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RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 am
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: spence
Logistically speaking, Midway is much longer than 3 weeks. It took a long time to get into position, and longer still to build up the supplies and fuel reserves at forward points. It involved more than 200 ships - and was virtually the same size as an invasion of Hawaii in 1941 would have been in terms of ship counts.
Given that all the logistics preparation took more than 3 weeks the fact remains that whatever the preparation the Combined Fleet burned 1/3rd of their yearly planned expediture sailing around for about 3 weeks.
The Midway Operation put 200 ships to sea but the lift of ground forces was 2 battalions of assault troops and a base force because most were warships....somehow I find the assertion that the same transport force could have lifted 3 assault divisions (presumably plus support/occupation forces) unsupportable.
IF such an assertion were made, I would agree with you. Because I DO agree with you, I did NOT make that assertion.
But as a sailor and a loggie doggie wannabe student of things like fuel consumption (I have a shelf of books dedicated to logistics, including offical manuals) - I must point out that transport ships are notoriously efficient things fuel / lift wise. Dunnigan reports - in our generation - it costs only 8 cents worth of fuel oil to move 100 metric tons 1000 nautical miles.
The thing that eats fuel in a major naval operation is the fast warships - not the slow transport ships. The earlier the operation is done, the less shipping (= fuel) that would be required. Over time, Japanese planning had to continually increase the assets - because the defenses increased. This happened slowly pre war - but much more rapidly once the war began. I don't think the Japanese could have won the battle they attempted to fight in 1942 - even had the opening round sank all three US Carriers without significant cost. By the time they planned to get to Oahu proper - it was going to be a far more difficult operation than it would have been nearly a year earlier. This op is ONLY feasible in 1941. And the great strategic benefits to Japan - a truly free hand in the SRA - is ONLY possible if it attempts it at the start of the war. Australia may not be able to cut a deal with the USA - or may not want to given how little the USA can send its way.
It is almost a perfect battle insofar as Japan is fighting over something it can afford to lose, but the US cannot disregard it - even if it were willing to do so. Alaska was (and is) regarded as expendable: it is the only state where the President has authority in peacetime to force US citizens to abandon their property. We can come back years after an invasion - or never - but either way the country is not in peril - so the Army reasoning goes. [1/5 of US territory, 3/4 of US coastline - it lacks any naval bases at all today - and has only two brigades - both of which are substantially gone almost all the time]
Well - Hawaii isn't like that. If the US is going to fight in the Western Pacific - it needs Hawaii - and it cannot afford an enemy sub and fleet base in the center of the pond. So the US WILL fight over Hawaii - and that is exactly where Japan is best off if the US is at. Because what it needs to take - and hold - is thousands of miles away.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 12:03 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: JeffK
Iff the japanese got the HI how long would the Allied counterinvasion take.
I would assume that OZ would be left to its own devices and the 1st Marine Div & Americal kep to defend the Fatherland. "Torch" would have been put on hold and many Air units that IRL went to Europe/Africa would be kept on the West Coast
As the landings at Tarawa showed, the US still had a lot to learn about Amphib landings, and its a long haul from the West Coast to HI in the face of the japanese subs and Betties.
The real place you see our lack of amphib expertise is the (almost unknown) Aleutians campaign. We actually managed to fight the Canadian Army!!! Brilliant generalship that - US and Canadians landed on opposite ends of a L shaped valley - and thought the Japanese were in the middle. When they spotted enemy troops - they began to shoot - and of course when they saw troops shooting at them - the ones not already shooting started shooting back. Never occurred to anyone to put recon on the ground to confirm old photographs. Lots of stuff like that became lessons learned.
It would depend on lots of things - but probably not until several Essex were finished. And there was a big gap between the first few and the bulk - for various reasons - a gap that was not going to be narrowed significantly. Absent bases to cover from - only mobile air would do - and that was something that itself was a bad idea. Only at Guadalcanal did we attempt an invasion out of range of land based air support - and we decided it was a mistake - so we wrote a doctrine that said 'don't do that.' Well - at Hawaii - you would have to do that - unless somehow you could come up from the SW and get Johnston Island first.
Then too there were no ready troops. The best division before the war was the Hawaii division - and it would be gone. The Marines had lost most of their pre war organization to building up many units - and so the force that went into Guadalcanal is the first significant force available. It isn't enough - probably - and there won't be enough carriers - probably - until later. MAYBE you could get RN to help - MAYBE you could commit our training carrier - and probably you still have USS Hornet. Hornet, Ranger, Wasp, and Illustrious or two - not big enough. You need to wait for the first three Essex - to train up a proper landing force - and to acquire enough modern planes to make a good job of it. Knowing what you just learned about zeros' and oscars' you might be loth to engage with early planes in limited numbers. Probably not until sometime in 1943 could an effective campaign be mounted. The sooner you try it - the more likely it would fail.
Meanwhile there will be no Battle of the Coral Sea. No stopping limited forces offensives in the Western Pacific. This is almost dreamland for the Japanese - IF the naval thinkers could have influence on strategic options.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 12:11 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: spence
The Japanese were not the ones to learn from though. Their Khota Bharu landing put a division ashore in the face of a battalion of enemy stretched over 20 miles of coast.
Take another look. It isn't battalions that start at Kota - it is brigades - plural. You have to be reading something very narrow to allege a battalion stretched over 20 miles of coast. Further - they had more than light infantry weapons - because they were able to set ships afire at night. There was artillery in effective support.
Granted that the Japanese had remarkably good intel in Malaya - and may have had some idea where to land in a tactical sense - they got it wrong at Kota. The troops could not reach the waterline - and had to wade ashore in too deep water. They had to rally in the water - organize and attack out of it across open beach - and they did. It was a bit of a nightmare - as such things often turn out to be. [I learned the old school amphib art on an APA, and I never liked the idea of going ashore in landing craft - open top boxes that make about 8 knots - less in many conditions. And when they hit the beach - whatever protection you had goes away when the ramp goes down. A sailor who crews a landing craft in an opposed landing in USN - and lives - is automatically promoted. And no one wants to get a promotion that way.]
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 12:21 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: spence
Their plan to invade Midway had two battalions that couldn't even talk to each other or their ships or friendly a/c with nothing more than a couple of mortars in support wading through 200 yards of surf to assault 2500 odd fully alerted defenders.
This is an interesting allegation. Based on what? I don't believe it can be true. The Japanese had a range of signals equipment - and both naval troops and Army troops trained for amphibious operations were able to communicate - day or night - by various means. Granted we have lost the art today - even a generation after WWII US sailors didn't need radio's to communicate - and every squad had a proper signalman in it - never mind every petty officer was supposed to have basic skills. The Japanese didn't have the best radio equipment in the world - they used superregenerative recievers rather than superheterodyne - but they had a full range of tactical and operational radio equipment. They had quite servicable wire equipment. But equipment is not entirely the point: it requires NO equipment to use semaphore (flags help but are not required) or runners; it requires almost no equipment to use blinking lights - visible and invisible.
Professional soldiers will tell you never to count on something like "the enemy cannot communicate with each other."
Probably it isn't so - and if you depend on it - you will be sorry. It is far safer to assume he is competent in the basics than stupid and unable to organize or use things he always has (like his arms, a flashlight, etc).
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 12:33 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
In terms of amphibious operations, the IJA was the most experienced of the major powers by 1941. However in terms of amphibious assault, they enchewed this, like the British, they felt it was not a feasible option. Only the USMC studied the concept of assault with enthusiasm though it would take real life practice to work out the kinks. (and a generous supply of dedicated assault craft) There is some dispute in sources other than Shattered Sword as to coordination with air and sea bombardment support that say it was there though not to the level of a late war assault.
The Wake Island op is IMO an unfair comparison....it was an inadequate effort using 2nd team materials and they paid the price for their lack of preperation. Same goes for Midway.....the force levels deployed were totally inadequate to the realities present as the Japanese assumed the advantage of suprise was in their favor. Wake was also an example of Amphibious Assault if a reletively weak garrison. Had the Japanese taken the Island more seriously (as every WitP player does) it would probably have not been the fiasco it was initially.
As for Hawaii.....if the Japanese were to have had any chance it would have had to have been around the time of Pearl Harbor. By Midway, SS makes it pretty clear that the force levels at Oahu would have been all but impossible to crack. The sea lift required combined with the distances would have been cost prohibitive with a high chance of failure and/or bogging down. I don't buy the "One Japanese division is worth Two Allied divisions" blanket statement. It depends on the specific opponent. And IIRC, the 25th Inf Div was regular army...not conscript/National Guard. They would not have rolled over and played dead. Nor do I assume the Japanese would have captured substantial oil reserves from the assault. Its just as likely these reserves would have been torched rather than be let fall into enemy hands. Taking Hawaii would be a great blow to the US but not IMO worth holding up the SRA ops (from which the force levels would have to be taken from to do this operation) Japan needed the SRA for her future economy and Hawaii is no substitute for that, nor would Hawaii's fall bring the US to the peace table.
I generally agree - but the Washington Army National Guard would take strong exception to saying it was not part of the division! They regard it as the best Army unit of the Pacific campaign. At the time the war began the division had a Hawaii NG regiment - at about 2/3 strength: only in 1942 was that combined with the other HNG regiment - and replaced by the WARNG regiment. In compensation, you still have four regiments of regulars - trained to the highest standards that existed (if only WWI levels of equipment - right down to the helmits - and tactics) in the US at the time. They would certainly not roll over and play dead. The Japanese could count on winning - and did win in fact - for lots of reasons - and of course it is true the circumstances matter. But this is a planned offensive - it involves reducing the defenses by bombing before the landings - and that is a sound concept. I think parties might survive the entire war in the mountains - but that isn't the same thing as controlling the island - or driving 30,000 men into the sea (an all up Japanese division). Never mind two or three times that. Take a look at the tanks that surrounded Government House in Honolulu - it should be "tanks" in quotes - and you will have a sense of the state of things. I don't mean to say the IJA could take on twice its number and win without preparation, planning and support - or without putting competent commanders in charge. But rather with all those things.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 12:38 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Its certainly risky. While the Japanese had been able to capture supplies in some campaigns to propell their operations one can't count on it in all situations. The Imphal campaign is a good example there. They came close to capturing a major supply dump but close wasn't good enough in the end. Capturing oil in quantity....any assumption that they would is definately best case scenario.......but worst case scenario planning is often better, and more likely to occur.
I agree in principle. In particular about a military operation. What can go wrong will go wrong kind of thing. I am famous for being a 'pessimist' and for things 'never going as bad as we thought they might' - which is exactly where I want to be. But in a sense - my assumption is exactly that - from a US point of view. Studying Oahu - I am an engineer and I had US officers and historians with me - we could not figure out any way to get rid of the oil very fast - nor prevent some significant fraction of it being recovered? It is a much bigger problem that it sounds like at first blush. And then too - at what point does anyone even try to do something? By that time, is anyone able to do anything much? Hard to know.
That the operation is risky is beyond dispute. But it is an unusual kind of risk involved here: the STRATEGIC point is that it is going to work even if it fails. The US is going to defend Hawaii - and it probably has to retake many if not all of its islands - and it is going to lose a lot in the process. Whatever the situation at the end of the battle, the US is not going to be in the position it is without an invasion of the Central Pacific area in force. And that means Japan is inherantly better off in the SRA than it can otherwise be. I assume that some level of casualties - particularly of ships or aircraft - is above a tolerable threshold for the Japanese - and at that point the offensive stops - at least for a while. Details don't matter - Yamamoto was right - and it is the best opening move.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 2:15 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
[It appears that Tsuji was able to get along with people as diverse as Adm Yamamoto and the later Prime Minister of Thailand. Also, and somewhat remarkably, with KMT officers - whom he spent a good deal of time with after the war (when officially he was supposed to be in hiding). Remarkable he could do that among his nominal erstwhile enemies.ote
A statement which is supposed to mean what?
But here, if you get technical about it, he admits to a form of lieing - or at least attempted lieing:
His book retraction didn't require any technical explanation.
To think that because he is a Japanese nationalist and a strong willed one means he is a liar is, in my view, to misunderstand his character.
I don't recall labeling him as a "liar" I said he was capable of bending the truth, or distorting it if it suited his purposes. I also said that his background did not automatically disqualify everything he stated from having any accuracy, but rather that you had to take it with a grain of salt. His reliability remains questionable in my opinion and I stand by it.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 2:26 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
The Japanese could count on winning - and did win in fact - for lots of reasons - and of course it is true the circumstances matter. But this is a planned offensive - it involves reducing the defenses by bombing before the landings - and that is a sound concept. I think parties might survive the entire war in the mountains - but that isn't the same thing as controlling the island - or driving 30,000 men into the sea (an all up Japanese division). Never mind two or three times that. Take a look at the tanks that surrounded Government House in Honolulu - it should be "tanks" in quotes - and you will have a sense of the state of things. I don't mean to say the IJA could take on twice its number and win without preparation, planning and support - or without putting competent commanders in charge. But rather with all those things.
It will have to be a very well planned offensive and it will require at least 4 divisions, 5 i'd say. I would assume any amphibious landing would involve "bombing the enemy". Kind of a no brainer don't you think? How effective that bombing would be is another matter. KB, as others will point out strongly......is not a siege engine, its a raiding force. It's ability to support a ground campaign is limited by time even if one assumes as successful a suppression of the airforce as they achieved.
That the operation is risky is beyond dispute. But it is an unusual kind of risk involved here: the STRATEGIC point is that it is going to work even if it fails. The US is going to defend Hawaii - and it probably has to retake many if not all of its islands - and it is going to lose a lot in the process. Whatever the situation at the end of the battle, the US is not going to be in the position it is without an invasion of the Central Pacific area in force. And that means Japan is inherantly better off in the SRA than it can otherwise be.
I don't agree with that at all. If the offensive fails than Japan is in trouble and the disention between the IJN and IJA from the lost troops and equipment would likely cause great disruption in their future planning ops. The loss of Hawaii is not going to change the US attitude, it will in fact strengthen it because of the loss of home soil. If we can get bent out of shape from losing two insignfigant pieces of real estate up north, than the theoretical loss of Hawaii would cause an even stronger reaction. I don't assume either that the US will "lose alot in the process" either though its possible but irrelevent in the strategic sense. How Japan is better off in the SRA? troops needed for that op will be busy in Hawaii....the IJN will be tied up far from it's bases, air assets will need to be diverted and the US now has a clear path to Japan without the distractions of the South Pacific. Maybe if they win a few carrier battles the optimal sitaution you postulate will come to pass. Its possible, but again hardly written in stone anymore than the success of occupying Oahu, and a full occupation is what it would take for your scenario to succeed.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 8:21 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
[It appears that Tsuji was able to get along with people as diverse as Adm Yamamoto and the later Prime Minister of Thailand. Also, and somewhat remarkably, with KMT officers - whom he spent a good deal of time with after the war (when officially he was supposed to be in hiding). Remarkable he could do that among his nominal erstwhile enemies.ote
A statement which is supposed to mean what?
REPLY: It was meant as a polite contradiction of the proposition no one got along with him - or at least the implication from the examples cited. Not to say that those examples are untrue - but that they should not stand alone to represent a complete picture of the man.
But here, if you get technical about it, he admits to a form of lieing - or at least attempted lieing:
His book retraction didn't require any technical explanation.
REPLY: WHAT book retraction? Tsuji was not "surfaced" very long - he wrote only two books - and went back underground - in SE Asia - to a fate unknown. He didn't have very much time to write memoirs and we have never found his personal papers. He was a politician in that period - head of a non-majority party in the National Diet in fact.
Much of the time in the open was spent writing the books - so there isn't that much time in which he could have retracted anything. Not that Tsuji was unwilling to take blame for things - he does so without being asked remarkably often.
But I am not aware of any retraction of anything he ever wrote - and if there is supposed to have been such a thing - we better check when it was done - and if it was done - what was going on that might have been a factor? It is alleged that he went to work for US intelligence - and so the story might be very complicated in that era. This was the era in which Noguchi bought freedom with radium from Tsuji's yard - and the CIA sold it to fund ops it could never get the President of Congress to approve. It was an era in which the CIA felt perfectly justified in manipulating who became President of the Philippines - every time - and the kinds of deals it cut were remarkable in several senses. It was sometimes manipulated by those dealing with it - see the case of Gen Ichii (the BW guy - cought three times not turning over all he had agreed to do - and we never did get it all - but we were too embarassed - and afraid of what might come out of use to the Russians - to prosecute). The CIA in that era believed in BW and even RW weapons - even for "peacetime" use - and funded development - and tests - entirely separate from DOD work - except it used USN and USAF aircraft for real world experiments in Korea (not one or two - thousands of sortees). IF Tsuji entered the mirky world of Cold War intel in that period the picture gets very complex indeed, and may not be one we will be able to understand. I find it hard to accept he would do that - he considered Justice Santos a traitor to Asia for serving a US regime after all - but he MIGHT have been ORDERED to do it - and in the context of Russia as a possible threat and the US as a new ally - he MIGHT have done so.
To think that because he is a Japanese nationalist and a strong willed one means he is a liar is, in my view, to misunderstand his character.
I don't recall labeling him as a "liar" I said he was capable of bending the truth, or distorting it if it suited his purposes. I also said that his background did not automatically disqualify everything he stated from having any accuracy, but rather that you had to take it with a grain of salt. His reliability remains questionable in my opinion and I stand by it.
I think that Tsuji reveals a great deal more about himself in his "other" book - which is virtually unavailable in the United States - than he does in his more famous one about Malaya. He accounts for his years in hiding in detail, with many flashbacks to the war and prewar period. When I did an inter-library loan search, I found only 12 copies existed in libraries in the USA - and only one of those (UCLA if I remember right) would send it out. I tend to write in the context of what I know - but a lot of what I know about Tsuji directly is from this very little read material - and I keep forgetting that many will not have tracked it down. I made archival copies of hundreds of its pages - as I had to send the book back.
It may be that Nik didn't mean to call Tsuji a liar - others have and did - but distortion is a form of lieing - if only in degree. Trained to use deception professionally - originally electronic deception - I submit that a subtile change is much more effective than a blatant 100% deception - most of the time. The problem with evaluating people IRL - particularly with limited data - is that communication is at best a subjective and imperfect process. Communication across cultural and linguistic lines is notoriously much more imprefect, full of many opportunities to misunderstand. That someone says something that isn't true does not mean they lied about it - not difinitively in every case. Further - that the evaluator "knows" it isn't true does not even mean it isn't true - a fact untrained evaluators may not be aware of. It takes an open mind to probe for real truth - and the possibility we have it wrong almost always exists. If you don't approach events and people during forinsic investigation with this attitude - you will tend to not get past your own ignorance, assumptions, etc. Working with a detective once, I was told: "I like working with you. You don't like to put people in jail. I never have to worry about if we got it wrong? You never want to believe something bad until the evidence drags you, kicking and screaming, to the conclusion there is no other possibility. On the other hand, I LIKE to put people in jail, and I am no better than the average cop in the USA - I am wrong about 10% of the time." So you see it is my SOP NOT to jump to conclusions - to look for possibilities instead of certainties - and to try to get inside another person's mind set in order to grasp why he or she might or might not do this or that? This is a pretty demanding way to proceed - but essential if you really are passionate about forinsic evaluation leading to probably correct conclusions. And whatever else may be said, it is always said that I passionately care about whatever I look at.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 8:48 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
The Japanese could count on winning - and did win in fact - for lots of reasons - and of course it is true the circumstances matter. But this is a planned offensive - it involves reducing the defenses by bombing before the landings - and that is a sound concept. I think parties might survive the entire war in the mountains - but that isn't the same thing as controlling the island - or driving 30,000 men into the sea (an all up Japanese division). Never mind two or three times that. Take a look at the tanks that surrounded Government House in Honolulu - it should be "tanks" in quotes - and you will have a sense of the state of things. I don't mean to say the IJA could take on twice its number and win without preparation, planning and support - or without putting competent commanders in charge. But rather with all those things.
It will have to be a very well planned offensive and it will require at least 4 divisions, 5 i'd say. I would assume any amphibious landing would involve "bombing the enemy". Kind of a no brainer don't you think? How effective that bombing would be is another matter. KB, as others will point out strongly......is not a siege engine, its a raiding force. It's ability to support a ground campaign is limited by time even if one assumes as successful a suppression of the airforce as they achieved.
I quite agree that KB is not able to sustain air operations. I mean explicitly that land based Japanese air is the instrumentality for reducing Oahu. Take temporary control of the area, land on the outer islands and put those fields in service, and use them to sustain presence - keeping reinforcement out and reducing the defenses. Further - it isn't the beach defenses I am talking about - but the giant guns of Fort Ruger. There are only two of these - and both are on open wholly exposed mounts that can not be relocated (it takes many months to mount them). You don't go in until they go down - and it won't be hard to tell (but it might be possible to decive).
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 8:53 pm
by DuckofTindalos
It's a fantastically complicated plan, and most complicated plans go wrong very quickly. Pie-in-the-sky.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 8:58 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
That the operation is risky is beyond dispute. But it is an unusual kind of risk involved here: the STRATEGIC point is that it is going to work even if it fails. The US is going to defend Hawaii - and it probably has to retake many if not all of its islands - and it is going to lose a lot in the process. Whatever the situation at the end of the battle, the US is not going to be in the position it is without an invasion of the Central Pacific area in force. And that means Japan is inherantly better off in the SRA than it can otherwise be.
I don't agree with that at all. If the offensive fails than Japan is in trouble and the disention between the IJN and IJA from the lost troops and equipment would likely cause great disruption in their future planning ops. The loss of Hawaii is not going to change the US attitude, it will in fact strengthen it because of the loss of home soil. If we can get bent out of shape from losing two insignfigant pieces of real estate up north, than the theoretical loss of Hawaii would cause an even stronger reaction. I don't assume either that the US will "lose alot in the process" either though its possible but irrelevent in the strategic sense. How Japan is better off in the SRA? troops needed for that op will be busy in Hawaii....the IJN will be tied up far from it's bases, air assets will need to be diverted and the US now has a clear path to Japan without the distractions of the South Pacific. Maybe if they win a few carrier battles the optimal sitaution you postulate will come to pass. Its possible, but again hardly written in stone anymore than the success of occupying Oahu, and a full occupation is what it would take for your scenario to succeed.
Ironic you call Hawaii "home soil" - it is an accident of history it was US at all - and it is not very like the US to this day. Allegedly the sovereingty movement is more serious now than it ever was a century ago - and involves politicians believing they must pay some sort of lip service even up to the very top. But - yes - it was US soil - just like Guam and the Philippines were. Both were occupied - and we ultimately went back to both - so it is indeed in the same class. But you are being too pessimistic here: unless Japan were truly incompetent it cannot lose a gigantic amount of equipment: it simply stops attacking when the number of ships and / or planes that are not sufficiently operational is inadequate. Naval thinkers are notoriously conservative - and will withdraw to repair. Navies try to preserve their experts too - a captain is permitted to NOT perform his mission IF his motive is to save the ship and crew - and if IJN had problems with officers unwilling to do that - it was led from the top by a commander who insisted on it (and gave orders forbidding suicide for example). To say the outcome of the campaign might not end up with Japanese control of Oahu if things don't go well should not mean there were Midway type reverses. The instruments available to the US were not then capable of such damage. Sure - an enemy usually defeats himself - and if he works at that hard enough - he can always find a way: Japan once torpedoed one of its own command ships off Java. But no single disaster of that sort is going to be decisive in itself for a force of this size. That they might not keep on attacking is the reason the cost of the campaign would not be excessive - the strategic mission is to pin the US - and it virtually must succeed - no matter the details of its execution - wether or not Oahu is taken. Instead of starting from conclusions, you might want to actually study the matter. It is a very sound concept.
If you do not assume the US would "lose a lot in the process" - you are engaged in wishful thinking far more than any advocate of this operation was. Could the two carriers in the Central Pacific stand up to the Kiddo Butai - even if they first joined up? Could they if the one carrier at San Diego joined them? Consider their aircraft (type and number), their abysmal score rates at targets not even shooting at them, and so on. Could the battle fleet not sortee? Could it stand up to the KB? Then consider this KB is not the historical raiding one - but a supported one - sort of Midway in Reverse - with land based recon and bombers also in the picture. The problem is one of sheer size: the US lacks the air power and naval power in theater to stand up to the largest concentration of naval and air power in the world. When you commit obsolescent or inadequately armed aircraft with relatively green crews AND when they are badly outnumbered - well see Bloody Shambles for what to expect. In the game you can "instantly upgrade" aircraft types - but do that IRL and effectiveness goes DOWN for a while - and it isn't that likely to happen (not that you can really do it instantly - the units would not have any spares - and so on). With artificial things like this you still cannot compete - never mind IRL.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Tue Aug 21, 2007 10:19 pm
by Andrew Brown
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
The loss of Hawaii is not going to change the US attitude, it will in fact strengthen it because of the loss of home soil. If we can get bent out of shape from losing two insignfigant pieces of real estate up north, than the theoretical loss of Hawaii would cause an even stronger reaction.
Indeed. In fact, I would guess that if there was a Japanese attempt to invade Hawaii in December 1941, successful or not, then the USA would probably not agreed to the "Germany first" strategy. So a "what if" scenario such as this one should also, in my opinion, include very large increases in US air and ground reinforcements (say, increase the amount of each by at least 50% for the duration of the scenario), plus an advance in US ship arrivals by a few months across the board. On the other hand, some British reinforcements, and all US reinforcements arriving from the ETO in 1945, would not appear, on the assumption that the European war would not be over yet.
Ironically, I suspect the only benificiary of such a strategy by Japan would be Germany.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 1:10 am
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
REPLY: It was meant as a polite contradiction of the proposition no one got along with him - or at least the implication from the examples cited. Not to say that those examples are untrue - but that they should not stand alone to represent a complete picture of the man.
Thats nice, except I never stated noone got along with him. I said that some front line commander's found him intrusive. i.e. meddling, and he could be aggressive enough about it to the point of rudeness.
REPLY: WHAT book retraction?
See Nomonhan by Alvin Coxx for details regarding his confrontation with 26th Infantry regiment commander Sumi. As mentioned, Tsuji's point of view and relating of past battle accounts was not treated as gold by all within the IJA. I find it puzzeling that you keep suggesting his every word should be treated as factual.
It may be that Nik didn't mean to call Tsuji a liar - others have and did - but distortion is a form of lieing - if only in degree.
No "may" about it. Nik did not call Tsuji a liar. Nik stated that Tsuji was perfectly capable of putting his own spin on things which he did according to some RL IJA officers and circles. You can disagree if you wish, but what i read about him doesn't give me any impression that he was some golden boy of truth. I take Tsuji's writings with a grain of salt and caution as a result.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 1:14 am
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
I quite agree that KB is not able to sustain air operations. I mean explicitly that land based Japanese air is the instrumentality for reducing Oahu. Take temporary control of the area, land on the outer islands and put those fields in service, and use them to sustain presence - keeping reinforcement out and reducing the defenses. Further - it isn't the beach defenses I am talking about - but the giant guns of Fort Ruger. There are only two of these - and both are on open wholly exposed mounts that can not be relocated (it takes many months to mount them). You don't go in until they go down - and it won't be hard to tell (but it might be possible to decive).
I have serious doubts about the IJA/N's ability to sustain a land based air offensive so far from their base of operations. Not impossible. I'm not of the group that says that Hawaii is strictly a fantasy operation, but i forsee huge difficulties with consequences for other front line areas that need Japan's attention. It is true however that in WitP, its very easily acomplished due to abstractions in supply and laser pinpoint transfer options for aircraft, ready to go and conduct ops at a moment's notice.
Avoiding the CD guns entirely is Japan's best bet. Land, consolidate and overland march.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 1:37 am
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Ironic you call Hawaii "home soil" -
Ironic that you can't seem to keep yourself from going off on wasteful tangents.
But you are being too pessimistic here: unless Japan were truly incompetent it cannot lose a gigantic amount of equipment: it simply stops attacking when the number of ships and / or planes that are not sufficiently operational is inadequate. Naval thinkers are notoriously conservative - and will withdraw to repair. Navies try to preserve their experts too - To say the outcome of the campaign might not end up with Japanese control of Oahu if things don't go well should not mean there were Midway type reverses.
Amphibious operations were and remain the most complex of operations to undertake. Pessimism is well warrented. The chance for error, setback and outright failure are compounded by the sheer distance involved. Japan has no nearby support net to repair the damaged ships you cite nor replace equipment that is damaged/lost. I never said any setbacks must mean Midway type reverses...that is your invention. The key point is that unless Japan wins decisively and quickly, she will be bogged down on an island and in a major campaign she cannot sustain for long due to the distance.
The instruments available to the US were not then capable of such damage.
I disagree.
But no single disaster of that sort is going to be decisive in itself for a force of this size. That they might not keep on attacking is the reason the cost of the campaign would not be excessive - the strategic mission is to pin the US - and it virtually must succeed - no matter the details of its execution - wether or not Oahu is taken. Instead of starting from conclusions, you might want to actually study the matter. It is a very sound concept.
I suggest you study the matter yourself. Start with Galipolli, and move on to Lunga. And the strategic mission is not pinning the US, its taking the island in full to deny it's use to the US and hold it as a bargaining chip. Pinning the US fleet achieves nothing for Japan if it pins her own fleet and resources in the process as well and any attack on Hawaii will draw a major response from the US making the securing of the island essential.
If you do not assume the US would "lose a lot in the process" - you are engaged in wishful thinking far more than any advocate of this operation was.
If you assume that Japan "must" win, you are engaged in wishful thinking of preportions I can't put on paper much less a forum.
Could the two carriers in the Central Pacific stand up to the Kiddo Butai - even if they first joined up? Could they if the one carrier at San Diego joined them? Consider their aircraft (type and number), their abysmal score rates at targets not even shooting at them, and so on. Consider their aircraft (type and number), their abysmal score rates at targets not even shooting at them, and so on
Depends. On paper, no. But battles rarely occur as they would appear on paper. Ask Nagumo. If the USN carriers rush to action, and assuming KB is not busily engaged in "ground attack" then they retain the edge but even unsuccessful or partially successful attacks will force the IJN to react, maneuver and burn supply. At such distances even a minimum of hits on their carriers will exaserbate the IJN's exposed position. I'm not sure where you get the "abysmal" comment. USN early carrier strikes were not impressive but neither were they toothless. They certainly were not toothless at Coral Sea.
Could the battle fleet not sortee? Could it stand up to the KB? Then consider this KB is not the historical raiding one - but a supported one - sort of Midway in Reverse - with land based recon and bombers also in the picture.
We already know the preposed condition of the US battlefleet. They would stay in the harbor assuming a maximum effort by the IJN added to the damage caused by a suprise attack.
The problem is one of sheer size: the US lacks the air power and naval power in theater to stand up to the largest concentration of naval and air power in the world. When you commit obsolescent or inadequately armed aircraft with relatively green crews AND when they are badly outnumbered - well see Bloody Shambles for what to expect. In the game you can "instantly upgrade" aircraft types - but do that IRL and effectiveness goes DOWN for a while - and it isn't that likely to happen (not that you can really do it instantly - the units would not have any spares - and so on). With artificial things like this you still cannot compete - never mind IRL.
The Japanese problem is lack of ability to deploy the numbers you allude too halfway across the Pacific ocean and supply and maintain them for an extended period. This was not a strong suite for the Japanese. You can cite existing airfield facilities as a counterpoint, the best developed Japanese airfields were the ones they captured after all, but the logistical challenge remains. All this in addition to keeping KB supplied for a mission she was not designed for. If you have the Japanese battlefleet present as well, your logistical challenges are again compounded. I've read Bloody Shambles, and the situation you allude to again bears no meaning here. Malaya was far closer to established Japanese logistical nets and could be supplied and maintained with far greater ease as was the ability to recon' the target.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 1:48 am
by Mike Scholl
One other "little problem" with invading Hawaii at the War's start. Winter is "Big Surf Season" in Hawaii, especially on the North Shore. So even if the CD coverage wasn't as strong on this side, landings were going to be quite difficult on "good days", and suicidal on the "not so good days". And the conditions can change at rather short and unpredictible intervals..., so scheduling would be totally "hit or miss".
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 1:50 am
by Nikademus
LoL, i had occasion to witness that for myself back in 05. Having no fins I was prohibited by the life guards from entering the massive swells, but even had I had some, I probably would have been too chicken to dare the waters. Impressive doesn't do those waves justice compared to the calm Touristy waters of Waikiki.
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 1:59 am
by Dili
Supposing a succefull invasion what were the facilities in Pearl Harbour that could support KidoButai instead of having it return to mainland?
RE: Yamamoto's Plan in action
Posted: Wed Aug 22, 2007 2:07 am
by Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: Dili
Supposing a succefull invasion what were the facilities in Pearl Harbour that could support KidoButai instead of having it return to mainland?
Probably very little..., check out the repair and reclaimation projects the Allies faced when capturing harbors from the Germans. In fact, simply sinking one large vessel in the entrance would neutralize PH (which was what the Captain of the Nevada was worried about, and why she was beached on the point.