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Hi, They had sent PBY to Midway and Johnston. They were not flying because it was the weekend.
What would have happened if a USN plane or submarine had spotted the IJN CV (without the IJN knowing it)

If, for instance, the Japanese had indeed struck at Manila (as Bywater also wrote), or if the task force on it's way to Pearl Harbor had been detected, the entire course of the war and that of the rest of the 20th century would have been very different.

I'll give Kimmel some leeway because of the constrictions on his abilty to do anything but Short screwed up majorly. He could have done a lot more to protect his command. CAP, spread the planes out, search patterns. He could have done much more.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

If, for instance, the Japanese had indeed struck at Manila (as Bywater also wrote), or if the task force on it's way to Pearl Harbor had been detected, the entire course of the war and that of the rest of the 20th century would have been very different.

Let's not forget that we also milked the "sneak" attack angle to inflame public opinion. The fact that the Japanese were in the process of breaking diplomatic relations at the time of the attack was withheld from the public. If the Japanese had actually delivered a declaration of war prior to the attack, I don't think we would have seen quite the patriotic fervor for unconditional surrender that was present. And assuming that the war went badly for us (i.e. defeats at Midway and Guadalcanal, etc...) into 1943, it's quite possible that a negotiated peace may have been attempted.

But lucky for us, the Japanese had a history of attacking without a declaration of war and the rest is history.

Chez

It is important to emphasize the lack of any formal distribution procedures to inform responsible fleet commanders of the intelligence information being gleaned from decrypts of Japanese communications. In the Navy, this was complicated by the self appointed intelligence expert of then Captain Richmond K. Turner known as “Terrible Turner”, the new head of the Navy’s War Plans department of CNO. The weakness of Admiral Stark as CNO let Turner completely usurp the functions of ONI and DNC to fulfill their responsibilities to properly warn fleet commanders of the impending Japanese actions based on the Purple diplomatic decrypts and other indicators. More serious war warning messages and a more accurate picture of the current situation as indicated by Japanese decrypts that were advocated by Captain Laurence Stafford as OP-20-G, Admiral Noyes DNC, and the acting Director of Intelligence (DNI), Captain Kirk, were forestalled or greatly watered down by Turner. One excuse Turner tried to give for such perfunctory warnings was that Pearl Harbor had all the Japanese diplomatic decrypts, which was false. Earlier, Captain Turner was convinced Japan would only attack Russia and just before Pearl Harbor he convinced Stark that Japan was not ready to attack the U.S. only the British. The new DNI Theodore S. Wilkinson refused to challenge Turner’s rebuff of a further specific war warning drafted by Captain Arthur H. McCollum on 5 December. Again on 6 December, Stafford tried again but was dismissed by Noyes so as not to antagonize Turner. On the Army side, General George G. Marshall and intermediaries vetoed similar requests made by Colonels Rufus S. Bratton and Otis K. Sadtler. Later, Marshall denied receiving the related decrypts. As Washington politics go, both Stafford, Bratton and Sadtler were relegated to rather minor posts and discredited, while Noyes and Turner were given prime advancement billets and promotions. Although General Marshall was held to have been derelict in his duties by the first Army board of inquiry on the Pearl Harbor attack, the subsequent congressional investigation only found Admiral Kimmel and General Short at fault for the Pearl Harbor disaster. Marshall had the backing of both Secretary of War Stimson and President Roosevelt. Stimson instigated a fierce campaign to reverse Marshall’s prior dereliction finding. During the latter hearings, none of Turner’s subordinates would break ranks and reveal Turner’s derelictions due to his great wartime achievements and rank as Vice Admiral. Only subsequent revelations have verified Turner’s and Marshall’s responsibility for impeding more appropriate and timely warnings urged by intelligence professionals based on Purple decrypts.

ORIGINAL: William Amos

The whole problem was the "yellow Peril" think of the 1920s and 1930s that believed that the "Yellow" man was inferior to the white man.

We sent B17 bombers to Phillipines claiming that " the biggest bomber force in the world will bring the Japanese to their knees"

We sent BBs to Pearl because the BB was the "Ultimate" navy weapon.

We were so ready to fight WWII like it was WWI.

Its the old Military Axiom that you can learn more from defeat then victory IF you learn the right lessons.

after Dec 7th we learn the right lessons. Before then we had only our superior arrogant beliefs.