese effort to identify and exploit sources of uranium and thorium. According to Robert K. Wilcox: “During the deliberations of the committee of experts, Hantaro Nagaoka...had speculated that...they might find [uranium] in Burma...It is said that the Japanese were poised to go into Burma to look for uranium as soon as their armies had taken the country, but they never did.” (Japan’s Secret War, 2nd Edition, Robert K. Wilcox, Marlowe, 1995, p. 120). Relative to Korea, on p. 27 he states: “Konan turned out to be the hub of one of the largest industrial complexes in Asia...Suitland even yielded formerly classified documents saying there was uranium near it.” On p. 36: “Konan had a refinery capable...of converting raw ores into pure uranium...Two mountaintop reservoirs...generated at least 600,000 kilowatts between them. According to...Arthur Compton...our own separation plants at Oak Ridge required only 250,000

Japanese SSNs, Page 5, Rev. 8

kilowatts...And Konan was close to Japan’s possible uranium supply. My searches at Suitland had turned up numerous reports of uranium ores being mined by the Japanese in Korea...” On p. 37: “According to a...Military Intelligence System (MIS) report of the Far Eastern Command, numbered 1710 and dated January 1947, ‘German sources’ had told U.S. interrogators in June 1946 that ‘uranium deposits’ had been found in coal mines near Chuul, North Korea, a settlement just north of Eian...Postwar intelligence from the area disclosed that three Koreans who had worked there told U.S. interrogators that there had been ‘nine buildings and workers quarters’ outside the mine--an unusually large cluster--and that when the Russians took over the mine, they immediately restricted access to it...Other reports said there was a plant ‘capable of refining rare element minerals’ near Eian...Eventually I turned up no fewer than ten sites in Korea where U.S. intelligence reported that the Japanese had mined uranium ore during the war...at least one of them was reported to have been pitchblende--the primary ore.” There are reports that the Japanese China Fleet had 1,000 tons of uranium from the traditional pigmentation industry in Shanghai, obtained by surface mining techniques. [The area SE of Shanghai using these same methods later produced a significant fraction of Communist China’s initial uranium because the mines took many years to come into significant production]. The Japanese also mined minor uranium ores in Manchukuo (especially at Anshan) in Outer Mongolia and North China. I found references in a nuclear geology reference that “several thousand tons” of uranium and thorium bearing ores were exported from Malaya (and probably also Banka Island) to Japan in 1942 and 1943. (Minerals for Atomic Energy, A Guide to Exploration for Uranium, Thorium and Beryllium, Robert D. Nininger, van Nostrand, 1954). Small amounts of nuclear ores were obtained in Japan itself. “[Nashina] first went to Satoyasu Iimoir, the Rikken’s chief geologist...While prospecting in 1936 in Fukushima Prefecture, he had found a mine that was full of ‘heavy elements.’ It was near the town of Ishikawa. The year before, 1935, he had also brought back from Korea some fifty tons of black sands, an ore which contained small amounts of uranium. It had already been refined. In addition, he told Nashina, in Malaya, which had fallen in the first days of the war, there was a large amount of tin-ore residue, called aman by the natives. It contained uranium-bearing monazite and zircon. The British had left it. The aman was being shipped to Japan...Much later...the Ishikawite mines were still being counted on to provide ores with up to a 20% uranium content.” (Japan’s Secret War, 2nd.Ed, Wilcox, Marlowe, 1995, Pp 99-100). [Monazite also contains from 1-15% thorium].

While Wilcox findings have often been criticized in scholarly literature, a number of journalists and historians have uncovered both original Japanese documents and U.S. intelligence documents which tend to corroborate them. [These include Bruce Cumings, Charles W. Stone, Joseph Mark Scalia, and Joseph Bermudez.] As a result, some scholars are beginning to publish that Japan was “vigorously pursuing” a nuclear research program. [See The Two Koreas by Don Oberdorfer, Addison-Wesley, p.251]. If the details of this program are not entirely clear, the scale of the Japanese search for and exploitation of sources of uranium and thorium combines with their construction of ore processing facilities and massive heavy water production facilities to suggest there probably was a significant atomic industry infrastructure in place specifically related to nuclear reactors. Those reactors could be related to weapons production, to power production, or to ship propulsion. To this it should be added that a significant number of IJN officials told interviewers of the USSBS that they were particularly interested in atomic power for submarine propulsion. [According to a retired Rear Admiral who served as a captain as a rare naval member of the USSBS]

The Shock of Hiroshima
Tristan Grunow
University of Oregon

Japanese Atomic Bomb Projects

Unlike the American Manhattan Project, which was initiated by civilian
scientists and then supported by the military, the Japanese atomic programs
were started by military officers who then sought out the expertise
of scientists.5 The Japanese military actually conducted three entirely
separate atomic programs in the course of the Pacific War: one by the
Army code-named “Ni-go,” and two by the Navy, first the “B-research”
program and second the “F-go” project.

The Army’s “Ni-go” Project
In April 1940, Lieutenant-General Yasuda Takeo, director of the Army
Aeronautical Department’s Technological Research Institute, ordered
Lieutenant-Colonel Suzuki Tatsusaburo of the Army Aeronautical Department
to investigate the possibility of building an atomic bomb.6
Suzuki consulted with his former Tokyo Imperial University physics
professor, Sagane Ryokichi, and reported to Yasuda in October of the
same year that the Japanese empire contained enough uranium ore to
produce atomic weapons.7 Yet the Army was slow to act on this information.
It was not until April 1941 that Yasuda ordered Suzuki to contact
Okochi Masatoshi, head of the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research
(Riken) in Tokyo, and consult with him about establishing a
nuclear program. Okochi referred Yasuda to a scientist at the Riken,
Nishina Yoshio.8

Nishina, who was the leading Japanese physicist of his day, had
studied under Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge,
England, and under Niels Bohr, the most prominent nuclear scientist
of his time, in Copenhagen, Denmark.9 At the time he was
approached by Yasuda, Nishina was in the middle of completing a 60-
inch cyclotron at the Riken, and saw the atomic bomb program as a
means to earn military financial support for his own research.10 With
this in mind, Nishina joined the program and began researching atomic
energy, in turn ordering Takeuchi Masa, a scientist at the Riken, to begin
researching an atomic bomb on 22 December 1942.11

The project received official sanction in early 1941 from Tojo Hideki,
then serving as Army minister, who proved exceptionally prescient in
his recognition of the potential importance of atomic weapons in determining
the outcome of the war.12 However, because Japanese forces were
winning the war at first, there was no initial sense of urgency about
atomic research.13 In addition, Nishina and his staff were not given much
financial or technical support. All this began to change after the Japanese
defeat at Midway on 6 June 1942. Suddenly, the Japanese military
started looking for new weapons to turn the tide of the war. In March
1943, Yasuda updated then–Prime Minister To\jo\ on the progress of the
projects, which had been proceeding sluggishly.

The slow progress of the Japanese projects, and rumors that the United
States and Germany had started similar projects, led Tojo to express
concern about Japanese atomic research at a Cabinet meeting held in
early spring 1943 at the War Ministry.14 During this Cabinet meeting,
To\jo\ stated that if Japan fell behind the United States in atomic science,
they would lose the war.15 In response to To\jo\’s argument, the Cabinet
issued two new directives to accelerate scientific research, the “Outline
of Urgent Measures for Scientific Research” and the “Comprehensive
Policy for the Mobilization of Science and Technology.”16 The first directive
was conceived in August 1943, and created a Research Mobilization
Committee to regulate research for the war effort. In October 1943, the
Cabinet reconfigured the committee as the Research Mobilization Council.
Finally, in November 1943, the second directive, the “Comprehensive
Policy for the Mobilization of Science and Technology,” gave priority
to aeronautic research and the development and production of new scientific
weapons.17 In addition to these two directives, To\jo\ ordered the
bomb projects to be accelerated, and commanded Major Generals
Kawashima Toranosuke and Taniguchi Hatsuzo\ to meet with Nishina
and promise him all of the supplies and finances that he needed. Yasuda
appointed Kawashima as the military liaison to Nishina, and in May
1943, upgraded Nishina’s research program into an official Army program
code-named “Ni-go\,” after the first characters of Nishina’s name.18
The “Ni-go\” project was allocated a laboratory, designated Building 49,
at the Riken campus in Komagome, Tokyo.19

Takeuchi Masa, a scientist involved in “Ni-go\,” recalls that after the
program was officially recognized by the military, the program scientists
were required to put “confidential” at the top of their documents
and were reminded of the importance of their research to the war effort.20
However, “Ni-go\” continued to proceed slowly. The increasingly heavy
firebombings that started in 1945 convinced scientists at the Riken that
building a bomb was impossible under such conditions.21 Worse, on 13
April 1945, Building 49 was destroyed by fire in a bombing raid, ruining
much of Nishina’s experimental equipment.22 On 28 June 1945, beset by
all of these difficulties, Nishina reported to his Army superiors announcing
the cessation of atomic research, citing the difficulty of obtaining
enough weapons-grade uranium to produce a bomb, and stating that
since the United States would probably be suffering from the same difficulties,
there was no reason for continuing research.23 The Army Technical
Research Division then sent a three-article report to the Army
Ordinance Division, announcing that Nishina could not obtain enough
uranium to build a bomb and that the United States would not be able to
obtain enough uranium either.24 Army Minister Anami Korechika then
made the decision to officially terminate “Ni-go\” in June 1945.25

The Navy’s “B-Research” and “F-go\” Projects
As early as 1934, the Imperial Japanese Navy had sponsored an investigation
into the feasibility of producing a “super-weapon” based on
Enrico Fermi’s theories of atoms. Although this early investigation concluded
that an atomic weapon was not then feasible, the military paid
close attention to international developments in nuclear physics. The
Navy saw nuclear fission not only as the means to produce an atomic
bomb but also as a potential alternative fuel source for warships, and to
this end sponsored monthly lectures on nuclear physics by Osaka Imperial
University Professor Asada Tsunesaburo\ starting in 1937. These
lectures, conducted at the Navy Technical Research Institute and the
Navy Aeronautical Laboratory, continued until the outbreak of the war.26
Around the same time as the Army project was getting under way,
Captain Ito\ Yoj\ i, chief of the First Section of the Electronic Division of the
Navy Technical Research Institute, was also closely following international
developments in nuclear physics.27 In 1939, Ito\ had proposed the
idea of establishing a nuclear project to the institute, but it was not until
shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 that he initiated
a feasibility study.28 Like Suzuki of the Army before him, Ito\ consulted
with Professors Sagane Ryo\kichi and Hino Juichi.29 Ito\’s report, entitled
“Atomic Physics Application Research,” stated that the U.S. military
was probably already conducting research on atomic energy in cooperation
with Jewish refugee scientists from Germany.30 The report, therefore,
suggested that the Japanese military also begin a program, and cited
atomic energy as a promising source of fuel for ships, but did not specifically
mention the development of a nuclear bomb. The Navy saw promise
in the project and authorized research in four sections. The Navy
code-named the section concerning atomic bombs “B-Research,” and
established the Physics Committee to conduct preliminary studies of
nuclear energy. The Navy, like the Army, looked to Nishina Yoshio to
chair the committee.31

Research, however, did not begin until after the Battle of Midway in
1942, when the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Navy Yamamoto
Isoroku ordered the production of “epoch-making” weapons—including
atomic weapons, radar, and the “death ray.”32 The Navy’s Physics
Committee met for the first time on 8 July 1942 at the Suikosha officers’
quarters in Shiba Park in Tokyo.33 In addition to Ito \ and Nishina, some of
the nation’s leading physicists attended, including Sagane Ryok\ ichi and
Asada Tsunesaburo.\ 34 Ito \ asked the scientists two main questions: would
Japan be able to produce a bomb?, and could they do it before the United
States or Great Britain? In response, Sagane stated that a bomb would
take years for Japan to build.35 During these meetings, perhaps due to his
commitment to confidentiality concerning the Army’s “Ni-go\” project,
Nishina remained silent.36 The committee, which was made up of the
“best minds in Japan,” met for the last time on 6 March 1943, at which
time the scientists informed the military that, although producing a bomb
was theoretically possible, they doubted whether Japan could produce
one in time for use in the war.37 Furthermore, they expressed doubt that
any country, including the United States or Great Britain, would be able
to produce an atomic bomb.38

While Ito\ was forming the Physics Committee under the Navy Technical
Research Institute, Lieutenant-Commander Murata Tsutomu came
across an article entitled “America’s Super Bomb,” in the German science
journal Nitrocellulose. Murata made a translation of the article and
distributed it to other departments in the Navy.39 The article fell into the
hands of Captains Iso Megumu and Mitsui Matao of the Bureau of Ships’
Artillery and Explosives Division, who consulted with Kyoto Imperial
University Professor Arakatsu Bunsaku about the feasibility of an atomic
weapon.40 Arakatsu agreed to start researching a nuclear bomb under
the authority of the Bureau of Ships, although he was skeptical. “Theoretically
speaking, an atomic bomb is possible, but in reality I’m not
sure,” he responded to the order to start research, “It’d be good if we
could get hold of a lot of uranium, but for now we’ll just research the
possibility [of a bomb], that good enough?”41 When Arakatsu finally did
start a research program, he did so, as he later stated, largely to save
young scientists from being drafted into the military.42

After Ito\ disbanded the Physics Committee in March 1943, the only
remaining Navy nuclear weapons project was the Bureau of Ships project
led by Arakatsu in Kyoto. In May 1943, the Bureau of Ships increased
financial support for Arakatsu’s program, and officially designated it
the “F-go\” project.43 The scientists involved with “F-go\” held their first
and only formal meeting with their Navy sponsors on 21 July 1945 at a
hotel on Lake Biwa near Kyoto.44 During this meeting, two Navy officers
reported that no uranium was then available for research purposes.45
The scientists in turn informed the Navy that while a bomb was theoretically
possible, it could not be produced in time for the war.46

Ramifications of the Failed Japanese Projects
With the dissolution of the “F-go\” project, all three of Japan’s atomic
programs had come to an unsuccessful end by the close of July 1945. On
three separate occasions, Japan’s top scientists had informed the military
that neither Japan nor the United States would be able to produce an
atomic weapon before the end of the war. These repeated failures—of the
Physics Committee in 1943, of the Army’s “Ni-go\” program, and the
Navy’s “F-go\” project in 1945—combined to convince the Japanese military
that atomic bombs could not be developed in time for use during the
war. Moreover, they instilled within the Japanese military a false sense
of immunity to the threat of atomic weapons, as Japanese scientists, extrapolating
from their own failures, concluded that other nations’ endeavors
to construct atomic weapons would also end in failure.
That high-ranking military officers were well informed and aware of
the lack of progress of the atomic weapons projects is evident from their
involvement in the sanctioning and decision-making processes of the
projects. To\jo \Hideki and Anami Korechika, the two most powerful military
men in the country during their respective terms as Army minister,
were part of official sanctioning of the Army project in 1941 and also the
decision to terminate it in 1945. Anami also served as the Chief of the
Army Aeronautical Division, under whose authority the “Ni-go\” project
was carried out, from 1944 until his appointment as Army minister in
April 1945. While To\jo\ was prime minister, he even corresponded personally
with Nishina to discuss the progress of the program and was
disappointed when he learned the project had not proceeded very far.47
Other high-ranking military officers, including Lieutenant-General
Kawabe Torashiro\ and the members of the Army General Staff, were kept
up-to-date on the difficulties faced by each of the programs.48


___________________


Conclusion: The Shock of Hiroshima
In the final days of the war, the Japanese military, especially Army Minister
Anami Korechika, steadfastly denied that the bomb dropped on
Hiroshima was atomic. The military’s denial was a direct result of their
false convictions that atomic weapons could not be produced by any
country in time for use during the war. These convictions arose from the
failure of Japan’s own atomic ambitions under Nishina’s Army “Ni-go”\
project, and the Navy’s “B-research” and “F-go\” projects under Arakatsu
Bunsaku. The failure of these projects and, most notably, the scientists’
insistence that development of an atomic weapon was nothing short of
impossible during the current war, reassured the military in the face of
Hiroshima that there was no genuine threat from atomic weapons. Put
together, all of these factors served to delay the surrender of Japan until
after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and the bombing of Nagasaki,
needlessly resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties. Anami’s
statements during the Cabinet meeting on 7 August explicitly illustrate
the false convictions of the military. “Is it not a matter of common knowledge
among Japanese physicists,” he questioned rhetorically, “that it
will take several more years before an atomic bomb can be developed?”208
“Any such move [for peace],” Anami continued, “is uncalled for, we do
not yet know if the bomb was atomic. Until the investigation reports are
received, we must not take any impetuous action.”209

While they were waiting for the final report of the Arisue Investigation
Team in Hiroshima, Japan’s military leaders argued that the nation
should not surrender because they remained confident in Ketsu-Go.\ Furthermore,
the military maintained that the Hiroshima bomb did not pose
an insurmountable threat to the country. Not until the submission of the
Hiroshima Bombing Investigation Report on 10 August did the government
and military leaders know for sure that the Hiroshima bomb was
atomic. Even then, conflicting reports continued to contest this claim,
thus leaving some doubt in the minds of the military leaders. At this
point, however, the leaders succumbed to the emperor’s desire for peace.
As Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Kawabe Torashiro\ wrote in his
diary after being informed of the emperor’s decision: “Alas, everything
is over.”210 The Army now sought a way to abide by the emperor’s will
while at the same time retaining “face.” This led them to concede that,
while they had not been fully defeated militarily, they had lost a “scientific
war.”

Although it is the military that was ultimately responsible for Japan’s
delayed surrender, the Japanese atomic scientists, who so assuredly informed
the Japanese military leaders that atomic weapons would not be
developed during the war, must shoulder some of the blame. Yet, Japanese
atomic scientists have largely escaped criticism for their wartime
actions and their roles in the delayed surrender. As Keiko Nagase-Reimer,
Walker Grunden, and Yamazaki Masakatsu have pointed out, “The Japanese
scientists involved in wartime nuclear research were not strongly
criticized by the Allied scientists for their cooperation with the military
during the war.” In fact, because the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki have become “a symbol of the Japanese defeat” and the “ultimate
symbol of the suffering of Japanese people during the war,” the
Japanese people, along with the atomic scientists, have all come to be
seen as victims of the war. And indeed, they see themselves as victims,
too. “Even nuclear victims were not inclined to criticize these scientists’
involvement in nuclear projects during the war.”211

One critic who has spoken out against the Japanese atomic scientists
is Yamamoto Yo\ichi, of the 8th Army Research Division associated with
the “Ni-go\” project. Yamamoto has argued that the blame for the tragedies
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki rests solely on the scientists, because
they did not “fear” the bomb, and did not believe that the United States
could produce one.212 Yamamoto argues:
If the Japanese scientists’ thinking that production of atomic bombs was
not presently possible had not led them to deny as a rumor the American
announcement [the Potsdam Declaration] that the United States had
completed the bomb, Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not have been
bombed. The regrettable thing is, we then have no excuses for the victims
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the scientists knew the dreadfulness
of the atomic bomb, simply because of the completion of the atomic
bomb, would there not have been an effort to take a step toward ending
the war?213

In addition, Yamamoto argues that the scientists had a moral responsibility
to alert the Army to how destructive an atomic bomb could be.
Kawabe Torashiro\’s postwar interrogation corroborates this opinion.
“Actually, [the] majority in the Army did not realize at first that what
had been dropped was an atomic bomb,” Kawabe stated, “and they
were not generally familiar with the terrible nature of the atomic bomb.”214
Had the scientists alerted the military about the power of atomic bombs,
the response to the Potsdam Declaration would have been different.
However, because the scientists did not believe a bomb was possible,
they did not warn the military. Thus Yamamoto contends that the scientists
’ mentality—”if Japan could not produce a bomb, then neither could
the United States”—actually caused the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.215

Obviously, there was no initial consensus among Japanese scientists
that the Hiroshima bomb was atomic. Moreover, had the scientists immediately
acknowledged that the Hiroshima bomb was atomic, the Army
could possibly still have opted for a decisive homeland battle. As the
Army Military Affairs Bureau’s report to the National Diet suggests, the
atomic bombs would not have caused a change in Ketsu-Go\ plans. Yet,
since the scientists exacerbated the entrenched obstinacy of Japan’s
myopic leadership by assuring that atomic weapons would not, and
could not, be developed during the war, their dilatory influence should
certainly be factored into any discussion of the delayed Japanese surrender.
Had the military not been falsely led to believe that atomic weapons
were not a genuine threat during the war, they would have responded
much differently to the bombing of Hiroshima. If, in the wake of
Hiroshima, the military had immediately perceived that the bomb was
atomic, they could have sooner utilized the “face-saving” possibility of
the atomic bomb, and acquiesced to Foreign Minister To\go\’s entreaty for
peace on 7 August. In this case, the hundreds of thousands of casualties
and lives lost in the disaster of Nagasaki and the Russian invasion of
Manchuria would have been preventable. In the end, the real “shock of
Hiroshima,” then, was not from the destruction of the city or the introduction
of a “new and most cruel bomb,” but from the realization that
U.S. science had succeeded where Japanese science had failed. It was
this realization that made possible the emperor’s final decision to surrender.
If only it had come sooner.





6



5. Dower, “‘NI’ and ‘F’,” 82.
6. Yomiuri Shinbunsha, ed., Sho\wa-shi no tenno\ (The emperor in Sho\wa history)
(Tokyo, 1967–76), 78; Walter E. Grunden, Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in
the Shadow of Big Science (Lawrence, Kans., 2005), 56.
7. Yomiuri, Sho\wa-shi, 79; Pacific War Research Society (PWRS), The Day Man
Lost: Hiroshima, 6 August 1945 (Tokyo and New York, 1981), 19.
8. Grunden, Secret Weapons, 57; Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear
Weapons Research,” 116. Grunden reads Okochi’s first name as Masatoshi.
9. Nagase-Reimer, Grunden, and Yamazaki Masakatsu, “Nuclear Weapons Research
in Japan,” 206.
10. Ibid.
11. Yomiuri, Sho\wa-shi, 86; Takeuchi is also sometimes referred to as Takeuchi
Tadashi.
12. Bo\eicho\ Kenshu\jo Senshi-shitsu (Self-Defense Agency Training Institute War
History Office), Senshi so\sho: Hondo bo\ku\ sakusen (War history series: Homeland airdefense
strategy) (Tokyo, 1971), 632; Asahi Shimbun, “Maboroshi no genbaku kaihatsu:
Nihon no genshiryoku, dai-ichi bu, 2” (The illusory A-bomb development: Japanese
atomic power, pt. 1, no. 2), 28 Aug. 1995, evening ed., 11.
13. Asahi Shimbun, “Maboroshi no genbaku kaihatsu,” 28 Aug. 1955, 11.
14. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
119.
15. Yomiuri, Sho\wa-shi, 84.
16. Walter E. Grunden, Yamazaki Masakatsu et al., “Laying the Foundation for
Wartime Research: A Comparative Overview of Science Mobilization in National
Socialist Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union,” OSIRIS 20 (2005), 97.
17. Ibid.; Low, “Japan’s Secret War?,” 349.
The “Shock of Hiroshima” 159
18. Nihon Heiki Ko\gyo\kai (Japan Ordnance Association), ed., Rikusen heiki so\kan
(A guide to army weaponry) (Tokyo, 1977), 697; Grunden, Secret Weapons, 69.
19. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
120.
20. Nihon Kagakushi Gakkai (History of Science Society of Japan), ed., Nihon
kagaku gijyutsushi taikei (The complete history of Japanese science and technology),
vol. 13 (Tokyo, 1970), 449.
21. Asahi Shimbun, “Maboroshi no genbaku kaihatsu: Nihon no genshiryoku, daiichi
bu, 4,” 11 Sept. 1995, evening ed., 11.
22. Grunden, Secret Weapons, 73.
23. Yamazaki Masakatsu, “Nihon no senji kakukaihatsu to Hiroshima no sho\geki”
(Japanese wartime atomic development and the shock of Hiroshima), in Hiroshima
Daigaku So\go\ Kagakubu, ed., “Senso\ to kagaku” no shoso\: Genbaku to kagakusha wo
meguru futatsu shimpojiumu no kiroku (Thoughts on “war and science”: Records of
two symposiums on the atomic bombs and scientists) (Tokyo, 2006), 54; Nihon
Heiki Ko\gyo\kai, ed., Rikusen heiki so\kan, 712.
24. Nihon Heiki Ko\gyo\kai, ed., Rikusen heiki so\kan, 712.
25. Yomiuri, Sho\wa-shi, 207–8.
26. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1988), 457; Grunden,
Secret Weapons, 50.
27. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
116.
28. Ibid.; Grunden, Secret Weapons, 61.
29. Ito\ Yo\ji, “Butsuri kondankai toha: Genshibakudan to kyo\ryoku denpa no shinso\”
(About the physics gathering: The truth about the atomic bomb and the death ray),
in Shiga Fujio, ed., Kimitsu heiki no zenbo\ (The whole story of secret weapons) (Tokyo,
1953), 161; Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
116; Grunden, Secret Weapons, 61.
30. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
116.
31. Ito\, “Butsuri kondankai toha,” 165; Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime
Nuclear Weapons Research,” 116.
32. Grunden, Secret Weapons, 61; Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime
Nuclear Weapons Research,” 116.
33. Ito\, “Butsuri kondankai toha,” 166; PWRS, The Day Man Lost, 27.
34. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
117.
35. Grunden, Secret Weapons, 65.
36. Nihon Heiki Ko\gyo\kai, ed., Rikusen heiki so\kan, 697–98.
37. Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 457; PWRS, The Day Man Lost, 35.
38. Ito\, “Butsuri kondankai toha,” 166; Grunden, Secret Weapons, 62.
39. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
117.
40. Ibid., 118.
41. Nihon Kagakushi Gakkai, Nihon kagaku gijyutsushi taikei, 469.
42. Ibid.
43. Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime Nuclear Weapons Research,”
122.
44. PWRS, The Day Man Lost, 201.
45. Nagase-Reimer, Grunden, and Yamazaki, “Nuclear Weapons Research in
Japan,” 230.
46. PWRS, The Day Man Lost, 201; Grunden, Walker, and Yamazaki, “Wartime
Nuclear Weapons Research,” 122.



207. Asada, “The Shock,” 507.
208. Ibid., 505.
209. Brooks, Behind Japan’s Surrender, 170.
188 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations
210. Hasegawa, “Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion,” 128.
211. Nagase-Reimer, Grunden, and Yamazaki, “Nuclear Weapons Research in
Japan,” 234, 236.
212. Nihon Heiki Ko\gyo\kai, ed., Rikusen Heiki So\kan, 713.
213. Ibid., 694.
The “Shock of Hiroshima” 189

3313 words....20837 characters.

Nice Job Tree........not only is your posted article roughly half the words posted by Sid, your quoted material largely stays on topic vs. going off on endless tangents and bouts of self promotion. How dare you sir!

Bonus: you provide the article's citations and sources at the end. Bravo.

While Wilcox findings have often been criticized in scholarly literature, a number of journalists and historians have uncovered both original Japanese documents and U.S. intelligence documents which tend to corroborate them. [These include Bruce Cumings, Charles W. Stone, Joseph Mark Scalia, and Joseph Bermudez.]

Is this what you are relying on?

Atomic Secrets

MISSING ATOMIC SECRETS
THE GREATEST SECRET
Charles W. Stone
All Rights Reserved, Copyright 2005


From the WW II era of history comes perhaps the greatest secret of the US Government....

BLAH BLAH BLAH...then we get to this gem.

The danger of a regional or even worldwide atomic conflict has increased substantially. Most of the information has been in books, articles and other sources starting in the early 1980’s. It was know informally in military intelligence circles far earlier. Yet the important story has been totally ignored by the media. In fact the chief gatekeeper for ABC News, Peter Jennings, has done a documentary with the chief revisionist historian at MIT. In addition Mr. Jennings did an infomercial for CIPRO BEFORE the anthrax letters were mailed and continued to hype it despite there being better and more effective therapies.

There is substantial evidence of atomic conflicts in ancient history including radioactive skeletons in India, vitrified stone forts in Scotland, large desert areas with sand turned to glass and even the story of Lot’s wife in the Bible. By failing to learn from the past the US government has cast a grave course for the future!

Wowzers...

Welp, I'm a complete convert!