warspite1 wrote: Sat Nov 26, 2022 10:30 am
There is an important part to this 'plan' that I hadn’t picked up on until yesterday.
As has been said, the Japanese quite understandably set great store by the need for secrecy and avoiding detection. Attacking Pearl with surprise and attacking Pearl against an alert defender were going to be two very different things for the aircraft and pilots of the 1st Air Fleet – and with two very different outcomes.
Right. And the Japanese got lucky on that count. The US was placed under alert multiple times prior to the raid. They really, really needed an option to abort if the US was under alert. This plan gives them that option.
But as also has been said, this 'plan' simply ignores that requirement – but I hadn’t fully put together what Curtis Lemay appears to be proposing.
On the contrary, it gives them an abort option. The pathfinders will know if the troops on Maui are under alert and can abort the whole raid.
Given what has been said about the need for secrecy and surprise, we are to believe that the lightly armed, and highly vulnerable, destroyer conversions make their way from the flying-off point to the holding point off Maui.
At night. In Peacetime. On a weekend. About as detectable as a stealth fighter.
And let’s be clear here. The destroyers sail in Hawaiian waters the night before the attack on Pearl. Maui is southeast of Oahu and so the destroyers will need to sail past Oahu (and other islands).
Nonsense. They would be positioned for the optimum pathway to Maui - avoiding all other islands.
Presumably the wider the berth around the island, the longer the journey takes. But of course no word on timing has been given (and Buckrock's comments make doubtful whether this could even be done) just the usual mantra that the Japanese have plenty of time, plenty of slack etc etc etc.
So the chances of detection are increasing by the second, and have been since the destroyers left the KB.
Again, about as detectable as stealth fighters.
Curtis Lemay protests that he’s been providing detail. Well what is detail to Curtis Lemay and what makes for a coherent plan are clearly two different things. Maui is a large island, it had (as I understand it) just one airfield capable of operating Bettys. The Japanese need to be fully in position to capture this airfield without being detected. They have to approach Maui, unload 1,600-2,000 men and head inland – all in complete secrecy.
Aided by pathfinders (who keep close tabs on the garrison. Reminder: Maui is a big island. The garrison is tiny.
The Japanese also need to capture a port to allow for the ground crew, fuel, engines, ammunition etc. But where do the Japanese need to land to do all this? Where is the airfield in relation to the landing point? Where is the airfield in relation to the port? Do they need more than one landing zone (increasing further the chance of detection)? The Japanese come with no transport. They need to move, in darkness on foot.
Guided by the pathfinders, who've been months prepping.
Apparently pathfinders will tell them where to land so that negates the need for any of these absolutely vital details to be shared with the group…… or in other words, Curtis Lemay has absolutely no idea whether such an operation is even feasible EVEN IF they at no point gave away their arrival…. And of course, in planning typical of the Japanese in WWII, he gives no thought to any defenders the Japanese may encounter. They are all partying like its 1999 apparently.
Yes. The pathfinders have months to figure out the best site to land and how to get prepositioned for the strike. Again, if the garrison is alerted, the pathfinders alert the DDs.
Meanwhile the KB are sitting at the flying-off point hoping that they won’t get noticed until it’s time to launch their attack, that the destroyers have successfully sailed around and through the HI without being spotted, the troops have landed, unseen, on Maui and have moved stealthily to their targets without anyone being any the wiser….
This is Maui. In peacetime. On a weekend.
Anything else? Oh yes, the precious Bettys and aircrew (about 25% of total Betty strength) have been previously ordered on their 10-15 hour flight. The pilots know that they are on a suicide mission if just about any part of this ‘plan’ fails – detection, stronger defence of the airfield than expected, weather conditions, mechanical issues etc. but that is not a problem as all Japanese are Kamikaze at heart apparently….
If they're not Kamakazes they can ditch and surrender.
And even if they make it to the airfield, they are defenceless, immobile, useless chunks of metal unless the follow up destroyers can escape whatever patrols of submarines and ships the US put to sea (remember the US become fully aware of the Maui landing the moment the Japanese open up – if not found before).
Their weight added to the first strike puts the US air and naval in even worse shape. And the US are not going to figure out what is going on on Maui for a long time. There's no guarantee any signal will be able to be sent, and any that is will be by somoeone in bewilderment.
This debate is not about Curtis Lemay proving the Japanese wouldn’t be detected before the raid, or that the invasion would be successful. It’s not about me proving they would be detected and that the raid would be unsuccessful. None of which either of us can do. This debate is about whether Curtis Lemay has put together a feasible plan that has sufficient chance of success to allow the decision makers to have given it the green light in 1941.
Well if we:
- Get the military comfortable with the idea that the start of the war with the US, Britain and the Netherlands (and all the operations against territories and islands that need to be co-ordinated) can be flexible depending on whether 1,2 or 3?!?! Carriers are at home
- Ignore Japanese Navy/Army lack of co-operation
- Give Yamamoto powers of foresight he never had about the relative merits of carriers vs battleships
- Give Japanese decision makers the foresight to see, months before the war, that they would need to convert destroyers to troop carriers and that this work is more important than the carrier and battleship programs then under way and that they really don’t need more than 10% of their destroyer force which can be easily sacrificed for this operation.
- Give the decision makers the absolute confidence that delaying The PI conquest won’t affect the capture of the NEI and the oil that is so badly needed.
then, and only then do we even get the Japanese into a position where they have to make a decision about the merits of this ‘plan’. For most people who have any understanding of the war, the above obstacles would not have been overcome.
Again, all that is necessary is for Yamamoto to realize 1. That the carriers may not be in port on the date the raid is scheduled. And 2. That the raid may not have enough force to torch the port and oil stocks.
But even if they were, who on earth would sign up to a plan that a) relies on massive amounts of luck considering all the things that go wrong in war, and b) actually puts the attack on Pearl at great risk of either disaster or has to be called off, and c) even if all stars perfectly align, the Japanese have absolutely no chance of following up with supplies.
Risk. Reward. Low risk. High reward. The risk that the oblivious Americans will spot the carriers AND leap to what they were about. Vs. the Reward of sinking two US CARRIERS. The risk of two battalions of troops and two air groups. Vs. the Reward of delaying the US response TWO YEARS.
One final element that smacks against the funny bone is this. Regardless of what hindsight tells us, and regardless of the stupidity of Japan seeking war with the US, the real life Japanese action against Pearl kind of makes sense from their point of view once they decided that war was their only option.
This is off-topic, but ridiculing Japan's choice of war with the US is benefiting from perfect 20:20 hindsight. We know what Japan could not know in the Fall of 1941: That Russia was going to survive. Had Russia been KO'ed - as appeared likely to the world at that time, the Pacific War is radically altered.
Why? Well sinking large elements of the Pacific Fleet would give Japan a clear run at the vital oil rich NEI (without which this is all pointless anyway). BUT, in coming up with this ‘plan’ Curtis Lemay has actually said that if its detected and the plan fails it doesn’t really matter that much as all the US would be gaining is a few old BB compared to historical.
The truth.
Which kind of begs the question why, if it’s ultimately no big deal, the Japanese are throwing so much resource into this and are prepared to delay the NEI invasion, delay taking the PI, losing more than 10% of their destroyers, two battalions of infantry and 40+ precious Bettys and their crew…. Words and figures differ Curtis Lemay, words and figures differ…..
I'm pretty sure they expected to find a few carriers at Pearl. My idea makes that much more likely.
By the way, I shall shortly be presenting my ‘plan’ for the British 1st Army’s capture of Berlin in September 1939. The RN sail up the Baltic unseen, the army unload, also unseen, in a place located by pathfinders. They get aerial assistance by Hurricanes (that can’t reach but maybe the British will also capture an island or two along the way so they can stage) and Wellingtons which land on an airfield north of Berlin. I don’t need to account for the troops used other than to say the British realised the need for this operation in 1938 and got together the force required. The ships used will be those that were to be used for the cancelled reinforcement of France….
All the Germans are in Poland or on the Siegfried line so there is no one defending Berlin!! And remember, rule 37(b) of a wargame says that the capture of a nation’s capital brings an end to the war. Simples. Low Risk and High Reward – I think I’ve made my case perfectly. Stay tuned…..
Just for the record, some minor countries did surrender upon the fall of their capitol.
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