Page 255 of 319
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 12:07 pm
by Panther Bait
One other comment for discussion.
Most of the time the discussion about 4EB in ground support goes one of two ways. The first is the comparison to the large carpet bombing raids during Normandy, which were generally area bombing, i.e. you take a large number of bombers and attempt to saturate an area target. The natural follow on argument is that the in-game raids are typically much smaller (number of bombers per raid) and much more effective (no of casualties per raid or sortie) than any of the carpet bombing raids. Most likely true that if hundreds/thousands of planes carpet bombing couldn't generate the in-game casualties rates, than much smaller semi-blind carpet bombing raids wouldn't be able to either.
The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.
Well, what if the in-game 4EB usage is something different. Could you use 4EB on more of a targeted strike type of operation from mid- to low- altitude with 4EB groups "trained" to do so. Team them up with some kind of ground spotter organization, and it doesn't seem impossible that they would be much more effective than the semi-blind carpet bombing raids. Particularly if they are attacking large numbers of troops in open terrain in view of said spotters and in smaller more-controllable formations, a squadron or two at a time. So was this ever done in real-life, not probably not. Is it still more effective than would have been possible if it was tried, probably.
People also like to mention about the theoretical troop densities of 10K to 20K soldiers in a 40-mile hex, but in reality those troops would concentrated in a much smaller area proximate to the enemy troops in the hex, not to mention concentrated around road/rail networks, etc. In general, in they are in contact with the enemy in open terrain, the Allies are probably going to have a fairly decent idea where the enemy troops and support echelons are located.
Mike
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 12:40 pm
by Lowpe
John is an agent provocateur![:D]
The cynic in me, wonders if John brings up the 4E hobby horse, which has well and truly been beaten to death every few months, simply because he is pulled away from the AAR or the game for a few days and wants to see traffic on his AAR while he is occupied with real life concerns.
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 12:41 pm
by John 3rd
Nice comment Mike.
Are all those books in your library Walloc? What is your specialization? If any...
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 12:45 pm
by adarbrauner
At around 1140, 17 Nell torpedo bombers (two squadrons from the Genzan Air Group) approached the two capital ships. Eight concentrated on Repulse, while nine attacked Prince of Wales, sending eight torpedoes speeding towards the flagship (one plane aborted its run on Prince of Wales and peeled off and attacked Repulse).[36] One Nell was shot down and three more were damaged by the Prince of Wales anti-aircraft fire during this attack. This first wave of torpedo attackers however managed only one, ultimately catastrophic, torpedo hit on Prince of Wales (and none on Repulse), right where her outer port propeller shaft exited the hull
Another torpedo attack was carried out by 26 Betty bombers of the Kanoya Air Group at approximately 1220,[41] and Prince of Wales was hit by another three torpedoes on her starboard side (some historical accounts[37] state four hits, but the 2007 survey of the hull showed there had been only three); one at the very bow, one opposite B main gun turret, and one abaft Y turret which not only punctured the hull but bent the outer starboard propeller shaft inboard and over the inner shaft, stopping it instantly.[42]
At the same time as this last torpedo attack developed against Prince of Wales, planes from the Kanoya Air Group also attacked Repulse from both starboard and port. Repulse, which had dodged 19 torpedoes so far, was caught in this Japanese pincer attack and was hit on the port side by one torpedo. Within minutes, further attacks resulted in at least three more torpedoes striking Repulse.
The Japanese had achieved eight torpedo hits, four each on Prince of Wales[48] and Repulse,[49][50] out of 49 torpedoes, while losing only three aircraft during the attack itself (one Nell torpedo bomber from the Genzan Air Group and two Betty torpedo bombers from the Kanoya Air Group) and a fourth plane was so badly damaged that it crashed on landing.
From Wiki

RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 12:49 pm
by adarbrauner
Guadalcanal, Betties

RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 1:09 pm
by Walloc
Hi John3,
If we talk purely about the books mentioned then, yes. As u can tell my writting skill arent terribly good so i had to walk about collecting the books to make sure i got the names and titles correct. I dont own a caboose tho, guess its a question of prioverties.
As to the offcial papers, studies, AARs and so forth. I have some in photocopies, some in pdf/picture files. Others are found online. Many i dont have acces to peronally right here and now, but its good to know people.[;)]
My specialization has nothing to do with military other than a periode a long time ago spend in battlefield Intel in the Danish army.
Kind regards,
Rasmus
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 1:46 pm
by MakeeLearn
ORIGINAL: adarbrauner
Guadalcanal, Betties
That is a great pic.

RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 1:50 pm
by MakeeLearn
"Slinging!"
- What the pilots called throwing the bomb into the ship
You can see them DUCK!

November 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 2:04 pm
by John 3rd
November 2, 1944
A large Tanker Convoy drops anchor at Osaka and begins to unload a whopping 174,000 fuel.
Cannot say that the Home Isles are swimming in oil/fuel but I will say we're in solid shape for at least three months.
RE: November 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 2:17 pm
by Panther Bait
John, have you started to notice an effect from the strategic bombing on supply or HI generation? Or even fuel usage?
RE: November 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 3:35 pm
by John 3rd
Supply. My supply levels were headed pretty steadily up but now are so-so. Nothing horrific as of yet but it has my attention.
My HI has stopped rising and is simply staying steady at about 900,000 stockpiled. Thank goodness for his holding off in this area, the initial TK Convoys I brought home added nearly 150,000 HI to the pile prior to seeing it slow down.
November 3, 1944
Yet another Tanker Convoy drops anchor at Tokyo and 88,600 Fuel and 32,400 Oil begin to be unloaded.
This is the last convoy for a while. I have several about to begin loading in Soerabaja but nothing traveling TO the Home Islands presently.
The CVs are no longer even putting up a pretense of escort, LRCAP, and or ASW support. The convoys, for the last two weeks, are sailing under no protection whatsoever. Shhhhhhhh...don't TELL ANYONE that!
RE: November 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 3:40 pm
by John 3rd
November 3, 1944
Here is the active area of China presently. The Allies are beginning to push harder and harder on the western edge of the lodgement. The dam is showing signs of cracking gang...
Had an Engineer unit move into the Shaoshing hex. FORGOT to to redirect it (DUMB!) and it was--literally--destroyed by about 125 B-24s. Obliterated.
Want to make the China position clear. The LONGER the Allies want to play here the BETTER. WE can bleed the Infantry and Tank units and trade space and cities for TIME. All those units lost in the Philippines and Formosa have been bought back and many are simply sitting in Tokyo/Osaka/Hiroshima rebuilding, updating, and filling out. Time spent in China--such as it is--is my FRIEND.

RE: November 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 3:42 pm
by John 3rd
Let November 3, 1944 be the FIRST DAY I have truly noticed the Allied Submarine effort. On this day Allied SS sink 4 AKs and 2 AKLs. It is the best day of the war for them by a long shot. Good, solid testimony to Japanese ASW (Air and Sea), routing convoys, and some simply good luck (as well as bad Allied tactics)!
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 3:47 pm
by Walloc
ORIGINAL: Panther Bait
One other comment for discussion.
Most of the time the discussion about 4EB in ground support goes one of two ways. The first is the comparison to the large carpet bombing raids during Normandy, which were generally area bombing, i.e. you take a large number of bombers and attempt to saturate an area target. The natural follow on argument is that the in-game raids are typically much smaller (number of bombers per raid) and much more effective (no of casualties per raid or sortie) than any of the carpet bombing raids. Most likely true that if hundreds/thousands of planes carpet bombing couldn't generate the in-game casualties rates, than much smaller semi-blind carpet bombing raids wouldn't be able to either.
The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.
Well, what if the in-game 4EB usage is something different. Could you use 4EB on more of a targeted strike type of operation from mid- to low- altitude with 4EB groups "trained" to do so. Team them up with some kind of ground spotter organization, and it doesn't seem impossible that they would be much more effective than the semi-blind carpet bombing raids. Particularly if they are attacking large numbers of troops in open terrain in view of said spotters and in smaller more-controllable formations, a squadron or two at a time. So was this ever done in real-life, not probably not. Is it still more effective than would have been possible if it was tried, probably.
People also like to mention about the theoretical troop densities of 10K to 20K soldiers in a 40-mile hex, but in reality those troops would concentrated in a much smaller area proximate to the enemy troops in the hex, not to mention concentrated around road/rail networks, etc. In general, in they are in contact with the enemy in open terrain, the Allies are probably going to have a fairly decent idea where the enemy troops and support echelons are located.
Mike
I like the idea Mike,
3 comments.
1. The safety ranges during the carpet bombings was of such distance that the training and inherent small size of such "small raid group" would have be significantly lowered. As the common distance between the FLOT(forward of own troops) and the FLET(forward line of enemy troops) is normally less than the carpet bombing safety distances. If your able to do that it has a leg to stand on, if not it doesnt.
2. As the idea counts on having ground spotters. The distance to the enemy, that is having large forces in open terrain cant be longer than view ranges, obviously. The question begs how often did u enemy have large forces in open terrain in clear view of the enemy lines and stayed there long enough to call in a raid.
3. Most convincingly to me. If we encountered the conditions as in 2. Why not just use artillery. U alrdy have a trained ground spotter crews that just need to pick up the phone. Call the artillery central and call in a seemigly much more cost effective option in this case. 878 British artillery tubes was directed on to the assembly area of 9.SS as they tried to set up the counter attack at the flanks of Epsom. Welcome to the western front. That was pretty effective use of a force u alrdy had in place for these conditions. Why bother using 4E resources that could be used else where and most likely wasnt any where so cost effective.
Kind regards,
Rasmus
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 4:18 pm
by Panther Bait
ORIGINAL: Walloc
ORIGINAL: Panther Bait
One other comment for discussion.
Most of the time the discussion about 4EB in ground support goes one of two ways. The first is the comparison to the large carpet bombing raids during Normandy, which were generally area bombing, i.e. you take a large number of bombers and attempt to saturate an area target. The natural follow on argument is that the in-game raids are typically much smaller (number of bombers per raid) and much more effective (no of casualties per raid or sortie) than any of the carpet bombing raids. Most likely true that if hundreds/thousands of planes carpet bombing couldn't generate the in-game casualties rates, than much smaller semi-blind carpet bombing raids wouldn't be able to either.
The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.
Well, what if the in-game 4EB usage is something different. Could you use 4EB on more of a targeted strike type of operation from mid- to low- altitude with 4EB groups "trained" to do so. Team them up with some kind of ground spotter organization, and it doesn't seem impossible that they would be much more effective than the semi-blind carpet bombing raids. Particularly if they are attacking large numbers of troops in open terrain in view of said spotters and in smaller more-controllable formations, a squadron or two at a time. So was this ever done in real-life, not probably not. Is it still more effective than would have been possible if it was tried, probably.
People also like to mention about the theoretical troop densities of 10K to 20K soldiers in a 40-mile hex, but in reality those troops would concentrated in a much smaller area proximate to the enemy troops in the hex, not to mention concentrated around road/rail networks, etc. In general, in they are in contact with the enemy in open terrain, the Allies are probably going to have a fairly decent idea where the enemy troops and support echelons are located.
Mike
I like the idea Mike,
3 comments.
1. The safety ranges during the carpet bombings was of such distance that the training and inherent small size of such "small raid group" would have be significantly lowered. As the common distance between the FLOT(forward of own troops) and the FLET(forward line of enemy troops) is normally less than the carpet bombing safety distances. If your able to do that it has a leg to stand on, if not it doesnt.
2. As the idea counts on having ground spotters. The distance to the enemy, that is having large forces in open terrain cant be longer than view ranges, obviously. The question begs how often did u enemy have large forces in open terrain in clear view of the enemy lines and stayed there long enough to call in a raid.
3. Most convincingly to me. If we encountered the conditions as in 2. Why not just use artillery. U alrdy have a trained ground spotter crews that just need to pick up the phone. Call the artillery central and call in a seemigly much more cost effective option in this case. 878 British artillery tubes was directed on to the assembly area of 9.SS as they tried to set up the counter attack at the flanks of Epsom. Welcome to the western front. That was pretty effective use of a force u alrdy had in place for these conditions. Why bother using 4E resources that could be used else where and most likely wasnt any where so cost effective.
Kind regards,
Rasmus
I know I said ground spotters, but I was more thinking trained Army spotters. I guess in regards to 2 and 3, I was thinking a combination of recon planes, trained aerial spotters, ground spotters when terrain permitted, maybe even RDF to a degree. I agree that the 4EBs would be better used for targets of opportunity at the far end of arty range and further back.
And don't get me wrong, I don't think that the above concept fully explains the bombing results in game, but I think it is a better model of what the game is trying to simulate than either mass carpet bombings or CAS effects.
Mike
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 5:09 pm
by Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: Panther Bait
The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.
At least for me this is not my second argument.
My argument is that the game fails to model tactics and weapons (FBs and the roles/weapons I spoke of up-thread) which constituted most of the Allied land air war effort ex-strat bombing cities. CAS simply isn't really in the game, and it was the root of Allied air superiority for at least 1944-45, and somewhat earlier by theater.
So, the devs (really GG, not Henderson), AS COMPENSATION, made 2E and 4E Ground attacks more effective than history (COBRA, etc.) To compete with the ahistorical Japanese air effort, which over time JFBs have learned to make truly monumental, probably in excess of what the devs envisioned. So, any effort to argue AE ground 4E results against history will fail. They weren't intended to be historical. Any more than the ability to see patrolling submarines at 200 NM ranges in daylight, when they were at periscope depth, is historical. It's abstracted, and you can't pull one thread without the whole blanket coming apart.
RE: October 1944
Posted: Wed Aug 16, 2017 5:57 pm
by John 3rd
The Moose makes a very good point.
RE: October 1944
Posted: Thu Aug 17, 2017 11:44 am
by Lecivius
ORIGINAL: Lowpe
And I will add that there is no greater excitement than the final year of this game playing as Japan, whenever that year occurs. Your back is to wall, limited everything, and a mighty sword hangs over your head on almost every turn by a weakening thread.
What joy!
Seriously, you need to get out more [;)][:'(]
RE: October 1944
Posted: Thu Aug 17, 2017 12:09 pm
by Panther Bait
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: Panther Bait
The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.
At least for me this is not my second argument.
My argument is that the game fails to model tactics and weapons (FBs and the roles/weapons I spoke of up-thread) which constituted most of the Allied land air war effort ex-strat bombing cities. CAS simply isn't really in the game, and it was the root of Allied air superiority for at least 1944-45, and somewhat earlier by theater.
So, the devs (really GG, not Henderson), AS COMPENSATION, made 2E and 4E Ground attacks more effective than history (COBRA, etc.) To compete with the ahistorical Japanese air effort, which over time JFBs have learned to make truly monumental, probably in excess of what the devs envisioned. So, any effort to argue AE ground 4E results against history will fail. They weren't intended to be historical. Any more than the ability to see patrolling submarines at 200 NM ranges in daylight, when they were at periscope depth, is historical. It's abstracted, and you can't pull one thread without the whole blanket coming apart.
I agree. I almost added a side note about FBs and CAS to my last point, but didn't want to seem like I was piling on.
By 1944, most of US fighters, and some of the British, had FB loadouts available that included 2000-3000 lbs of bombs, plus rockets in many cases and of course thousands of rounds of 50 cal. To put that in perspective, the short-range loadout of a B-17 or B-24 was about 8000 lbs of bombs. So about 3 FBs = 1 4EB, and the FBs can sortie more often from closer airfields (in a land campaign) and be more accurate on smaller targets. In reality, the FBs are way more effective than 4EB could ever be in a ground support role.
Mike
RE: October 1944
Posted: Thu Aug 17, 2017 3:11 pm
by Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: Panther Bait
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
ORIGINAL: Panther Bait
The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.
At least for me this is not my second argument.
My argument is that the game fails to model tactics and weapons (FBs and the roles/weapons I spoke of up-thread) which constituted most of the Allied land air war effort ex-strat bombing cities. CAS simply isn't really in the game, and it was the root of Allied air superiority for at least 1944-45, and somewhat earlier by theater.
So, the devs (really GG, not Henderson), AS COMPENSATION, made 2E and 4E Ground attacks more effective than history (COBRA, etc.) To compete with the ahistorical Japanese air effort, which over time JFBs have learned to make truly monumental, probably in excess of what the devs envisioned. So, any effort to argue AE ground 4E results against history will fail. They weren't intended to be historical. Any more than the ability to see patrolling submarines at 200 NM ranges in daylight, when they were at periscope depth, is historical. It's abstracted, and you can't pull one thread without the whole blanket coming apart.
I agree. I almost added a side note about FBs and CAS to my last point, but didn't want to seem like I was piling on.
By 1944, most of US fighters, and some of the British, had FB loadouts available that included 2000-3000 lbs of bombs, plus rockets in many cases and of course thousands of rounds of 50 cal. To put that in perspective, the short-range loadout of a B-17 or B-24 was about 8000 lbs of bombs. So about 3 FBs = 1 4EB, and the FBs can sortie more often from closer airfields (in a land campaign) and be more accurate on smaller targets. In reality, the FBs are way more effective than 4EB could ever be in a ground support role.
Mike
All that, plus by 1944 (Tinian was the first use of napalm I think), the US at least had bifurcated FB loads to high-explosives for structures (bridges, command posts, hangars, etc.), and pure anti-personnel loads. Napalm was big, especially in jungle and island overgrowth, and WP was big for more open, grassy terrain as on Okinawa. Neither are in the game overtly. In jungle, as in much of Burma, once the Japanese dig in through local forts, they can laugh at hi-E bombing, and the supply models give them VAST amounts of supply through untenable terrain. The game gives the Allies the historical planes in historic numbers, but no way to use them historically.
I'm just incredibly unimpressed with any JFB who complains about 4E uses on troops in the open. It's a weak tea, second-order benefit for the AFB. Take it away and the Allied air war is truly crippled.