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RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Wed Jul 04, 2012 5:52 pm
by FatR
ORIGINAL: spence
The IJN spent nearly 4 years wishing that all this was true. In the real world the Bettys (and Nells) had one really good day against ships (Prince of Wales and Repulse). That same torpedo corps went after the Lexington in February and then Adm Crace's TF at Coral Sea without any effect. After that they spent the rest of their existence completely justifying their reputation (amongst their own crews) as RONSONs (a type of cigarette lighter). The occasional torpedo hit they scored hardly justifies the expenditure of aircrew that went along with it.
Okay, let's count successes of Betties after PoW and Repulse:

CV:1 damaged
BB:1 damaged (disputed, might be B6N)
CA:1 sunk, 3 damaged
CL:3 damaged (or 4, if USS Birmingham was also torpedoed by G4M on 10/08/43, can't find definite information about the attacker's type anywhere)
A bunch of lesser ships (AV Langley, both APAs lost by USN during the war, a couple of destroyers), I'm far too lazy to count exactly.

That's... a very good tally for a plane of which only 2435 (I hope you realise that this is a quite small number for a plane that also was the main ground attacker and one of the main searchplanes of IJNAF) were produced and which was on the losing side. In fact, I don't think any other purely land-based plane on both sides can boast a comparable list. Add here important operational results achieved by repulsing Allied cruisers at Makassar Strait, and by numerous airfield and port attacks during the Japanese offensive in Philippines, Malaya and DEI, as well as far less triumphant, but still vital for holding the line as long as Japs did, action over Darwin, Port Moresby and Solomons, and I fail to see how G4M career can be considered anything other than illustrious. Impossibility of the odds placed against IJNAF land-based bomber force is a weak reason to condemn a plane's design.

That said, Stormwolf is far in the realm of exaggeration too.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Wed Jul 04, 2012 7:19 pm
by spence
Okay, let's count successes of Betties after PoW and Repulse:

CV:1 damaged
BB:1 damaged (disputed, might be B6N)
CA:1 sunk, 3 damaged
CL:3 damaged (or 4, if USS Birmingham was also torpedoed by G4M on 10/08/43, can't find definite information about the attacker's type anywhere)
A bunch of lesser ships (AV Langley, both APAs lost by USN during the war, a couple of destroyers), I'm far too lazy to count exactly.

That's... a very good tally for a plane of which only 2435 (I hope you realise that this is a quite small number for a plane that also was the main ground attacker and one of the main searchplanes of IJNAF) were produced and which was on the losing side. In fact, I don't think any other purely land-based plane on both sides can boast a comparable list. Add here important operational results achieved by repulsing Allied cruisers at Makassar Strait, and by numerous airfield and port attacks during the Japanese offensive in Philippines, Malaya and DEI, as well as far less triumphant, but still vital for holding the line as long as Japs did, action over Darwin, Port Moresby and Solomons, and I fail to see how G4M career can be considered anything other than illustrious. Impossibility of the odds placed against IJNAF land-based bomber force is a weak reason to condemn a plane's design.

That's roughly the same number of a/c as the Fairey Swordfish with the same record of combat success (approximately). Not too many threads from the IJN fanboys complaining about how the game portrays such an invidious British invention though.

Point is that the G3/G4 failed in their mission of sea control. I am not denying that they could score the occasional success but the pre-war concepts held by Combined Fleet were not justified by events.

Perhaps the effectiveness of weapons systems should not be knowable for certain by the players. Let them guess whether their investment is worthwhile until it is proved in combat. And let the values for penetration and accuracy vary some from game to game.

As it stands the IJ Player is perfectly content to risk his BBs in all sorts of ways because he knows for sure that Allied LBA can't score any damaging hits (except the occasional fire) for the first 8 months or so. Even the 1000 lbers delivered by US carrier air most probably will not seriously harm IJN BBs. Such historical certainty allows for very unhistorical play. Even if the real reason that such operations were not undertaken was that the IJN Admirals restrained themselves this is supposed to be a game about the IJN and its command authority really was part of the picture.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Wed Jul 04, 2012 11:13 pm
by Commander Stormwolf
G3M / G4M was successful as an area denial weapon

Nimitz and crew were more concerned about the betty than the ijn carriers ,

and they stayed away from japanese LBA after midway.. they even abandoned the marines on guadalcanal
due to the concern of betties from rabaul..

and they only started offensives once japanese LBA was worn down and large numbers of essex were available

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Thu Jul 05, 2012 6:21 pm
by spence
quote:

Okay, let's count successes of Betties after PoW and Repulse:

CV:1 damaged
BB:1 damaged (disputed, might be B6N)
CA:1 sunk, 3 damaged
CL:3 damaged (or 4, if USS Birmingham was also torpedoed by G4M on 10/08/43, can't find definite information about the attacker's type anywhere)
A bunch of lesser ships (AV Langley, both APAs lost by USN during the war, a couple of destroyers), I'm far too lazy to count exactly.

That's... a very good tally for a plane of which only 2435 (I hope you realise that this is a quite small number for a plane that also was the main ground attacker and one of the main searchplanes of IJNAF) were produced and which was on the losing side. In fact, I don't think any other purely land-based plane on both sides can boast a comparable list. Add here important operational results achieved by repulsing Allied cruisers at Makassar Strait, and by numerous airfield and port attacks during the Japanese offensive in Philippines, Malaya and DEI, as well as far less triumphant, but still vital for holding the line as long as Japs did, action over Darwin, Port Moresby and Solomons, and I fail to see how G4M career can be considered anything other than illustrious. Impossibility of the odds placed against IJNAF land-based bomber force is a weak reason to condemn a plane's design.



That's roughly the same number of a/c as the Fairey Swordfish with the same record of combat success (approximately). Not too many threads from the IJN fanboys complaining about how the game portrays such an invidious British invention though.

I guess I misspoke about the FAA Swordfish. Before the first RIKKO had fired a single war shot Swordfish had:

SUNK: 4 Battleships (although all in harbor and 2 were raised) and 5 DD with torpedoes along with sinking 2 DD with bombs.
DAMAGED 3 BB (2 underway), 1 CA (underway) and 3 DDs with torpedoes (including crippling hits on the Italian CA Pola and German BB Bismarck which allowed surface ships to catch and subsequently sink them)

The Swordfish also sank many many submarines and merchant ships throughout the war. Seems the Swordfish had a better record than the RIKKO.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 12:14 pm
by Mundy
ORIGINAL: crsutton

ORIGINAL: treespider

You think Allied CV's early war are weak...bite me! I knew exactly where they were...one of my subs even had the temerity to scratch Yorktown's paint with a torpedo the day before the big exchange on the 15th.

Image


I think the general consensus has always been. Never take on KB-"unless" Treespider is your opponent. Then you can safely figure that you have about a 80% chance of sinking at least six of his carriers.

We call it Treespider's Law. [:D]

For what it's worth, only one of my CVs survived in the end. Hornet was untouched by the arial battle, only to get put down by a lurking sub the next day. The dirty tricks department put York away for awhile after a SSX ran amok in Noumea.

Ed-

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 12:31 pm
by Historiker
ORIGINAL: crsutton

ORIGINAL: treespider

You think Allied CV's early war are weak...bite me! I knew exactly where they were...one of my subs even had the temerity to scratch Yorktown's paint with a torpedo the day before the big exchange on the 15th.

Image


I think the general consensus has always been. Never take on KB-"unless" Treespider is your opponent. Then you can safely figure that you have about a 80% chance of sinking at least six of his carriers.

We call it Treespider's Law. [:D]
[:D]

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 1:09 pm
by Chickenboy
ORIGINAL: spence
Even the 1000 lbers delivered by US carrier air most probably will not seriously harm IJN BBs. Such historical certainty allows for very unhistorical play.

Ummm...no.

USN-delivered 1000-lb bombs are quite unhealthy for BBs. I've had several seriously harmed by fires and SYS damage rendered by these weapon systems.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 1:12 pm
by Mundy
Fires are bad.

In the above fight, Lex had roughly 45 sys and 35 flt. However, she had 98 fires and only lasted a day.

Ed-

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 1:26 pm
by Chickenboy
ORIGINAL: spence
Seems the Swordfish had a better record than the RIKKO.

Meh. The Swordfish had a different record than the Rikko because it was used in a very different naval war than the Pacific. In spite of its limitations, and the absence of a good follow-on design in the early to mid-war, it did well enough to justify its existence. It was a useful tool for the Allied naval war effort.

The G3/4 series was useful in its mission-to an extent. Then Japanese conceptual failures in design (armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, etc.), pilot training issues and usage (poor escort coordination at times) made its deployment a case of diminishing returns. On the whole, I can't be so dismissive of the successes of this airframe (it ONLY sank how many ships?) as to say that it wasn't at least modestly successful.

Furthermore, I would say that the capabilities of the G3/4 were respected enough to cause the Allies to alter their strategic goals in the Pacific IRL. If they were concerned about the IJ Guadalcanal buildup cutting off supply routes from CONUS-Australia, they weren't concerned about the range and naval interdiction capabilities of the Dave float planes or even the occasional Emily torpedo attack. They were concerned enough about the capabilities of the G3/4 series (and its range) at naval interdiction that they felt compelled to hold an invasion on a shoestring.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 1:57 pm
by jeffk3510
How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 2:48 pm
by castor troy
ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?


bombs worked very well (better than in the game IMO, compared to torps) so that there was no real need for torp bombers. What we see in the game with thousands and thousands of torp attacks through the years has nothing to do with real life. Torp availability in AE made it somewhat better but a smart IJ player will have enough air HQs where he needs them to fly 95% of the torp attacks he also flew in WITP where he didnt need those air HQs.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 3:06 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Meh. The Swordfish had a different record than the Rikko because it was used in a very different naval war than the Pacific. In spite of its limitations, and the absence of a good follow-on design in the early to mid-war, it did well enough to justify its existence. It was a useful tool for the Allied naval war effort.

The G3/4 series was useful in its mission-to an extent. Then Japanese conceptual failures in design (armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, etc.), pilot training issues and usage (poor escort coordination at times) made its deployment a case of diminishing returns. On the whole, I can't be so dismissive of the successes of this airframe (it ONLY sank how many ships?) as to say that it wasn't at least modestly successful.

Furthermore, I would say that the capabilities of the G3/4 were respected enough to cause the Allies to alter their strategic goals in the Pacific IRL. If they were concerned about the IJ Guadalcanal buildup cutting off supply routes from CONUS-Australia, they weren't concerned about the range and naval interdiction capabilities of the Dave float planes or even the occasional Emily torpedo attack. They were concerned enough about the capabilities of the G3/4 series (and its range) at naval interdiction that they felt compelled to hold an invasion on a shoestring.

The S-79sil had a different record too. Different situations, different combat environments. Apples and Oranges.


RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 3:10 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?


Couple reasons. First off, the USN pre-war was still largely gun-based. War plan Orange/Rainbow envisioned a fleet action to relieve the PI. The Japanese envisioned a defensive action to attrit this fleet. Yamamoto was an air enthusiaist and the Japanese in general saw the torpedo as an ideal means to acompish this attrition. Second....for 'defensive' the US envisioned high alt precision bombing as a possible solution to naval shore defense......hence the B-17.

The Japanese ended up under-estimating the problem of widely seperated bases lacking mutual protection and the US grossly overestimated the ability of high alt bombers hitting moving ships. It can also be noted (and has been by some authors) that the Japanese were so enthralled with long range that they failed to appreciate that being unescorted could produce problems and that crew fatigue would have an impact as well.

Live and Learn.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 3:25 pm
by Onime No Kyo
ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?


Couple reasons. First off, the USN pre-war was still largely gun-based. War plan Orange/Rainbow envisioned a fleet action to relieve the PI. The Japanese envisioned a defensive action to attrit this fleet. Yamamoto was an air enthusiaist and the Japanese in general saw the torpedo as an ideal means to acompish this attrition. Second....for 'defensive' the US envisioned high alt precision bombing as a possible solution to naval shore defense......hence the B-17.

The Japanese ended up under-estimating the problem of widely seperated bases lacking mutual protection and the US grossly overestimated the ability of high alt bombers hitting moving ships. It can also be noted (and has been by some authors) that the Japanese were so enthralled with long range that they failed to appreciate that being unescorted could produce problems and that crew fatigue would have an impact as well.

Live and Learn.

Can't it be argued instead that the Allies in general never saw the torpedo as a viable weapon (vis "the USN was gun crazy")? The British, or for that matter the French, never put much effort into developing a long range, land-based TB despite the likelihood of it being very effective in N.Atlantic conditions?

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 4:07 pm
by Commander Stormwolf
Have to say it again,

japanese didn't understand that because 90% of their atoll bases were water,
best thing to do was use that space for flying boats with torpedoes (and they had the fastest flying boat in the world, the emily)

so instead of 50 zeroes and 50 betties, you could fit 150 zeroes and 150 emilies on a size 3 or size 4 atoll

, a few of these atolls put together (like the marshall islands), and a USN counter-offensive would be quite difficult


taking out some of the fuel from the emily (don't need 30 hex range, 15 will do fine) and putting lots of armor or more ordnance
would have made it a truly devastating weapon - the only problem would be the high cost in materials, H8K1 was about 16 tons, and H8K2 was 18 tons


the concept of the long range torpedo plane, with escort and high performance oxygen torpedoes was a brilliant one

just implemented with a few flaws

(and using their few precious betties to attack allied airfield didn't help either)

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 4:13 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

Can't it be argued instead that the Allies in general never saw the torpedo as a viable weapon (vis "the USN was gun crazy")? The British, or for that matter the French, never put much effort into developing a long range, land-based TB despite the likelihood of it being very effective in N.Atlantic conditions?

I think it would be more accurate to say the US saw the torpedo as too expensive and preferred bombs being targeted into pickle barrels with the amazing Norden bombsite and advertised to Congress as the ultimate in Cheap defense....more so given that at high alt the precious (and expensive) bombers would be more immune to counter-attack :)

The FAA was the black sheep stepchild of the RAF and was also starved of funds. Funds for big bombers were focused on continental bombing primarily pre-war

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 4:16 pm
by Onime No Kyo
ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

Have to say it again,

japanese didn't understand that because 90% of their atoll bases were water,
best thing to do was use that space for flying boats with torpedoes (and they had the fastest flying boat in the world, the emily)

so instead of 50 zeroes and 50 betties, you could fit 150 zeroes and 150 emilies on a size 3 or size 4 atoll

, a few of these atolls put together (like the marshall islands), and a USN counter-offensive would be quite difficult


taking out some of the fuel from the emily (don't need 30 hex range, 15 will do fine) and putting lots of armor or more ordnance
would have made it a truly devastating weapon - the only problem would be the high cost in materials, H8K1 was about 16 tons, and H8K2 was 18 tons


the concept of the long range torpedo plane, with escort and high performance oxygen torpedoes was a brilliant one

just implemented with a few flaws

(and using their few precious betties to attack allied airfield didn't help either)

In my opinion you spend too much time double guessing historical decisions. I agree that this can be fun, but (also in my opinion) it doesnt have much of a place in a discussion of historical reality.

Good point on the reasoning behind the development of float planes in the 20s and 30s but aside from that there is, unfortunately, not a lot to go on in your post aside from speculation.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 4:23 pm
by Onime No Kyo
ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

Can't it be argued instead that the Allies in general never saw the torpedo as a viable weapon (vis "the USN was gun crazy")? The British, or for that matter the French, never put much effort into developing a long range, land-based TB despite the likelihood of it being very effective in N.Atlantic conditions?

I think it would be more accurate to say the US saw the torpedo as too expensive and preferred bombs being targeted into pickle barrels with the amazing Norden bombsite and advertised to Congress as the ultimate in Cheap defense....more so given that at high alt the precious (and expensive) bombers would be more immune to counter-attack :)

The FAA was the black sheep stepchild of the RAF and was also starved of funds. Funds for big bombers were focused on continental bombing primarily pre-war

I dont disagree. Besides Billy provided what was seen as ample proof that bombs could to the job. But torpedo development in the USN was in general a good decade behind even the British, much less the Japanese. I'm referring not only to the air launched kind but also the sub and ship-borne varieties (how much difference is there between them in an engineering sense?).

As an aside on the FAA/RAF.....I thought that the FAA was only concerned with shipboard aircraft (CVs and scout spotter planes) and the RAF was responsible for coastline defense for lack of a better term. I can see how there might not have been any interest in the RAF to develop a land-based TB but was this in fact the case?

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 4:32 pm
by Nikademus
your right. Coastal Command was responsible for patrol/ASW duties, however it too tended to only get 2nd hand equipment. Once the war began and stepped up, Harris begrudged every large modern bomber to anything other than his Bomber Command.

The Japanese viewpoint was different keep in mind because they were focused on the Decisive Battle so an attack on an invading fleet was paramount in their thoughts. the UK faced no similar threat and had the still had quantitively the most powerful navy in the world at the time (but along with an extremely tight budget).

As such there wasn't alot of fiscal room to develop a 2nd naval line of defense nor was there seen a pressing need.....hence the FAA remained stuck with torpedo biplanes and went down the dead end corridor of the multi-purpose aircraft such as the Skua and Roc.

RE: Allied CVs, early wwar

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2012 4:35 pm
by Onime No Kyo
ORIGINAL: Nikademus

your right. Coastal Command was responsible for patrol/ASW duties, however it too tended to only get 2nd hand equipment. Once the war began and stepped up, Harris begrudged every large modern bomber to anything other than his Bomber Command.

The Japanese viewpoint was different keep in mind because they were focused on the Decisive Battle so an attack on an invading fleet was paramount in their thoughts. the UK faced no similar threat and had the still had quantitively the most powerful navy in the world at the time (but along with an extremely tight budget).

As such there wasn't alot of fiscal room to develop a 2nd naval line of defense nor was there seen a pressing need.....hence the FAA remained stuck with torpedo biplanes and went down the dead end corridor of the multi-purpose aircraft such as the Skua and Roc.

What about the Med?