RHS was born unintentionally as an aircraft data mod of CHS - in the days of the original War In the Pacific.
The guy who became chief programmer for AE was in charge, and his background is mathematics and programming, while
his interest is history. I was the detail analyst who compiled the system. It was accepted by the CHS "coordinator"
but later rejected by a CHS "stakeholder" on irrational grounds. [His only direct communication to me complained that
I had ruined the "long range" of the Pete!] The coordinator then recommended building an entire mod around this
aircraft data - because it works so well.
RHS was born deliberately to get rid of the "stakeholder" tyranny - and "RHS Principles" were part of the RHS Manual
for RHS in its War in the Pacific days. Part of this was to do things publically, and to document them fully, and
to accept ideas and criticism. There followed a great deal of long debate about all aspects of aircraft data. And
a PUBLIC evolution of what you are talking about - which I think is the maneuverability rating. WITP and its mods
generally do this by "seat of the pants" guestimates. RHS on the other hand does it objectively and formally - using
a formula. Note that RHS has a Documentation section which helps explain many features.
I myself am an engineer. I once worked in aircraft and missile R&D at (not for, but as a resident engineer whose desk
was at) a USAF Boeing laboratory. Today I am an associate at a think tank at Air Force University and one of my tasks
for this year is to evaluate Chinese stealth fighters. I have a tiny bit of background in subjects like aircraft
maneuverability.
In an ideal world, there would be more than one field value for us to put data into. But this is the real world. We
do NOT have access to the code (legally we agree not to mess with it as a condition of our licenses) and it is NOT
documented in a formal, professional sense - it would be hard to modify if we did. So we must cram a bunch of different
things into that field. This requires compromises be made.
In the agonizing process of forming a consensus (in the Forum)about the maneuverability issue, the most contentious issue
was how to handle multi-engine aircraft. Ultimately, we went with a pattern suggested by stock data (intentionally or
not - it was not entirely consistent). It seems like the original algorithm took a basic maneuverability rating
derived from speed and rate of climb, and divided that by the number of engines. We ended up doing precisely that,
but in a formal way, and adding in two other factors: power to weight ratio and wing area to weight ratio were minor
modifies to the base value. There is also a special case - two engines are treated as one IF they are BOTH on the
centerline - it is only OFF CENTERLINE engines that reduce the basic maneuverability rating.
What we did NOT do was pay attention to the popular male game of "my gun is better than your gun" in its "my fighter plane
is better than your fighter plane" form. Our approach pays no attention at all to national origin, to emotional commitments
to a particular aircraft. I argued - and often was not believed - that the code is SUPERB for its purpose and simpolicity -
and that NO ONE FACTOR DOMINATES. P-38 fans were very upset by their maneuverability ratings even when modified.
[We added a special modifier for certain kinds of flaps - which indeed boost that rating - BUT we ALSO gave the same
modifier to ENEMY aircraft with similar flaps. Our approach is even handed, objective and data driven.] I said the
P-38 was superb BECAUSE it had high durability (extra engines help that too), high firepower and adequate maneuverability.
It has turned out that quite dismal looking maneuverability ratings are JUST FINE on two engine aircraft - and today
I always build the Ki-45 because of that. Too much focus on that one factor misinterprets what happens in game terms.
Maneuverability does not equate to victory. A Japanese plane generally does not do well when hit, an Allied plane
is heavier, often better protected, and far more likely to be lost.
I never look at a specific plane combination as a consideration in design. In fact, the Zero was significantly more maneuverable than
its early war counterparts in many ways - in what we call "the horizontal" aspect of maneuvering. On the other hand, is
had some disadvantages in what we call "the vertical" aspect - rate of clime and, surprisingly, ability to dive. This was
NOT understood at first. AFTER we captured Koga's Zero (upside down but almost undamaged - easily made airworthy) in
the Aleutians, we were able to advise pilots how to exploit their advantages. At the same time, we told them NOT
to dogfight with a Zero - lest it would win. It was one of the first fighter planes to be mass produced with cannon.
That these were relatively slow firing and had limited ammunition was less important than that they did real harm to
things they hit. Because it could maneuver, and because its pilots had what was then the most combat experience in the
world, they often got into firing position with unpleasant effects. Later in the war, when those pilots were dead
(the core died on a single day, at Midway), and Allied planes in better forms were becoming numerous, the Zero was not
able to compete well. It soldiered on mainly for lack of a better alternative. Late in the war, better (land based)
alternatives WERE effective - when in skilled hands. Some of the last technical surprises of WWII in Japan's favor
were its 1944 fighter planes - which COULD maneuver, were robust and superbly well armed. [But good pilots were by then
very rare] One of these took on an impossible number of fighters without a wingman until the survivors gave up and let
him alone.
The data is what it is. It is a compromise expressing both horizontal and vertical maneuvering considerations, as well
as power to weight and wing area to weight considerations. And it seems to produce very realistic results. From
a Japanese point of view - too realistic. If the chances of shooting down an enemy plane with early, high rated
pilots is very good, TOO MANY Zeros are going to die - with their pilots - and by mid 1942 Japan can no longer count
on winning a battle unless it has significant numbers advantages.
The formula is published and posted on the forums many times with extensive debates in some cases. So are other
formulas - as in the protection algorithm.
But NOTHING is case in stone. If you have a better proposal, make it. A MAJORITY of RHS material came from
forum members NOT part of the RHS team itself. We shamelessly adopted the formal position "if it is better than
what we have, it is in." We have no problem casting out our own work in favor of "alien" but better ideas. No
pride - better is the standard we use. Study this, ask questions, and then make suggestions if you have any.
ORIGINAL: Socket
Hello.
I wanted to ask about air maneuver. Sorry if this question has been already mentioned here.
Firstly, when i came to play this mod i was completly surprised about AC maneuver rating, they don't represent the real state of affairs. First modifications of A6M are almost the same with F4F, and P40E has this rating even higher! I tried to understand why the things have been done such, but it looks like an un-historical nerf. Actually i want to be wrong and i will be glad if an appropriate explanation would be be found.
thanks and sorry for my english.