Matrix Games Forums

Posted: **Mon May 28, 2001 3:25 pm**

very interesting quote. Thankyou for the translation. Have not myself read lost victories.
I agree with you about the dubious nature of much of Suvorov's argument. I do not like to quote him as I regard his work as a mixture of occasionally very interesting research (weapons choices in particular) outright falsehood and gross misrepresentation.
I am not a Suvorov beleiver.
The work of Hoffmann and Post I find far more credible although I myself believe that no one has proved the Soviets were going to attack. The mystery is therefore why they deployed so many of their tanks and aircraft so far forward in attack positions.
Mainstain's statement about being defensive but ready to be a threat at any time is possibly as close to the truth as anyone could ever get.
Very interesting topic.

Posted: **Mon May 28, 2001 3:55 pm**

Sorry for my weak english

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Matthew Buttsworth:

Some corrections and remarks

The amount of troops or weaponry kept by the Soviets on the Japanese, Iranian, and Turkish borders is totally incomparable with the costs of German deployments in North Africa and Western Europe.

Minimal force on Japanise (summer 1942) - about 800 000 men. Average in 1941-1945 - about 1 000 000
I don't know about Iranian and Turkish border

Cannot agree in terms of materielle, where the Soviet superiority in brute numbers was of tanks, artillery and planes (with many of those being of low quality)

Germans engineers copy russian 120 mortar one-to-one (it was better than any germany mortar). Almost all soviet 76 guns was use
in germany. I think, soviet artillery was better than germany.

German Barbarossa strength planes 3,410 (total 5,714), artillery pieces 8,072, (32, 710),

I think, it (8072) only guns > 75 mm. For example, one infantry divisions has not less than 40 AT guns. 150 X 40 = 6000....

tanks 3,582 (5,639) divisions 190 (209)
Soviet first and second echelons (all deployed or being deployed on Western front)
planes 9917 including 3,719 modern (plus second echelon 20,000, artillery pieces 34,695, (79,100)

It number (34695) calculate with all guns (include 20 and 37 flack, 50 mortar, 45AT)

, tanks 12,800 incl 1800 middle and heavy tanks totally superior to German (23,200), divisions 237 (303).

Soviet full rifle division 14500 men, germany - 16900.

Raw estimation: 190x16,9 = 3200
237x14.5 = 3400

About tanks vs tanks and tank quality see www.wargamer.org/GvA

And main soviet problem: Army is not ready to war (not mobilized). Most divisions hadn't full men complete (average about 9000), hadn't transport and so on.

Regards,
moi

Posted: **Mon May 28, 2001 10:16 pm**

I think that the major difference between Montgomery and Patton was that Patton's gambles payed off (except for his attacks on the Metz Fortressess) and Montgomery failed at Market Garden. With the benefit of history we can say that Market Garden was a dumb idea, purely on the basis that it failed. However, at the time it appeared to be a possible way to win the war very fast. Due to weather and strong German defences (against a Parachute Army and a SS Panzer Korps) the attack failed to secure Arnhem, but got all of the other bridges.

In regards to France in 1940, If you look at a lot of the engagements in Belgium against the French, Belgians and Dutch, the Germans do not appear to be as superior. The British did not fight the Germans until Arras, which was a tactical victory (2 Tank Battalions and 2 Infantry Battalions vs. 2 German Divisions).

The Dutch defeated most of the German's Airborne troops and surrendered only after threats to destroy their capital. The Belgians retreated in good order to Dunkirk, and only surrendered due to their King surrendering.

In fact, there were 4 French Armoured Divisions, 3 Mechanized Divisions (virtually Armoured Divisions) and 1 British Armoured Division. That was an equivalent of 8 Armoured Formations. The French fought these forces together and sustained some success when they did so. Most of the dispersed tanks were R-35's, which supported the Infantry. When German Infantry forces fought Allied Infantry forces they were usually handicapped because German infantry were based off of 1918 patterns, where the Allied Infantry was generally Motorized and Mechanized. The French/British actually had more AT guns per Division than an average German Division. What won the battle was because Panzer Group Kleist went up against the wings of the 9th and 2nd French Armies, the weakest formations in the French Army. They broke through while most of the French/British armour was in Belgium. Since they were engaged or moving up to their positions they could not react as quickly. The attack at Arass, already mentioned, was very close to success. If the French in the south were not delayed in their attack, the German pincer could very easily have been cut, with their armour easily destroyable cut off in the West.

The Allies were never defeated in direct battle, the Germans won by not fighting their enemy, but by outflanking them. French and British formations consisted of 8 Armoured Divisions against 10 German. Unfortunately these were not in the position to counter the actual German attack.

The brilliance of German commanders was to realize that their enemy was strong and could defeat them in a straight up fight. The overcame this through attacking where it was thought that they could not. They repeated this attack in similar success against the Americans in 1944. Lucky for us, our reserves were better able to counter this.

Posted: **Wed May 30, 2001 12:08 am**

Originally posted by Major Tom:
I think that the major difference between Montgomery and Patton was that Patton's gambles payed off (except for his attacks on the Metz Fortressess) and Montgomery failed at Market Garden. With the benefit of history we can say that Market Garden was a dumb idea, purely on the basis that it failed. However, at the time it appeared to be a possible way to win the war very fast. Due to weather and strong German defences (against a Parachute Army and a SS Panzer Korps) the attack failed to secure Arnhem, but got all of the other bridges.

It wouldn't have been a dumb idea if the SS Panzer forces weren't nearby. Had they known, Market-Garden likely wouldn't have even been attempted. Not knowing about the SS Panzer force and a lack of urgency on the part of the British ground force caused M-G to fail.

Posted: **Mon Jun 04, 2001 7:37 am**

Back to the odds.

One table from www.achtungpanzer.com more:

Principal Tank Campaigns and Battles of World War II.

Location / Codename: Date: Contestans: Tanks engaged (approx.):

Poland
Fall Weiss September 1-October 6, 1939 Germany vs. Poland 3195 German tanks
574 Polish tankettes
190 Polish (light) tanks
Poland
September 17th September 17 - October 6, 1939 Russia vs. Poland 6191 Russian tanks
250 Polish tankettes
85 Polish (light) tanks
Finland
Winter War and Offensive of the Mannerheim Line November 30, 1939 - March 13, 1940 Russia vs. Finland 1500-1800 Russian tanks
50-60 Finnish tanks
Denmark and Norway
Weserubung April 9 - June 25, 1940 Germany vs. Denmark, Norway, Britain, France and Poland 60 German tanks
Low Countries & France
Fall Gelb May 10 - June 25, 1940 Germany vs. Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, Britain and Poland 3379 German tanks
3063 French tanks
310 British tanks
325 Belgian and Dutch tanks
Cyrenaica
Operation Compass June 1940 - February 1941 Britain vs. Italy 275 British tanks
380 Italian tanks
Balkans
Operation Marita April 6 - May 1941 German - Italian Axis vs. Yugoslavia, Greece and Britain 843 German tanks
157 Italian tanks
200 Allied tanks
Cyrenaica April - May 1941 Axis vs. British 50-130 Axis tanks
120 British tanks
Cyrenaica
Operation Battleaxe June 1941 Britsh vs. Axis 200 British tanks
170 Axis tanks
Russia
Operation Barbarossa June 22 - December 5, 1941 Germany vs. Russia 3200 German tanks
20000 Russian tanks
Cyrenaica
Crusader November 18 - December 1941 British vs. Axis 756 (+ reserve) British tanks
249 German tanks
150 Italian
Russia
Winter counter-offensive December 1941 - February 1942 Russia vs. Germany 2000 Russian tanks
1450 German tanks
Cyrenaica
German counter-offensive January 21, 1942 Axis vs. British 84 German tanks
89 Italian tanks
150 British tanks
Russia
Baravenko January 28 - May 17, 1942 Russia vs. Germany 5000 Russian tanks
3000 German tanks
Cyrenaica/Egypt
Operation Theseus May - June 1942 Axis vs. Britain 332 German tanks
228 Italian tanks
849 British tanks
Russia
Caucasus/Stalingrad June - November 1942 Germany vs. Russia 3000 German tanks
1250 Russian tanks
Egypt
1st El Alamein July - August 1942 Britain vs. Axis 150 British tanks
55 German tanks
30 Italian tanks
Egypt
Alam Halfa August - September 1942 Axis vs. British 200 German tanks
240 Italian tanks
935 British tanks
Egypt
2nd El Alamein October 23 - November 4, 1942 British vs. Axis 1441 British tanks
210 German tanks
280 Italian tanks
Russia
Stalingrad December 12, 1942 - January 31, 1943 Russia vs. Germany 894 Russian tanks
675 German tanks
Russia
Kharkov February 16 - March 15, 1943 Germany vs. Russia 350 German tanks
250 Russian tanks
North Africa
Battle for Tunis November - December 1942 British, U.S.A and France vs. Axis 80 British and U.S.A tanks
40 German tanks
North Africa
Kasserine February 1943 Axis vs. Allies 150 German tanks
20 Italian tanks
350 U.S.A tanks
100 British tanks
North Africa
Final offensive March 20 - May 13, 1943 Allies vs. Axis 2200 Allied tanks
130 Axis tanks
Russia
Operation "Citadel"
(Unternehmen "Zitadelle") and Russian counter-offensive July 5 - September 1943 Germany vs. Russia 2700 German tanks
3306 Russian tanks
Sicily July 10 - August 17, 1943 Allies vs. Axis 600 Allied tanks
200 Axis tanks
Italy
Advance to Cassino September - November 1943 Allies vs. Germany 800 Allied tanks
250 German tanks
Russia
Dneiper August - December 1943 Russia vs. Germany 2400 Russian tanks
2100 German tanks
Russia
Smolensk August - October 1943 Russia vs. Germany 1400 Russian tanks
500 German tanks
Russia
Ukraine December 1943 - January 1944 Russia vs. Germany 2000 Russian tanks
2200 German tanks
Italy
Rome May - July 1944 Allies vs. Germany 1400 Allied tanks
250 German tanks
Western Europe
D-Day Invasion June 6, 1944 Allies vs. Germany 5300 Allied tanks
1500 German tanks
Western Europe
Operation Goodwood July 1944 British vs. Germany 1350 British tanks
300 German tanks
Western Europe
Operation Cobra July 1944 U.S.A vs. Germany 1500 U.S.A tanks
110 German tanks
Eastern Europe
Invasion of Poland July 17 - August 1944 Russia vs. Germany 6000 Russian tanks
1800 German tanks
Southern Europe
Invasion of France August - September 1944 Allies vs. Germany 700 Allied tanks
100 German tanks
Southern Europe
Gothic Line August - September 1944 Allies vs. Germany 1200 Allied tanks
200 German tanks
Western Europe
Ardennes Offensive
(Battle of the Bulge) December 16, 1944 - January 28, 1945 Germany vs. Allies 970 German tanks
800-2000 Allied tanks
Eastern Europe
Drive to the Oder January 1945 Russia vs. Germany 4100 Russian tanks
1150 German tanks
Western Europe
Drive to the Rhine February 1 - March 7, 1945 Allies vs. Germany 5000 Allied tanks
500 German tanks

The table is large, hardly convenient, but understandable and it clearly indicates that since 1942 the Soviets operated with odds not greater (in fact - considerably less) than the western Allies.

Posted: **Mon Jun 04, 2001 1:35 pm**

very interesting table. mrb

Posted: **Thu Jun 21, 2001 10:11 am**

Because there are so many elements in judging all the generals, many game designers use several stats or ratings for each represented commander. Outside of the common ratings such as "leadership", "aggressiveness" or "ability", it is equally judicious to compare the generals on the scope of their command. Even then, we are only provided with empirical evidence as opportunity presented itself to each being rated.

Given the impact of resources, intelligence available, popular support, socio-political influences, etc., it is difficult to compare generals of one nation to another, one theatre to another or time period to another.

Yet, I can't resist throwing in my two cents on this topic. In keeping with the spirit of the original post of this thread, I will limit my discussion to the "best German general of the war".

Tactically, the Germans offer many strong candidates. Many of their accomplishments and failures though are too directly tied to the desires of the Fuhrer and the political dynamics surrounding him. Brilliant careers were blemished by the Stalingrad disaster, but can one reasonably blame the commanders who were there?

Rommel has been discussed at length here and because of his legendary reputation, such a discussion is warranted. In my opinion, he deserves the high marks for the simple reason that he wasn't defeated until over half of his equipment was captured from the allies. The impact of Allied intelligence on his resupply efforts was critical and could hardly be blamed on him.

But, I give my highest marks for Tactician to the general who wrote the book on the tactics that revolutionized warfare. If I'm not mistaken, it was Guderian who literally wrote the book on "blitzkreig".

Strategically, I go out on a limb. At risk of political correctness exile, I give Adolf Hitler the highest marks for Strategist. It is easy to forget his accomplishments amidst his atrocities and later insanity. Modern America's military supremecy is modeled (without credit) after Hitler's visionary ideas. The expulsion of British forces for mainland Europe and the defeat of France was accomplished despite fierce resistance by his general staff. Defeating France was not a case of a powerful nation overwhelming a weaker neighbor. When one looks at Germany's successes, you find Hitler advancing an idea and his generals saying it can't be done. It was Hitler who instructed Speer as to what he needed from him and it was Hitler who understood the benefits of R&D and advanced weaponry far better than his contempories.

Besides, what other "general" can be credited for the vision and realization of so many advances in technology like the VW Beetle, which was decades ahead of it's time.

*Fame retardent on*

Posted: **Thu Jun 21, 2001 6:56 pm**

Originally posted by JustAGame:

Rommel has been discussed at length here and because of his legendary reputation, such a discussion is warranted. In my opinion, he deserves the high marks for the simple reason that he wasn't defeated until over half of his equipment was captured from the allies. The impact of Allied intelligence on his resupply efforts was critical and could hardly be blamed on him.

Granted. Altough a great commander much of his success comes as a result of an incompetent british side.

But, I give my highest marks for Tactician to the general who wrote the book on the tactics that revolutionized warfare. If I'm not mistaken, it was Guderian who literally wrote the book on "blitzkreig".

True. Just don´t read Guderians "Panzer leader" and always take his version as the correct one. He exaggerates his own effort quite a bit.

At risk of political correctness exile, I give Adolf Hitler the highest marks for Strategist. The expulsion of British forces for mainland Europe and the defeat of France was accomplished despite fierce resistance by his general staff.

Hitler was a brilliant strategist. Luckily for the world his tactical abilities was insufficent.

*Fame retardent on*

Posted: **Thu Jun 21, 2001 8:32 pm**

Well, as far as Hitler being a "strategist", I have to disagree- he was simply shrewd, and in modern terms, ablet o think outside the box- let's look at his record"

Poland- planned and run by the Army staff with little input from Hitler

Norway/Denmark- See above

France- Hitler ordered the army to adapt a plan put forward by Manstein. He later ordered them to halt in front of Dunkirk, despite pleas by the commanders at the front. He also ordered Guderian to stop on the Channel Coast and consolidate, allowing the Allies to both reach Dunkirk in the first place, and allowing the French to reorganize a defense.

The Battle of Britain- Hitler made no constructive contribution, leaving it to Goring- that is in itself a strategic failure in my book.

North Africa- Hitlers only "Strategy" here was to hold on to the last man at El Alamein and in Tunisia, in both cases causing huge defeats.

The Balkans- Ordered operation Merkur (the airborne invasion of Crete) on very short notice after the Army succeeded in crushing Yugoslavia and Greece for less than 1000 casualties- then claimed airborne assaults were too costly.

Barbarossa- As far as I can tell, his one marginally competent decision was to stand fast during the disasters of December-January- disasters he was chiefly responsible for by mandating 3 widely seperate Axii of attack, failing to listen to his Intelligence people regarding Soviet capabilities, etc.

Fall Blau- The Stalingrad campaign and it's aftermath show no credit to Hitler, please let me know if I missed something.

Zitadelle- I believe this operation speaks for itself.

Sicily/Salerno/Cassino- conducted by Kesselring against Hitler's original wishes, he came around when they were succesful.

Bagration/Lvov-Sandomierz- Yah, he really saw them coming, and dealt with them effecively, huh?

Overlord/Anvil- Let's see, split up the Panzers, tie down an entire Army in the Pas-de-Calais, and order the counter-attack at Mortain that ends up costing the best part of an Army Group- Outstanding strategy!

The Bulge- I wish I had that quote by Dietrich handy- theone where he says, "All we have to do is cross a river,,,all in the dead of winter on 2 roads!"

Lake Balaton- after throwing away all his reserves in the Ardennes, he sends the remnants to HUNGARY, while the Russians "liberate" the rest of Polans and the Allies move up to the Rhine.

After January of 1945 or so, I figure that not even Alexander the Great could have done anything to even significantly slow down the Allies, so we'll leave it at that. Please do let me know if I have missed a brilliant flash of strategy that HITLER himself came up with. Maybe the Maus? Or the Me 262 bomber? Or are those too "technical"?

Posted: **Thu Jun 21, 2001 9:09 pm**

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

I've always wondered why that happened. The Finns attack them in the Continuation War, but in '44 the Soviets don't bother running their steamroller all the way to Helsinki, which they could have easily done. Below Finland, the Soviets occupied everything from the USSR to the Austrian border, but they don't finish off Finland which couldn't stand for very long against Soviet pressure. Why?

Well, it's not that simple. First, Soviets attacked Finland in Winter War without even declaring war first (it took Russia 50 years to finally admit that it was unprovoked attack).

And then there's the continuation war. Which started after soviets (again, without declaring war) bombed finnish cities. There were german troops in Finland operating against russians, but officially, Finland was not involved. Then finns proceeded to recapture the land they lost during the Winter War. They also invaded eastern Karelia (the people there were related to finns, and it helped to shorten the front-line).

What then happened is a long trench-war. Nothing much seemed to happen, and the finnish army got demoralised. Large amounts of troops were sent back home to help the economy. And then the soviets attacked with overwhelming numbers (about 40 divisions) .

They did throw us back, but in the end, they were stopped, fair 'n square. Soviets lost alot of men, including an elite division that was annihilated.

Why didn't Soviet Union invade Finland? Well, I guess they could have (country of 170 million vs. country of a bit over 3 million). But it would have required ALOT of men! And they needed those men to fight Germany. The terrain in interior Finland would have been difficult for the attackers. Alot of lakes everywhere, so advancing would have been rather difficult. In the end, they propably thought that the cost of invading Finland would have been too high. and it could be that the western powers wouldn't have liked it much.

[ June 21, 2001: Message edited by: Nemesis ]

Posted: **Fri Jun 22, 2001 1:22 am**

Originally posted by Matthew Buttsworth:
apart from the losses that invovled one rumour I heard from a Mannerheim fan was that he made a secret agreement with the Russians that Finnish troops would not attack the Murmansk railway or threaten Leningrad which he stuck too with the Soviet side of the bargain being not to invade Finland which they too stuck too.
Finnish war aims were limited to tryign to get back Keralia which they never regained.

I believe that the real reason was that USA had threatened to declare war on Finland if they had cut the Murmansk rail-line. B-17's over Helsinki? Not a pretty sight.

Posted: **Fri Jun 22, 2001 2:26 am**

Originally posted by Nemesis:

I believe that the real reason was that USA had threatened to declare war on Finland if they had cut the Murmansk rail-line. B-17's over Helsinki? Not a pretty sight.

What is B-17 when Soviets threat to maul all Finnish manpower? We Russians are so big masters of brute force and unexperienced hordes that elite small Finn army could not fight long war. Cutting off Murmansk could affect the course of the war, but I doubt that it would lead to victory. Murmansk wasn't only way where lend lease was going from. Finnland had limited goals in this war, like every minor Axis ally. It achieved them and wasn't going to pay huge price for gaining more. You know, I've dug out old history book which were official during Soviet times. It was real fun to read. Sometimes, I hear similar things about WWII just turned up down here in the forum. It is not personal, just a note. Read different sources guys. It is a fun to compare them.

Posted: **Fri Jun 22, 2001 12:31 pm**

Originally posted by Phocks:
Well, as far as Hitler being a "strategist", I have to disagree- he was simply shrewd, and in modern terms, ablet o think outside the box....

Same here, Hitler was a *military* incompetent. One German general said he had no concept of logistics. He was shrewd, and good at politics, up until the attack on Poland to take the Polish Corridor. He thought England and France wouldn't fight for Poles but they did. It went downhill from then on.

Or the Me 262 bomber?

Hitler was the "genius" who insisted the Me262 be made a fighter-bomber, despite the desperate need for high-powered fighters to stop the bombing of the Reich from the West. This delayed the arrival of the Me262 by about a year. Military brilliance? Yea, right.

Posted: **Fri Jun 22, 2001 1:17 pm**

Originally posted by Mist:

What is B-17 when Soviets threat to maul all Finnish manpower? We Russians are so big masters of brute force and unexperienced hordes that elite small Finn army could not fight long war. Cutting off Murmansk could affect the course of the war, but I doubt that it would lead to victory. Murmansk wasn't only way where lend lease was going from. Finnland had limited goals in this war, like every minor Axis ally. It achieved them and wasn't going to pay huge price for gaining more. You know, I've dug out old history book which were official during Soviet times. It was real fun to read. Sometimes, I hear similar things about WWII just turned up down here in the forum. It is not personal, just a note. Read different sources guys. It is a fun to compare them.

Well, if you could choose to go to war against Soviet Union, or to go to war against Soviet Union and USA, which would you choose?

When the finns could have cut the Murmansk rail-line, the war was far from over. It was not as we were already preparing to surrender, But it's just that if we had cut it, we would have got new enemy. Cutting the rail-line would propably meant that US Air Force would have bombed Finland alongside Germany, Romania etc. So why would we have done it? Sure, maybe it would have caused SU to surrender to Germany )of course, we will never know for sure), but it would have meant that finnish cities would be destroyed by aliied bombings. Besides, it was the job of the German troops in the northern Finland. The finns fought in the south.

True, Lend-Lease equipment went to SU from otuer sources besides Murmansk. But I believe the Murmansk was the most important supply-route for that equipment.

Yep, I have read one Soviet encyclopedia from sixties (or was it seventies). It was translated in to finnish. Pretty hilarious stuff!

"The oldest Soviet citizen is 150 years old"

"The Winter War was started when imperialist finnish forces attacked Soviet Union"

I espesially like they way they describe the war against Japan:

"Soviet forces attacked japanese in xxxxxxx (don't remember the date). Two week later Japan surrendered". Of course, they forgot to menation that during that time two japanese cities got nuked....

Posted: **Sat Jun 23, 2001 12:13 pm**

Originally posted by Phocks:
[QB]Well, as far as Hitler being a "strategist", I have to disagree- he was simply shrewd, and in modern terms, ablet o think outside the box- let's look at his record"

QB]

I'm not a fan of Hitler, but history shouldn't be so clouded by propaganda.

For decades, Hitler has been painted as an insane incompetant. Less impassioned and more objective study reveals a very different man. It is still easy to despise the man, but judging his character is altogether different from evaluating his abilities.

Since Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union is so often cited as a case study for his incompetence, I will challenge that myth.

First of all, the timing was impeccable. We now have evidence that Stalin was already moving his own forces to the border for his own invasion in July of 41. Within a matter of a few weeks, 8 out of 9 Soviet armies were destroyed and nearly 1 million Soviet troops had been killed, wounded or captured compared to about 54,000 German casualties.

At this point, Hitler is criticized for diverting a large portion of the invading armies away from Moscow. Hitler's original plan was secure a fortress Europe to the Volga. In that pursuit, his plan was to capture the economic and population rich lands for the benefit of Germany and to deny Stalin of them. His generals were slow to divert south as the plan called because they believed Moscow to be a greater prize.

While the decades have written a history that says Germany could've won the war in 1941 if Hitler hadn't diverted away from the disorganized defenders of Moscow, there is a great deal of assumption. We have always assumed that was the goal, yet evidence shows that Hitler was more interested in pushing the border such that Germany would be beyond Soviet bomber range and Stalin would be without the resources west of the Volga. We also assume that the Soviets would've collapsed without Moscow which is a stretch at the very least. Even if Army Group Center continued on to Moscow, what of the Soviet armies to the east and north? The likelihood of being flanked and encircled was ever present.

His strategy for heading south was also intended to encourage Iran in resisting an imminent invasion from Anglo and Soviet forces.

Had his high command been less stubborn and undisciplined and followed the plan, who knows who would have won. The original plan was genius in all respects.

Posted: **Sat Jun 23, 2001 2:58 pm**

First of all, the timing was impeccable. We now have evidence that Stalin was already moving his own forces to the border for his own invasion in July of 41.
QB][/QUOTE]

July 41??? Were did you get that information from. Some yeras ago I wrote a study on this topic and I never heard about a planned soviet invasion this early. Unless you can show some facts I have to say that this is totally incorrect.

Posted: **Sun Jun 24, 2001 12:04 am**

I can't believe Stalin intended to attack the Germans in 1941. He might have considered that at a later point, but at that time the Red Army was in no way prepared for war. Stalin didn't even believe there would be war between the USSR and Germany when it had already started. If the country had planned to declare war itself on such powerful enemy as Germany it certainly wouldn't have been as unprepared as it was.

As to Hitler's strategy in 1941 - the goal of the war was to win it, and if Hitler really should have thought it would be enough to push the borders and inflict huge casualties on the Red army he was as stupid as the Japanes who thought the USA would make peace after Japan had conquered all the territories it wanted. Maybe a capture of Moscow would not have decided the war, we will never know about that. But it is a fact that Moscow was very important, both for industrial and logistical reasons. There was almost no chance of winning the war as long as the Soviets held Moscow. Hitler didn't see it that way, he believed that destroying enough Red Army units would make the resistance collapse, and this was a huge mistake, because it severely underestimated the Soviet resources.

Posted: **Sun Jun 24, 2001 1:13 am**

Originally posted by Micha:
I can't believe Stalin intended to attack the Germans in 1941. He might have considered that at a later point, but at that time the Red Army was in no way prepared for war. Stalin didn't even believe there would be war between the USSR and Germany when it had already started. If the country had planned to declare war itself on such powerful enemy as Germany it certainly wouldn't have been as unprepared as it was.

I agree that the Soviets were unprepared for and not planning an attack on Germany, but they did make a number of preparations for a defensive war in 1941. In March and April, 800,000 reservists were called up in the Soviet Union. These men were not deployed to the front, but further back at Velikie Luki, Gomel and other areas in the rear. The Soviets deployed around 64 divisions near the border, but another 96 further back, although the front line divisions were stronger, so the strength was probably fairly equal. Just looking at the number of prisoners taken in different areas show the distribution of manpower, with just under 300,000 men at Minsk and Bialystok, but over 500,000 at Smolensk, Velikie Luki, Gomel and the Dnepr river line. Considering the surprise on June 22, it is very unlikely that the Soviets had large concentrations in the Bialystok salient at that point, or the number captured would have been much higher compared to later on. Also, the total German casualties were 4 times higher during the month after July 13 as before, indicating the escalating fighting going on. Also, numerous artillery units were in the rear getting firing practice on June 22, and many pilots were also away from their airfields on that date.

The Soviets planned fairly well for the German attack, but were surprised by how poorly their men did along the frontier. They kept massive reserves in their operational echelon, rather than pushing them all up to the border, where Zhukov said after the war they probably wouldn't have survived anyway (maybe hingsight though). This seems to be the result of two wargames held in early January between Zhukov and Pavlov (who just happened to end up the only senior General ordered killed by Stalin after the disasters at the start of the war). In one, Zhukov led the "Blue" (German) forces and was considered the winner in attacking the "Red" forces in a wargame on the entire front. In the second, Zhukov led the "Red" force against Pavlov's "Blue" in the Lvov salient area representing a Soviet attack into Hungary and the Balkans. The only comments I have heard on this wargame is that Stalin was "perturbed by the outcome". At this point, Stalin and Zhukov developed a new plan to defend the USSR, which is the plan carried out above.

Posted: **Sun Jun 24, 2001 7:47 am**

Originally posted by Kuniworth:
First of all, the timing was impeccable. We now have evidence that Stalin was already moving his own forces to the border for his own invasion in July of 41.
QB]

July 41??? Were did you get that information from. Some yeras ago I wrote a study on this topic and I never heard about a planned soviet invasion this early. Unless you can show some facts I have to say that this is totally incorrect.[/QUOTE]

And the Nazi war trials "proved" the same point that your study concluded.

As published by the Institute of historical Review by Joseph Bishop:
"A mass of evidence, including recently uncovered documents from Russian archives, shows instead that the massive Soviet forces encountered by the German invaders right on the western border areas were poised for their own imminent offensive. Writes Stolfi (p. 204):

Hitler seems barely to have beaten Stalin to the punch ... Recently, published evidence and particularly effective arguments show that Stalin began a massive deployment of Soviet forces to the western frontier early in June 1941. The evidence supports a view that Stalin intended to use the forces concentrated in the west as quickly as possible -- probably about mid-July 1941 -- for a Soviet Barbarossa. Statements of Soviet prisoners also support a view that the Soviets intended an attack on Germany in 1941. The extraordinary deployment of the Soviet forces on the western frontier is best explained as an offensive deployment for an attack without full mobilization by extremely powerful forces massed there for that purpose.

Stolfi's view is consistent with the detailed revisionist study by Russian historian Victor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War, as well as research by several German historians."

We could continue believing the story as told by the victors just after war or we can use the evidence.

Post Edit: I should mention that this review by Jospeh Bishop is for a book called Panzers East by Stolfi. The Institute of Historical Review regularly evaluates "historical" publications for accuracy. In Panzers East, Stolfi actually argues that Hitler's fatal flaw was in not taking Moscow in 41. While his work is exceedingly accurate and well researched in terms of revealing and proving old myths to be just myths, his conclusion of not taking Moscow being the downfall of German hopes for victory was oddly circumstantial and assumptive.

[ June 24, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

Posted: **Sun Jun 24, 2001 9:21 am**

Originally posted by JustAGame:
Post Edit: I should mention that this review by Jospeh Bishop is for a book called Panzers East by Stolfi. The Institute of Historical Review regularly evaluates "historical" publications for accuracy. In Panzers East, Stolfi actually argues that Hitler's fatal flaw was in not taking Moscow in 41. While his work is exceedingly accurate and well researched in terms of revealing and proving old myths to be just myths, his conclusion of not taking Moscow being the downfall of German hopes for victory was oddly circumstantial and assumptive.

[ June 24, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

A couple of things about Hitler's Panzers East. I have the book and read it closely. Stolfi makes some good arguments, but as you say many of his comments are based on assumptions without any attempt to back them up. The one that got me the most was that if the German's struck for Moscow in early August, the Soviets would not have fought in the city because they hadn't fortified it, and thus would have withdrawn without a major fight to the east (p. 184). I find this extremely hard to believe.

The other thing that makes me discount Stolfi's work is the complete or near-complete lack of primary Soviet sources to support any facts that he presents. He lists huge numbers of German records, interviewed Germans, and used numerous English, American and German books as sources. However, he lists 4 Soviet sources - 1 economic report from the late 50s, a "political military survey" from the early 60s, a book related to Stalingrad, and finally a book by Victor Suvorov. The book by Suvorov is the sole source for Stolfi's claim that Stalin was going to attack in 1941. Suvorov was a Spetsnatz who defected to the West and wrote numerous books at that point. I have not read his books but there is at least some controversy about them. Without seeing what his sources are I would have a very tough time believing Suvorov's claims, and since Stolfi didn't gather any primary source information himself to support this claim of imminent attack, I put no faith in it without some kind of further details.

Stolfi bases almost everything he concludes on German sources, and the German sources must be considered suspect as related to Soviet strength issues as they state themselves time after time the surprise they had in the number of men put into battle by the Soviets. Their operational and strategic intelligence was terrible and yet Stolfi uses this intelligence to support his arguments. Stolfi presents no evidence of Stalin attacking in his book - the evidence would have to come from Suvorov's book on the subject.

[ June 24, 2001: Message edited by: RickyB ]

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