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ORIGINAL: Von Rom



If you have read that article carefully, then just cutting and pasting those few paragraphs from it, does both a great disservice to the author of the article, to the reader here, and to your so-called "analysis."

How? You've just made a sweeping assertion regarding a lengthy article that you don't agree with. Now explain yourself. If you cannot provide evidence to back your comment then I suggest you fold.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



If you have read that article carefully, then just cutting and pasting those few paragraphs from it, does both a great disservice to the author of the article, to the reader here, and to your so-called "analysis."

How? You've just made a sweeping assertion regarding a lengthy article that you don't agree with. Now explain yourself. If you cannot provide evidence to back your comment then I suggest you fold.

"Fold?"

I haven't even started. . .

Since you won't approach Metz in a systematic way, then I will just do my own thing regarding Metz.

Patton at Metz


My apologies if this post is a bit long, however, I think it is vitally important to read it and understand the situation of Patton and Third Army by September, 1944, before the Battle for Metz started.

All of the information contained in this post is from the article Kevinugly posted above.


Introduction

After the initial breakout, Patton's army pursued German forces deep into France. Armored spearheads led the way, with infantry riding the backs of the tanks. Overhead, fighter-bombers patrolled the flanks and attacked any German unit that took to the roads in daylight. With the remnants of two German army groups in full retreat, the Supreme Allied Commander, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, noted in his diary on 5 September, "The defeat of the German Army is complete."

As Third Army neared the French border province of Lorraine, Third Army's intelligence sources seemed to confirm that the war was virtually over. The top-secret interceptions known as Ultra revealed that the Franco-German border was virtually undefended and would remain so until mid-September. A corps reconnaissance squadron reported that the Moselle River, the, last major water barrier in France, was also undefended. Patton issued orders to his corps to seize Metz and Nancy, sweep through Lorraine, and cross the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz.

Yet, just as Patton was about to seize Metz and Nancy, and then sweep through Lorraine to the German border, fuel shortage caused Third Army to stop dead in its tracks.

When Patton's tanks sputtered to a halt, the German forces defending Lorraine totaled only 9 infantry battalions, 2 artillery batteries, and 10 tanks. During the first week in September, while Third Army was immobilized, German forces flowed into Lorraine from the northern sector of the front, from southern France, and from Italy. The headquarters charged with the defense of Lorraine was Army Group G, under the command of GEN Johannes Blaskowitz. First Army, Nineteenth Army, and later Fifth Panzer Army were Blaskowitz's major forces.

When Patton's troops received enough gasoline to resume their advance towards the Moselle on 5 September, after a delay of nearly a week, the troops quickly discovered that the great pursuit was over. Instead of running down the fleeing fragments of shattered German units, soldiers all along Third Army's front encountered enemy soldiers who contested every foot of ground and who counterattacked viciously to recover lost positions.

Why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all?

The REASON is that Patton WAS ORDERED to take Lorraine.

Did you catch that?

That's right, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz:

"Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front.."

Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.


It seems in the Lorraine Campaign that the Germans had an unwitting ally - the Allied High Command. What the German armies were incapable of doing - stopping Patton - the Allied High Command did it for them.

Read on:


SITUATION OF THIRD ARMY AT METZ


************************

Shortage of Fuel

Although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, by August 31, Third Army received NO gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River.

For the next 5 days, Third Army was virtually immobilized.

Why?

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

Patton's troops captured some gasoline from the Germans, hijacked some from First Army depots, and received some gasoline by air, but when gasoline receipts finally increased to the point that the advance could be resumed, the opportunity of sweeping through Lorraine unopposed had passed.



************************

Shortage of Supplies


The gasoline shortage was followed by a shortage of ammunition, particularly in the larger artillery calibers that had not been in great demand during the fluid pursuit. By 10 September, Third Army's artillery batteries received only one-third of a unit of fire per day. Other shortages would crop up as the campaign progressed. At one time or another, rations, clothing, mattress covers, coffee, tires, tobacco, antifreeze, winter clothing, and overshoes would all be in critically short supply.



************************

Shortage of Intelligence

Third Army's intelligence sources began to run dry at the same time as its gas tanks. As Third Army approached Lorraine, Ultra provided less and less information of an operational and tactical nature. Free French sources had cooperated actively with Third during the pursuit, but Lorraine, with its partially hostile population and its swelling German garrison, was not a favorable setting for Resistance activities. Military intelligence interpreter teams found fewer knowledgeable natives willing to be interviewed, and the barrier posed by the Moselle River prevented the easy flow of both civilian agents and combat patrols. Moreover, the corps commanders did not receive Ultra at all. Their corps intelligence assets could, at best, see only 15,000 yards behind the enemy's front.



************************

Shortage of Troops


At the same time that the Germans received reinforcements, Patton's Third Army was being trimmed down. In the pursuit across France, Third Army had controlled four far-flung corps, but during September two of those corps were REMOVED from Patton's command.

Just before the Battle of Metz, Patton's Third Army was cut in half.

"For most of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army would consist of two corps, the XX and the XII. Four to six infantry divisions and two or three armored divisions would carry the bulk of the burden for the next 3 months."



************************

Shortage of Air Power

Patton's arsenal for the Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the pursuit across France. Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC flew 12,000 sorties in support of Third Army during August, but in September, TACs efforts would be divided between the Lorraine front and the battles being waged to reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the French coast. As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be increasingly frustrated by poor weather.

Therefore, before the Battle for Metz began, Patton lost HALF of his airforce!


************************

Conclusion


Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, which Patton WAS ORDERED to pursue, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets.

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz.

With all these handicaps, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

Imagine being a football coach and you are about to play an important game. However, before starting the game, you learn that you will lose half your players, there will be no water for your players that do remain, some of your players will have no helmets, shoulder pads or shoes, and that you will be facing the sun and the wind in every quarter. Further, as coach you MUST play the game.

This is the situation Patton found himself at the end of August, 1944.

Don't try and pretend that you lifted that from the site I linked to.

All of the information contained in this post is from the article Kevinugly posted above.

1) Eisenhower is not mentioned as ordering Patton to take Metz.

2)

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz

The full text of that section reads as follows:-

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

Selective editing to try and show that the decision was Bradley's alone.

Seems you are flailing about trying to prove that poor Patton was merely following orders. To do this you will use whatever tactic, no matter how underhand.

I would again recommend interested parties head over to the site I linked to. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... gabel3.asp

Note that this is the 'Combined Arms Research Library' of the Command and General Staff College based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Don't try and pretend that you lifted that from the site I linked to.

All of the information contained in this post is from the article Kevinugly posted above.

1) Eisenhower is not mentioned as ordering Patton to take Metz.

2)

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz

The full text of that section reads as follows:-

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

Selective editing to try and show that the decision was Bradley's alone.

Seems you are flailing about trying to prove that poor Patton was merely following orders, To do this you will use whatever tactic, no matter how underhand.

I beg your pardon?

Sharpen your reading a bit more:

This quote is found near Map 2:

With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front. In late August 1944, with the Lorraine gateway so invitingly open, it was unthinkable to Patton that Third Army should be halted in midstride.

Who do you think was in charge? Ike.

Who was Patton's superior? Bradley.

Ike ordered Bradley to order Patton to attack Metz.

Understand?

Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944

This again shows your complete lack of understanding about Patton.

Yes, Patton was convinced the war could be won in 1944 - that was BEFORE the Allied High Command stripped Third Army of fuel, men, planes and almost everything else Patton needed to fight at Metz.

The next time you post an article READ it before you use it.

Err, Eisenhower ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine. That cannot be inferred that Ike ordered him to take Metz. Metz could have been bypassed and 'left to wither on the vine'. Find me the order from Ike specifically asking General Patton to take Metz by storm. In any case this is in direct conflict to General Bradley's order to seize Mainz and Mannheim.

Secondly, all the the Allied generals were well aware of the logistics problems, Patton included.

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

This is from that site, note the date of the order and the fact that 3rd Army was already on the 'move'

A few paragraphs beforehand we have the fact that even before the campaign in Lorraine began, Patton was aware of the logistics problem.

"Thus, it was not surprising that on 28 August, with Patton's spearheads in the vicinity of Reims, Third Army's gasoline allocation fell 100,000 gallons short of requirements; and since all reserves had been burned up in the course of the pursuit, the pace of Patton's advance began to suffer almost at once. The simple truth was that although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August, Third Army received no gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River."

Put into proper date order it can be clearly seen Ike ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine as part of his 'broad front' strategy. Bradley ordered Patton to take the Rhine crossings at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton was already moving at this time in full knowledge of the dire logistical situation yet still agreed that this was the correct strategy.

'Nuff Said [:D]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

This is my last try at getting a direct answer to this direct question.

Regards
33

33,
The section on Hammelburg in D'Este's (excellent work) provides some evidence for you. He makes it clear that a personal letter written home was at odds with other things Patton was writing and saying at this time about the incident. Two letters home, one three days before the incident and the other after the raiwas launched make it clear Patton knew who was there. In War as I knew it Patton tells us that he launched the raid to free 900 prisoners (no mention that he knew who was there) and to keep the enemy off balance as to his true intentions. Even more revealing is D'Este's description of the press conference at which Patton was asked to explain this action.

He recounts how Patton waved his Diaries and personal letters in the air insisting he had known nothing of the presence of his son in law. D'Este pretty conclusively shows that he did, using pesonal correspondence to his wife as the evidence. The correspondence pre-dated the raid, and specifically mentions the son in law as being at the camp.

These daries clearly omitted any mention of the true reason for the raid, which suggests they are not as reliable as has been claimed. Many military figures used their diaries whilst writing memoirs after the war, and I believe Patton (as War as I knew it demonstrates) would have written at length after the war about his role, as the other senior commanders did. Diaries are also published, I've seen AlanBrookes for example. Knowing this, he would have to have been careful when writing anything that it fit what he was publicly pronouncing at the time.

Still, this just means we have to treat Patton's diaries with the same caution as we treat any first peron account, not that they are useless. I think there is much in there that is useful.

regards,
IronDuke

I now know why I'm bored.

The level of debate here has entered the realm of Mush. . .

Why does it feel like I'm reading a page of gossip from the National Enquirer or watching an episode of Jerry Springer?

I guess when Great Men like Patton, MacArthur, Ike, Kennedy, Caesar and Napoleon dare to do Great Things, they can also make mistakes.

But never fear, there is always an Oswald or a Booth standing nearby to take a shot at them. . .

I have read the accounts of the Hammelburg Incident in D'Este and Blumenson as well as a few other places, and the general consensus is this:

D'Este says that the evidence that Patton knew that Waters was in Hammelburg is circumstantial. In other words, Patton might have known Waters was in the POW camp, but then again, he might not have know.

Blumenson adds that when Waters saw Patton he asked him if he knew he was in the camp, and Patton replied: "I didn't know for sure."

What is known for sure is that a POW camp containing American POWs was in Hammelburg and that Waters might be there. Apparently the POWs in a camp in Poland were moved to Hammelburg. The belief was that Waters might have been in that Polish camp as well. But no one knew if he was even alive.

In Patton's two letters to his wife, he mentions that "he" (Waters) is in the camp. But this may have been Patton being overly optimistic to his wife about rescuing their Son-In-Law. Many men will tend to put on a brave, optimistic face for their wives, if something bad might happen. Also, Patton suffered from Dyslexia, so he may not have written it the way he had intended to.

Even after the incident was over, the only thing Patton regretted was not in sending a larger rescue force as he had originally intended.

As it stood, the rescue force freed 700 Russian POWs, and liberated the POW camp in Hammelburg that was holding 5,000 POWs, including Waters. However, this rescue attempt ultimately failed.

A short time later another rescue party liberated the camp.

The verdict?

Patton maintains he did not know for sure if Waters was in the camp. No one really did. He felt since there were 5,000 POWs there anyway, it was worth liberating. He also felt that it would cause a diversion and draw German forces away from his main thrust of attack.

Personally, I feel it has been made into a big deal for two reasons:

1) Patton's critics can feel all warm and fuzzy inside because they have found a chink in the armour of the Great Patton; and

2) The fact that the original operation failed. If Patton had sent a larger force as he had originally intended, and had it been successful, the whole operation would just be a footnote in history.

Therefore, those who dislike Patton will continue to ring the Bell of Hammelburg, while fair-minded people, when considering Patton's Great Accomplishments, will place this incident in the proper perspective as it should be. . .

Incidently (and it comes as no surprise to me) that Charles Whiting has written a book about this incident called "48 Hours to Hammelburg: Patton's Secret Ghost". No doubt he will be fair and objective about Patton. [8|]

Von Rom
I now know why I'm bored.

The level of debate here has entered the realm of Mush. . .

Why does it feel like I'm reading a page of gossip from the National Enquirer or watching an episode of Jerry Springer?

[>:] A debating trick. Line it up next to the Straw man Golf identified for us, and the dodging the question we've all witnessed.

Von Rom
I guess when Great Men like Patton, MacArthur, Ike, Kennedy, Caesar and Napoleon dare to do Great Things, they can also make mistakes.

But never fear, there is always an Oswald or a Booth standing nearby to take a shot at them. . .

The sad thing is you will never know how the truly great men in your list would feel being lined up for a purpose like this, and being put in some of the company you choose. [:-] You list of great men has some notables, but also some figures it is difficult to talk of in the same breath. I see a pattern. Your fervour for Patton is becoming unsettling.

Von Rom
I have read the accounts of the Hammelburg Incident in D'Este and Blumenson as well as a few other places, and the general consensus is this:

We both know your description of the consensus isn't the case. You continue to believe you own the only copy of D'Este in the world, and feel free to selectively quote him. I have a copy. For the critical forum reader, I shall relate what D'Este actually says so they can decide for themselves.

Von Rom
D'Este says that the evidence that Patton knew that Waters was in Hammelburg is circumstantial.

This is strictly true, but the evidence he provides is compelling, which I note you strangely omit. Perhaps Forum readers should be allowed to view this evidence themselves (as presented in D'Este) to decide the matter for themselves.

The raid was launched by Hoge's 4th Armoured. The mission was given to Hoge and Patton's bodyguard, Al Stiller, turned up to join the raid. D'Este notes (AND I QUOTE)

D'Este: Pg 714.
However, General's aides do not just go along on combat missions. Clearly, Stiller seemed to be there for another purpose.

Hoge, together with his Corp Commander raised concerns with Patton about it. Neither could see the point of this raid. Patton inisisted saying:

Patton:
I promise I'll replace every man and every vehicle you lose.

Bearing in mind what D'Este thinks the raid was for, this quote does not sit well with Von Rom's continued insistence that Patton put his men first.

Hoge was embarrassed by the pleading tone in Patton's voice (D'Este's adjective not mine). Hoge turned to Stiller (Patton's bodyguard) and D'est says.

D'Este:
As historian John Toland reveals:"...Stiller explained in a low voice that the 'Old Man' was absolutely determined to free the prisoners at Hammelburg-and revealed that John Waters, Patton's son in law, was one of the prisoners.

So, CCB are ordered to do the mission. The request to use the entire Combat command was Hoge and the task force leader's (Baum's) request. D'Este says nothing at this juncture about Patton specifying the size of the force. The request was turned down by Eddy, the Corp Commander. Patton was Eddy's superior Officer, so quite why Patton wanted to send the entire Combat Command yet wouldn't overrule his Subordinate who was against it escapes me, but never mind.

Task Force Baum is created. 16 tanks, 3 SP 105s, 27 Halftracks, 294 Men.

The main evidence presented by D'Este for Patton knowing about Waters being at the camp is this:

Letter to Beatrice his wife, dated 23/03/1945. Three days before the task force was despatched.

Patton
We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

Second letter to Beatrice dated 27/03/1944. The raid had been despatched, but was reported as missing so Patton had no idea at this stage what they had found at the camp.

Patton
Last night I sent an armoured column to a place 40 miles east of Frankfurt where John and some 900 POWs are said to be...everyone but me thought it was too great a risk.

This rather places Patton's later plea (that he wanted to send a Combat Command) into perspective. He didn't feel the raid was a risk despite being only of TF size having just despatched it, but all his senior officers did think it was a risk. This is interesting, since the raid was caught by elements of three German divisions on it's way back from Hammelburg, and chopped to pieces. 293 men were listed as MIA. Many were liberated several weeks later, including the Commander. D'Este does not provide a figure for the number killed attempting to rescue Patton's son in law. He however describes "scores of wounded" suggesting there were many deaths. This suggests Patton was not being completely honest after the raid turned into a fiasco.

Von Rom
In other words, Patton might have known Waters was in the POW camp, but then again, he might not have know.

Forum readers can now decide for themselves.

Blumenson adds that when Waters saw Patton he asked him if he knew he was in the camp, and Patton replied: "I didn't know for sure."

The clear implication of which is that Patton suspected (at the very least) that Waters was there. Although in his private correspondence he seemed much surer, and in public, denied it.

As D'Este says

D'Este
Those involved in the raid, Hoge, Baum, Stiller and Creighton Abrams, were convinced that Patton had mounted Hammelburg to save his son in law. All, however, chose to remain silent in deference to Patton.
Not until 1967, when he was himself a four star General did Abrams write that Stiller had admitted he made the trip "only because General Patton's son in law, Colonel Waters, was in the prison camp."

The Leader of the Task Force, the Commander of the Combat Command it belonged to, The Commander of the Division the Combat Command belonged to and Patton's Bodyguard knew who was there. You say Patton might not have done.

Von Rom
In Patton's two letters to his wife, he mentions that "he" (Waters) is in the camp. But this may have been Patton being overly optimistic to his wife about rescuing their Son-In-Law. Many men will tend to put on a brave, optimistic face for their wives, if something bad might happen. Also, Patton suffered from Dyslexia, so he may not have written it the way he had intended to.

I have been accused of twisting facts to suit my argument. Here, you suggest (D'Este doesn't enter the realm of fantasy about why Patton was telling his wife this) that Patton was somehow being overly optimistic. Why raise his wife's hopes unless he knew John Waters was these? Of all the POW camps in Germany, he tells his wife (you say without knowing) that Waters is in the camp. You're suggesting he deliberately raised her hopes by mentioning John despite the fact that

Von Rom
But no one knew if he was even alive

[8|] Your remarks about his dyslexia defy belief. I believe Patton's condition is something else we can add to the list of things you know little about. D'Este (who would have read every word Patton wrote) writes:

D'Este
Patton's dyslexia generated a lifelong writing problem manifested by mis-spelled words, and the frequent omission of punctuation and capitalisation.

In an attempt to rubbish this evidence, you're suggesting you know better and it could actually manifest itself by making him write things so as to give the wrong meaning. I felt:

Patton
We are headed right for John's place

looks fairly easy to understand. Trying to use his dyslexia in this manner does you no credit.

Von Rom
Even after the incident was over, the only thing Patton regretted was not in sending a larger rescue force as he had originally intended.

As his letters illustrate, he wasn't too concerned about the size of the force when it was despatched. He was the only one who felt it had a chance.

As for whose fault it was, D'Este makes several comments (not quotes from others, these are his own words.)

D'Este
The only certainty in the entire tragic affair is that Bradley would have forbidden Patton to undertake the Hammelburg raid if he had known of it in advance.

He goes on:

D'Este
Patton attempted to put a brave face on an unjiustifiable act.

Further

D'Este
Patton perpetuated the fiction of Hammelburg at a press conference, in which he baldly deceived the correspondents by waiving his personal and official diairies in the air and claiming he had known nothing of Water's presence in Hammelburg until 9 days after the raid.

These are the diaries you maintain are invaluable because they are unaltered, reveal Patton's true thoughts and come down to us as evidence not designed to be read by others, so not likely to be doctored.

Regarding Patton's claim he had not been allowed to send enough men, D'Este says:

D'Este
Patton later blamed Bradley. He also blaimed Eddy and Hoge. In fact he blaimed everyone but himself.

Later he comments on Patton's version of events in War as I knew it.

D'Este
This version is as self serving as his earlier complaint that Bradley had denied him the necessary force to mount the raid.

The last words are again Colonel D'Este's.

D'Este
His denials notwithstanding, the raid not only branded Patton a liar but tarnished the very fabric on which his fame lasted-that his troops came first, and everything possible must be done to insure their survival. Instead, he had sent 307 men on a mission whose implicit purpose was the rescue of his own son-in-law.

All bar one of these men were (at best) captured, or at worst, injured or killed. These men belonged to the US Army, not to Patton. He commanded them, but they were not his property. I can not think of another event during WWII quite like this (anyone any suggestions?)

Critical readers of this thread can now decide for themselves why Hammlelburg was launched, whose fault it was, and whether being upset about it (as his critics are) is fair and "putting it into perspective."

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: warhead2

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



Here again, is another one your lop-sided opinions.

Patton can do no right no matter what he does.

However, everything German officers did is brilliant no matter the circumstances.

Let's take a look at the so-called "brilliant" BlitzKrieg of the early German years, shall we?

The Germans surprise-attacked the unprepared Poles, bombing poor defenceless Warsaw. The Poles attacked German tanks with cavalry. Quite the achievement [8|]

Next, came poor little neutral Belgium. A surprise attack forced its surrender - another brilliant military move.

Next on the agenda was poor, defenceless Denmark - yes quite the military victory.

Then there was Holland - the technique of bombing defenceless Rotterdam is still studied today. . .[8|]

Then of course, there was the surprise attack through the Ardennes at Sedan, when German tanks basically raced for the channel, hardly encountering any opposition. The Germans faced divided, inexperienced, and poorly led Allied forces.

And at Dunkirk, the Germans couldn't even capture all the defenceless Allied soldiers trapped on the beaches [8|]

Yes, yes, all brilliant.

Then of course, the Germans attacked Russia in a surprise attack, surrounding and defeating a poorly led rabble. All those encirclements meant that those German officers encountered very little opposition. And the opposition they did encounter, was carried out by troops with low morale, poor clothing and weapons, and with very poor leadership.

Yes, what stunning successes. . .

My God,I have yet to get to the end of this "debate",but I must chime in here and say you sure do have a simpleton's view of the "blitzkrieg". Reading thus far has been like an instruction on how to lose a debate..you're getting your *ss handed to you,and you don't even realize it.

Cheers!

Ohhhh, yes it's quite shocking, isn't it. . .

When people can fault Patton for victories against supposedly inferior forces, then I can compare and find fault of early German Blitzkrieg victories against inferior forces.

Did you catch that?

Or am I being too simple for you?

I think you are indeed being too simplistic for him. I think Warhead2's point is that the German method of warfare and their campaigns are far more complicated and technical than your post suggests. My apologies to Warhead2 is I have misread his point (welcome to the fun, Warhead2.)

Can I ask:

Why do you keep saying "Next came Belgium, next came Denmark" etc. Are you aware the Germans actually attacked Holland, Belgium, France etc at the same time. They didn't bully one after the other, but attacked them all simultaneously.

Also, why in these quotes is the word "surprise" used as a criticism, yet when Patton achieved operational surprise in the Ardenne or during the breakout, it is somehow a mark of genius? Is German surprise a different type of surprise to American surprise? Was Patton's surprises somewhat more surprising and deserving of praise than the German's surprises?

IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Err, Eisenhower ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine. That cannot be inferred that Ike ordered him to take Metz. Metz could have been bypassed and 'left to wither on the vine'. Find me the order from Ike specifically asking General Patton to take Metz by storm. In any case this is in direct conflict to General Bradley's order to seize Mainz and Mannheim.

Secondly, all the the Allied generals were well aware of the logistics problems, Patton included.

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

This is from that site, note the date of the order and the fact that 3rd Army was already on the 'move'

A few paragraphs beforehand we have the fact that even before the campaign in Lorraine began, Patton was aware of the logistics problem.

"Thus, it was not surprising that on 28 August, with Patton's spearheads in the vicinity of Reims, Third Army's gasoline allocation fell 100,000 gallons short of requirements; and since all reserves had been burned up in the course of the pursuit, the pace of Patton's advance began to suffer almost at once. The simple truth was that although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August, Third Army received no gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River."

Put into proper date order it can be clearly seen Ike ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine as part of his 'broad front' strategy. Bradley ordered Patton to take the Rhine crossings at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton was already moving at this time in full knowledge of the dire logistical situation yet still agreed that this was the correct strategy.

'Nuff Said [:D]

What? No apology for accussing me of fabricating that Ike quote? [:-]

Err, Eisenhower ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine. That cannot be inferred that Ike ordered him to take Metz. Metz could have been bypassed and 'left to wither on the vine'. Find me the order from Ike specifically asking General Patton to take Metz by storm. In any case this is in direct conflict to General Bradley's order to seize Mainz and Mannheim.

This is the type of nonsensical argument that is given for argument's sake, and reflects the unending twisting of logic and common sense that has permeated this entire thread.

Eisenhower replaced Montgmery as the Allied ground forces commander and adopted a "broad front" strategy, which had the Allies advancing slowly, steady and always as a continuous mass, with forward units never out of touch with their companions to left or right. It was the safe approach, and typical of Eisenhower's minimum-risk attitude to warfare.

This approach meant that the Allied armies each had their "zones" or regions for which they had responsibility. Patton's Third Army was to attack along the "Moselle River Front". The broad front strategy also meant Patton had to spread out his forces along his entire front.

Ike said that Patton would have forty-eight hours,"to become so heavily involved I might reconsider". Reconsider what? If Patton attacked with vigor, then Ike would re-consider giving Third Army more supplies (D'Este, p. 661).

In addition, this broad front strategy also allowed the Germans to keep their line, to regroup and reinforce, and to maintain morale. Not until the very last weeks of the war did their front collapse, and individual units begin to surrender freely.

You may not be aware of this but the entire Maginot Line runs in a continuous front from the Swiss border to the Belgium border.

Also, Patton's Third Army was still desperately short of fuel, so that any type of maneuver of this type was simply out of the question. Any type of maneuver would also have struck against fortifications.

Look at a map - the route chosen to seizing Mainz and Mannheim, is eactly the shortest, historic route to the Rhine. And it is also the region given to Patton's Third Army for its advance. In advancig to the Rhine, thought also has to be given to roads, etc Where do you think most of the road networks are located? Metz.

In addition the terrible rains that fell that fall meant that Patton had to confine his armour and trucks to the roads, or be hopelessly bogged down in muddy fields.

Again, because of shortages of fuel, Patton could not maneuver or move his forces beyond the axis of his present advance.

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

This is from that site, note the date of the order and the fact that 3rd Army was already on the 'move'

Here again you are twisting Patton's motives and plans for 1944.

The author of that paper interjected that sentence of Patton's and his superior's in-between the first and last sentence. The author has taken Patton's thinking completely out of context.

Patton was firmly convinced that he could have ended the war in 1944, had he been given the supplies to drive to the Rhineland. Many other historians, including Liddel Hart agree.

This ended when he was deprived of supplies at the end of August.

His forces were "on the move" because Patton ordered his forces to keep moving until they ran out of gas.

Put into proper date order it can be clearly seen Ike ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine as part of his 'broad front' strategy. Bradley ordered Patton to take the Rhine crossings at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton was already moving at this time in full knowledge of the dire logistical situation yet still agreed that this was the correct strategy.

[&:]

You, yourself state Ike ordered 3rd army into Lorraine.

Then you say Bradley ordered Patton to take the Rhine crossings at Mannheim and Mainz. Again, look at a map and do some reading. Do you really think this article you posted contains all the info about the Lorraine Campaign and places every word in logical sequence to events?

Patton had NO choice. It WAS the correct strategy. The only problem was he was about to run out of fuel and supples (he was given some fuel in early Sept - but it would only last a few days).

Therefore, because of the lack of supplies and the delay this caused, Patton could NOT advance into Metz and drive to the Rhineland, and thus not be able to end the war in 1944. Instead, he was forced to attack across the Mosselle. Without proper fuel and supplies he could not maneuver.

Add to all of this the terrible rains that descended throughout the three months Patton was in Lorraine dictated that his armoured forces had to stick to the roads, otherwise, his forces would become hopelessly bogged down in the mud.

Anyway, after reading and answering some of the non-stop nonsense over the past few days, I will no longer be participating in this thread.

Nothing is going to be gained.

I just wanted to post that last reply to Kevinugly, and now I am outta here.

I am leaving, not because anyone has "won"; rather, it has now become a complete waste of my time.

It is summertime, the weather here is beautiful, and I'm going to enjoy myself. . .[:)]

I would urge anyone who is interested to learn more about Patton to go to your library and read some good books about him. Don't take anyone's word for it in this thread, which has been dominated by a few individuals who are determined (against much of the evidence) to destroy Patton's Great memory.

I take full responsibility for not defending Patton to the fullest extent and with all the knowledge and books I have with me. But when you have 4 or 5 individuals continually pitted against you, it becomes very, very tiring trying to answer dozens of posts day after day.

Instead I opted to post a few articles in the hopes that people would be able to read about Patton for themselves.

I now leave this thread to those few who remain, so that they can squabble among themselves over "how many angels it really does take to sit on the head of a pin".

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



What? No apology for accussing me of fabricating that Ike quote? [:-]

You stated that Ike ordered Patton to take Metz. He never issued such an order. That's the bottom line.

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Anyway, after reading and answering some of the non-stop nonsense over the past few days, I will no longer be participating in this thread.

Nothing is going to be gained.

I just wanted to post that last reply to Kevinugly, and now I am outta here.

I am leaving, not because anyone has "won"; rather, it has now become a complete waste of my time.

It is summertime, the weather here is beautiful, and I'm going to enjoy myself. . .[:)]

I would urge anyone who is interested to learn more about Patton to go to your library and read some good books about him. Don't take anyone's word for it in this thread, which has been dominated by a few individuals who are determined to destroy Patton's Great memory.

I now leave this thread to those few who remain, so that they can squabble among themselves over "how many angels it really does take to sit on the head of a pin".

This is not the first time you've printed this message. I'm sure you won't stay away!

I printed an article which concludes that Patton made some serious errors of judgement attempting to capture the fortified city of Metz. You attacked those conclusions so I asked you to offer your own analysis of why. All you produced were the same old excuses of 'it was the weather' or 'it was the lack of supplies' without offering up anything on Patton's chosen tactics - the main point of the article I posted. I would suspect that this is because you have nothing and so are flouncing off to worship at the shrine to Patton you have sited in some dark recess[:D].

By 'good' books, I presume you mean those that don't portray Patton in anything but the most favourable light[:D]

Enjoy yourself. And thank you for participating in a most 'challenging' thread. If nothing else it's pushed me to find some most interesting information on the net that I otherwise would not have found. It's also broadened my knowledge of Patton, if not quite in the way you would have intended [;)]

My apologies if this post is a bit long, however, I think it is vitally important to read it and understand the situation of Patton and Third Army by September, 1944, before the Battle for Metz started.

Indeed it is, hence my intervention.

When Patton's troops received enough gasoline to resume their advance towards the Moselle on 5 September, after a delay of nearly a week, the troops quickly discovered that the great pursuit was over. Instead of running down the fleeing fragments of shattered German units, soldiers all along Third Army's front encountered enemy soldiers who contested every foot of ground and who counterattacked viciously to recover lost positions.

I don't know why you included this. It suggests Patton's great sweep across France was unnopposed. I thought you were denying this not so long ago?

Why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all?

The REASON is that Patton WAS ORDERED to take Lorraine.

Did you catch that?

That's right, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz:

"Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front.."

I occasionally get the feeling you're not entirely arguing in knowledge of all the facts. There are actually two separate campaigns in Lorraine by Third Army, which you seem to be confusing (for what purpose I can only guess at).

The campaign which attracts the criticism was the second campaign beginning in early November. This is the Metz Campaign. The campaign Patton fought in Early/Mid September brought his forces to the Moselle, but not directly to Metz. He moved up to Metz with a series of small attacks during October, but the assault on the city that is presumably the source of this section of the thread did not begin until early November.

This is where you start to lose the plot.

Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

Actually, no. Patton's September campaign was actually a good one, culminating in 4th Armoured's good performance arround Arracourt defeating a sizeable German counterattack. He didn't attack Metz in this portion of the battle. He was being allowed to advance (his supply situation was not quite as bad as you make out) and was using the advance to convince Bradley he had enough supplies to attack, and thus being allowed to continue.

The real attack on Metz came in November, of which more later.

It seems in the Lorraine Campaign that the Germans had an unwitting ally - the Allied High Command. What the German armies were incapable of doing - stopping Patton - the Allied High Command did it for them.

This statement betrays a complete lack of understanding of the logistical situation facing SHAEF in late august. Third Army did run out of fuel, but to blame this on Allied High Command is shallow. Firstly, supplies were still being hauled from the Normandy beachheads on the other side of France. The Red Ball Express Convoys were guzzling the equivalent of an Army's fuel hauling the fuel across France. The speed of the advance across France meant they were going further and further every day, and the round trip was becoming longer and longer. The trucks were working non stop and suffering attrition as a result. To accuse the Allied High Command over this is shallow, three new American divisions arrived in france and were promptly immobilised to allow their organic transport to be given to the Red Ball Express to try and cope with the logistical demands placed upon it. SHEAF was trying it's best. but it was simply not possible to keep all the forward Armies supplied. Everybody ran out of steam, because they outran the capabilities (excellent though they were) of the logistics system set up to supply them. Between August 25 and September 6, the Red Ball Express consumed 300 000 tons of gasoline a day in order to supply the front line units with just under 90 000 tons of supplies.

Read on:


SITUATION OF THIRD ARMY AT METZ


************************

Shortage of Fuel

Although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, by August 31, Third Army received NO gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River.

For the next 5 days, Third Army was virtually immobilized.

Why?

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

This is a good bit. Gasoline was indeed plentiful in Normandy, but then Patton wasn't in Normandy, but the other side of France and fuel had to be driven across France to reach him. Therefore, the fact fuel was plentiful in Normandy is irrelevant.

This also touches on the Patton Legend's assertion that given the fuel, he could have entered Germany through an undefended Metz and ended the war by christmas. SHAEF considered this option in August as he moved across France. Their conclusion was that the logistical system was only capable of carrying him and perhaps 10-12 divisions through the German border as far as Frankfurt. However, they could only do this by immobilising everybody else as far back as the Seine and using the transport to supply Patton. They concluded that 10-12 divisions defending a narrow corridor as much as 500 km long into Germany would be exceptionally vulnerable to the Germans as they regrouped, and that if Patton got into a fight (as he undoubtedly would once the Germans realised what was happening) every other Allied soldier in Europe would be unable to help because they would be immobilised on the Seine. They considered it militarily nonsense. They further concluded that even if attempted, Patton would receive little or no air support, because supplies would not exist to establish, support and defend forward airfields.

Patton's troops captured some gasoline from the Germans, hijacked some from First Army depots, and received some gasoline by air, but when gasoline receipts finally increased to the point that the advance could be resumed, the opportunity of sweeping through Lorraine unopposed had passed.

This had some effect, but it was a mammoth effort by the Red Ball Express that permitted a limited supply improvement, resulting in the resumption of offensive operations in early September when daily tonnage increased by about 500 tons.

As for:

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

Yes he did, for good reason. Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that a single thrust into Germany was all that could be sustained logistically. There were sound military reasons for that thrust to be in the north around the Ruhr, rather than in Patton's sector.

1. A thrust along the northern coast of France would give the Allies a chance to capture channel ports close to England, thus considerably shortening the supply lines which ran back to Normandy.

2. Along the northern coast, a thrust would have the benefit of air cover and tactical air support from England.

3. It would also have the support of American and Royal Naval vessels in the channel.

Therefore, 21st Army group was given priority, and Hodge's 1st US Army was given US priority as it would be advancing on 21st Army Group's right flank with responsibility of covering that flank.

Therefore, Patton was halted for sound military reasons. Had he been pushed on, he would have been bereft of support and would have been defeated on the German border or just beyond. He would have had little air support and flanks stretching 500 km. There would have been no possibility of other Allied forces moving to his aid. Only in the Patton legend is this manouevre possible.

************************

Shortage of Supplies


The gasoline shortage was followed by a shortage of ammunition, particularly in the larger artillery calibers that had not been in great demand during the fluid pursuit. By 10 September, Third Army's artillery batteries received only one-third of a unit of fire per day. Other shortages would crop up as the campaign progressed. At one time or another, rations, clothing, mattress covers, coffee, tires, tobacco, antifreeze, winter clothing, and overshoes would all be in critically short supply.

Supply issues in September are not relevant to the second campaign in November where most of the criticism stems. Also, as I've illustrated, this wasn't anybody's fault. the supply situation was critical, Eisenhower's strategy demanded a northern thrust. In November, there were indeed further logistical problems, but Patton was not being ordered to attack Metz at this time.

At the same time that the Germans received reinforcements, Patton's Third Army was being trimmed down. In the pursuit across France, Third Army had controlled four far-flung corps, but during September two of those corps were REMOVED from Patton's command.

Just before the Battle of Metz, Patton's Third Army was cut in half.

"For most of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army would consist of two corps, the XX and the XII. Four to six infantry divisions and two or three armored divisions would carry the bulk of the burden for the next 3 months."

Some good points here although I suspect your chronology is dodgy, although it begs the question why Patton attacked with this reduced force in November at a point in time he wasn't being ordered to.

************************

Shortage of Air Power

Patton's arsenal for the Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the pursuit across France. Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC flew 12,000 sorties in support of Third Army during August, but in September, TACs efforts would be divided between the Lorraine front and the battles being waged to reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the French coast. As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be increasingly frustrated by poor weather.

Therefore, before the Battle for Metz began, Patton lost HALF of his airforce!

So why fight?

************************

Conclusion


Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, which Patton WAS ORDERED to pursue, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets.

You're mixing two campaigns again. The campaign you're concentrating on is one of his better ones, the September attacks into Lorraine.

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz.

He allowed them the chance to advance after Patton crossed the Moselle in sufficient strength. Bradley was giving out advance warnings to Patton that Market Garden would have to take priority and offensive action would be curtailed. Prior to that, Eisenhower was doing all he could for third Army without jeopardising his operational plan for the sensible northern thrust. He authorised the increase in supplies that resulted in the 5th September operational restart.

With all these handicaps, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

Again, Metz came in November, not September. Many of the things you complain about were not part of the equation in September. The weather and air support issues were issues in November, not in early September.

The operations in November were essentially agreed as the Queen plan which grew out of a series of meetings Ike had with senior Commanders on Sept 21. For Third Army, the order was that it would advance only when "logistics permit". It's primary function would be at that point protecting Hodges flank.
Bradley was allocating the bulk of his supplies to the 1st and 9th US armies, in conjunction with the general strategic plan. However, Patton wanted to attack, and Bradley agreed to let him provided the plans were for only a limited move up to the west wall, which Bradley felt the supply situation might be able to support. Patton's start date was 10 November, but he persistently asked to be able to go earlier, evenetually getting Bradley to agree to him attacking on 2 November, although the rains intervened and prevented the assault starting until 8 November. Therefore, Patton requested permission to attack, and was granted it. To suggest he was unwilling or somehow made this attack because Bradley forced him to is nonsense.

IronDuke.

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Anyway, after reading and answering some of the non-stop nonsense over the past few days, I will no longer be participating in this thread.

I've tried this, and it isn't easy.

Nothing is going to be gained.

I just wanted to post that last reply to Kevinugly, and now I am outta here.

I am leaving, not because anyone has "won"; rather, it has now become a complete waste of my time.

This is for Forum readers to decide individually after assessing the evidence and arguments presented by both sides.

It is summertime, the weather here is beautiful, and I'm going to enjoy myself. . .[:)]

I wish you all the best and hope the weather holds.

I would urge anyone who is interested to learn more about Patton to go to your library and read some good books about him. Don't take anyone's word for it in this thread, which has been dominated by a few individuals who are determined (against much of the evidence) to destroy Patton's Great memory.

Absolutely.

I would suggest D'Este's biography. There are interesting sections in there. My posts on the strategic pointlessness of the Sicily operation and the Hammelburg raid were largely based on D'Este. In addition to the biography, D'Este's "Bitter victory" was also a prime source for my comments on Sicily.

For Patton's actions in Normandy, my references were D'este "Decision in Normandy". Hasting's "Overlord". Robin Neillands "The battle for Normandy". Russell Weigley "Eisenhower's Lieutenants."

For Patton at the Bulge: "Men of Steel" by Michael Reynolds. "The Battle of the bulge" by Charles b MacDonald. "Hitler's last gamble" George Forty. For the quality of the forces facing Patton, Nafziger's OOB on infantry, Mitcham's "Hitler's Legions" and Macdonald's appendix on the forces involved in the battle. I am indebted to the posters who chipped in with the OKW war diary to support me.

I also used excerpts from John Ellis's "Brute Force".

Instead I opted to post a few articles in the hopes that people would be able to read about Patton for themselves.

It was more than a few, and that was what we were all doing to be fair. I hope the scholarly efforts I've quoted above will complement the websites you have been freely citing. I too would advise everyone to read further if the subject interests them. My recommendations are above.

Ironduke

ORIGINAL: freeboy

This has been an interestiing thread to read.. and while I do not share Iron Dukes disdain for Paton, I would like less general and more specifics.. for instance ID, ironduke, states Paton incorrectly turned into Britany, why? Third army was held up in France on orders from above, why is this seen at Avranches and later in not allowing paton to race to Luxemburg as a strategic error? Does anyone really believe Patons forces could not have easily defeated a remnant army in france, with the overwelming supplies and air power, before these same two assets where squandered in pushing slowly up the coast?

Ok Paton was criticised in Sicaly, he pushed his troops to get forward faster... again help me out here.. do not see the problem.. and in North Africa he took over a pretty directionless command and seemingly overnight had the situation righted...
I do conceed legends are always bigger than the actual men .. but is he not at least a good, competent aggressive corp commander?

Iron duke, I never saw your response, to why Monty who was slow but won... request.. feel fre to toss it in...
I finally mean no disrespect for those who disagree, I actually consider myself better educated than most History profs I knew in the Ivy league scxhool I went to, in terms of modern military histroy and weapons, and still consider myself a student not a Historian!
please help me understand youe point of view...


Freeboy,
I apologise, I did promise, I did start it and have a wordpad doc somewhere (You might regret asking for this) however, it will make for a good discussion. I'm just off to type Monty into Google and start looking for evidence .

Regards (and apologies)
Ironduke


Why don't you start a monty thread, this place is tiring me out...
thanks again
m

Freeboy, the problem for the Allied offensive was that, following the initial hold-up in Normandy, it reached the Seine river on schedule and then advanced even faster than that. They basically over-extended their supply lines. The problem for Patton's 3rd Army is that they were furthest from the Normandy supply ports and, as has been pointed out, the cost of maintaining them in Eastern France was astronomical. Had he been given priority for the supplies it still is considered unlikely his 10-12 divisions would have been enough to defeat the Reich. Patton might have been able to destroy more of the German army in France but he would still have run into the same supply problems. There are plenty of 'what-if's' concerning Patton in France and with Monty too. Falaise, Market-Garden, Lorraine, Antwerp, the 'Bulge' all could have been different.

Oh and if you think this thread has been tiring for you .............. just think of us poor grunts who've been slogging it out in the trenches[:D]

kev,
My biggest askiii was simply, why could not these divisions of Pattons encircled all the active wermatct west of say Brussels? supported by follow on units .. monty etc.. remember those germans who stood and fought had a terrible supply line into France, daily bomber raids before the late fall weather slowed this... I see lots of statements of the nature of "this couldn't be done" I have no problem wiht opinions.. I simply ask why?

Why Why Why...???
Not to pour salt in the wounds caused here, I'm only asking how poeple are so set that this total encirclement theory is off base? also above looking for ID's defence of his statement "at least Monty Won" ... etc etc etc ...
thanks guys.. again I don;'t mind differing opinions and I really am not interested in winnig a debate, more curious why poeple I respect hold such contrary views to my own... thanks all

Matthew the freeboy

ORIGINAL: freeboy

kev,
My biggest askiii was simply, why could not these divisions of Pattons encircled all the active wermatct west of say Brussels? supported by follow on units .. monty etc.. remember those germans who stood and fought had a terrible supply line into France, daily bomber raids before the late fall weather slowed this... I see lots of statements of the nature of "this couldn't be done" I have no problem wiht opinions.. I simply ask why?

Why Why Why...???

Matthew the freeboy

Cheers Matthew, I hadn't read your previous post for some time and it was late and I was tired (and,and,and ..... etc.)

My take on this is that there are several reasons this didn't happen.

Firstly, it would have required a major change in Allied strategy to switch 3rd Army in a big 'left-hook' to trap the German armies fleeing into Belgium. Additionally, Devers 6th Army Group had landed/was intended to land (depends on the timeline) in Southern France and a major drive into Belgium would have left them dangerously exposed.

Secondly, there would have been massive political fallout since it would have appeared that the Allied armies were not going to liberate France as a whole on schedule. At the time I doubt that an argument 'but it will/may end the war more quickly' would wash with the likes of De Gaulle and the Free French. Part of the rationale behind Eisenhowers 'broad front' strategy was to drive the Germans out of France.

Thirdly, the Germans were retreating so quickly that I'm not sure any encircling maneouvre would have trapped a significant German force. Intel was that the Germans were beaten in the West and Allied command wanted to keep them that way.

I'll be interested to read the 'Dukes take on this.

Right, those are good points, sounds political.. do you see a strictly military reason? thanks again
m
freeboy