Matrix Games Forums

Originally posted by mdiehl
I keep hoping he'll rehab and start showing up at the round table with something credible. Like the Charleston Harbor thing. So far I've found one instance of Charleston Harbor being mined by U Boats.

September 18, 1942: A German U-boat laid a dozen mines off Charleston, South Carolina. None were ever struck.

No instance of the Charelston Harbor closed on account of mines since the American Civil War that I can find. I suppose I should add that changes in minesweeping technology make the anecdote somewhat dubious with respect to minesweeping and mine effectiveness.

I didnt claim that any ships were struck. I said the harbor was mined. And it was closed for a month until it was declared safe.

OK. Show me a link that says the harbor was actually closed because of these mines. Or a reference to a book (title, author) that I can read about the event.

Originally posted by mdiehl
OK. Show me a link that says the harbor was actually closed because of these mines. Or a reference to a book (title, author) that I can read about the event.

Relying solely on memory...Victory in the Pacific - JFD and Al Nofi

They have a whole chapter on mines.

You Mdiehl more than anyone should know the limitations
of web-browsing as a source material.

Sadly My copy of that book is in Windom Mn. I cant get to it to give a page number.

Also memory is fallible, it could have been an S&T article
or Moves article on the same topic.

I'm sorry, but I have to disagree with you again, mdiehl.
When the USN designed the DE, it was to be powered by geared turbines. Yet gear production was unable to provide the necessary reduction boxes and turbine production could not meet demand. That is why you have DEs with turbo-electric (no reduction gears), diesel-electric (no turbines and reduction gearing with less tolerances) and diesel plants. The PFs were built with reciprocating machinery to ease demand on turbine and reduction gearing production.
You may have noticed all the locks on the turbine covers and reduction boxes on the "New Jersey" in 1968? A single hand of steel shavings would damage the machinery so badly as to require repair at a base. Even the ARs weren't capable of these repairs.
As for tactical/strategic bombing, D3A1 dive bombers were quite accurate with 551lb GP bombs and the B5N2s were level bombing from low altitude compared to the efforts of the strategic bombing campaign. It is possible that during the bombing raid focused on installations that a vital capability would be severely damaged or destroyed. In 1941, there was no reserve of such maintenance capabilities just sitting in storage somewhere. All such machinery and the trained operators were in maximum utilization levels in the building and modernization programs.
Sure it would only take a couple weeks to transport the machinery to Hawaii, but it would take months to identify available machinery, remove it from its current plant, pack and ship it to the port of embarkation. When it got to PH, it would take a month or more to unpack, inspect, test, assemble, integrate and complete the machinery before it could be operationally ready. And since some other installation had to give up the machinery, now there is a shortfall in the rearmament and sustainment program at a yard in the US. Your other option is too wait for the tools and machinery to be produced from the industrial base. For the possibility of that happening, refer to the problem with plants for the DEs built from late 42 to 45.
As far as oil fuel is concerned, you just can't take fuel oil and stick in any container. If you damage the fuel tanks, and more importantly the fuel distribution system, the parts to repair and build new storage tanks and fuel distribution systems has to come from the US. Again, there is much more to this than Order Ship Time, especially if the items have to manufactured.
Maybe a better target would have been the aviation gas storage. High octane aviation gas was an essential item for use of high power engines in a/c. The Soviets ranked it among the top five most effective Lend Lease items they received. The demand was immense and production in 1942 still expanding.
This is not to say that an attack by 150 D3A1 and B5N2 carrier attack a/c would level all of PH, or even the installation maintenance plant. Yet the plant was concentrated next to the docks, would not be difficult to hit, and affords the possibility that an essential support function could be severely damaged or destroyed constraining USN operations for up to six months.
As a theater level logistics operator at the other end of a long LOC, I can tell you there is more to sustaining maintenance and supply support to field forces than shipping stuff.
Finally, the good old way of blocking a harbor was to use a block ship. Of course, civilian traffic wasn't allowed near PH and they maintained a net/boom across the harbor entrance. Mining the channel would seem simple, but only the Kates could have carried the weights, if the Japanese some how got a hold of a hundred air laid acoustic/magnetic/pressure fired ground mines. Subs laid mines wouldn't work. Drifting and moored mines would be easily swept and the IJN's subs couldn't get close enough to lay ground mines in sufficient quantities to block the harbor mouth. Historically, the best the Japanese could hope for was to catch a ship trying to sortie during the attack and sink it in the channel, as they almost did to the Nevada. In any case, the perfect case of mines closing a harbor during WWII, was not Haiphong, but the Japanese coastal trade being shut down by ground mines laid by B-29s.

When the USN designed the DE, it was to be powered by geared turbines. Yet gear production was unable to provide the necessary reduction boxes and turbine production could not meet demand. That is why you have DEs with turbo-electric (no reduction gears), diesel-electric (no turbines and reduction gearing with less tolerances) and diesel plants.

Let's be clear about why DEs didn't have turbines. 1. They were expensive. 2. In a DE, which was primarily designed to escort support vessels, 30 knots was completely unnecessary, 3. Turbines of the day positively gulped fuel, reducing the already short legs of ships in the DD-DE size range. As it turned out, the best ASW vessels in the US arsenal were the Coast Guard's 327s. 8000 NM range, 21 knots top speed, very seaworthy, and ready made to accommodate 2x5", DC rails, Kguns, ahead throwns, 8x20mm and 3x40mm dualies. 4. The USN was cranking out DDs for pacific duty and these of necessity needed turbines. Why delay the production in DDs to put them in DEs taht don't need them?

Putting together an extra turbine machine shop for a critical installation like Pearl would have been a cakewalk and it would not have set back new construction a microsecond.

As for tactical/strategic bombing, D3A1 dive bombers were quite accurate with 551lb GP bombs and the B5N2s were level bombing from low altitude compared to the efforts of the strategic bombing campaign.

Not accurate enough to hit targets the size of a dinner plate, even if the pilots could see the targets through the smoke, AAA, and sweat at 250 mph. Dinner plate is about the size of most of the hypercritical targets, other than the oil tanks.

It is possible that during the bombing raid focused on installations that a vital capability would be severely damaged or destroyed.

People keep saying this but have not yet been able to name a target that was easily destroyable that was not also easily replaceable.

In 1941, there was no reserve of such maintenance capabilities just sitting in storage somewhere.

Wrong oh, friend. In 1941 the US was still operating substantially under capacity in factories already built and awaiting orders for production. Assuming the loss of machine shops at PH, any given suite of machine tools from thousands of industrial centers in the US could have been borrowed, shipped to PH, and remanufactured in the US in a month.

All such machinery and the trained operators were in maximum utilization levels in the building and modernization programs.... 42 to 45.

All incorrect.

As far as oil fuel is concerned...

Actually, you *can* just stick it in any container. It's not the best system, though, to fuel your P40 with old French gasoline filtered through cheesecloth by means of a hand pump attached to a 5 ig petrol can. An oil tank of the sort at PH is nothing more than a big cylinder. They're not difficult to make at all. Nothing complicated. Nothing terribly expensive or requring really delicate finely machined parts. The only limitation in all of this is the rate at which replacement stuff can be shipped to Hawaii, assuming that local materials like concrete, tin, wood, or chunks of half ruined oil tanks, can't be made to do the job.

Let's see. AVGAS. Yeah, the Sovs ranked it highly in lend-lease because they weren't very good at making lots of 100 octane fuel and because much of the lend-lease equipment (aircraft and tanks) burned the stuff. The US was the home and inventor of 100 Octane fuel. The only limitation here, again, is the speed with which a tanker full of the stuff can be sent to PH to replace whatever is lost there.

This is not to say that an attack by 150 D3A1 and B5N2 carrier attack a/c would level all of PH, or even the installation maintenance plant. Yet the plant was concentrated next to the docks, would not be difficult to hit, and affords the possibility that an essential support function could be severely damaged or destroyed constraining USN operations for up to six months.

Pure random speculation. Very nice to assert six months when you don't go into the details as to what there is to hit, what it takes to really destroy it, and how long it takes to replace it. To reiterate, German a/c plants with 75% of floor space damage were back in operation in a month. That damage represents HUNDREDS of 500 lb GP bombs striking a production facility the size of a couple soccor fields. The reason why these factories were rather easy to repair is because machine tools are freaking hard to destroy.

Hi all,

Originally posted by mdiehl

What "facilities" Leo? What are you talking about?

I was thinking of:

- fuel (oil) facilities = 4.5 million tons
- general supply storage
- reserve parts
- port repair facilities (shipyard)
- machine shops
- submarine base (crucial)


Leo "Apollo11"

Ok then.

Oil reserve -- maybe, but there's nothing lost that can' be fixed quickly (a month or so) and for which adequate substitutes in mobile storage could be easily found.

The rest. Almost nothing that could not be quickly and easily replaced.

Find the torpedo storage in the sub base with a couple of bombs and you've hit the most expensive and critically short resource in the USN. FWIW, I don't know what sort of conditions the PH reserve ammunition and in particular the torpedoes was kept. If it was bunkerized, it was immune to any weapon carried by the IJN.

Originally posted by mdiehl
Ok then.

Oil reserve -- maybe, but there's nothing lost that can' be fixed quickly (a month or so) and for which adequate substitutes in mobile storage could be easily found.

The rest. Almost nothing that could not be quickly and easily replaced.

Find the torpedo storage in the sub base with a couple of bombs and you've hit the most expensive and critically short resource in the USN. FWIW, I don't know what sort of conditions the PH reserve ammunition and in particular the torpedoes was kept. If it was bunkerized, it was immune to any weapon carried by the IJN.

They were stored in a special shed. I dont know the exact details.
I suspect Morrison can answer that.

Hi, Perhaps I should clarify a few points. The shipyard at PH has 100 points of capacity. Not one point was destroyed. The effect of the bombing was to reduce performance to 14 percent the following day. None of the equipment or facility was destroyed.
I'll have to run the game a while to see how fast it comes back on line. But really I don't have a problem with this. It's hard for me to see workers going back and repairing ships when the building their machines are located is on fire.
Nothing would be required to be shipped from US since nothing is destroyed. It's just not working. Lets wait to see how long is required to bring it back to 100 percent.

I think US players will have to get used to the idea the IJN will stick around an extra day. The TF has too much power to just use once after traveling all that distance.

US players should beware. Even if the IJN does not attack on Dec 8th it might be waiting around for the USN CV to return to Pearl.

(I think the safest course is for both USN CV to meet at Johnson and wait to make sure coast is clear before returning to Pearl.)

I'd allow the TF moving to support Wake to make an attack on Japanese up there. There is nothing that can harm the TF.

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, Perhaps I should clarify a few points. The shipyard at PH has 100 points of capacity. Not one point was destroyed. The effect of the bombing was to reduce performance to 14 percent the following day. None of the equipment or facility was destroyed.
I'll have to run the game a while to see how fast it comes back on line. But really I don't have a problem with this. It's hard for me to see workers going back and repairing ships when the building their machines are located is on fire.
Nothing would be required to be shipped from US since nothing is destroyed. It's just not working. Lets wait to see how long is required to bring it back to 100 percent.

I think US players will have to get used to the idea the IJN will stick around an extra day. The TF has too much power to just use once after traveling all that distance.

US players should beware. Even if the IJN does not attack on Dec 8th it might be waiting around for the USN CV to return to Pearl.

(I think the safest course is for both USN CV to meet at Johnson and wait to make sure coast is clear before returning to Pearl.)

I'd allow the TF moving to support Wake to make an attack on Japanese up there. There is nothing that can harm the TF.

Cant do that. The key to using a CV task force is mobility.
To tie it to the defense of a static point is to limit the mobility.
The static point would compensate(like Midway)
If the Japs held it. But They dont.
I certainly will NOT stick around.

Originally posted by Chiteng
Cant do that. The key to using a CV task force is mobility.
To tie it to the defense of a static point is to limit the mobility.
The static point would compensate(like Midway)
If the Japs held it. But They dont.
I certainly will NOT stick around.

Hi, I don't think we are talking about the same thing. Remaining on station another 24 hours is not
"Being tied to the defense of a static point" it's simply taking a extra time to finish a job. Since it is doubtfull the force will ever again be in the area it is worth considering have them do a more complete job. It does not cost any more supply (since the oilers are already there and really should get a head start home)

Jpn CV readiness should be very low after the PH strikes. Of "things what players ought to worry about," the IJN player should be much more worried that US CVs will come in the direction of the HI than vice versa. If that's not the case, the Japanese readiness reduction and Japanese casualties from the PH strike are underestimated.

I read in the other thread that it is possible to take the PI in 2 months. If that is correct, then the Allied LCU readiness and EXP in the PI have been set much too low.

Hi, The 2 USN CV are not together. They will not arrive PH together unless they first combine which will require a day or two.
The second IJN strike is not as powerfull as the first but none the less is enough to make it worth while. On Dec 7, I retain one of the 6 fighter groups (I put it on training 0 percent).
This group flies CAP on Dec 8. (along with other groups)
AA is the danger on Dec 8 and it does a lot of damage. (The CV will have to return to port to replace all the lost AC and many ac are damaged. The airgroups are tired and morale is down. I make them fly regardless. They will never again have such a target.

No prob. As long as the US player has the option to combine the CV groups. The result should be rather Midway like if Japan sticks around. The IJN TF location should be known, and the US CVs location should be unknown. That should very heavily favor the US in getting in either the first strike or, better still, a surprise strike.

Originally posted by mdiehl
No prob. As long as the US player has the option to combine the CV groups. The result should be rather Midway like if Japan sticks around. The IJN TF location should be known, and the US CVs location should be unknown. That should very heavily favor the US in getting in either the first strike or, better still, a surprise strike.

Hi it would be
USN
42 fighters
72 divebombers
30 torpedo planes
102 bombers with 42 fighters for escort and CAP

versus

150 IJN fighters (minus lost/damged on Dec 7 approx 30)=120
120 divebombers (minus 30) 90
120 torpedo planes (minus 30) 90

180 bombers with 120 fighters for escort and CAP

(I had bad numbers the first time)

2 targets for IJN/ 6 targets for USN

USN player should also remember IJN TF can select react to enemy and launch strike against USN TF returning to PH. This is one reason I suggest they stay away untill after it is certain IJN have departed area.

Originally posted by mdiehl
No prob. As long as the US player has the option to combine the CV groups. The result should be rather Midway like if Japan sticks around. The IJN TF location should be known, and the US CVs location should be unknown. That should very heavily favor the US in getting in either the first strike or, better still, a surprise strike.

Midway like? Unlikely, First, I am pretty sure only the Enterprise would be in any position to attack on the 8th. Making it 1:6 odds vs. 1:1 odds at Midway.

Second, whereas the US would have an idea that the IJN TF somewhere NW of HI, there is no guarentee they would be able to pinpoint them. PH recon capability was fairly well degraded by the attack.

Third, historically the second attack as proposed would have held 2 CVs in reserve to deal with any enemy CVs that might show up. Extra CAP was to cover the TF and scout planes where to be launched to look for CVs. There is a chance they would find Halsey before Halsey found them. Regardless even if Enterprise did get the first lick, judging from the 4 historical CV vs. CV battles in the first year. the best one could expect would be 1-2 CVs sunk or incapacitated, with Enterprise sunk on counter strike.

Personally I think its a bad trade off. Enterprise is just too valuable in this stage of the war to lose even if its 2 for 1. I would instead join up with Lex then head for Wake and hope to ambush expected invasion force. "Hit em where they aint"

Didn't the Japanese wipe out Cavite Naval Yard with a single day of air strikes?

Yeah Cavite was demolished in the first strike (with follow up strikes finishing off what remained). One US sub in port (the Sealion, I believe) was sunk by a direct hit - later towed deeper into the harbor and sunk to prevent Japanese salvage, IIRC.

Yup, but to be fair Cavite was no Pearl Harbor, when it came to heavy equipment and shops. They did hit every single building and the docks were destroyed so they at least showed they could hit ground targets that they were aiming for. Same for Clark and Iba Field. They hit almost every single building, Hangar, and repair shop. At iba they scored direct hits on the Radar installation and completely destroyed it, killing everyone.

I wonder what kind of damage those special 16" armor pierceing bombs that, sank the Arizona, could have done on the cranes and dry docks.

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Yup, but to be fair Cavite was no Pearl Harbor, when it came to heavy equipment and shops. They did hit every single building and the docks were destroyed so they at least showed they could hit ground targets that they were aiming for. Same for Clark and Iba Field. They hit almost every single building, Hangar, and repair shop. At iba they scored direct hits on the Radar installation and completely destroyed it, killing everyone.

I wonder what kind of damage those special 16" armor pierceing bombs that, sank the Arizona, could have done on the cranes and dry docks.

If the intent is to NOT want it to happen, then reasons will be found to say it could not happen. It is that simple.
If the intent is a desire to see it happen, then reasons will be found to see it happen.