Matrix Games Forums

Thanks to all for putting such effort into your posts. I know nothing, so it helps.

But it did occur to me how I would model 1970s to very early '80s scenarios using the Soviet tactics of the day. There are some options in the game, but you pretty much have to role-play it. Most will go to that era and play it based on everything they know.

It would be interesting to follow the Soviet theories of the time to the letter and see how things play out. Would be perfect for multiplayer, but guessing the AI's tactics would still be better than what the WP was straddled with at the time.

ORIGINAL: Blond_Knight

Well, although their training has come a long way, you have to admit that historically the Soviets havent been concerned about casualties, only the objective. And its within the memories or some veterans that Commissars forced groups of untrained, and sometimes unequipped men into human wave attacks against German units.

You are wrong all over your post =) First of all, there was "fight with skill, not number" rule, that was set by Suvorov in 18th century, and it was rule for soviet army at least since 1942. Second thing is that there was not "one rifle for three soldiers" it never was so (there was about 37 000 000 of rifles in storage that was enough to equipe Soviet every mobilized men in USSR with at least one rifle. Role of Comissars was lowered in 1942, and disasterous casualties of 1941 is mostly result of Soviet Army was unprepared for war in general... in 1942 or even 43... picture would be qute different. Also in 1942 count of casualties become almost equal, and in 43-45 German casualties was a bit to much higher than soviet.

It would be interesting to follow the Soviet theories of the time to the letter and see how things play out. Would be perfect for multiplayer, but guessing the AI's tactics would still be better than what the WP was straddled with at the time.

Don't expect the AI to conduct a Soviet style "battle drill" attack. You have to experiment with that while being in control of the Soviets yourself. I suggest if you run experiments, select the NATO defence as either dug-in or dug-in and fortified. The later is really tough. If you don't dig NATO in, they will be run over by sheer numbers. Digging in NATO really hampers the Soviet's ability to spot.

Kevin

There was a trend we noticed in about 86 when Soviets were highly rewarding and encouraging acts of initiative during maneuvers. I do recall some examples. This was seen as a greater change to their traditional doctrine.

As for resupply. Our regimental tracked ammo carriers were not very far behind the companies. They could commit to a moddest resupply if a platoon went critical and if opportunity was there to rotate it back to cover for hasty replishment. Forget fuel though. Not a chance to refuel at this scope.

I've long wondered how Soviet forces managed to utterly destroy the bulk of the German army by using rigid tactics and by failing to reward initiative on the part of junior leaders. It's never rung true to me and my infantry training during the 1970s (we only ever seemed to be briefed on 'three Soviet tanks moving westwards') also left me unconvinced. There's politics and doctrine, and then there's human nature as observed during combat operations.

Panzer Operations by Erhard Raus is a great read and it dispels much of this myth. Even in 1941, when Raus commanded 6th Pz Div, he recounted to US Army interviewers that Soviet troops were displaying impressive professionalism, deploying quickly in carefully prepared, hidden positions, often holding fire until Axis forces had passed them by, marching without orders to establish new defensive lines, (the advancing Germans could often see their opponents in the distance, marching off-road in a race to the next river line) and essentially winning the war during its first year by inflicting a strategic defeat on the advancing enemy; denying them their strategic objectives.

Rigid adherence to orders during the conduct a desperate delaying battle should not be confused with complete rigidity of thought. And whatever the truth about their conduct, they won.

I just thought it was that in the Russian army it took more courage to retreat than to advance.

Sort of like British infantry in the 1800's feared their non-coms more than the French.

I wrote a long post about Chechnya, but the forum eated it [:@] (and I suppose I'd better use that time to work on my Chechnya map!)

In short, however, I would really refrain from taking Chechnya as any indication of anything about Soviet brigade or battalion-level officers. It really had nothing to do with anything that would have been used against NATO in an all-out war - unless you believe that the entirety of the Soviet war plan against the West in the 80s was comprised of driving up a few mechanized units at peacetime compliment, no planned artillery or secure communications, and no dismounts on their BMPs up to the Reichstag, and declaring victory. This was not a military action of the same kind, and the attitude of Russian leadership (at the presidential/MoD level) was mostly informed by the previous year's parliament crisis in Moscow, which was indeed resolved by driving up tanks to the key political objective and firing off a few rounds. That was definitely NOT what they drove into in Grozny, but the operation was essentially thought of at that level. The lack of resources there is not an abstract concept - when you actually look at how events during the initial assault on Grozny (which dictated the course of the rest of the conflict) unfolded, it's hard to imagine even the best officers from any other army doing better. It was not lack of initiative that was a problem there, and indeed accounts of veterans from that assault have generally spoken very favourably about officers at those levels of command.

ORIGINAL: Mark Florio

1). The game mechanics and how the weapons are modeled is excellent. But would love to see more independent movement of troops when they come under fire. Too often I see troops in the open not using smoke and not maneuvering well enough? They should break contact when hit but in this game they dont seem to do that as much?

I'm planning to add a 'Seek cover' SOP option for infantry: tm.asp?m=4560624

2). The artillery looks too much like direct fire animations... Howitzers shells came in usually at steep angles. You should allow for more mission types to include Rocket munitions and time to target missions. The explosion animations could be boosted a bit... a 155mm shell will create a lot of smoke and debris upon impact.

How the steep angles should look like in the 2D view? The particle effects such as explosions will be improved in the future.

3). It would be nice to know the effects of night vision. The US forces operated commonly at night and our training included thermal vision gunnery under all weather conditions. The soviets had very little if any night fighting capabilities by the way. The exception was their recon and rotary wing.

I quote the manual:

5.1.32. Thermal Imaging Systems

A vehicle or aircraft that has a weapon with NV range of 3500 meters (the Cold War default value) or more is considered to have a Thermal Imaging System (TIS). Compared to the ordinary NV devices, it allows an improved spotting capability and the unit can see through smoke and dust better. If the unit takes light or heavy damage it loses the TIS capability.

4). AI behavior. The soviet doctrine at the time was pretty rigid. Not every tank had radios and those that did were basically following a scripted attack. Jr leaders had very little tactical flexibility. The result was often, at least in their training an aggressive push by increasingly more powerful forces once the vanguard found a weakpoint. But their ability to react mid battle was always predicted to be limited.

I can see that there has been some discussion about this, and I haven't read all of it, but almost all the vehicles in the game currently do have radios.

5). AI behavior for NATO: I havent played yet against the NATO troops but the strategy should be a mobile defense with local counter attacks by Mech forces. Lots of air power and artillery to slow the wave until the REFORGER forces mobilized.

The NATO factions have a shorter command delay when making short-term changes to the plans.

6). I dont see NBC modeled in AB yet or might not have seen it yet?

The vehicles do have the NBC attribute, but currently the only effect is that they have a better protection against flamethrower attacks.

7) would like to see rotary wing have more independence. They tend to stay in one spot instead of hopping around behind tree lines and ridgelines?

The helicopters use pop-up tactics. I'll try to make the helicopters use low elevation terrain when moving between battle positions.

8) resupply. Mech forces usually did a full top off before action but it wouldnt be unusual for ammo and fuel to be pushed forward.Refueling an Abrams took about 5 minutes. Reloading took about 2 minutes a round if the crew hustled and was not in MOPP.

I think the only way to have resupply in the game is to have it abstracted. If the unit stays in one place then ammunition slowly regenerates, depending on the scenario parameter. Our ready/stowed ammunition system works pretty much like this. We will think about it in the future.

A rigid doctrine in 1980's is different than what the Soviets developed in 1944. in 44 they had a veteran army, with good leadership finally and the supplies to support dynamic warfare. In the 1980's they had east bloc conscripts with no experience. They had an offensive strategy that relied upon overwhelming NATO quality. rigid doesnt mean dumb. It means scripted and determined.