Thanks for your comments, MBT.
Most of my understanding of WW2 German armoured doctrine comes from an article published in S&T magazine 35 years ago.
While it's far less detailed than the magazine article, this diagram helps illustrate the frontage/spacing considerations that I referenced:
http://www.hq.wwiionline.com/articles/attack_mech3.gif
It's worth noting that the vehicles in the diagram are not drawn to scale.
While I agree with you that battlefield conditions could dictate changes/modifications to the spacing, the concepts underlying the interval between units (that I briefly outlined above) remain. These vehicles fought as units with assigned stations, particularly when advancing. Visibility and the ability to communicate effectively were inversely proportional to the volume of enemy fire endured. Platoons that became intermeshed with one another in the heat of battle could quickly disintegrate into a jarring mass of disjointed elements as they sought to untangle.
I'd also like to share some thoughts with you as to how tankers relate to "obstacles" associated with either LOS or movement. A crew in a buttoned-up, WW2 AFV really couldn't see squat. They needed an unobstructed LOS to the target area, one from their overwatch/firing position at the terminus of the next bound. ANYTHING that interfered with that LOS, be it a tree, structure or wreck was anathema. Likewise, entering into an area with obstacles to movement was frought with danger because the vehicle would have to change it's facing and risk giving the enemy a shot at it's side or rear.
BTW, there's a school of thought that says that a large AFV can simply drive through all but the largest trees and structures, but a vehicle that does so risks throwing a track, or worse still, shearing a final drive, which is a disaster little short of being KIA when in combat. The affect is so prounounced that the preferred method of entering a heavily wooded area for concealment is to back-in, so that the vehicle can simply drive forward on the same path to exit. This allows the track to avoid having to turn, again at the risk of becoming a mobility casualty, and allows the main-guns traverse (which may well be blocked) to remain oriented to the hull front.
The upshot of all this is that AFV on the attack don't have much use for obstacles that they might encounter along their line of advance. While elevation cover from bound to bound is desireable, any concealment benefit from trees and such may well be outweighed by constricted movement and the tendency of formations to become unglued as they are funneled into choke-points, again trying to negotiate the obstacles.
In many respects, the game appears to model these problems nicely. The German side is presented with a nightmare scenario of having to advance out-gunned and under-armoured against the Soviet T34/KV1 host. The intervening woods and other "roadblocks" just make it that much more challenging. Concentrating friendlies in too tight a space, longitudinally or laterally will only make it more so.
PoE (aka Ivanmoe)