Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Well, I'll just provide my daily Halsey missive and be on my way:

"[Admiral Nelson's counsel] guided me time and again. On the eve of the critical battle of Santa Cruz, in which the Japanese ships outnumbered ours more than two to one, I sent my task force commanders this dispatch: ATTACK REPEAT ATTACK. They did attack, heroically, and when the battle was done, the enemy turned away.

Of course, despite his bluster, this was not true. Halsey suffered one of the few (only?)* tactical defeats in a carrier battle for the US, and arguably also suffered a strategic defeat:

"Dr. John Prados offers a dissenting view: this was not a Pyrrhic victory for Japan, but a strategic victory.

By any reasonable measure the Battle of Santa Cruz marked a Japanese victory -- and a strategic one. At its end the Imperial Navy possessed the only operational carrier force in the Pacific. The Japanese had sunk more ships and more combat tonnage, had more aircraft remaining, and were in physical possession of the battle zone... Arguments based on aircrew losses or who owned Guadalcanal are about something else -- the campaign, not the battle."

But admittedly, Halsey talked a good game. [:'(]


*Coral Sea maybe being the other tactical defeat.

I would call Santa Cruz a Tactical Victory and a Strategic Defeat for the Japanese. Ultimately war is about control of land, even in the Pacific. Whoever controls the islands is the ultimate winner. No matter what the Japanese did to USN forces around Guadalcanal, they never had the upper hand on the ground where it counted. They really only threatened Henderson Field once in the whole campaign. Other attacks on the field were never strong enough to put the US hold on the field in serious doubt.

All the naval battles around the island were all about who could supply their troops and get in reinforcements. From that perspective, the Japanese lost pretty consistently.

Over the course of the Pacific War, the USN did not do all that well offensively against IJN carriers in head to head battles. The US only clearly won 1 battle in 1942 and the Battle of the Philippine Sea was a clear defensive win, but the USN failed to sink any IJN carriers from the air. At Leyte the USN only sank the IJN carriers because the IJN had thrown them out there as bait. As far as the overall objective of holding on to the land mass in question, the US never lost a carrier battle. After the campaign in the SRA, the US never lost a battle period. Whenever the US threw in naval assets to contend a land mass, the Japanese always lost.

It's a classic example of "won the battle, lost the war".

Bill

ORIGINAL: wdolson

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Well, I'll just provide my daily Halsey missive and be on my way:

"[Admiral Nelson's counsel] guided me time and again. On the eve of the critical battle of Santa Cruz, in which the Japanese ships outnumbered ours more than two to one, I sent my task force commanders this dispatch: ATTACK REPEAT ATTACK. They did attack, heroically, and when the battle was done, the enemy turned away.

Of course, despite his bluster, this was not true. Halsey suffered one of the few (only?)* tactical defeats in a carrier battle for the US, and arguably also suffered a strategic defeat:

"Dr. John Prados offers a dissenting view: this was not a Pyrrhic victory for Japan, but a strategic victory.

By any reasonable measure the Battle of Santa Cruz marked a Japanese victory -- and a strategic one. At its end the Imperial Navy possessed the only operational carrier force in the Pacific. The Japanese had sunk more ships and more combat tonnage, had more aircraft remaining, and were in physical possession of the battle zone... Arguments based on aircrew losses or who owned Guadalcanal are about something else -- the campaign, not the battle."

But admittedly, Halsey talked a good game. [:'(]


*Coral Sea maybe being the other tactical defeat.

I would call Santa Cruz a Tactical Victory and a Strategic Defeat for the Japanese. Ultimately war is about control of land, even in the Pacific. Whoever controls the islands is the ultimate winner. No matter what the Japanese did to USN forces around Guadalcanal, they never had the upper hand on the ground where it counted. They really only threatened Henderson Field once in the whole campaign. Other attacks on the field were never strong enough to put the US hold on the field in serious doubt.

All the naval battles around the island were all about who could supply their troops and get in reinforcements. From that perspective, the Japanese lost pretty consistently.

Over the course of the Pacific War, the USN did not do all that well offensively against IJN carriers in head to head battles. The US only clearly won 1 battle in 1942 and the Battle of the Philippine Sea was a clear defensive win, but the USN failed to sink any IJN carriers from the air. At Leyte the USN only sank the IJN carriers because the IJN had thrown them out there as bait. As far as the overall objective of holding on to the land mass in question, the US never lost a carrier battle. After the campaign in the SRA, the US never lost a battle period. Whenever the US threw in naval assets to contend a land mass, the Japanese always lost.

It's a classic example of "won the battle, lost the war".

Bill

Hiyo (classified as a CV) was sunk at the Battle of the Philippine Sea by carrier strikes.

I would agree about your assessment of the Battle of Santa Cruz, but not everyone thinks this - as mentioned, some (well, at least one) historian thinks it was both a strategic and tactical victory, but the CAMPAIGN was a losing one.

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

Hiyo (classified as a CV) was sunk at the Battle of the Philippine Sea by carrier strikes.

I would agree about your assessment of the Battle of Santa Cruz, but not everyone thinks this - as mentioned, some (well, at least one) historian thinks it was both a strategic and tactical victory, but the CAMPAIGN was a losing one.

My bad, you're right about the Hiyo.

Bill

Halsey won credit for taking over what looked like a hopeless situation and used combined arms operations to stall and then defeat Japan in the Solomons, even though Japan posessed more Battleships and Carriers. Also Halsey's decision to launch the Dolittle raid though discovered far short of the original launch point was a morale booster for Americans. He was Grant at a time needed, someone who would fight , fight , fight.

ORIGINAL: Bif1961

Halsey won credit for taking over what looked like a hopeless situation and used combined arms operations to stall and then defeat Japan in the Solomons, even though Japan posessed more Battleships and Carriers. Also Halsey's decision to launch the Dolittle raid though discovered far short of the original launch point was a morale booster for Americans. He was Grant at a time needed, someone who would fight , fight , fight.

i would agree with that (his willingness to fight) - though i think that there were others who could have done the same... the seniority structure of the USN would not allow it, i think. i don't think that Halsey reliably produced victories like Grant did, however.

This seniority structure caused problems in several instances - i.e. - relieving the commander of a successful TF on the eve of battle off Guadalcanal to replace him with an inexperienced commander with a couple of months more seniority comes to mind, but i recall several other instances where similar seniority issues happened. Of course, this problem wasn't limited to the USN.

Geoff sent me a turn this afternoon , I just returned it. Nothing really exciting....yet. Stay tuned. [:D]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Geoff sent me a turn this afternoon , I just returned it. Nothing really exciting....yet. Stay tuned. [:D]

Worst. Update. Ever. [:'(]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Geoff sent me a turn this afternoon , I just returned it. Nothing really exciting....yet. Stay tuned. [:D]

Worst. Update. Ever. [:'(]

+1

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Geoff sent me a turn this afternoon , I just returned it. Nothing really exciting....yet. Stay tuned. [:D]

Worst. Update. Ever. [:'(]

+1

+2 ( looks like one of mine [:D] )

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Geoff sent me a turn this afternoon , I just returned it. Nothing really exciting....yet. Stay tuned. [:D]

Worst. Update. Ever. [:'(]

You forgot to add two words to your comment. So. Far. [:D]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Geoff sent me a turn this afternoon , I just returned it. Nothing really exciting....yet. Stay tuned. [:D]

Worst. Update. Ever. [:'(]

You forgot to add two words to your comment. So. Far. [:D]

It's gonna get worse? Ugh. [X(]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
It's gonna get worse? Ugh. [X(]

Sitzkrieg?

(knock, knock, knock) Anybody home? AAR? Seems more like a military censorship!!![:D]

Just kidding guys, hope all is well.

Sorry. Still waiting for a turn. Been 3 days. Nothing happened on the turn before. BORRRRRIIINNNGGGGGGG!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!![:D]

Geoff had alluded to computer problems. I'm guessing that's the problem. [:(]

Steve,

I'm re-reading Samuel Eliot Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, volume 6: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier (22 July 1942-1 May 1944).

Early on in this time frame, while plans are being hatched and vetted at the highest levels, the Allies are in a quandry about what to do with Rabaul. Eventually Admiral King on 10 January 1943 recommends bypassing Rabaul to take the admiralties. Plans are drawn up and that's what the Allies eventually do. Other plans to bypass New Georgia to Buin in Southern Bougainville and by-passing Munda for Kolombangara are kicked around at that time.

Nimitz was particularly drawn to a startingly bold concept: to assault Chichi-Jima in the Bonins, only 523 miles from Tokyo. While the bypassing of Rabaul was being implemented, he recommended that this plan be kept alive until circumstances were more favorable. He pushed for the continued study of "plans to short-circuit the present campaign which now appears to offer Japan opportunity to remain on the defensive long enough to exploit the Far East, gain hegemony there and force us into a stalemate." This was his thinking in January 1943, scarcely a year into the war. He regretfully wound up setting the plan aside mainly for logistics issues.

This was the first I'd heard of Nimitz's infatuation with a very bold counter-stroke like this. Seems unusually daring and plucky for him.

Questions:

1. Oh owner of all books about naval history, do you have more information on this furtive planning? If it was a darling of Nimitz's, it stands to reason that he put some good thought and attention to planning detail of such an invasion. Where is it? What was it? Even the OOB would be fascinating to pore over.

2. Nimitz was absolutely right. In terms of drawing the Japanese fleet into a major battle, that (invading Chichi-Jima) certainly would have accomplished it. Eventually (years later) the Allies got their conclusive naval battle, but what would that battle (and its follow up) have looked like in March or April of 1943?

3. Would the Allies have an indisputable foothold on Hokkaido in 1943 and possibly ended the war almost two years early?

4. Just a reminder to you, the Allied player, to not look past the bold and daring options to short-circuit the war. These options were very favorably looked upon at the highest levels of the navy (Nimitz, et. al.), not just by the slavering wolves chomping about "killing Japs" (Halsey).

L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace!

Just a reminder to you, the Allied player, to not look past the bold and daring options to short-circuit the war. These options were very favorably looked upon at the highest levels of the navy (Nimitz, et. al.), not just by the slavering wolves chomping about "killing Japs" (Halsey).

Many in the rank and file also felt this way. In my talks with Eugene Sledge - Peleliu was unnecessary, Philippines was mostly for MacArthur's ego. Okinawa was hitting where it mattered. NO HALF STEPPING. Not one regret for using the bomb.

Landing on Hokkaido in 1943 is good stuff in the game, but IRL it would not force the Japanese to surrender - they would exact a heavy toll on all allied forces involved for Hokkaido and then when the invasion of Honshu came, it would get really bad.

Remember the estimates of one million casualties for Operation Olympic? Invading before the A-bomb was ready would likely lead to a negotiated end to the war because the Allies could not politically justify the casualties.

A great debunking of the rationalizations (mostly after the fact) for capturing Iwo Jima in MHQ. We can probably add this to Palau in terms of unnecessary expenditures:

http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cos ... vasion.htm