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Just for fun.. That rate of loss, if it is not just exaggerated "claims" would exceed the Schweinfort raid by a goodly percentage.

I would just point out that the raid in the original post was essentially unescorted. The P-40B's should be nearly useless at the range needed to get to Rabaul which leaves 23 P-38's operating at long range against 90 fighters operating at short range. One would have to realistically expect the bombers to be badly hurt in this case.

Hi, What were the actual lossess? The combat report is not a good source for judging results. However the escorts were outnumbered over 2-1 and those Tojo fighters will tear up bombers.
But from the combat report we can't tell what caused the loss of any aircraft. we can assume all the Japanese were A2A and the Allied fighters were A2A but we don't really know what the actual numbers were. But I've not had much trouble shooting down Allied heavy bombers in any version where and when I chose to comit fighters for defense. My problem has always been not enough fighters to defend everything in range and the enemy just changes targets when I send fighters to defend a base.

I sometimes post the complete ac loss report in my AAR. The losses posted by David in this example were mostly caused
in A2A combat. Most of the heavies were turned away before they could bomb and flak is not an important factor between 25-32k feet.

Several of the kills were credited after the battle when the damaged machines tried to get back home to PM.
In addition several bombers were reported as operational losses.

You may have noticed that I'm not using a lot of Zeros as bomber interceptors. Their durability, firepower and ceiling are all insufficient.
My Tony and Tojos are manned by a lot of 70-90 exp pilots - and yes: they tear the bombers apart.

I'm attaching a complete loss report from one of the biggest 'massacres'!

It should also be noted that the massive losses in the previous attachment were caused in several raids...e.g. over Kendari, Rabaul and Kwajalein.

ORIGINAL: PzB

My Tony and Tojos are manned by a lot of 70-90 exp pilots - and yes: they tear the bombers apart.

And yes, your results are Bull$hit! 65 heavies and 20 fighters lost in air to air against 13 Japanese A/C?
No matter how you slice it, or what examples you cite, that's just Bull$hit. Never happened. Never should. System broken..., end of story.

I think all those Allied bombers and fighters were shot down by 220+ Jap fighters in Kendari, Rabaul and Truk.
Still a high toll, but I've been able to swamp the Allied bomber formations time and again.

I'd suggest that the heavies be kept back until they can be sent out in formations of 2-300 + with a 100 plus escorts before
they go against heavily defended targets.

A loss of 13 Jap fighters is low, way too low - so you may be right there Mike.

ORIGINAL: timtom

Been digging about and came across these figures. They're on the no. of 21st BC B-29's lost to Japanese fighters Nov.44 - Aug.45.

According to the source, XXI.Bomber Command, 20th AF B-29 were subjected to 11,026 attacks by Japanese fighters while operating against metropolitan Japan. This resulted in the destruction of 58 B-29's. Another 29 were destroyed by a combination of fighters and AAA. 348 B-29 were damaged by fighters, and another 234 by the fighter-AAA combo.

So Japanese fighters destroyed or partook in the destruction of 87 B-29's, equal to 0.79% of fighter attacks resulting in the destruction of the B-29.

Japanese Fighters damaged or partook in damaging 582 B-29's, equal to 5.28% of fighter attacks resulting the damaging of the B-29.

Thus 669 (6.07%) of Japanese fighter attacks were of effect against the B-29's in question.

Approved claims by B-29 gunners were 714 fighters destroyed, 456 probables and 770 damaged. Without cross refence to Japanese sources, I should think it safest to disregard these.

(Source: MacIsaac, John (ed.): The United States Strategic Bombing Survey vol.IX: The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan, Garland Publishing 1976 (1946), pp.20-21.)

Whether this data is of relevance to the current debate I'll leave it to you to decide.

Tom

I'm taking the liberty of reposting the above here, as the "B-17 losses too heavy" thread has moved on. Also, a further reading of the text has made me realise that the above statistics are somewhat deceptive, or at least require some qualification. The highest no. of fighter attacks of B-29's occured in January 1945 (2,963). The worst single incident was the January 27 mission against the Nakajima works in Tokyo. 56 B-29's were subjected to 984 attacks resulting in the destruction of 9 B-29, which equals 16.07% of the attacking force and a 0.91% success rate by the attackers. No data on the number of damaged B-29's is given. Another source (Werrell, Ken P: Blanket of Fire; US bombers over Japan, 1996) in turn quoting this source http://www.usaaf.net/digest/operations.htm put the no. of January B-29's losses to fighters (12), fighters + AAA (2), unknown (6), and ops (7). Thus 20 out of 27 could be credited to fighters (74.1%). however that still only a 0.68% kill rate in relation to the no. of attacks.

The Statistics Digest also shows how of 368 XXI BC B-29's lost, 115 were lost to "cause unknown" (31.25%). All of these could've been lost to fighters, and it seem reasonable to assume that at least some of them were.

The average loss rate per sortie airborne throughout was 1.38%, however during January the loss rate approached 6%, comparable to the ETO in the dark days of 1943. Operational losses, as shown by the Statistical Digest, made up 25.9% of total losses in January, so the loss rate per sortie to enemy action was something like 4.5%. Proportionally speaking, then, under presumably ideal conditions, Japanese fighters were perfectly capably of mauling unescorted B-29. The 16% losses in the Nakayima raid is still a far cry from what we're seeing in WitP though.

The text suggests that the advent of escorts from April and sheer saturation overwhelmed Japanese fighter defences. However a breakdown of the numbers suggests to me that the efficiancy of Japanese fighters actually rose towards the summer of 45.

Result of fighter attacks on B-29's by month (damaged only):

Damaged by Fighter + Damaged by Fighter & AAA (Total)/No. of Attacks = Percentage Effective:

Nov.44: 2+3 (5)/185 = 2.70%
Dec.44: 22+14 (36)/1,597 = 2.25%
Jan.45: 68+21 (89)/2,963 = 3.00%
Feb.45: 46+12 (58)/1,341 = 4.33%
Mar.45: 12+9 (21)/445 = 4.72%
Apr.45: 76+80 (156)/2,414 = 6.46%
May 45: 52+43 (95)/1,278 = 7.43%
Jun.45: 48+51 (99)/1,554 = 6.37%
Jul.45: 13+2 (15)/99 = 15.15%
Aug.45: 8+0 (8)107 = 7.48%

Total: 348+234 (582)/11,026 = 5.28%

However as the no. of B-29's damaged by AAA rise sharply from 3 in Nov.44 to a peak of 513 in Jul.45, it raises the possibility that an increase in Japanese AAA is skewing the numbers by producing stragglers then beset by fighters. A quick glanse at the table above will reveal how the ratio between B-29's damaged purely by fighters to the fighter/AAA combo is about 3:1 in the beginning of 1945 but 1:1 or so by mid-45. As far as I can tell, WitP doesn't emulate this interplay between AAA and fighters, and as we're strictly only looking at the effect of fighters on heavy bombers, arguable the latter category should be disregarded. Yet while this might be the case, a look at the succesrate of pure fighter attacks reveals the same general trend.

Ratio between Percentage of Fighter and Fighter + AAA Attacks Resulting in Damage, by month:

Fighters/Fighters + AAA = Ratio

Nov.44: 1.62/1.08 = 1.50:1.00
Dec.44: 1.32/0.87 = 1.52:1.00
Jan.45: 2.30/0.70 = 3.29:1.00
Feb.45: 3.43/0.90 = 3.81:1.00
Mar.45: 2.70/1.02 = 2.65:1.00
Apr.45: 3.15/3.25 = 0.97:1.00
May 45: 4.07/3.36 = 1.21:1.00
Jun.45: 3.09/3.28 = 0.94:1.00
Jul.45: 13.13/2.02 = 6.50:1.00
Aug.45: 7.48/0.00 = ***

Average: 3.16/2.12 = 1.49:1.00

Is the the B-29 data at all relevant the B-17 debate? In the absence of any other statistically significant data from the PTO, I think it should at least be part of an informed debate on the issue. A B-29 isn't to be mistaked for a B-17, but then again a M2 or M3 model Zero isn't to be mistaked for an George or Jack either. Presumably the Japanese ability to put up fighters over metropolitan Japan was no worse than ditto over Rabaul. I think there's something for both sides in the arguement here. By the historical yardstick, Japanese fighters could, proportionally speaking, shoot down significant numbers of B-29's. However that yardstick is rather lower than the 50-60% that WitP at least occasionally produces.

For those who wish to demonstrate that the WitP model is out of whack, it might be an idea to set up a test of say, 100 B-29 against 50-100 N1K's or a similar late-war Japanese fighters. If this reproduces the heavy casualties experienced with the B-17's, at least it could be argued that there's something wrong with model on a sound historical basis.

However I still hold that it hasn't actually been proven that the model is in fact consistantly out of whack. We still only have what statistically amounts to isolated incidents, and what is really needed is comprehensive testing to show that it happens consistently (or not). This would make for a much stronger arguement than repeated cries and counter-cries of fanboy'ism.

And now for something completely different:

The USSBS also precents some data on the effect of German fighter armament on US heavies (vol.III, sec.2, fig.12). We're not informed as to how the values given are arrived at. It also only gives the effect of single hits by a given weapon, which suggests to me that this is the product of controlled tests.

MG 17, 15, & 81 (cal. 7.7mm): "Negligible effect"
MG 131 (cal. 13mm) & MG 151 (cal. 15mm): "Principal value as incendiary"
MG FF & MG 151 (cal. 20mm): "Possible 6% destruction"
MK 101, 103 & 108 (cal. 30mm): "Aircraft destroyed: 25%"

Tom