Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

In the 1940s I think it is fair to say the US saw itself as an anti-colonial state, one dedicated to liberty for all peoples. FDR shared that sentiment, although he had a practical side that let him help England regardless of the Colonial history. Churchill seemed to see himself as the saviour of the Empire, intent on keeping it and returning to pre-war colonialism once the Axis was dealt with. I think that played into the US refusal to reinforce the British in India - the Jewel of the Empire. What help America sent (like Merrill's Marauders) tried to work with local tribes in northern Burma, promising them post war self-determination and trying to get them on friendly terms with the US.

In China, the Japanese had already forced out all the other Imperial powers, so the US concentrated on trying to help get the Japanese out so the Chinese could have self-determination (and be friendly to the US). Didn't quite work out that way.

The U.S. talked a fair game about decolonizing, but I think they rather cynically used that policy as a cover to steal as much business from the Brits as they could. I find it rather ironic that a major power decries colonialism whilst having their own colonies, real or de facto [Philippines, Cuba, etc.]

This is not an anti-American screed, simply an observation based on quite a few books I've read that make that point. I'd still rather live next door to the U.S. than a lot of countries with checkered histories. In the end, they did to the British Empire what that Empire did to other powers during their centuries of ascendancy. And the U.S. is now the target of similar. That's the nature of our world, dogs always contending to be the alpha of the pack.

ORIGINAL: Randy Stead

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

In the 1940s I think it is fair to say the US saw itself as an anti-colonial state, one dedicated to liberty for all peoples. FDR shared that sentiment, although he had a practical side that let him help England regardless of the Colonial history. Churchill seemed to see himself as the saviour of the Empire, intent on keeping it and returning to pre-war colonialism once the Axis was dealt with. I think that played into the US refusal to reinforce the British in India - the Jewel of the Empire. What help America sent (like Merrill's Marauders) tried to work with local tribes in northern Burma, promising them post war self-determination and trying to get them on friendly terms with the US.

In China, the Japanese had already forced out all the other Imperial powers, so the US concentrated on trying to help get the Japanese out so the Chinese could have self-determination (and be friendly to the US). Didn't quite work out that way.

The U.S. talked a fair game about decolonizing, but I think they rather cynically used that policy as a cover to steal as much business from the Brits as they could. I find it rather ironic that a major power decries colonialism whilst having their own colonies, real or de facto [Philippines, Cuba, etc.]

This is not an anti-American screed, simply an observation based on quite a few books I've read that make that point. I'd still rather live next door to the U.S. than a lot of countries with checkered histories. In the end, they did to the British Empire what that Empire did to other powers during their centuries of ascendancy. And the U.S. is now the target of similar. That's the nature of our world, dogs always contending to be the alpha of the pack.

The concept of economic imperialism - which let the colony rule themselves but saddled them with monopoly businesses based abroad was a rather new one. All eyes tended to be on who ruled the country rather than who gathered the wealth. I never heard of economic imperialism until I went to college in the 1960s. The Del Monte company, CIA and Nicaragua situation sharply illustrated how business could control what happened in a country. But since politics is forbidden on the forum we best not get into the rights and wrongs on both sides.

Agreed. I'm new here, so I haven't earned my spurs yet, nor is it my intention to start controversial discussions.

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: Ambassador

Shit, session timed out, I lost my (rather long) answer to you, mind_messing. I’m coming back after work.

That happens fairly frequently - not just timeout from typing but the forum sometimes doesn't accept the input. Any time I compose a lengthy post I try to remember to copy it to my clipboard before hitting the OK button to post it. If the internet eats it, I can redo the post in no time - open a post and paste. [:)]

I often do that. Then, problems don’t happen anymore for a time, I get complacent, or I get carried over in writing a longer post than planned... and catastrophe occurs. It’s an endless cycle.[8|]

So, here’s the short version of what I was writing as an answer to mind_messing’s last post (having to write it all over again is discouraging, so I’ve shortened it).

1. Pilot experience

You refer several times to Allied pilots arriving with higher XP in the game, however it is false, or at least not quite so clear cut.
IJN/IJA replacement pilots keep 35/35 for the whole campaign.
USN/USAAF/USMC/CW pilots start at 40/30/35/35 respectively. 40 is higher than 35, but it still is very far from being battle-ready - I would say that it’s even more important for carrier pilots to have 70 XP and skill (including Def), or as close as possible, than it is for land-based squadrons.
Such rates stay the same across ‘42, and ‘43, but there’s a big boost in ‘44 (yoohoo !): USAAF pilots get to start at 35 as the others. Still far from adequate.
‘45 sees another improvement, across the Allied side : 50/40/45/40. This is closer to what would adequate, but still not quite so, and will only shorten the on-map training slightly (going from 40 to 50 is fast enough, if you cared to setup your schools efficiently).

What about squadrons arriving with trained pilots ? Well, until some time in ‘45, most of the squadrons arriving have an average of 45-50, with only few squadrons at 65 (and in ‘45 mostly).
Even USN CV only arrive with at most 60 average XP - and this means that half the squadron at least is under 60. So, not ready, needs training.

2. Industry

I don’t advocate stopping all subs to build 90k planes, only that you could (hey, I even hint at a big acceleration of an Unryu for the cost of only five RO-class subs). You also attribute far more importance to the supply stock late in the game, but supply won’t prevent the auto-victory. In fact, I don’t see many games ending due to the IJ player running out of supply in the late-game.

Supply spent early on is way more important than supply kept in the treasury at the end of the game. That one won’t bring you any VP. What is important is to not run off of supply during the course of the game.

For example, if you spend one million supply initially to improve 500 aircraft & RD factories, and 500 engine factories (ok, 1.1 million), spread on early- to mid-war planes, and going with the abstraction that they repair across ‘42, you get to produce an average of an extra 250 aircrafts per month in ‘42, and 500/month in ‘43. That production will enable you to pressure the Allied player far more efficiently, and push him further back - and, more importantly, delay the start of his advance across the map.
That million (or 1.1) of supplies converts to 21.000 planes on four years. That many planes would easily slow the progress of the Allies by at least four months, before they get to cut Japan’s access to the DEI Oil & Fuel. You get at least 10.000 Oil and Fuel from the DEI per day, on average, once the Fuel needs for ships are taken care of, so 10.000 supplies after conversion in the HI. Four months at 10.000/day, 1.2 million supplies.

And what do you say the Allied player should do ? Start an attrition warfare, when in ‘42-‘43 it is in favor of Japan ? And with what troops ? Do you know how long it’ll take for the Allies to have the ability to muster and support a multi-division drive somewhere the Japanese won’t have the choice to simply... take a step back ?

By the way, with a sound juggling of the industry, Taiho and the first three Unryus will arrive at the end of ‘43 or very early ‘44, with the last Unryus arriving in mid-‘44 (or even early ‘44). In the same time, USN receives 5 CV and a bunch of CVL in ‘43. While it may end up as a bigger aircraft aggregate, it is not enough to be used to make the IJN react all around, burning fuel. IJ has the advantage of the inner lines, and it costs a lot of fuel to go from one area to the next.

Reading your suggestions, I have the feeling you consider the Allied players just sit idly doing nothing. Very bad understanding of the Allied situation in the game - even doing all you can, the IJ player can still greatly expand his economy. The major risk is expanding too fast and running out of supplies in ‘42-‘43, before the payoff. This is when supply is most precious.


3. Inter-service rivalry and hindsight

Just because such a rivalry existed, and still exists somehow to this day, doesn’t mean the Allies were hampered in the same measure as Imperial Japan was, and just because the Allied player may also use hindsight does not mean the effects of it are the same.

First, no decent Allied player does a Sir Robin anymore, but even so, what can be saved ? PoW & Repulse, a couple of cruisers, two dozen B-17 ? Most AARs show a Japanese player much faster on the invasion of the DEI, so there really are not that many opportunities to save anything. But hindsight by the IJ player saves KB, at least until mid-43 if not further.

As for reinforcements sent somewhere else ? Yes, the 18th UK div and a couple of brigades can be diverted. But the IJ can finish China and allow sending way more than that to shore up the defenses of the perimeter.

Also, what were exactly the reinforcements sent IRL to MacArthur until March ? He’s not missing much...

It’s fun you mention the Allied player knowing the US CV are not up to par and not recreating Wake or Doolittle’s stint. First, how would you reproduce Doolittle’s mission exactly ? And second, a Wake operation being high risk ? To start with, most IJ players don’t botch the invasion of Wake, so there is no opportunity for a relief mission, but more importantly - Vice Admiral Pye ordered the TF around because of two IJN carriers being near Wake.

You can add the fact that Nimitz initially sent all four US CV to the Coral Sea, but Hornet and Enterprise were too late for the battle, despite knowing from intercepts that only two IJN carriers would be there.

So, yes, RL commanders (after the initial days) were fully aware of the superiority of the enemy, and only took calculated risks.

Besides, how many IJ players split KB ? Don’t we all know that KB is not to be split, ever, when in reality, after PH they never were all six together ?

About inter-service rivalry, did the rivalry between USA & USN lead to, for example, one refusing to provide air cover for the other, like IJA/IJN ? Just check there (https://www.quora.com/How-bad-was-the-i ... orld-War-2) to see many examples of a very detrimental inter-service rivalry (a few errors/approximations too, but I guess you’re learned enough to spot them). The Allies could compete, but never to the point of endangering the conduct of war, and good faith was preeminent.



So, to finish : no, it doesn’t all balance itself. Just because both sides can benefit from hindsight and better organisation, doesn’t mean they both profit from both on the same scale.

The communications were so great between the 3rd Fleet (Nimitz at CentPac) and the 7th Fleet (MacArthur at SWPAC) that messages from the 7th fleet to the 3rd Fleet had to go through SWPAC's facilities, arrived late, and were out of sequence. It is no wonder that Halsey, his staff, and others at 3rd Fleet who were tired and had cases of influenza or were recently recovered from it, did not understand what was going on at Leyte Gulf. How is that for not providing cover for the other?

1. Pilot experience

Edit for brevity.

Functionally free for the Allies, thanks to limitless supply production.

The IJ pays double cost, both in terms of HI for the replacement training process, then in supplies with any subsequent on map training. At 1/3 of a supply point per aircraft flying, this adds up.

2. Industry

I don’t advocate stopping all subs to build 90k planes, only that you could (hey, I even hint at a big acceleration of an Unryu for the cost of only five RO-class subs). You also attribute far more importance to the supply stock late in the game, but supply won’t prevent the auto-victory.

Wrong.

See s17.0 of the manual.

In fact, I don’t see many games ending due to the IJ player running out of supply in the late-game.

Then I would see an optician at the first opportunity.

Virtually every game that runs into the late war sees Japan collapse because of supply shortages.

Ask PzB, Lowpe, Obvert etc. They'll all say the same thing. Supply.

The fact that you make such a claim confirms my suspicions that you're just waffling rubbish.

Supply spent early on is way more important than supply kept in the treasury at the end of the game. That one won’t bring you any VP. What is important is to not run off of supply during the course of the game.

Again wrong as per s.17 of the manual.

Also worth banking supply given that the dual drains of strategic bombing and the war coming to the Home Islands leads to a massive increase in supply consumption (and not just to feed the numerous "last ditch" IJA formations that arrive).

For example, if you spend one million supply initially to improve 500 aircraft & RD factories, and 500 engine factories (ok, 1.1 million), spread on early- to mid-war planes, and going with the abstraction that they repair across ‘42, you get to produce an average of an extra 250 aircrafts per month in ‘42, and 500/month in ‘43. That production will enable you to pressure the Allied player far more efficiently, and push him further back - and, more importantly, delay the start of his advance across the map.
That million (or 1.1) of supplies converts to 21.000 planes on four years. That many planes would easily slow the progress of the Allies by at least four months, before they get to cut Japan’s access to the DEI Oil & Fuel. You get at least 10.000 Oil and Fuel from the DEI per day, on average, once the Fuel needs for ships are taken care of, so 10.000 supplies after conversion in the HI. Four months at 10.000/day, 1.2 million supplies.

Except it's not a flat cost of 1.2m and poof, you've a war-winning air force.

You've the supply cost of taking aircraft as replacements (between 12-30 supply a pop, so 500 supply for a full IJA squadron), and the cost of doing missions for those groups to be paid each day of combat ops (14 supply per fighter squadron per day).

Then factor in (if you're wanting to push the Allies back) the fuel cost of transporting supplies to the periphery and you're well on course to a PzB style economic crash because you've ran wild with air production to mediocre mid-war airframes.

And what do you say the Allied player should do ? Start an attrition warfare, when in ‘42-‘43 it is in favor of Japan ? And with what troops ? Do you know how long it’ll take for the Allies to have the ability to muster and support a multi-division drive somewhere the Japanese won’t have the choice to simply... take a step back ?

In the face of the scenario you suggest, encourage the IJ player into expending as much supply as possible, using concentrations of FLAK to minimize losses while using naval power to attrition Japanese strength.

It is impossible in game terms for the IJ to be strong everywhere on the map, and a bold operational plan properly executed can completely cut the IJ position asunder. For example Greyjoy vs Radar.

By the way, with a sound juggling of the industry, Taiho and the first three Unryus will arrive at the end of ‘43 or very early ‘44, with the last Unryus arriving in mid-‘44 (or even early ‘44). In the same time, USN receives 5 CV and a bunch of CVL in ‘43. While it may end up as a bigger aircraft aggregate, it is not enough to be used to make the IJN react all around, burning fuel. IJ has the advantage of the inner lines, and it costs a lot of fuel to go from one area to the next.

Interior lines or not, dragging the Combined Fleet across the map uses up fuel at an absurd rate.

Reading your suggestions, I have the feeling you consider the Allied players just sit idly doing nothing. Very bad understanding of the Allied situation in the game - even doing all you can, the IJ player can still greatly expand his economy. The major risk is expanding too fast and running out of supplies in ‘42-‘43, before the payoff. This is when supply is most precious.

Absolutely not. There's plenty of scope for the Allied player to make great inroads from '42 onwards. The mistake is in trying to pressure the IJ player through only the air component of the game, and to neglect the ground and naval aspects (where the Allies have a large superiority overall).

3. Inter-service rivalry and hindsight

Just because such a rivalry existed, and still exists somehow to this day, doesn’t mean the Allies were hampered in the same measure as Imperial Japan was, and just because the Allied player may also use hindsight does not mean the effects of it are the same.

So we've managed to get you to accept that hindsight does impact the Allies, so that's something.

First, no decent Allied player does a Sir Robin anymore, but even so, what can be saved ? PoW & Repulse, a couple of cruisers, two dozen B-17 ? Most AARs show a Japanese player much faster on the invasion of the DEI, so there really are not that many opportunities to save anything. But hindsight by the IJ player saves KB, at least until mid-43 if not further.

That's not the case.

There's a nice round of variations on the active defence of certain points around the DEI, but the general trend of strategy is to move assets (either already in or destined to arrive) in the DEI to threatened second-line targets (Oz, India).

It's rare that you see the American aircraft and LCU's that arrived on Java historically actually be used in the fighting there. Even rarer still for massive Allied reinforcements to the area.

Why? Hindsight that it plays into the IJ advantages of superior positioning of air and naval assets as well as the general exposed position of Allied forces in Malaya and the DEI.

As for reinforcements sent somewhere else ? Yes, the 18th UK div and a couple of brigades can be diverted. But the IJ can finish China and allow sending way more than that to shore up the defenses of the perimeter.

Which can be countered by a sensible Allied strategy in China.

Also, what were exactly the reinforcements sent IRL to MacArthur until March ? He’s not missing much...

I was thinking more of the fairly extensive reinforcements to ABDA in this case (which, unsurprisingly, end up in much more sensible locations than on Java...), and of the massive political pressure to send relief to Luzon in the early days of the war.

It’s fun you mention the Allied player knowing the US CV are not up to par and not recreating Wake or Doolittle’s stint. First, how would you reproduce Doolittle’s mission exactly ? And second, a Wake operation being high risk ? To start with, most IJ players don’t botch the invasion of Wake, so there is no opportunity for a relief mission, but more importantly - Vice Admiral Pye ordered the TF around because of two IJN carriers being near Wake.

You can add the fact that Nimitz initially sent all four US CV to the Coral Sea, but Hornet and Enterprise were too late for the battle, despite knowing from intercepts that only two IJN carriers would be there.

So, yes, RL commanders (after the initial days) were fully aware of the superiority of the enemy, and only took calculated risks.

Besides, how many IJ players split KB ? Don’t we all know that KB is not to be split, ever, when in reality, after PH they never were all six together ?

I should also mention the US CV raid on the Gilberts in the early months of the war too, which is rarely repeated by Allied players except in strength, thanks to hindsight of the capability of the Zero and Nell/Betty combo.

Doolittle's raid can be reproduced in spirit from an USN carrier raid on Japan proper or Hokkaido in the early weeks of the war. Which is really only possible in the first place thanks to hindsight of IJ dispositions and intentions...

As a counterpoint, how many players operate the RN carriers alongside the USN as the norm? Or remove the torpedo bombers due to their poor torpedoes? etc etc.

About inter-service rivalry, did the rivalry between USA & USN lead to, for example, one refusing to provide air cover for the other, like IJA/IJN ? Just check there (https://www.quora.com/How-bad-was-the-i ... orld-War-2) to see many examples of a very detrimental inter-service rivalry (a few errors/approximations too, but I guess you’re learned enough to spot them). The Allies could compete, but never to the point of endangering the conduct of war, and good faith was preeminent.

I won't disagree that the IJA/IJN divide was very detrimental to the war effort, but to claim that Allied inter-service disagreements had no impact on the war was absurd. The tensions between MacArthur and Nimitz for one, the Army/Marine animosity, use of the 20th Air Force...etc etc

That alone just glosses over the fact that the Allies were far from the unified machine they are in AE. In reality, each nation had its own interests to promote, which often precluded effective co-operation.

Also, quora? Really? I thought you'd damaged your credibility enough with the absurd statement on supply consumption earlier.

So, to finish : no, it doesn’t all balance itself. Just because both sides can benefit from hindsight and better organisation, doesn’t mean they both profit from both on the same scale.

At the end of the day, it does. For every example you can give for one side, there's an counter-example showing the other side that balances it out.

You might not like it, but that's just how it is.

I find it rather ironic that a major power decries colonialism whilst having their own colonies, real or de facto [Philippines, Cuba, etc.]

The Philippines were in fact scheduled for independence long before the war started. Cuba was never a U.S. colony, real or de facto, but that could be just me.

nor is it my intention to start controversial discussions

I just see a discussion here, no controversy.

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

The fact that you make such a claim confirms my suspicions that you're just waffling rubbish.



So we've managed to get you to accept that hindsight does impact the Allies, so that's something.

Two things I hate, as much as hypocrisy : insults and straw-man arguments.

I never said the Allies couldn’t use hindsight to some degree. I disagree with your claim that it has the same impact - I have repeatedly said so.

The fact you insults me yet fail to properly read and process what I say means the end of the discussion.

ORIGINAL: Ambassador

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

The fact that you make such a claim confirms my suspicions that you're just waffling rubbish.



So we've managed to get you to accept that hindsight does impact the Allies, so that's something.

Two things I hate, as much as hypocrisy : insults and straw-man arguments.

I never said the Allies couldn’t use hindsight to some degree. I disagree with your claim that it has the same impact - I have repeatedly said so.

The fact you insults me yet fail to properly read and process what I say means the end of the discussion.

Please indicate where these terrible insults that have made you run away from the discussion are located?

Is it perhaps embarrassment that you've stated such a factually wrong position regarding the role of supply that you simply don't want to engage further? If so, good move.

This is still ongoing? Wow!

[:D][:D][:D]

I'm not sure but I think my game against Bullwinkle/obvert, which was taken over by.... someone else, can't remember who now... I may not have run out of supply first. I would have run out of victory point buffer.