Battle of Savo Island

[Buckrock]

And I assume he came safely through the torpedoing (and later sinking) of the USS Blue less than two weeks later.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: spence

At Pearl, Nagumo's carrier TF was planning to launch a third strike, so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks.

.....(Lcdr Fuchida seems to be the principle proponent of his own insistence that there be a 3rd strike targeting the fuel reserves - his veracity has been called into question by Japanese sources).

warspite1

His veracity was torn apart in the excellent Shattered Sword too [X(]

Thanks for providing some info on the fuel tanks - I knew I hadn't made that up!

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

At Pearl, Nagumo's carrier TF was planning to launch a third strike, so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks.

You may find that your conclusion here is more in line with American post-attack hysteria than with the facts of the matter. Alan Zimm in his book "Attack on Pearl Harbor" discusses this particular aspect of the alleged Japanese plans (Lcdr Fuchida seems to be the principle proponent of his own insistence that there be a 3rd strike targeting the fuel reserves - his veracity has been called into question by Japanese sources)….

Last I looked, Fuchida was also a Japanese source.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.
And after the Savo surface battles, Mikawa's cruiser force had just under 50 percent shells and torpedo's left -- more than enough to do the job. So there are strong comparisons between these two engagements.

I read this with some surprise. It was my understanding that ordnance availability after the initial battle was all circumspect. There was even a lot of speculation that Mikawa's force was almost winchester, and contributed to his decision to retire. May I ask where you got this information?

The video I posted.
Did you watch it?

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

Not sure why you are comparing the two. You also assume the Japanese had the ordnance to destroy the fuel tanks. I don't have the knowledge to comment - but there were knowledgeable people on the forum who stated they didn't.

Anyway, as said at the start, there is almost always more than one perspective and more than one way of looking at things. Regardless of Mikawa's motivation or plan of attack, history judges that he made a mistake. Whether that mistake was not going for the transports in the first place, or deciding not to search for them after his initial success, can be debated. Fact was Mikawa's thought process - like much of Japan's naval thinking during WWII - was found wanting.

At Pearl, Nagumo's carrier TF was planning to launch a third strike, so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks.

warspite1

Well you may be right - but the argument against, presented on this forum previously, sounded pretty convincing.

I would be grateful if you have a source for your statement "so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks".

Thanks.

As for:

Mikawa's thought process was that of a samurai

I am not really interested whether he was thinking as a 'Samurai' or not. The idea that Mikawa may have decided to launch his attack without really giving too much thought to what he may find and what he really needed to achieve, is perfectly believable given the mindset of the Japanese military in WWII. Such a mindset gives a rationale for his actions, but it does not excuse the limitations of his thinking any more than one would seek to excuse the likes of Ichiki.

Samurai, as in "Train as you fight; fight as you train."

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Schlussel

Thanks for the Link Joe D.

The publisher of the video (Montemayor) has similar videos on pearl harbor, coral sea, and even Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign (Links below), that are also very informative. And Warspite will be happy to know that there aren't any USS/HMAS Australia gaffes in those. [:D]

Coral Sea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NB5hH3ksvKE
Pearl Harbor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f6cz9gtMTeI
Jackson's Valley Campaign: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCgi9BNjj6c

Thanks, but I actually posted the Coral Sea video on this forum some months ago.
It was excellent.

[spence]

Last I looked, Fuchida was also a Japanese source

That may be true but in his interview by the USBBS immediately following the war he made no mention whatsoever of attacking the fuel tanks. Somewhat thereafter (like after he read some of the US sources which criticized attack specifics specifically about about the Japanese failure to attack the fuel farms) he seemed to "revise his recollections" of what happened on Dec 7th. In fact those "revised recollections" were specifically rejected by both Adm Kusaka and Cmdr Genda who also survived the war. It may be that his ability to speak English and his conversion to Christianity enhanced the widespread acceptance of his "revised recollections".

The US Naval War College Review supports this evaluation of his "revised recollections".

https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Reflecti ... 0228993315 (Note citations for original source)

Fuchida's post war interview :

https://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=24

And there is also the Combined Fleet website:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/ThreeMoreWhoppers.htm

And then there is the critical book by an Operational Analyst (A. Zimm) which discusses and evaluates in detail the alleged 3rd strike against both the repair facilities and the fuel farms (as if each was attacked separately). "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy,Combat, Myths and Deceptions".

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

Last I looked, Fuchida was also a Japanese source

That may be true but in his interview by the USBBS immediately following the war he made no mention whatsoever of attacking the fuel tanks. Somewhat thereafter (like after he read some of the US sources which criticized attack specifics specifically about about the Japanese failure to attack the fuel farms) he seemed to "revise his recollections" of what happened on Dec 7th. In fact those "revised recollections" were specifically rejected by both Adm Kusaka and Cmdr Genda who also survived the war. It may be that his ability to speak English and his conversion to Christianity enhanced the widespread acceptance of his "revised recollections".

The US Naval War College Review supports this evaluation of his "revised recollections".

https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Reflecti ... 0228993315 (Note citations for original source)

Fuchida's post war interview :

https://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=24

And there is also the Combined Fleet website:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/ThreeMoreWhoppers.htm

And then there is the critical book by an Operational Analyst (A. Zimm) which discusses and evaluates in detail the alleged 3rd strike against both the repair facilities and the fuel farms (as if each was attacked separately). "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy,Combat, Myths and Deceptions".

OK, yet these accounts remain online.

"The Japanese opted not to launch a third wave of aircraft against Pearl Harbor, and instead turned around and headed back across the ocean, in part because their fuel was running low."

https://www.history.com/news/pearl-harb ... wii-attack

"So why did Vice Admin. Chuichi Nagumo decide to turn back rather than attack the repair facilities and the oil tanks?

By the time the Japanese air force was ready for the third strike, they had lost 29 planes total. Though they had well over 150 planes in the attack, Nagumo feared more planes would be hit. Rather than risk it, he told his men to turn around. The attack was over by 9:45 a.m."

https://pearlharbor.org/pearl-harbors-t ... have-been/

Even if the above were more hypothetical than actual, warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

[Lecivius]

It wasn't that they did not have enough ordnance. I believe the idea is they did not have the right ordnance.

[spence]

And then there is the critical book by an Operational Analyst (A. Zimm) which discusses and evaluates in detail the alleged 3rd strike against both the repair facilities and the fuel farms (as if each was attacked separately). "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy,Combat, Myths and Deceptions".



OK, yet these accounts remain online.

"The Japanese opted not to launch a third wave of aircraft against Pearl Harbor, and instead turned around and headed back across the ocean, in part because their fuel was running low."

https://www.history.com/news/pearl-harb ... wii-attack

"So why did Vice Admin. Chuichi Nagumo decide to turn back rather than attack the repair facilities and the oil tanks?

By the time the Japanese air force was ready for the third strike, they had lost 29 planes total. Though they had well over 150 planes in the attack, Nagumo feared more planes would be hit. Rather than risk it, he told his men to turn around. The attack was over by 9:45 a.m."

https://pearlharbor.org/pearl-harbors-t ... have-been/

Even if the above were more hypothetical than actual, warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

Even if the above were more hypothetical than actual, warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

Actually the last source I cited above discusses in great detail what could be accomplished by "The Third Strike". The Japanese lost more aircraft in the initial attack that the 29 that were shot down. Roughly one hundred other aircraft were unserviceable due to damage including roughly 20 that were so damaged as to be jettisoned. The remainder would take varying amounts of time to repair. Making every assumption favorable to the Japanese possible (except for setting aside no aircraft to attack the as-yet unlocated US aircraft carriers) the Third Strike could have carried up to 280 x 250 kg HE bombs...assuming that: 1) zero aircraft are shot down prior to dropping their bombs 2) no more than 1 bomb is dropped on any particular target and 3) the exploding bomb destroys its target the Third Strike deploys enough explosive to cover 6% of the area covered by repair/machine shops at Pearl Harbor. If the fuel tanks are targeted instead of the repair shops each tank must be targeted individually. Notably the author cites several instances of attacks on a refinery in Haifa, Israel which resulted in ZERO fires at the refinery: several Italian cruisers shelled it during WW2 and 28 Scuds were fired at it the First Gulf War. As noted Bunker C and NSFO are very much unlike gasoline (neither will burn resulting from a stray spark). In addition the tanks themselves are covered with a floating cover which serves to prevent contamination AND deprive a potential fire of oxygen. By their very construction the tanks themselves are immune to the standard Japanese machine gun round (7.7mm) and although the tanks can be penetrated by the 20mm's of the A6M it might be noted that the Americans were somewhat aroused and low level strafing by A6Ms would have cost the Japanese a large number of fighters. Even had the Japanese destroyed the fuel tanks the number of tankers required to restore the same tank capacity in differing amounts of time was: 13-20 (average)in one months, 9-15 in 2 months, and 5-10 in 3 months. It should be noted that the major Japanese base at Truk parked tankers in its harbor for varying amounts of time since it lacked tank farms entirely (proof of same is visible on the lagoon bottom courtesy of Operation Hailstone).

BTW, according to Zimm the criticism of the attack and the idea that destruction of the fuel tanks would have delayed the US victory can be attributed to an off-hand remark Admiral Nimitz which was picked up by S.E. Morrison and others and incorporated into their work.

So yes, even if an attack on non-ship/non-aircraft targets was ever contemplated the Japanese the Kido Butai lacked the ordinance to launch an effective Third Attack.

[Fishbed]

It's not really a debate.
Various analyses - including some already aforementioned - were clear about the fact that in the current state of knowledge, had there been a third strike, there's nothing hinting towards the idea that it would have been targeted at anything different from the original targets. Fuel reserves & repair docks were actually in the target list from the beginning - but they were placed at the bottom of it.

The problem is not a missed opportunity due to some johnny-come-lately acknowledgement, or some sort of magic revelation Fuchida supposedly had in the air over PH. It is just a matter of having a vulnerability overlooked (by both sides actually, to some extent) for reasons that are, after all, rather understandable: for the IJN, a ultra Mahanian-centered approach to strategy that lasted until the end of the war for one, and a common, generalized disregard for logistics that dates back to the very days of its foundation (cf.Kaigun). In that regard, more than any of the supposedly missed opportunities at PH, the IJN lack of serious consideration for logistics as a force multiplier/divider (and its long-term strategic implications) is somewhat best illustrated by its total disregard for any sort of convoy management and organized ASW policy until the later part of the war, as a non-combat assignment unworthy of its attention. If by 1943 they couldn't realize that their whole war was dependent on their ability to protect their lifeline to NEI and their tanker fleet, I find it a bit improbable to expect the Japanese navy brass - and especially the air staff and its junior officers - to have made a much more convoluted guess by Dec 7th 1941 regarding the PacFleet's own logistics and state of affairs.

[Buckrock]

In regard's to Zimm, I would point out his analysis regarding the potential damage to the shore installations is based primarily on a fairly simple ((No. of Bombs x USSBS per hit damage)/installation size) and I would have to wonder if those shore installations were so difficult to damage, why did several historical military leaders on the spot (including Kimmel, Bloch and several qualified specialists of 14th Naval Districts) after seeing the effects of the first two Japanese attack waves, believe an additional strike could have inflicted substantial destruction on the shore installations. Perhaps there may have been more to it than Zimm's 6%.

In regards to the whole question on if the Japanese decided to launch a third strike, what would it have done to the shore installations?, I thought Jon Parshall's response to the question in "Refighting the Pacific War" summed it up well - "It would have been very bad for the Americans" but "the odds of the Japanese even going after these installations were very low." "It simply wasn't on their radar".

[RangerJoe]

The reason for the floating covers on the oil tanks is because of a fire in California that was fought by the US 11th Cavalry Regiment when it was stationed at the Presidio. It was after this fire that the floating covers were adopting and over 20 cavalry troopers lost their lives fighting the fire. But they did help save many more lives besides property. That is, if I remember this correctly.

The Japanese carriers had the bombs available but many planes were damaged especially in the second wave. As far as fuel supply goes, staying that much longer would not have cost the Japanese that much fuel otherwise the entire raid was a problem. The KB did not have to go back to Japan, Central Pacific islands were much closer.

As far as the consistancy of bunker fuel, it is like tar.

[spence]

It's not really a debate.
Various analyses - including some already aforementioned - were clear about the fact that in the current state of knowledge, had there been a third strike, there's nothing hinting towards the idea that it would have been targeted at anything different from the original targets. Fuel reserves & repair docks were actually in the target list from the beginning - but they were placed at the bottom of it.

The problem is not a missed opportunity due to some johnny-come-lately acknowledgement, or some sort of magic revelation Fuchida supposedly had in the air over PH. It is just a matter of having a vulnerability overlooked (by both sides actually, to some extent) for reasons that are, after all, rather understandable: for the IJN, a ultra Mahanian-centered approach to strategy that lasted until the end of the war for one, and a common, generalized disregard for logistics that dates back to the very days of its foundation (cf.Kaigun). In that regard, more than any of the supposedly missed opportunities at PH, the IJN lack of serious consideration for logistics as a force multiplier/divider (and its long-term strategic implications) is somewhat best illustrated by its total disregard for any sort of convoy management and organized ASW policy until the later part of the war, as a non-combat assignment unworthy of its attention. If by 1943 they couldn't realize that their whole war was dependent on their ability to protect their lifeline to NEI and their tanker fleet, I find it a bit improbable to expect the Japanese navy brass - and especially the air staff and its junior officers - to have made a much more convoluted guess by Dec 7th 1941 regarding the PacFleet's own logistics and state of affairs.

+1 "It simply was not on their radar"

The reason for the floating covers on the oil tanks is because of a fire in California that was fought by the US 11th Cavalry Regiment when it was stationed at the Presidio. It was after this fire that the floating covers were adopting and over 20 cavalry troopers lost their lives fighting the fire. But they did help save many more lives besides property. That is, if I remember this correctly.

Didn't know that. Thanks.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

warspite1

No, that was not my argument at all - where did the word enough suddenly come in to what I said?

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

warspite1

No, that was not my argument at all - where did the word enough suddenly come in to what I said?

warspite1 Well you may be right - but the argument against, presented on this forum previously, sounded pretty convincing. I would be grateful if you have a source for your statement "so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks". Thanks.

Doesn't this mean that you doubt they had enough ordnance, or did I misunderstand your intent here?

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

And then there is the critical book by an Operational Analyst (A. Zimm) which discusses and evaluates in detail the alleged 3rd strike against both the repair facilities and the fuel farms (as if each was attacked separately). "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy,Combat, Myths and Deceptions".



OK, yet these accounts remain online.

"The Japanese opted not to launch a third wave of aircraft against Pearl Harbor, and instead turned around and headed back across the ocean, in part because their fuel was running low."

https://www.history.com/news/pearl-harb ... wii-attack

"So why did Vice Admin. Chuichi Nagumo decide to turn back rather than attack the repair facilities and the oil tanks?

By the time the Japanese air force was ready for the third strike, they had lost 29 planes total. Though they had well over 150 planes in the attack, Nagumo feared more planes would be hit. Rather than risk it, he told his men to turn around. The attack was over by 9:45 a.m."

https://pearlharbor.org/pearl-harbors-t ... have-been/

Even if the above were more hypothetical than actual, warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

Even if the above were more hypothetical than actual, warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

Actually the last source I cited above discusses in great detail what could be accomplished by "The Third Strike". The Japanese lost more aircraft in the initial attack that the 29 that were shot down. Roughly one hundred other aircraft were unserviceable due to damage including roughly 20 that were so damaged as to be jettisoned. The remainder would take varying amounts of time to repair. Making every assumption favorable to the Japanese possible (except for setting aside no aircraft to attack the as-yet unlocated US aircraft carriers) the Third Strike could have carried up to 280 x 250 kg HE bombs...assuming that: 1) zero aircraft are shot down prior to dropping their bombs 2) no more than 1 bomb is dropped on any particular target and 3) the exploding bomb destroys its target the Third Strike deploys enough explosive to cover 6% of the area covered by repair/machine shops at Pearl Harbor. If the fuel tanks are targeted instead of the repair shops each tank must be targeted individually. Notably the author cites several instances of attacks on a refinery in Haifa, Israel which resulted in ZERO fires at the refinery: several Italian cruisers shelled it during WW2 and 28 Scuds were fired at it the First Gulf War. As noted Bunker C and NSFO are very much unlike gasoline (neither will burn resulting from a stray spark). In addition the tanks themselves are covered with a floating cover which serves to prevent contamination AND deprive a potential fire of oxygen. By their very construction the tanks themselves are immune to the standard Japanese machine gun round (7.7mm) and although the tanks can be penetrated by the 20mm's of the A6M it might be noted that the Americans were somewhat aroused and low level strafing by A6Ms would have cost the Japanese a large number of fighters. Even had the Japanese destroyed the fuel tanks the number of tankers required to restore the same tank capacity in differing amounts of time was: 13-20 (average)in one months, 9-15 in 2 months, and 5-10 in 3 months. It should be noted that the major Japanese base at Truk parked tankers in its harbor for varying amounts of time since it lacked tank farms entirely (proof of same is visible on the lagoon bottom courtesy of Operation Hailstone).

BTW, according to Zimm the criticism of the attack and the idea that destruction of the fuel tanks would have delayed the US victory can be attributed to an off-hand remark Admiral Nimitz which was picked up by S.E. Morrison and others and incorporated into their work.

So yes, even if an attack on non-ship/non-aircraft targets was ever contemplated the Japanese the Kido Butai lacked the ordinance to launch an effective Third Attack.

How many bombs per plane are required to make an effective strike? It's not like Pearl's oil reserves were hardened targets.

If memory still serves me, Shattered Sword said the KB would launch half their aircraft in the first strike and then the other half in the second. The third strike would be just the first half of the carrier AC returning to be rearmed and refueled.

So are your sources saying that there wasn't enough bombs for half the KBs planes to return and take out a soft sitting target?

[spence]

How many bombs per plane are required to make an effective strike? It's not like Pearl's oil reserves were hardened targets.

If memory still serves me, Shattered Sword said the KB would launch half their aircraft in the first strike and then the other half in the second. The third strike would be just the first half of the carrier AC returning to be rearmed and refueled.

So are your sources saying that there wasn't enough bombs for half the KBs planes to return and take out a soft sitting target?

So the first strike consisted of 90 or more B5N torpedo bombers (40 carrying torpedoes and 50 more with 800 kg bombs plus whatever Cardiv 5 might have contributed (I don't know how many from Cardiv 5: Shokaku and Zuikaku). The were also some dive bombers but they only carry one bomb. That means that the first strike used up all (or close to all) of its Cardiv 1 and Cardiv 2 B5Ns so by your logic the Japanese were throw their own doctrine out the window to launch their 3rd strike using ALL of their best ship killers carrying 250 kg bombs while the location of the US carriers was unknown. NOT LIKELY.

But even if they had done so their bombs were only likely to seriously effect the fuel tanks if they scored a direct hit on the tank and then set it afire. That was not a certainty because, even though not specifically hardened, the fuel itself was not volatile at all. In addition, each tank had an earthen berm surrounding itself to contain the fuel in that tank AND to prevent the spread of fire. Obviously it did burn but one had to heat it to 140 degrees (NSFO) just to get it to act like a liquid.

So 90 B5Ns and some dive bombers (none falling victim to either American fighters or flak prior to dropping their bombs) with 2 250kg HE bombs each (or 1 bomb for the dive bombers) attacking by level bombing (per doctrine or would you rather throw that doctrine out the window too) at 8000-10000 ft and scoring a direct hit with every bomb that also manages to set the tank afire (the dive bombers dive bomb with greater accuracy but they only get one shot). Would you like to buy a bridge that I have for sale? Or maybe you'd like to bomb from a lower altitude and still count on no losses to flak or fighters. In fact, if you'd like, I can sell you a couple of bridges!

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

warspite1's argument was that the Kidô Butai was incapable of launching a third strike because they didn't have enough ordnance.

Do you agree with that?

warspite1

No, that was not my argument at all - where did the word enough suddenly come in to what I said?

warspite1 Well you may be right - but the argument against, presented on this forum previously, sounded pretty convincing. I would be grateful if you have a source for your statement "so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks". Thanks.

Doesn't this mean that you doubt they had enough ordnance, or did I misunderstand your intent here?

warspite1

No, it means that the argument put forward in this forum previously was that the Japanese didn't have the ordnance capable of destroying the storage facilities (and the fuel within) - not that they didn't have enough bombs left after the two strikes.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

warspite1

No, that was not my argument at all - where did the word enough suddenly come in to what I said?

warspite1 Well you may be right - but the argument against, presented on this forum previously, sounded pretty convincing. I would be grateful if you have a source for your statement "so they had the ordnance to destroy the harbor's fuel tanks". Thanks.

Doesn't this mean that you doubt they had enough ordnance, or did I misunderstand your intent here?

warspite1

No, it means that the argument put forward in this forum previously was that the Japanese didn't have the ordnance capable of destroying the storage facilities (and the fuel within) - not that they didn't have enough bombs left after the two strikes.

But ordnance is "military supplies including weapons, ammunition, combat vehicles and maintenance tools and equipment."

And thank you for trimming down this conversation; it was becoming increasingly difficult to follow.