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ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

I have a faint inkling that the whole big gun infatuation/arms race period of the early decades of the century was in part irrational or at best 'speculative.' Until bigger and 'better' was actually tested in war who could have easily dismissed the fact that a rival nation was building these things as being 'inconsequential?"

There were plenty of engagements that proved the point. A major test in The Great War, of course.

I do see your point - until having some real knowledge that they are of little value, how many bullets to the head are you willing to risk? But it turns out they did have value.

This is what I'd like to know: was it really just a waste of time? Were DDs and torpedo boats, aircraft, mines, etc., just as good for 'countering' enemy BBs as building your own BBs would have been?

No. Clearly an appropriate balance of forces was best, though.

Broadside = a firing of all guns that bear to one side.
Salvo = a firing of one or more guns.
The reason I'm saying this is because there is some confusion--salvo and broadside are not synonymous. The Americans had a doctrinal preference for full broadsides that seems to have been unusual. The Russian dreadnoughts were intended to fire their guns in three-gun groupings. The Germans liked half-salvos so much that they repented of putting nine guns aboard their cruisers and battleships and reverted to eight guns despite the extra cost in weight. The British generally preferred half-salvos. I recently ran into difficulties in examining Shropshire's performance at Surigao Strait because the participants were using the word broadside in a way that seemed synonymous with salvo. I was surprised to find they didn't intentionally fire a half-salvo at any time in the battle.
Blast damage to a battleship in WWII was a routine consequence of firing the main guns. Happened all the time. In Rodney's case, the situation was aggravated by the ultra-short range: guns at near 0deg elevation, as close to the decks as possible. There may also have been some exaggeration of the effects.
Battleships were of course good at something. There was nothing like a battleship to dominate the seas in its immediate vicinity. Not even an aircraft carrier could rival it.

Not in the 30's, certainly... Later, 'twas a different story.

I'd advance the opinion, however, that the last war-winning performance by the battleship was at Tsushima. After that, they didn't do much to justify their price-tags.

Thanks for the suggested readings!

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Not in the 30's, certainly... Later, 'twas a different story.

I'd advance the opinion, however, that the last war-winning performance by the battleship was at Tsushima. After that, they didn't do much to justify their price-tags.

The Grand fleet may have been built on the idea of winning another Trafalgar....but ultimately it's actions helped ensure Germany's defeat in WWI by the preserving of the ruinous embargo on Germany. Elements of the fleet also preserved Britian's freedom of the seas elsewhere (Faulklands)

The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.

ORIGINAL: Tiornu
The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.

I think Tiornu makes a good point. The larger the superiority, the fewer the opportunities to show that superiority. The fleet in being thing only works if you are able to pin or fixate an opposing (hopefully much larger) force onto your own, thereby opening up opportunities elsewhere.

But if you ain’t got no elsewhere, or the opponent is so superior they can confront the fleet in being as well as maintain superiority elsewhere, you be in a world of hurt, and just wasted a few billion dollars, pounds, marks, lire, francs, zlotys, whatever. So why poke your head out and die? Doesn’t leave much opportunity for the big boys to rack up a kill. HSF got marginalized rather quickly. But all that means is that the Grand Fleet BBs did their jobs, as an extension of policy.

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Tiornu
The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.

I think Tiornu makes a good point. The larger the superiority, the fewer the opportunities to show that superiority. The fleet in being thing only works if you are able to pin or fixate an opposing (hopefully much larger) force onto your own, thereby opening up opportunities elsewhere.

But if you ain’t got no elsewhere, or the opponent is so superior they can confront the fleet in being as well as maintain superiority elsewhere, you be in a world of hurt, and just wasted a few billion dollars, pounds, marks, lire, francs, zlotys, whatever. So why poke your head out and die? Doesn’t leave much opportunity for the big boys to rack up a kill. HSF got marginalized rather quickly. But all that means is that the Grand Fleet BBs did their jobs, as an extension of policy.

I agree. I think the Grand Fleet met all of it's objectives during WWI.

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying.

Indeed. While it did fight, it would have been a huge success even if it never fought. Like taking precautions against having a fire and never having one because of those precautions. In the case of the Grand Fleet, it was not tested more because it existed and it's superiority was known (or believed) by adversaries.

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.

all the more so given that Britain tried via diplomancy to explain to Germany how it's naval program impacted them. I thought Author Belfour put it in simple eloquence when he wrote for German reader's sakes; "Without a superior fleet, Britain would no longer count as a power. With no fleet at all, Germany would remain the greatest power in Europe."

It fell on deaf ears. Tirpitz was determined to build his battlefeet and the Kaiser naively clung to his dream of two equally powerful battlefeets passing each other in mutual review and respect. He was a great admirer of the Royal Navy and wanted a similar navy for his own country....failing to understand how it would be viewed in GB. It pushed GB into the Entente.

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

all the more so given that Britain tried via diplomancy to explain to Germany how it's naval program impacted them. I thought Author Belfour put it in simple eloquence when he wrote for German reader's sakes; "Without a superior fleet, Britain would no longer count as a power. With no fleet at all, Germany would remain the greatest power in Europe."

It fell on deaf ears. Tirpitz was determined to build his battlefeet and the Kaiser naively clung to his dream of two equally powerful battlefeets passing each other in mutual review and respect. He was a great admirer of the Royal Navy and wanted a similar navy for his own country....failing to understand how it would be viewed in GB. It pushed GB into the Entente.

Go back in time to that day, then name a country that would have accepted that proposition. It's an issue of human nature.

Bismarck would have.

Wasn't there and didn't.

If he was there, would the political climate in Germany have allowed him to? We cannot assume that he would have remained as powerful if he had lasted that long or if he had lived at a different time.

What amazes me is that the Germans, having lived the example of monumentally failed policy, tried something similar again in the 1930's. Wasn't anyone paying attention?

Nobody ever does... History repeats itself, because nobody listens the first time around...

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Bismarck would have.

Well, Nik’s comment begs the ultimate question doesn’t it. Just what the heck do you build a fleet for? Remember, all these guys were Mahananians. You build a fleet to protect the homeland and to secure the SLOCS and trade routes.

If you don’t depend on colonial trade, and have no SLOCS, and you are a continental power, and needn’t depend on a fleet to protect the homeland, just what the heck do you build a fleet for?

Bismarck was smart. Yeah, Bismarck would have accepted the proposition. Very little risk, very much more money for what mattered.

Agreed. Bismarck was not much interested in naval matters which was a plus here. He was a master at "the great game" as they called it then and he would rather have solidified a strong political alliance with Britain to balance France and Russia than build a big expensive fleet or, short of that, at least keep her neutral. I would point out too that Belfour wasn't suggesting that Germany have "no" fleet. He was just emphasizing the point that even had Germany no fleet at all, she'd still be the biggest power in Europe. A less ambitious naval program whose' objective was not specifically to rival and surpass the RN would have been acceptable to the British. Anything else and you have the very expensive arms race that developed. Bismarck would IMO have rather avoided it and could have rejected Tirpitz's ideas. As Tiornu pointed out, it ended up being a ruinous political decision and I don't believe it was inevitable that it must happen.

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

What amazes me is that the Germans, having lived the example of monumentally failed policy, tried something similar again in the 1930's. Wasn't anyone paying attention?

Do they pay attention nowadays? [Non-partisan comment on the state of dumb-ass politicians everywhere.]

Most especially in the 1930's, the game was about something else. The naval build-up was just hanging on to the coattails of the overall situation.

I think that german auxiliary cruisers were one of the most succesfull designs. Relatively cheap, ingeniously designed, armed with obsolete guns, had a few torpedo tubes, flak batteries, some even floatplanes. And they coul'd change it's appearance and even silhouette. What is most important, they were very successfull (Penguin, Thor, Atlantis, Kormoran), moral impacting and had tied up very large parts of Royal Navy! So, my vote is on them

That's right, Tirpitz and the Kaiser were Mahanian, and that's the key to why they built up their fleet. Navalism and Imperialism went hand-in-hand, so while Germany had little in the way of overseas holdings to protect, that was taken as an argument for naval build-up.
Two rivals figured specifically in Germany's navalism. First, Britain. As bizarre as it seems, the naval race with Britain represented a German attempt to cement an alliance with Britain. (The word "duh" comes to mind.) Second, the US. Wilhelm whined incessantly about his inability to expand German presence in the New World and in the Pacific due to Germany's slow start into naval build-up; by the time the Germans developed a strong fleet, so did the Americans. Oh well.
Reading suggestion: Luxury Fleet by Herwig is a fine summary of the subject, a good place to start. You can then track down any number of articles by the same author. Oh, and another book, Politics of Frustration, which focuses on Germany's ongoing trouble with managing with the American factor. If you want to look into the underlying politics, Yesterday's Deterrent by Steinberg gives an excellent view of Tirpitz as a gifted politician.