RE: CoG and EiA
Posted: Wed Jul 13, 2005 7:27 pm
Fair enough Reiryc but I'd contend that your solution reinforces my problems with the game rather than appease them.
Its not that the British land and march on an undefended paris. Its that a Corps of British can land in Brest in 1805, defeat 30, 000 Frenchmen waiting for them there and then march directly on Paris with no thought to requiring a seaport.... consistently. Its like the designers bought into all the hype of the British at Waterloo and made them a high quality army and then gave them that army in 1805.
If the solution to the fight against Austria sees hundreds of thousands of troops on both armies fighting decisive battles in Switzerland and the Tyrol, there is something fundamentally flawed with the design. Campaigning in the mountains was a way for a small force to totally frustrate a larger force and rarely produced decisive results. Napoleonic campaigns tended toward the lowlands for many reasons and this game doesn't reflect that.
Also, if the way to defeat an enemy force in France is to order all of my National Guard units to leave their fortresses and wait in the open while the main army fought an indecisive engagement, why was this tactic never adopted? No, provincial strongpoints are situated such that they do block access routes. As well, surrounding armies was simply not viable at the scale this game suggests. I should not need to order my Flanders garrison units into the field to cut off units fighting a few miles west of Paris. Even the entire Ulm encirclement campaign would, at this scale, exist entirely in the space of a single province. Army destruction has to be the rsult of local tactics rather than grand strategic.
EDIT: It should be noted that I am not saying this to bash CoG. I'm discussing it in the context of what may be the difference between EiA and CoG. EiA, as a boardgame, enforced fairly realistic results in my opinion.
Its not that the British land and march on an undefended paris. Its that a Corps of British can land in Brest in 1805, defeat 30, 000 Frenchmen waiting for them there and then march directly on Paris with no thought to requiring a seaport.... consistently. Its like the designers bought into all the hype of the British at Waterloo and made them a high quality army and then gave them that army in 1805.
If the solution to the fight against Austria sees hundreds of thousands of troops on both armies fighting decisive battles in Switzerland and the Tyrol, there is something fundamentally flawed with the design. Campaigning in the mountains was a way for a small force to totally frustrate a larger force and rarely produced decisive results. Napoleonic campaigns tended toward the lowlands for many reasons and this game doesn't reflect that.
Also, if the way to defeat an enemy force in France is to order all of my National Guard units to leave their fortresses and wait in the open while the main army fought an indecisive engagement, why was this tactic never adopted? No, provincial strongpoints are situated such that they do block access routes. As well, surrounding armies was simply not viable at the scale this game suggests. I should not need to order my Flanders garrison units into the field to cut off units fighting a few miles west of Paris. Even the entire Ulm encirclement campaign would, at this scale, exist entirely in the space of a single province. Army destruction has to be the rsult of local tactics rather than grand strategic.
EDIT: It should be noted that I am not saying this to bash CoG. I'm discussing it in the context of what may be the difference between EiA and CoG. EiA, as a boardgame, enforced fairly realistic results in my opinion.


and missed seeing it.