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AVG does seem too powerful though. Especially against defending Zeros.

I dunno, how badly are you losing? If the AVG is killing 5-10 Zeroes per P-40 you're about right with respect to historical losses.

Hi, Mike when did the AVG ever encounter a Zero?
Personally I think the USA pilots are too low on average. There are a lot of pilots in the 50's in existing pre war groups.

However I fall back on my trusty "It's also related to how how you play" As the allied player I get my 1-1 very early in the war. You have to force yourself not to engage the A6M2 in numbers when you cannot also fly the numbers. 20 F4F/P-40 against 80 A6M2 will lose. You'll shoot down a few A6M2 but you'll lose the battle. If you keep doing this day after day you hurt the growth of your air forces. Choose the time and place to fight and don't fight where you are out numbered 3 to 1. You need pilots to return from missions.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Being in actual combat is something training (no matter how good) can't substitute.

Again, that is just hyperbole. It's a matter of knowing how combat differs from combat simulation. I'd say the chief effect of combat is in weeding out people who can't figure out when to disengage with a crippled aircraft or how to get home in one that is really shot up.

While I have no problem with the exp ratings in the game (they are used for game mechanics not to evaluate real people) I must disagree with the above. There is a large difference in troops who have been under fire and those who have only been on training exercises. There are boosts in confidence, cohesion, capabilities, etc that cannot be taught. That is not to say that training, good training, cannot prepare one for live fire, its just not the same.

Combat experience in and of itself is not going to create a more effective unit.

Experience can be helpful, but well trained unit with solid Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, quality leadership, and doctrine that matches personnel and equipment for the battlefield task is bettter prepared to suceed on the battlefield.

Codifying experience into knowledge on how to collectively solve battlefield problems is in great part a function of doctrine and training.

Expereience is wasted if the right lessons are not learned.

ORIGINAL: Caltone

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Being in actual combat is something training (no matter how good) can't substitute.

Again, that is just hyperbole. It's a matter of knowing how combat differs from combat simulation. I'd say the chief effect of combat is in weeding out people who can't figure out when to disengage with a crippled aircraft or how to get home in one that is really shot up.

While I have no problem with the exp ratings in the game (they are used for game mechanics not to evaluate real people) I must disagree with the above. There is a large difference in troops who have been under fire and those who have only been on training exercises. There are boosts in confidence, cohesion, capabilities, etc that cannot be taught. That is not to say that training, good training, cannot prepare one for live fire, its just not the same.

ORIGINAL: denisonh

Combat experience in and of itself is not going to create a more effective unit.

Experience can be helpful, but well trained unit with solid Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, quality leadership, and doctrine that matches personnel and equipment for the battlefield task is bettter prepared to suceed on the battlefield.

Codifying experience into knowledge on how to collectively solve battlefield problems is in great part a function of doctrine and training.

Expereience is wasted if the right lessons are not learned.

Absolutely. It goes without saying that the NCO's and Officers need to be of high caliber to insure the proper lessons are learned and bad habits are corrected. But when conducting a recon of the perimeter, you don't put the new guy on point.

Hi, China is two edged. On the one hand the Japanese might have been learning how to fly in Spain or Europe and not for the coming Pacific War. On the other hand they were still aquiring hours flown in combat and learning their aircraft. One can suppose that this experiance might be of limited value later but it is certainly more then the same hours spent flying training.
However I think people tend to underrate the hours the peacetime US pilots had aquired before the start of the war. The Airforce, USN and USMC flying corps had all began increase in both size and training in 1940. By Dec 1941 they were among the best trained pilots not already at war. The training programs were in place and functioning. US pilots that saw action in 1942 were either pilots of peacetime establishments (already well trained) or pilots trained for over 1 year in period from 1940 to early 1942 (and thus well trained and benifactors of lessons learned to date in war) I don't think there should be any pilots below 55 in any USA group at start of war. As a simple by product of this no pilot under 55 should ever arrive on map in course of game without the US groups suffering enourmous losses. (This is quite possible if player engages in combat under unfavorable conditions for a protracted period of time)
By mid 1942 the USA should be able to face the Japanese at one location and hold their own or win. By 1943 this condition should exist at almost all points of contact. There is nothing the Japanese can do about this. The USA simply can bring more groups to any fight. The pilots advantage Japan has at the start will erode and the Allies will send the numbers. The Japanese have to narrow the war not expand it. There will always be physical limits to the number of groups either side can employ in a local campaign. The Japanese have to focus where geography limits the number the Allies can use while allowing a numerical advantage to Japan. (And then both sides cycle airgroups through the battle. The Japanese objectives if offensive have to be met during the period they hold the advantage and at least complete before they lose equality.

Japan cannot not fight the Allies under any condition (land sea or air) where results are dependant on numbers over a protracted period. Japanese objectives have to be of the type that can be met in short (sometimes violent) periods of time. This includes both offensive and defensive operations. After mid 1942 there will be few Japanese offensive operations other then very local in nature. (This is under the best of conditions resulting from highly favorable phase I and II results)

Over the last few years,I have been proud to know everybody in here is a knowledgeable person,usually driven by either "historical correctness",or "game playability" in their interpretation of aspects of different games..Unfortunately,sometimes folks will proffer opinions,without actually making it clear what their motive is,(history,or playability).
Anybody who knows me,knows I'm a big time history nut..
I'm also a combat veteran,so it's fairly easy to detect when somebody is proffering an opinion they really don't know anything about..
It's o.k....We are all friends.....[:D]
Will Rogers once said something like this:"Some folks will learn by reading....A second group will learn by watching...Then there's that third group that you just have to let pee on the electric fence.".....

Mogami. Why are all the Allied pilots less proficient than the US guys? Training is one thing but when ya look at the Commonwealth Forces which had been fighting since 39 and the USA was not, I find it somewhat arrogant and downright ignorant of an assumption. Strikes me as one of those design biases. Perhaps some game came out 30 years ago and it had higher rated US pilots and this game was used as the "bible".

Always wondered why Canada was never mentioned in "The Longest Day".[8|]

I'm also a combat veteran,so it's fairly easy to detect when somebody is proffering an opinion they really don't know anything about..

Uh huh, if they ain't been there, you aren't going to convince them otherwise.

Yeah...that's true Somewhere between Richard Burton and John Wayne poor Canada and Juno Beach got left on the editing room floor in The Longest Day. (if they made it that far.)

The answer to the at start of the war question is very simple with a little research. Japanese navy pilots flew missions over china. In fact at the begining of operations there they had more pilots than planes and the planes would fly 3 missions or more a day with different crews each time.

American pilots trained for thousands of hours. True, they didnt get shot at, however they were indeed "bloodied". 50% of japanese pilots being trained for carrier operations crashed at least once. A goodly number were killed. I suspect a like number of American pilots were involved in accidents and a significant number killed as well. This tends to give one a sense of professionalism about their job and consequently it is reflected in their experience.

American success vs the japanese began when the US stopped using WW-I tactics and WW-II euro tactics and developed their own for use against the Japanese. Really didnt have anything to do with superior equipment or experience. Was pure tactics. In europe the aircraft performance was nearly identical so you tended to have swirling dogfights. Jap planes were more maneuverable and faster. This left out dogfighting. But the allies lost a lot finding this out.

Combat is different than training to be sure. But training is invaluable. A person, properly trained knows what to do in a given situation. Knows what his equipment is capible of. What his equipment is not capible of. An untrained or under-trained person will hesitate and attempt to assess what is going on when fired upon. Or do something stupid because they didnt realize that their equipments wasnt up to the task. And usually die doing it. 50% of all fighter pilots shot down in air-to-air combat had never gotten a kill and most had flown 10 missions or less. In the official history of the 4th fighter group (P-47's in europe) the standing order was any pilot with less than 10 missions encountering JG3 (or was it 26?) of the Luftwaffe was to immedately head for home.

I attended an airshow here once and they had 5 USMC medal of honor pilots there as guest speakers (including Joe Foss). I talked to Col. Swett afterwards because I wanted to know details of the missions that you dont normally see in history books. The coordination of the mission forces ect. He reccomended 2 books:

Wildcat by Barrett Timan
The Dauntless Dive Bomber of WW-II by Barrett Timan

These 2 books went into great detail on this. The Lex and Yorktown for example at Coral Sea. 1 carrier (dont remember which) launched its strikes, formed over the carriers and headed off. The other launched and the aircraft proceeded to target alone (by type), forming for attack there. There was no "standard" at that point in the war. I believe the same was done at Midway, but I am not 100% sure of this. Dauntlesses were used for CAP at Coral Sea. Pilot training was there, but operation manuls were being re-written. So to say that the pilots didnt deserve the 90 experience rating isnt 100% correct. Doesnt take long before them 90% experience groups are chopped down to 75% (and frankly I believe this is accurate also, thus accounting for the change in tactics).

Consider also that experienced pilots, medal of honor winners even, had to undergo hundreds of hours of training when converting from F4Fs to F4Us. Why? Because they werent experienced? No. Because there is no substitue for training. It is AS IMPORTANT as being under fire. Make no mistake about that.

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: denisonh

I have a question about "historical" effectiveness.

Is it historical for the huge kill ratios that result in the game between the F4Fs and Zeros? (can we say Uber-Zero?)

This topic was run to ground in the UV thread, and think that we are going to go down that same road again.

One of the premises that differentiate "world class" military establishments is superior doctrine and training. Superior trained troops with better doctrine will defeat an enemy with battlefield experience (US Army vs the Republican Guards for example).


There are serious doubts as to the "value" of the Japanese experience in China, particularly with respect to doctrine and tactics. The US, the USN in particular, paid a great deal of attention to unit operations. Given that combat is a collective excersize, it collective skill in the form of superior leadership, tactical employment and doctrine will generally beat individual skill and equipment (something like the France in 1940).

So framing this discussion with historical evidence (kill ratios would be a good start) and an understanding of the synergistic effects of the unit on combat (the principle of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts) will have more credibility IMHO.

You can't compare USA vs. Japan in WWII with USA vs. Iraq nowadays.

That would simply be ridiculous.


Japan was truly world power in WWII with extremely highly trained 1st class Navy, Army and Air Force.


Also I don't see any suggestion of super (or "Uber") in both UV and WitP games.

You can ask my PBEM opponents - when I play as Allies I kill enemy Zero fighters - when I play as Japanese I kill with my Zero fighters.


Also let us not forget that historical truth is that Zero _DID_ surprise USA and that it was very very effective weapon at the begging of the war (i.e. entering dogfight with Zero meant certain death).

When time passed proper tactics (like _NEVER_ dogfight Zero) were introduced and Zero shortcomings become very obvious...


If you want to amuse yourself you can read USA reports from the beginning 1942 when it was firmly believed that:

- German pilots fly for Japanese (because all Japanese were small people with thick glasses).

- German planes are in fact Japanese planes (because Japan is such technologically inferior country unable to produce anything complex).


Leo "Apollo11"

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Jon_Hal

They wiped the skies Until the met the USN in places like Coral Sea, Midway and the 'Canal. If the Japanese were so superior in Training and aircraft then why is this not borne out in combat results? the superiority of the Zero over the Wildcat is well established but there is no proof in the histroical record that the Japanese Carrier aviators were superior to their USN counterparts.

The Coral Sea is very bad example.

Why is this counted as US victory?

Because Japanese invasion Admiral lost his nerve and Port Moresby convoy turned around (which was 100% unnecessary).

The only way Coral Sea battle can be counted as USA victory sf fact that both Japanese Carriers were unable to participate in Midway battle (due to Japanese problem with pilot training resulting in pilot shortage).

And even such Midway was one _BIG_ lucky thing for USN.


Please note that saying all this doesn't mean that Japan lost the war the very second they decided to attack USA (same thing as Germany lost war the very second they decided to attack Russia).

The overwhelming Allied advantage in supply, manpower and building capacity meant that WWII was never ever winnable for Axis powers.

What could have been different is only timeframe when defeat for Japan/Germany would occur (they could have won some battles that they historically lost similarly to premise that they could have lost some battles that they historically won).

No matter what the end result would always be the same... defeat (without any chance or hope for victory)...

The "Thatch Wave" was defensive tactics only.

Fine and dandy. the Thatch weave was a defensive tactic that worked and when first used the Wildcat's were on an offensive mission. The Wildcat didn't permit many offensive options besides Shoot and Scoot.

What I meant was that "Thach weave" was devised to save lives of USN fighter pilots when attacked by Zero fighters - it was not tactics meant to destroy the Japanese Zero fighters.

Again, against USN Carrier pilots this claim can't be backed. Vastly superior pilots in vastly superior planes should have wiped out the USN Navy pilots they encountered.. they didn't. why is that?

Japanese did great in all air battles vs. USN up until Midway (CV Yorktown was sunk after all with just handful of planes) and even after that in Solomon carrier battles.

What Japanese were missing were additional excellent pilots that needed to replace their lost comrades...

The USN used towed sleeves from aircraft and practiced that way. Again, see John Lundstrom's "The First Team" for good discriptions of training.

Sounds nice but pilot would still be clueless how actually his bullets would behave and fly in such maneuvers (BTW, I don't have that book)...


Leo "Apollo11"

Hi all,

I knew that you would netre this thread...

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Well for the first 6 months they did just that... Japanese ruled the skies and the sea without any significant opposition...

That is at best simplistic hyperbole with respect to the subject at hand. For the first six months of the war the Japanese faced little opposition because there were relatively few aircraft opposing them. The P40 pilots who did won the battle in China, did quite well in the Philippines until unfavorable logistics wore the planes out, and held their own in New Guinea. The loss rations probably favor the Japanese slightly in New Guinea, but otherwise there is nothing spectacular in Japanese performance. They executed a well conceived set of early operations and employed a superior strategic position and overwhelming numerical advantage to good effect for their cause.

And that is exactly what I said.

For the first 6 months they executed their plan to the letter (in fact things were even better than they planned) and they ruled the skies and the sea...

The "Thatch Wave" was defensive tactics only.

That is incorrect. The Thach (not "Thatch")-Flatley beam defense was both defensive and aggressive. Its purpose was to put an enemy plane in front of the guns of a US plane. And it worked quite well towards that end.

In theory any tactics can be viewed as defensive and/or offensive in some degree.

But you can't deny the fact that "Thach Weave" was primarily devised as a mean to save USN pilots when they encounter Zero fighters and dogfight occur (natural tendency for almost all pilots in all sides at that time in history was to enter circling dogfight)...

But when you add to this fact that Japanese pilots actually fired their guns in combat and shoot down enemy over China one side gains significant advantage.

You would not know that from the actual loss numbers. Based on losses, the F4F+pilot combination through June 1942 was superior to the A6M+pilot combination. So whatever "advantage" you derive from the limited combat experience of a *few* Japanese pilots in China flying against relatively unarmored, slow a/c piloted by very poorly trained pilots, it apparently did not serve them well against first class opposition.

Well I think that Japanese did quite well against USN and against British (many BoB veterans were flying against Japanese) as first class opposition.

What Japanese lacked was replacement of same caliber to replace lost pilots (as looses mount in combat over time)...

Also being in combat is something that can only help (even if opposition is weaker than you). The latest good example of that is how USA saw this correctly by perpetually flying combat air missions over Iraq in past decade - this paid greatly well when 2nd Iraq war come.

Similarly the Spain was test battleground for Germans and China was for Japanese.

Being in actual combat is something training (no matter how good) can't substitute.

Again, that is just hyperbole. It's a matter of knowing how combat differs from combat simulation. I'd say the chief effect of combat is in weeding out people who can't figure out when to disengage with a crippled aircraft or how to get home in one that is really shot up.

You can only see what soldiers are made of when someone is shooting at them and trying to kill them.

Training is great but only in combat you can see who is fit for war and who is not (especially true for commanders and pilots)...

Zero was almost invincible if piloted by good pilot and if adversary choose to dogfight it (natural tendency, sad but true, of almost all pilots on all sides at the beginning of WWII was to enter circling fight - the "boom-and-zoom" tactics were something that come later)...

That is incorrect in so many ways. 1. The Zero was good at low speeds. The F4F at high speeds. The Zero paid the price for its low speed superiority by being almost criminally fragile. The F4F brought many an injured pilot home, and brought many a rookie pilot home in a badly shot up plane. 2. The claimed "tendency to dogfight" is mostly applicable to RAF pilots whose experience against Germany was to win turning engagements in the Battle of Britain. The USN trained for mutual support before the war began (the beam defense was conceived in 1940 and first used in combat training exercises in Spring 1941).

The USA had very poor Air force in 1940 - let's be honest here.

Some pilots may have been training some advanced concepts but in general USA pilots at that point in time (i.e. history) were no different in mentality than pilots in other nations...

In the CBO theater, Chennault stressed "boom and zoom" tactics and the tendency in the USAAF was to try to use these with the P40. Unfortunately, in the early going, many of the USAAF units were deployed with the P-39, and the RAAF was saddled with P400s in many cases.

IMHO the accomplishments of Chennault was much publicized for propaganda sake while actual results were not that great (and add to that fact that they did _NOT_ encounter Zero fighters although they constantly claimed so).

But how would that deflection training be done in practice?

Combat flying exercises with live opposition. After flying combat training against within-service pilots, the USN and USAAF had combat exercises against each other annually starting in 1937. In 1941, Thach and Flatley demonstrated the beam defense for the first time, using it to "win" the Army-Navy exercise that year against USAAF pilots flying P40s. Judges reviewed post combat results using gun cameras (obviously not live rounds). In addition, all US pilots trained at deflection shooting using live ammunition against towed targets. Typically these exercise required the attacking pilot to approach the towed target along a given quartering approach.

OK... interesting...

But what aircraft were they using when training before the war (the military expansion was very very late in USA and, luckily, the war didn't start for USA in late 1939 - it started in very late 1941 or, for all practical reasoning, 1942)?

When did USA Air Force and USN actually properly equip all their squadrons with 1st class combat aircraft?


Leo "Apollo11"

That is not to say that training, good training, cannot prepare one for live fire, its just not the same.

They're obviously not the same. But anyone who thinks that they can predict that a combat veteran unit will outperform a unit that has not served in combat is putting alot of faith in hyperbole. Again, I think it's a kind of "survivors' vanity." Such simplistic generalizations really don't allow for thoughtful analysis of how veteran units differ from rookie ones.

Take ground units for example, since you mentioned them. There may well be less of a training boost for ground units than air units, since WW2 ground combat was scarcely a high tech arena. WW2 air to air combat was, in contrast, a very high tech arena in which training was of paramount importance and in which the thinking man held the edge. I'm not sure what you are referring to by 'preparation for live fire.' In most WW2 air to air combat a fellow was too busy opertaing his plane to cower, and half the time didn't know he was being shot down until it was too late. This is hugely different from the pace of action and the, umm, psychological and physiological cirumstances of ground combat.

Mogami - It's not certain that the AVG ever faced A6M2s, although Erik Shilling thought that they did. The aircraft that they did face (Ki-43s, IIRC) were *more manueverable* than the A6M2 and about as fast. In short they were even more the dogfighther than the Zeke. So if it's contrasting qualities and fighting styles, one might suspect that the Ki-43 was the Zeke yet even more so. Of course, the Zeke had 20mm and the Ki-43 not, and that's a huge difference. But AVG tactics would not have been substantially different in the face of A6M2s. And since in all other respects the P40C/E used in the way that the AVG/23d FG used them was far superior to the A6M series, I think the AVG would have done about as well against Zeroes as against the Ki-43s.

The real bummer is, perhaps, that the USAAF did not train intensively at deflection shooting like the USN. Had they done so, the Axis would really have suffered far more hurt in every theater where they faced US pilots.

Just to compare this simulation and the real thing: japanese lost 380 planes to complete their essential conquests (till march 1942). I am waiting for the patch v 1.3 so stopped the game on 20th december or so. Are the losses similar to historic ones?

And that is exactly what I said. For the first 6 months they executed their plan to the letter (in fact things were even better than they planned) and they ruled the skies and the sea...

Fair enough. For some reason I thought (maybe because of the title of the thread) that you were implying that the Japanese pilot+plane combination was superior to the US pilot+plane combination for reasons having to do with expertise or aircraft characteristics. My error.

In theory any tactics can be viewed as defensive and/or offensive in some degree. But you can't deny the fact that "Thach Weave" was primarily devised as a mean to save USN pilots when they encounter Zero fighters and dogfight occur (natural tendency for almost all pilots in all sides at that time in history was to enter circling dogfight)...

It was not the natural tendency of pilots to enter a circling dogfight. The beam defense was a way for two F4Fs to handle the enemy when outnumbered. The way of handling the enemy was to shoot the enemy down. Killing the enemy is an offensive move. The result of killing the enemy is that fewer of them increases your own safety. But as to the natural tendency to enter circling dogfights, for the USN that's just not the tendency. When you look in detail at the Coral Sea engagements you see F4F pilots flying boom and zoom tactics alot -- especially Thach and Flatley. You also see a high degree of situational awareness to not allow airspeed to drop and pilots routinely bugging out when they found themselves low on airspeed and returning to the combat after gaining speed and altitude. This does not mean that every pilot flew boom and zoom or that even good pilots did not at time find themselves out of airspeed. All it means is that the actual combats were, from the get go, much more complicated than the "Japan ruled the skies" point of view embraces.

think that Japanese did quite well against USN and against British (many BoB veterans were flying against Japanese) as first class opposition.

I guess.. if "quite well" means that more Japanese A6Ms were shot down by F4Fs at the Coral Sea than F4Fs were shot down, or that more Japanese A6Ms were shot down by F4Fs at Midway than were shot down. I honestly don't know how the IJN comes off looking "quite well" when in direct, head to head, fighter vs fighter engagements, they consistently lost more planes than they shot down. That doesn't strike me as a good record, even if the Japanese could have found enough replacement pilots to recover their losses.

Also being in combat is something that can only help

I fundamentally disagree. When you look at Coral Sea you can see some fine examples of veteran Japanese pilots losing their lives because they learned the wrong lesson in China. I can name three wrong lessons they learned as they died. 1. Don't cross ahead of an F4F within range, even at a high deflection angle, because unlike Chinese pilots, USN pilots can and routinely do kill you with a snap shot. 2. Don't engage an F4F in a head to head attack because the F4F can take what you can dish out, but the A6M can't take what the F4F can dish out. 3. Under the right circumstances, an F4F can and will turn with you or even ahead of you and kill you.

You can only see what soldiers are made of when someone is shooting at them and trying to kill them.

"You can only see what soldiers are made of" is hyperbole. There's no there there. In ground combat, veterans can crack and run like hell. Rookies can stand and fight. Unit morale and cohesion can be there, go away, and return. Training can and does make a huge difference even in the intangible things like morale, initiative, espirit de corps. Like other false "common sense" the "experience trumps all" perspective is just crap and demonstratably so in numerous circumstances. Consider the 20th Me. In one prior combat (Fredericksburg) their only mission was to advance across an open ground, be shot and die. Not much learning there since everybody knew that frontal assaulting a fortified position sporting artillery was suicide. In their second battle (Gettysburg Day 2 L. ROund Top) they executed a series of complex maneuvers in combat that most units never used in combat. They'd never used them in combat before. These included a doubling of the interval under fire, followed by refusing the left flank, followed by a bayonet charge that began with a left forward wheel. These things worked (and resulted in the capture of some 400 CSA veterans-of-numerous-battles) solely because of intensive training.

Training is great but only in combat you can see who is fit for war and who is not (especially true for commanders and pilots)...

It's true that combat provides the test of personal courage and skill. It is not necessarily true that surviving combat makes one either more skilled or more courageus. There's not much evidence that, for example, Montgomery, or McClellan, ver improved much as generals as a result of any lessons that they learned in combat. They started out utterly devoid of talent (McC) and mediocre (Monty) and stayed talentless and meidocre respectively.

had very poor Air force in 1940 - let's be honest here.

That is neither substantive in its scope, correct in the broadest sense, nor honest. It's also not "1941" as stipulated in the thread title. The USN pilots of 1940 were every bit as good as any IJN pilot in 1940 and better than most other nations' pilots (in part because of their unparalleled skill at deflection shooting). By 1941, even the USAAF had absorbed many of the lessons of the Battle of Britain in consultation with UK and Commonwealth air forces. IN 1941-e.1942 the chief disasters that befell USAAFFE and the PH contingents had *nothing* to do with pilot quality and everything to do with strategic position and logistics.

Some pilots may have been training some advanced concepts but in general USA pilots at that point in time (i.e. history) were no different in mentality than pilots in other nations...

That is manifestly and documentably different for USN pilots. No other nation trained intensively at deflection shooting. That may be one of the reasons why F4F pilots facing Me109s in the North Africa campaign shot down three German veterans per F4F lost. Not bad considering that the Me109 was definitely a better plane than either the F4F or A6M.

As for the USAAF, the basic problem there remained the use of substandard aircraft in the PTO. In North Africa, unblooded USAAF pilots in P40s acquitted themselves quite well against veteran Luftwaffe units flying Me109G2s and Italian units flying the MC in-line thingie (MC 201 or 202 I forget which) which was a pretty good plane.

IMHO the accomplishments of Chennault was much publicized for propaganda sake while actual results were not that great (and add to that fact that they did _NOT_ encounter Zero fighters although they constantly claimed so).

When you stop reading the propaganda written in 1942 and start reading about the AVG you will see that, discounting the "confirmed kills" and taking a realistic assessment of the claims and unit records, the AVG lost 1 aircraft in combat for every six Japanese aircraft shot down by P40s. That includes AVG pilots lost in ground attack. So "actual results were not that great" is the only remaining propaganda. The Zero question is more difficult to tackle. There are some good reasons to believe that Japanese units that faced off against the AVG in the CBO had some Zeroes. The debate is really extensive and not resolvable by us.

The thing is we can predict the outcome. The P40 boom and zoom tactics used by the AVG were every bit as effective against A6Ms when non-AVG units flying in New Guinea began routinely to employ them after mid-1942. Since the AVG pilots were that much better at it (having been trained in them at the get go), I think the results of deploying A6Ms rather than Ki-43s against the AVG would not have differed substantially. The Zekes would still have the snot shot out of them and would have acquitted themselves poorly, regardless of the experience of the Japanese pilots flying them, against the AVG.

OK... interesting...

But what aircraft were they using when training before the war (the military expansion was very very late in USA and, luckily, the war didn't start for USA in late 1939 - it started in very late 1941 or, for all practical reasoning, 1942)?

When did USA Air Force and USN actually properly equip all their squadrons with 1st class combat aircraft?

There it depends on how you view the tactical side of things. Thach and Flatley did not like the F4F-4. They really liked the F4F-3. More gun time (but fewer guns) in the latter and the F4F-3 was 500 pounds lighter. The F4F flown by the USN/USMC was adequate for the task of handling IJN units. In part this was because the A6M was a very fragile aircraft.

So I can't answer whether or not the F4F was a "first line" a/c. IMO, it was a first line a/c since it did well against *other* a/c that people call "first line." In 1942-1943 those others were primarily the A6M and the Me109 in North Africa. If the F4F was not a first line a/c, then I'd have to say that the A6M2 was not a first line a/c.

That said. GM production of F4F was converted at the last second from F4F-4s to F4F-3s with folding wings (named FM2s by the US and "Martlet" by the UK). Over the next two years the FM2s engine was upgraded with more HP. If a pilot in a 1943 FM2 had encountered a pilot in any A6M type plane, the FM2 had the distinct advantage, plane wise. But the USN was NOT satisifed in general with an a/c with 4 MGs and a bad climb rate, so the F6F began to make its extensive appearance in mid-1943 as the primary USN carrier fighter.

The P40 series also received a sequence of upgrades within variant. Early P40Es lacked a bit in high altitude performance but these problems were solved. It was never as good as the best Allied fighters, but by the end of the war the P40N for example was better than the Me109, the Zero, or the Tony hands down.

You'd have to check elsewhere to determine when the P38s arrived in the PTO in numbers. I have no reason to think Matrix has it wrong. Certainly the P38 was a "first class" a/c. Better than just about everything offered up by the Japanese.

I'm playing the Japs in a PBEM full campaign. My Operational plane losses are greater than my combat losses and the total is about 300 but it's only late Jan 1942 I haven't taken Java yet.

I don't think the USN pilots are over-rated. Sometimes years of peactime training are better than what pilots often got during wartime.