The US B-29 was a powerful weapon which DID DO THAT MUCH DAMAGE!!!!!!!
I would have to put a caveat on that statement to read "when used correctly." This applies to any weapons systems.
My take is that there are three parts to bombing accuracy. They are (in no particular order):
1. Altitude, winds and weather.
The higher you fly, the less accurate bombing in general is. And the B-29, by virtue of its ability to fly very high, ran into an unknown phenomenom- the jetstream that greatly decreased its accuracy above 27-30K feet. Lemay determined that the accuracy from these altitudes simply wasn't good enough for the risks involved. That's the primary reason why he chose to change to night tactics using incendiaries at lower altitudes.
Japanese weather records showed that for five years there had never been two successive good visual bombing days over Tokyo, indicating what might be expected over other targets in the home islands. The worst month of the year for visual bombing was believed to be June, after which the weather should improve slightly during July and August and then become worse again during September. Since good bombing conditions would occur rarely, the most intense plans and preparations were necessary in order to secure accurate weather forecasts and to arrange for full utilization of whatever good weather might occur. It was also very desirable to start the raids before September.
2. Bombsight design
This really had very little to do with the actual platform employing it so long as that platform was stable. The Norden bombsight was the most accurate bombsight available to US forces but that doesn't necessarily make it accurate, especially during adverse weather. US bombers over Germany seldom were able to put more than 50% of their bombs within 1000 yards of the aiming point and that's assuming the bomber crews actually determined the true aiming point. The B-17, B-24 and B-29 should have very similar accuracy rates at similar altitudes when using the Norden bombsight. It could be argued that the B-29s higher cruise speed might actually reduce its accuracy. Also consider this.
3. Experience level of the crews using it.
This one's obvious. You have to be familar enough with the system in order to use it effectively. That means training but dropping practice bombs in the desert under optimal conditions isn't going to do much to teach someone how to adjust for less than optimal conditions. So you also need actual combat experience. The more the better.
I, for one, prefer an acurately modeled, HISTORICAL game. Play balance be damned. If the game doesn't model the B-29 to reflect its effectiveness IRL, then it should be changed. We do know that it is way too effective against shipping so that should be reduced. As far as its daytime accuracy, it left a lot to be desired, mostly due to engine problems and the weather over Japan.
Consider this article from
this site.
On June 5, the Superforts made their first bombing attack, against the rail yards at Bangkok. Balky engines and bad weather conspired to cripple the mission. Only eighteen bombs hit the target. Not a good start.
Washington continued to pressure General Wolfe, CO of XX Bomber Command, to attack Japan itself by the middle of the month. On the night of June 14-15, ninety-two B-29's took off from staging bases in China, to strike at the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyushu - a vital target that turned out a quarter of Japan's rolled steel. The diminishing number of bombers at each stage of the mission illustrates the problems inherent in Operation Matterhorn:
92 bombers left India.
79 reached the staging bases in China.
75 took off from the bases.
68 left China, the others aborted after take-off.
47 reached the target at Yawata.
15 bombed visually; 32 bombed by radar due to the weather.
One bomb hit the target!
Despite the failure of the raid in material damage, the press hailed it as a great victory; it was the first American bombing raid to hit Japan since the Doolittle Raid in April, 1942.
The Matterhorn raids continued. Eighteen bombers hit Japanes cities on July 7. Two days later, 72 Superforts were launched against a steel plant in Manchuria. More ineffective raids were staged in August.
General Curtis LeMay, only 38 years old, arrived on August 29, to head up XX Bomber Command. A cigar-chomping tough guy, LeMay shook things up. He increased training and mission frequency; he re-organized the flights into 12-plane boxes; he introduced the 'lead bomber' concept; and he re-organized the Bomb Groups. Raids continued through the fall, hampered by supply problems and more effective Japanese air defenses. By the end of 1944, 147 Superfortresses had been lost to enemy guns and to accidents. Operation Matterhorn wasn't working and it was phased out.
In the summer of 1944, the Marianas were secured and airfields were quickly built. XXI Bomber Command was organized for the Marianas B-29 operations. After the planes were brought in, the crews trained, and some preliminary raids, 111 Superforts bombed the Nakajima Aircraft Company's Musashi engine plant near Tokyo on November 20, 1944. Largely ineffective raids continued against the Musashi plant and the Mitsubishi engine plant at Nagoya through the end of the year.
Once again the Joint Chiefs called in Curtis LeMay to take over. He had analyzed the Japanese economy and focused on its dependence on small cottage industries spread throughout the large cities. Since the previous afforts at high-level precision, daylight bombing of specific targets had failed, LeMay instead proposed to burn out the Japanese cities entirely, destroying the critical industries (and the civilian population) in the process. (Not exactly the way we wage war now, where every errant bomb that hits an Afghan camel must be accounted for.)
LeMay developed a radically different approach. First, the bombers would carry incendiary, rather than high explosive, bombs. To save fuel and maximize the bomb load, the guns were stripped out, the Superforts would fly at 5,000 (instead of 30,000) feet, and each plane would fly directly to the target (no more circling and joining up in formation). These allowed each Superfort to carry about seven tons of M69 incendiary bombs. Lastly, they would go at night, since precision was no longer required and because Japanese night fighter forces were not very good.
The results were devastating. On the night of March 9-10, 279 B-29's bombed Tokyo. A huge firestorm resulted, sixteen square miles of Tokyo were reduced to ashes and 84,000 Japanese were killed. In the next week, similar, but less destructive, results were obtained in Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe. Only twenty B-29s were lost.
So incendiaries, 5000ft altitude and single-file formations were able to achieve the effects that high altitude, iron bombs and massed formations could not.
So, Derek, Sounds to me like you are getting the results that were historically achieved by high altitude, massed B-29 formations. Why don't you try it at night at 5000 feet?
Chez