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RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 9:30 pm
by Cpt Sherwood
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: John 3rd

I think the problem I have with this is the sheer planning to stage a snatch-and-grab KNOWING where the Fleet is and THEN running away--abandoning the troops--in 20-30 TF. If you are going to take the risk then TAKE THE RISK! Those troops, whether intentionally or not, have been sent on a suicide mission. The shipping? Well it boils me to see the scatter technique used in this manner. YES: Convoys did scatter with horrific results usually occurring afterwards. Concur with Michael about it being gamey after the 1st month or so...

I don't like it when people come into my AAR and get snarky, so I won't. I'll just suggest that CR, who is an honorable man and does not cheat, only knows what you give him. If he knew the location of the KB (did he?) it was because you let him know. I'll also suggest that the troops are his, the ships are his. High-risk operations were undertaken many times in WWII, by both sides. I'd ask you for cases where convoy scattering was "horrific", or at least more than would have been the case if the ships had stayed in column so U-boat ladder-combing torpedoes could do multiple re-attacks.


funny, I had a snarky answer typed out and then deleted it before posting it.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 9:38 pm
by obvert
ORIGINAL: John 3rd

I think the problem I have with this is the sheer planning to stage a snatch-and-grab KNOWING where the Fleet is and THEN running away--abandoning the troops--in 20-30 TF. If you are going to take the risk then TAKE THE RISK! Those troops, whether intentionally or not, have been sent on a suicide mission. The shipping? Well it boils me to see the scatter technique used in this manner. YES: Convoys did scatter with horrific results usually occurring afterwards. Concur with Michael about it being gamey after the 1st month or so...

I don't follow your thinking above. He isn't probably going to take three islands in the Gilberts NOT knowing where the KB is located! Are you implying that the honorable thing to do is to leave your ships to get nailed when you don't have to? If there was no HR and you guys are friends, why not work something out now before it happens again. What if he used two ship TFs? Would that have had a different result?

By engaging in a lot of very noticeable ops with the CVs and large amounts of shipping and troops while not securing your back door I'd say it's tough to call out your opponent right now for taking advantage of it. Whether you took out ships or not the troops are on the islands, and that is not going to change if you sink twenty AK and AP. It won't even hurt his next landing.

The real issue is you've now got enemy troops on atolls, far from your strategic center. You could knock them off, but at what cost?

It was slightly after this in timing, but wasn't the Guadalcanal/Tulagi operation pretty similar in terms of leaving troops on islands? As I see it the main difference there was that the Japanese were actually closer and had a better position to snuff that landing and wipe those troops off the island fairly quickly afterward, and fortunately didn't do it. I've been reading 'Islands of Destiny' by John Prados so I've been thinking a bit about this recently. Interesting to see something similar in game.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 10:09 pm
by Chickenboy
I don't have a problem with scattering ships into 2 ship TFs, if there's a question about singletons getting targeted. So we're talking about 15-20 TFs here versus 30 some-odd. There are still some questions about singleton targeting, so I probably wouldn't do that. I certainly wouldn't do it as a means of 'soaking up' carrier sorties or SCTF movements.

Convoys RARELY scattered IRL. They were much better protected in convoy, even if attacked by a wolfpack. There's only a handful of instances of this occurence in all of the Atlantic convoys attacked by German wolfpacks. In the war, singletons, convoy laggers, convoy 'trotters' (ahead of the convoy) or those that did not follow the exhortations of the convoy command (e.g., u-boat line identified here, change your course to such and such) fared very very poorly by comparison. But, convoy scattering *did* happen under rare exigencies.

Making it a hallmark of play style-if it happens regularly-is problematic. It's not a realistic application of the game engine, so I wouldn't do it. YMMV.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 10:16 pm
by Chickenboy
ORIGINAL: John 3rd

I think the problem I have with this is the sheer planning to stage a snatch-and-grab KNOWING where the Fleet is and THEN running away--abandoning the troops--in 20-30 TF. If you are going to take the risk then TAKE THE RISK! Those troops, whether intentionally or not, have been sent on a suicide mission.

Maybe, maybe not, John. It's not suicide until they're dead. That hasn't happened yet and probably won't for several days (weeks?) until you get sufficient forces in theatre to deal with the incursion.

A snatch and grab should be scheduled for exactly when you know that enemy carriers cannot interfere with your D1 landings. Wouldn't this be similar to Guadalcanal for the Allies? Didn't they know that some carriers were at Truk? But they dumped the troops and get out of dodge. Sure, they didn't scatter afterwards, but I think that's a separate issue.

Don't let this unhinge your strategic plans for the region. Would you mind reviewing those in light of these developments?

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 10:46 pm
by witpqs
Agree on this - it's not a suicide mission unless John makes it that. If he chooses not to, or can't, or does but that costs him in terms of whatever else he is not doing so he can do that, then maybe not such a 'gamey' move after all.

Disagree on targeting - there is no question about single ship TFs being targeted. They are targeted. If a player does not have sufficient search in the area that is one of the game problems that player faces. As was pointed out above, single ship TFs are more difficult to see and fix via search. The developers covered that a long time ago and plenty of us have seen single ship TFs get hit. The game was changed specifically to handle targeting small and single ship TFs. The assertion that they don't get targeted or that it's an open question whether they get targeted is without merit.

I also don't understand why single ship TFs are not gamey in the first month but are gamey thereafter? IMO it's the situation that should dictate their use. I might not make the same decisions that Dan has/apparently has made in this situation, but my differences in style don't make his style gamey.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 10:50 pm
by CowboyRonin
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

I'd ask you for cases where convoy scattering was "horrific", or at least more than would have been the case if the ships had stayed in column so U-boat ladder-combing torpedoes could do multiple re-attacks.

The classic example is PQ-17, a UK-Russia convoy that scattered in the face of a potential attack from a SAG based on Tirpitz (which never came off, the SAG turned back). The result was a bloodbath by U-boats and bombers, only a handful of cargo ships made port in Russia.
ORIGINAL: obvert
It was slightly after this in timing, but wasn't the Guadalcanal/Tulagi operation pretty similar in terms of leaving troops on islands? As I see it the main difference there was that the Japanese were actually closer and had a better position to snuff that landing and wipe those troops off the island fairly quickly afterward, and fortunately didn't do it. I've been reading 'Islands of Destiny' by John Prados so I've been thinking a bit about this recently. Interesting to see something similar in game.

That was August versus June, but the biggest difference was that Guadalcanal was after Midway, when 2/3 of the KB went down. The Americans had 3 carriers to the 2 remaining KB carriers, so they felt they had air superiority over the carriers. Another difference was that Guadalcanal was taken to prevent building a Betty strip there, as the Americans were unwilling or unable to push supplies strictly through Perth. The Americans at Guadalcanal were more worried about Betty LBA (a left-over fear from early in the war). After Savo Island, they really had no choice-their escorts and surface cover were at the bottom of Ironbottom Sound, so they had to leave. Fletcher bugging out didn't help, but I do not recall that carriers were his big worry at that time.

If you want to talk gamey, you can argue that the gamiest thing about this game is permitting all theaters to be under one strategic mind. If you take away the competition, the misunderstandings and miscommunications that both the Allies and Japan experienced (the Japanese Army and Navy were rarely on speaking terms), then you can play the game much more efficiently than either side in the war could command their forces. Also, seeing Hawaii as secure on its own, rather than terribly vulnerable, unleashes some very ahistorical strategies on the part of the Allied player. Canoe has shown in previous games that he is entirely comfortable sending US infantry divisions to India, rather than the Pacific. IMO, that is gamier than anything involving single-ship TFs escaping from a high-risk operation.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 10:58 pm
by Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: witpqs

Disagree on targeting - there is no question about single ship TFs being targeted. They are targeted. If a player does not have sufficient search in the area that is one of the game problems that player faces. As was pointed out above, single ship TFs are more difficult to see and fix via search. The developers covered that a long time ago and plenty of us have seen single ship TFs get hit. The game was changed specifically to handle targeting small and single ship TFs. The assertion that they don't get targeted or that it's an open question whether they get targeted is without merit.

If folks would just understand that the whole combat model rests on DL and MDL in some way, that they are foundational, they would be a lot happier. In my own Top-5 for any WITP2 are rudimentary radar and sonar models, but I can guarantee that the JFBs would be howling if they had to face any semblamce of sonar-based ASW or surface gunnery with mid- and late-war surface radar, Allied-style.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 11:05 pm
by Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: CowboyRonin

The classic example is PQ-17, a UK-Russia convoy that scattered in the face of a potential attack from a SAG based on Tirpitz (which never came off, the SAG turned back). The result was a bloodbath by U-boats and bombers, only a handful of cargo ships made port in Russia.

I'm familiar with PQ-17. It was entirely atypical for the reasons you state, as well as being relatively early in the US-phase of the war. All convoys were not Arctic convoys. PQ-17 was also savaged by German aircraft, which became a non-issue in 1943 and after, pretty much. I also specified wolfpacks carrying pattern-running, ladder torpedoes which were a mid- and late-war weapon. Sailing on in evenly spaced columns against ladder-runners was exactly the wrong tactic.

In many cases convoys did not scatter in a traditional sense, but radically opened the gaps in the columns while under attack, with COs given discretion to evade as necessary when their own look-outs saw incoming.

In no case did a convoy commander say "Well, chaps, here it is. It's simply not sporting to not give Jerry the very best chance to kill us, so let's stay tight, stay straight, and press on even as we're gutted like a carp."

Fortunately for the good guys, convoy commnaders weren't JFBs. [:'(]

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 11:09 pm
by desicat
Central Pacific
KB refuels and nails Makin and Tarawa with afternoon Kate strikes. With fuel they now move slightly NE making sure the seas are clear of Allied FLEEING SINGLE SHIP TF's (Very BITTER...).


To me this reads a lot like Jeb Stuarts ride around the Union army while the battle of Gettysburg was taking place. A lot of tactical foam and fury yet at what cost? Stuarts cavalry was supposed to be Lee's "eyes and ears" and his absence really hurt the Rebel planning.

John has a better feel for the game than me as he is playing but I think a few questions need to be asked.
- Is the KB bombing ground forces on Makin and Tarawa the best use of this asset during June 1942?
- Is chasing empty allied merchant ships (using sorties and fuel)the best use of the KB during June 1942 (single task forces or not)?
- The use of the KB to combat this "suicide mission" reveals its location to the CR, where are his carriers?

Don't let this unhinge your strategic plans for the region. Would you mind reviewing those in light of these developments?

This is good advice and an equally good question.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Sun Mar 24, 2013 11:29 pm
by witpqs
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Disagree on targeting - there is no question about single ship TFs being targeted. They are targeted. If a player does not have sufficient search in the area that is one of the game problems that player faces. As was pointed out above, single ship TFs are more difficult to see and fix via search. The developers covered that a long time ago and plenty of us have seen single ship TFs get hit. The game was changed specifically to handle targeting small and single ship TFs. The assertion that they don't get targeted or that it's an open question whether they get targeted is without merit.

If folks would just understand that the whole combat model rests on DL and MDL in some way, that they are foundational, they would be a lot happier. In my own Top-5 for any WITP2 are rudimentary radar and sonar models, but I can guarantee that the JFBs would be howling if they had to face any semblamce of sonar-based ASW or surface gunnery with mid- and late-war surface radar, Allied-style.
Right! I give massive attention to search in my PBMs.

RE: June 6, 1942

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 12:03 am
by obvert
ORIGINAL: CowboyRonin
ORIGINAL: obvert
It was slightly after this in timing, but wasn't the Guadalcanal/Tulagi operation pretty similar in terms of leaving troops on islands? As I see it the main difference there was that the Japanese were actually closer and had a better position to snuff that landing and wipe those troops off the island fairly quickly afterward, and fortunately didn't do it. I've been reading 'Islands of Destiny' by John Prados so I've been thinking a bit about this recently. Interesting to see something similar in game.

That was August versus June, but the biggest difference was that Guadalcanal was after Midway, when 2/3 of the KB went down. The Americans had 3 carriers to the 2 remaining KB carriers, so they felt they had air superiority over the carriers. Another difference was that Guadalcanal was taken to prevent building a Betty strip there, as the Americans were unwilling or unable to push supplies strictly through Perth. The Americans at Guadalcanal were more worried about Betty LBA (a left-over fear from early in the war). After Savo Island, they really had no choice-their escorts and surface cover were at the bottom of Ironbottom Sound, so they had to leave. Fletcher bugging out didn't help, but I do not recall that carriers were his big worry at that time.

If you want to talk gamey, you can argue that the gamiest thing about this game is permitting all theaters to be under one strategic mind. If you take away the competition, the misunderstandings and miscommunications that both the Allies and Japan experienced (the Japanese Army and Navy were rarely on speaking terms), then you can play the game much more efficiently than either side in the war could command their forces. Also, seeing Hawaii as secure on its own, rather than terribly vulnerable, unleashes some very ahistorical strategies on the part of the Allied player. Canoe has shown in previous games that he is entirely comfortable sending US infantry divisions to India, rather than the Pacific. IMO, that is gamier than anything involving single-ship TFs escaping from a high-risk operation.


Midway made this move much easier to call, obviously, but the IJN actually had Zuikaku, Shokaku, Ryujo, and Zuiho and later the Junyo and Hiyo as well. The major issue for them is they didn't prioritize the CV over the surface ship even after Midway, and they didn't combine these forces but instead committed them piecemeal. Even when they were used in the same op CVs often were not used closely enough to support each other, which is how Ryujo was sunk and Zuiho was hit and damaged, (as well as the Shoho being lost earlier).

The point is this is actually not so different. There was a known threat, a calculated risk and now we're here waiting for the fireworks. [;)]

Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 12:35 am
by John 3rd
GREAT DISCUSSION Guys! This is what I love to see happen in an AAR.

OK. Let me clarify a few things:

1. The KB AIN'T going after them. That is a waste of fuel and resources. Want to keep my wear-and-tear down on the Fleet as well.

2. I will land the 14th within a week of game time. Barring a horrific roll on landing they should easily carry the atoll. Makin should follow within a week of that.

3. The door was in the process of being closed as witnessed by me having to divert a convoy carrying two CD units and a pair of Naval Guard that were headed for Tarawa and Tabiteau (Sp?). Makin and Apamama weren't going to get anything.

4. It is a suicide mission. I shall turn it into that. Those troops are DEAD. HIGH Body Count in store. They cannot have much supply so we'll burn that up with Aerial Attack and Surface TF.

5. This has not diverted my attention from finishing the objectives of Sho-1. There are still 2 1/2 ID prepping to take out Luganville. Have plenty of airpower to aid and complete this.

Maybe I simply don't get the move on his part. He deliberately moved these units into my roundhouse knowing the Fleet was concentrated and quite close. The attack hasn't stopped Sho-1 at all. Thus, the confusion comes in simply asking 'why take the risk?'

Hope this help clarify the thinking currently...



RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 3:22 am
by JocMeister
John, Regarding the Tarawa atoll landing with the 14th. [X(]

That is not going to work. You just don´t land an ID on an atoll like that. I can guarantee you will land, get insane disruption, burn all supplies and get an adjusted AV of 0 and get destroyed. I don´t know if you have done an atoll landing outside the Jap Amphib bonus before. But I have done a few as the allies. With 100% prep and APAs/AKAs/LST its still one of the hardest things in the game to do.

You need to read up on atoll invasions. Take a deep breath and have patience. Even with 100 prep dislodging a Marine RGT and a tank battalion is going to require a massive effort. You might even need more then a division. This thread was started by me in the war room some time ago. I learned the hard way what atoll invasions mean.

tm.asp?m=3212274&mpage=1&key=

Look at the adjusted AV values of my units. That is with 100% prep!

You have to have 100% prep. Not 80 or 90. 100.
Your fist wave will probably get destroyed. Have a second one ready.
Bring loads of combat engineers and tanks.

If you do it your way you will get an adjusted AV of 0 and that has nothing to do with dice rolls! If it was as easy as just dumping some AV on Tarawa to recapture it do you really think CR would have done this? [;)]

Can´t believe I´m helping the evil empire! [:D]

RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 6:40 am
by janh
ORIGINAL: John 3rd

GREAT DISCUSSION Guys! This is what I love to see happen in an AAR.

OK. Let me clarify a few things:

1. The KB AIN'T going after them. That is a waste of fuel and resources. Want to keep my wear-and-tear down on the Fleet as well.

2. I will land the 14th within a week of game time. Barring a horrific roll on landing they should easily carry the atoll. Makin should follow within a week of that.

3. The door was in the process of being closed as witnessed by me having to divert a convoy carrying two CD units and a pair of Naval Guard that were headed for Tarawa and Tabiteau (Sp?). Makin and Apamama weren't going to get anything.

4. It is a suicide mission. I shall turn it into that. Those troops are DEAD. HIGH Body Count in store. They cannot have much supply so we'll burn that up with Aerial Attack and Surface TF.

5. This has not diverted my attention from finishing the objectives of Sho-1. There are still 2 1/2 ID prepping to take out Luganville. Have plenty of airpower to aid and complete this.

Maybe I simply don't get the move on his part. He deliberately moved these units into my roundhouse knowing the Fleet was concentrated and quite close. The attack hasn't stopped Sho-1 at all. Thus, the confusion comes in simply asking 'why take the risk?'

Hope this help clarify the thinking currently...

John, I can understand your bitterness about the 1 ship TF scattering, though I am not sure what I think about that myself. Convoys did scatter, though rarely as other already said. The Atlantic battles during the time of 39/40 surface raiders, or the PQ battles in the northern ice come to mind. Sometimes the result was horrific, sometimes it saved the convoy (I have the impression this was mainly a result of subs being around or not...? Against a single surface raider, scattering would be generally smart, or am I missing something?). So perhaps it is a legit thing to do IRL, but perhaps AE's spotting and target selection routines are not up to model that and in game one should restrain from it, or only split to min 2 packages. Whatever.

Anyway, you know Dan is a very experienced player and must have known that this a suicide mission. Apparently. I find it hard to believe he has pulled that off with all the intel he must likely have had (I ain't reading his AAR, so just speculating here). Doesn't this whole thing have a very bad smell about it? Very unreal? What is he about to pull off?

RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 6:57 am
by JocMeister
I don´t understand where the "suicide discussion" comes from! [&:] Why is this suicide? For now his troops are safe and sound onshore and its going to take a MASSIVE effort to dislodge them. He is on atolls. Atolls. Not islands.

Atoll invasions are nasty, nasty business even as the allies with specialized units and ships. I can only assume its a nightmare as the Jap.

RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 8:45 am
by janh
Sure, you are probably right that it is going to take a while to reduce them with the allocated force, but with stacking that's what is is. However, at this point in time, what other than voluntary prison camps for some premier US LCUs do they represent? What is the point of this? John can easily isolate them there for the next 6-12 months? Ok, it will bind a few units, but I still fail to see the forest from all these trees... Once they are starving, they'll be ripe, even on an atoll.

RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 9:07 am
by koniu
ORIGINAL: JocMeister

I don´t understand where the "suicide discussion" comes from! [&:] Why is this suicide? For now his troops are safe and sound onshore and its going to take a MASSIVE effort to dislodge them. He is on atolls. Atolls. Not islands.

Atoll invasions are nasty, nasty business even as the allies with specialized units and ships. I can only assume its a nightmare as the Jap.

I have landed on atoll as Japan in middle of `42 with full 100% prepared ID.
Enemy have ~70-90 AV on atoll (Infantry and some small number of tanks) behind fort 2 or 3.

I have not prepared landing good enough with bombers, and naval bombardment. Also lack of Tank support not help. But biggest problem was overstocking by 2x numbers of troop i landed in first day.

Short story is that I suffer 12k deaths on day one for ~500 killed enemy soldiers.
It took 4 months to rebuild ID.

Atoll landing for Japan is nasty thing. I would consider blockade. And If he decide to break it, it can create chance to CV engagement, and after few months on bombarding You can try to capture those islands.


RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 9:28 am
by obvert
ORIGINAL: janh

Sure, you are probably right that it is going to take a while to reduce them with the allocated force, but with stacking that's what is is. However, at this point in time, what other than voluntary prison camps for some premier US LCUs do they represent? What is the point of this? John can easily isolate them there for the next 6-12 months? Ok, it will bind a few units, but I still fail to see the forest from all these trees... Once they are starving, they'll be ripe, even on an atoll.

Think of the actual problems the Japanese faced in the war during the Solomons campaign. These are the problems they will face in prosecuting power to an entrenched force in the Central Pacific, except slightly reduced by the excesses of this mod and the abstracts of the game. Is this area important strategically?

RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 10:59 am
by JocMeister
ORIGINAL: janh

Sure, you are probably right that it is going to take a while to reduce them with the allocated force, but with stacking that's what is is. However, at this point in time, what other than voluntary prison camps for some premier US LCUs do they represent? What is the point of this? John can easily isolate them there for the next 6-12 months? Ok, it will bind a few units, but I still fail to see the forest from all these trees... Once they are starving, they'll be ripe, even on an atoll.

You can´t isolate the troops without a naval blockade. The only way to make sure the troops are truly cut off is to station the KB nearby. Otherwise what would stop CR from just popping in with his CVs, cover a supply landing and then pop back? And you can´t land troops without doing a proper atoll landing.

Its a very clever move by CR and John will have to as, obvert says, decide if the Gilberts are strategically important enough to devote time and attention to.

RE: Clarifying

Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2013 11:24 am
by GreyJoy
ORIGINAL: koniu

ORIGINAL: JocMeister

I don´t understand where the "suicide discussion" comes from! [&:] Why is this suicide? For now his troops are safe and sound onshore and its going to take a MASSIVE effort to dislodge them. He is on atolls. Atolls. Not islands.

Atoll invasions are nasty, nasty business even as the allies with specialized units and ships. I can only assume its a nightmare as the Jap.

I have landed on atoll as Japan in middle of `42 with full 100% prepared ID.
Enemy have ~70-90 AV on atoll (Infantry and some small number of tanks) behind fort 2 or 3.

I have not prepared landing good enough with bombers, and naval bombardment. Also lack of Tank support not help. But biggest problem was overstocking by 2x numbers of troop i landed in first day.

Short story is that I suffer 12k deaths on day one for ~500 killed enemy soldiers.
It took 4 months to rebuild ID.

Atoll landing for Japan is nasty thing. I would consider blockade. And If he decide to break it, it can create chance to CV engagement, and after few months on bombarding You can try to capture those islands.


+ 1

John, be carefull with that decision.