I will take a look on Amazon and see what I can find on this – and look again over my books that cover the period.
But in the meantime, coming back on your answers I would comment as follows:
warspite1
The problem with dummy companies and routing through third party countries (particularly given the size and position of those countries) is that surely it is not difficult for the US to spot something amiss.
Alfred
Correct but spotting something and being able to do something effective about it are two completely different things.
Yes but as said, that is made easier by the fact that the USA is both putting the embargo in place and the seller of the oil. There is no 3rd party (as in the case of Italy) to get around the embargo (see USSR below).
Alfred
For a start, there are the diplomatic consequences. How do you stop a third party from reexporting without antagonising that third party. Do you want to turn them into an enemy?
There is no reason to antagonise the 3rd Party though. We would not be talking about the US suddenly stopping the supply of oil to those 3rd parties, but simply ensuring that there was no sudden, unexplained 'increase in usage' i.e. surplus oil is being sent to Japan.
Alfred
Do you want Vichy France to throw in its lot with the Axis. Depending on when this occurs, this could be a significant boost to Italo-German operations in Africa.
This is too simplistic. The Vichy/German/British/US relations were complex, and I cannot see that this is possible for two reasons. Firstly remember, the British were keen to stop imports into Metropolitan Vichy France – although the US wishes ultimately carried the day and they provided oil and foodstuffs to Petain. Make no mistake the Vichy regime
needed the US. If the US imports stopped, Adolf Hitler wasn't going to lift a finger to make up the shortfall.
The French were able to send shipping between France and West Africa – but not south of Dakar. There was little chance of any oil being sent from Metropolitan Vichy France to Japan.
But this ‘throwing in their lot with the Axis’ did not happen for a number of reasons and so was certainly never going to happen over the size of oil imports to French Indo-China – Hitler’s plans for France post WWII were such that he did not want a rapproachment with France (even if Petain and co could not see it).
Alfred
Same with Portugal, do you think Britain will thank the USA for the new U-boat bases in the Azores, or Angola/Mozambique perfectly positioned astride the Cape Town route used for all those convoys not able to use the Mediterranean.
I think the idea that Portugal is going to join the Axis because the US refuse to send massive amounts of oil to Timor is not realistic. The US and the British worked behind the scenes to keep Franco’s Spain from being seduced by the charms of Axis participation. Portugal, in a fit of pique, is not suddenly going to sign up for getting her Empire dismantled and the country ultimately invaded by the Allies because the US refuses to send bucket loads of oil to Timor and thence to Japan. What exactly is there in it for Portugal?
Alfred
How exactly do you measure an unacceptable increase in demand for oil from these 3rd parties. An immediate jump of 400% is a bit of a give away. But what if the increase is only 50%, justified as a prudent course of stockpiling for a rainy day. You can't just invade them, there is probably no casus bellus to put before Congress. Are you prepared for a trade embargo in return and possible job losses in certain Congressional districts. These are all difficult issues to deal, all with costs which cannot be avoided.
But we are talking about
Japan’s oil requirements. Industrial Japan with a very large navy to keep fuelled. A 50% increase in French Indo China’s, Thailand’s and Portuguese Timor’s oil consumption is not going to touch the sides of Japan’s annual requirement.
As for job losses, I really can't see that as an issue. There is plenty of scope for the slack being taken up. The British oil position for one, the expansion of the USN (already well underway) for another and, bearing in mind we are talking July 1941, the USSR is going to be helped - even if oil itself is not required the shipping to Murmansk, Vladivostok and the Middle East (the three points for delivering lend lease) is going to need a lot of oil.
Alfred
Not difficult to imagine Japan making it a condition for the non aggression pact to be supplied with oil from the Soviet Union before Barbarossa at which point Uncle Joe becomes Japan's Roosevelt to Italy. The benefits of diversifying their oil sources had not be lost on the Japanese.
I think to suggest ‘not difficult’ is perhaps a bit of a stretch. At Nomonhan in 1939, the Soviets totally crushed the Japanese - not the other way around. The uneasy peace that followed has to be set against that background. Stalin was relaxing in the warmth of his Nazi-Soviet pact and, given Nomonhan, would be unlikely to be too concerned over Japan. Although I grant you, Stalin probably signed the NS pact thinking that Germany and the Western Allies would beat themselves into a stalemate. That Germany had defeated the French, kicked the British off the continent and then was shaping up for moving into the Balkans, would likely have left him feeling a little less smug.
So the USSR and Japan signed a non-aggression pact in April 1941. Sensing what may be about to come, Japan refuse to sign the pact unless an oil agreement is included. Given the USSR’s strong negotiating position at this point this may or may not happen and Stalin may be forgiven in thinking what is in it for him given Russian/Japanese recent history and given that Japan and Germany have a nice little pact in place themselves? But because of the events in France of 1940 lets say that he does agree to this.
June 1941 Barbarossa is launched and the USSR is in trouble. Are the Soviets really going to be pulling out the stops to fulfil their oil obligations? Is it even possible?
Sure enough the US oil embargo is put in place in July 1941. But things now get complicated. Even if the oil agreement was signed, even if a USSR - busy losing millions of men, busy moving large parts of its industry and busy trying to keep its armies in the field and supplied - is able to physically provide the oil, there is a problem. Fearing the Soviets will collapse, the first US aid to the USSR began in October 1941. So to recap, in your scenario the USSR are supplying oil to Japan to circumvent the US embargo. Meanwhile the US are about to start sending aid to the USSR which is seemingly on the verge of military collapse. That these two agreements would continue side by side seems untenable.
Even if such an agreement were
initially possible, Japan ends up in the same place by the autumn of 1941 or perhaps as early as June 1941, just two months after signing the agreement in the first place.
warspite1
I have no idea of the timescale for the synthetic fuel and what it would entail and what could be produced. It would be great to get some detail on that.
Alfred
You have a timescale commencing late 1940 when the fleet remains at San Diego (maybe even earlier). Add the stockpile of 12 months which can be extended (as occurred historically) means some 18-24 months to get some plants into operation. Wouldn't be enough to time to fully set up but should suffice to start getting some flow. Depends a lot on how good the technology transfer goes.
Starting it in 1940 seems a little 'forward thinking' but let's suppose someone in Tokyo has their eye on the ball and understands where this
initial US embargo will end up. The most important question of all is how much can they realistically provide in terms of Japan’s requirements going forward? In other words how realistic is this as a solution to Japan's problems?
As to the last two points, I will need to revisit some of my books and possibly purchase new ones. The ability of the Japanese to simply remove itself from China at the behest of the US may be possible – although I understand Tojo vetoed a possible plan of withdrawal (which if true surely effectively puts him in the war camp?) – but I find it difficult to believe based purely on Japanese behaviour both before and during World War II.