Matrix Games Forums

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 2:59 am**

I dont think its possible ..
 
1. The embargo would be meaningless without the DEI & Brunei and the DEI would only agree if the US & UK guaranteed them. Without an embargo there is no war.
 
2. The DEI could not be bought or threatened like Vietnam it would need to be taken , and why take it when you can buy the goods ?
 
Also why would you want to the move to take Java and relative risks is one of the more interesting aspects of play.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 8:58 am**

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I dont think its possible ..

1. The embargo would be meaningless without the DEI & Brunei and the DEI would only agree if the US & UK guaranteed them. Without an embargo there is no war.

2. The DEI could not be bought or threatened like Vietnam it would need to be taken , and why take it when you can buy the goods ?

Also why would you want to the move to take Java and relative risks is one of the more interesting aspects of play.

<sigh>

The fact that the US embargoed oil was the least of Japan's problems resulting from the embargo.

Several other key elements of the embargo which simply do not change ... not even if the Alien Space Bats magic the Japanese into occupation of the DEI ... are -

1) Financial Embargo: The US basically cut the Japs off from credit and banking/exchange facilities at the same time as they cut off the oil (US controlled oil only, of course ... at least directly ...)

This meant that the Japs couldn't finance purchases of oil on the scale required. They would have had to have paid cash in advance, and no economy can do that, not even today. Especially not if one of the world's biggest economies has basically said to the rest of the world "we're out to ruin these bastards financially if they don't change their evil, wicked, ways".

I suppose, theoretically, the British Empire (i.e. the UK) could have financed the Japanese oil purchases ... but, see, there was this thing called "World War Two" going on at the time and, well, most of the BE's finances were going towards buying warmaking stuff ... a lot of it from the US.

So while, theoretically, they could have financed the Japs, they a) didn't have a lot of cash to spare to do it and, well, they weren't stupid ... b) they wanted very much to not piss off the US and have them cut off the war supply tap.

Of course, you could argue that they could have traded oil for guns (war supplies) with the Japs ... except for the minor fact that the Japanese economy was a mosquito compared even to the size of the UK economy, let alone the US economy. So no joy there.

2) The only other major sources of oil are already pretty much spoken for. The DEI and Borneo/Sarawak fields were needed by the British Empire and her allies for the war against Germany.

Even if the Japs get the DEI fields, there are problems there ... see (3), below.

The South American fields ... well, they didn't want to piss off the US, either. Assuming that any of their governments were more than US puppets anyway [;)]

The USSR? Well, it was supplying itself and Germany ... no slack there (and no proved or discovered or accessible fields in eastern Russia, either, so Japan attacking Russia for oil is pointless).

Which leaves ... damn all ...

3) Even if the Japs had a) found the credit and b) found the oil then there was the small problem that they did not have sufficient ships to move it around in real life. Around 20-30 tankers all up, IIRC is all they had in 1940.

Their oil imports had, pre-embargo, been moved in US flagged and owned tankers.

Theoretically, of course, they could have moved it by non-US and non-Japanese tankers ... if they could have found the credit/finance to hire them which, as noted above, wasn't gonna happen ... except for one thing.

This minor thing called "World War Two" which I mentioned already.

Guess who controlled most of the rest of the world's Tankers apart from the US in 1940?

The Allies. Mostly the UK/British Empire and her allies (especially Norway, IIRC).

And what were these tankers doing?

Moving POL around the world for the allies ... and getting sunk by German and Italian forces for their trouble. At a rate close to their production rate.

Not a lot of slack, really.

So, no, the Japs couldn't have avoided the effects of the Embargo for the reasons noted above, even if the Alien Space Bats teleported them into the occupation of the DEI without any foreign interference.

Phil

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 10:00 am**

First, all of this is conjecture. As such, it is impossible for anybody to be right or wrong about any of the particulars regarding this matter. While some events projected in this scenario are more likely than others, no one cane say "That would never have happened". Basically because none of any of this actually happened, any of the possible alternate realities are possible. You can argue for your view point, but I think all of us should stay away from inflamatory statements that could be construed as personal attacks.

"I see your point but I disagree because of A, B, and C" is a much better word choice when trying to foster intelligent discussion than replies that are demeaning, dismissive, or out right insulting

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 10:12 am**

The problem is that no-one really could be sure that this would be what would happen.

The Japanese, for a start, pursued the idea of a massive, decisive, surface fleet vs. surface fleet action with the USN through the whole war.

The fact that it didn't work that way is neither here nor there.

The point is that the Japanese thought that was the way it would (or should) work ... and generally planned accordingly where they could.

Actually most of the IJ high command and planners knew/accepted that Japan would loose a long-term war waged over several years as IJ would not simply have the capacity or resources to out-produce the US + it's Allies. They based their strategy on massive surprise (it certianly was) + hoping that the US would not have the stomach/fight for a long protracted bloody campaign in the Pacific, realise that the PI was not defendable (as the WPO tacticians were still squabbling over, since 1903 in fact) and after the first six months or so of stunning and demoralising victories by the IJ forces, the US would be forced to the negotiating table.
What the IJ planners didn't counter for was just exactly how much the surprise undeclared attack (OK so admittedly the declaration was supposed to have been delivered simulatenously at 1 pm Washington time but was actually 40 minutes late) really ticked off the US, both politicians and jo public. From then on the US were in it for the long-term, no matter how long it took, and Yamamoto was dead right when he said I can think of nothing that would infuriate the Americans more. All we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.

Or, putting it another way ... it wasn't access to resources that lost Japan the war, it was their inability to move those resources back to Japan that lost them the war

For what was basically a recently industrialised island society, Japan never ever realised just how dependant its economy and industries were upon shipping to move said resources and raw materials back to the HI. They never ever set up a convoy system, ASW varied from haphazard to non-existant until '44, and there were insufficient tankers and oilers to move the most precious commodity of all (fuel and oil) back to the HI. In fact in Dec '41 all of Japan's big tankers and oilers were actually purchased or leased from abroad, and incredibly during the conflict precious few further tankers and oilers (of any size) were built at the shipyards...

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 10:12 am**

RUBBER

That's right, rubber.  If Japan held the DEI without a fight in 1941, or even 1940 the US would've been in trouble as it wasn't until 1943 that synthetic rubber was being produced in decent quantities.  The US never rationed gasoline because of it being in short supply, rather they saw it as a way to limit rubber consumption by the public given the military's needs.

FDR was looking for ways to get the USA into the fight against Germany and the Japanese were bound to offer him the chance.  The Japanese would never pull out of China and the US and Commonwealth were bound to conflict with Japan's ambitions.  Sooner or later the Pacific war was inevitable.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 12:04 pm**

ORIGINAL: aspqrz
The problem is that no-one really could be sure that this would be what would happen.

The Japanese, for a start, pursued the idea of a massive, decisive, surface fleet vs. surface fleet action with the USN through the whole war.

The fact that it didn't work that way is neither here nor there.

The point is that the Japanese thought that was the way it would (or should) work ... and generally planned accordingly where they could.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
Actually most of the IJ high command and planners knew/accepted that Japan would loose a long-term war waged over several years as IJ would not simply have the capacity or resources to out-produce the US + it's Allies. They based their strategy on massive surprise (it certianly was) + hoping that the US would not have the stomach/fight for a long protracted bloody campaign in the Pacific, realise that the PI was not defendable (as the WPO tacticians were still squabbling over, since 1903 in fact) and after the first six months or so of stunning and demoralising victories by the IJ forces, the US would be forced to the negotiating table.

And some even "knew" that the chances of the US negotiating even after a devastating Japanese attack (surprise or otherwise) were minimal.

Granted all that.

Their premise was crazy, however - that the only solution to getting the embargo lifted was a military option involving attacking the US.

Within the premise, however, assuming that you are going to attack the US, their plans and assumptions were quite logical ... the need to take the DEI, and the consequent need to "neutralise" the PI and the need consequent to that need to "neutralise" the Pacific Fleet at PH.

One presupposes the next, which presupposes the next.

So, if the Japanese attempt to subvert the intent of the US embargo rather than find a peacefully negotiated compromise involving their stopping some of their nastiness in China, this presupposes that they have accepted that a military solution is, at the very least, extremely (if not overwhelmingly) likely ... and, moreover, that they have accepted the fact that they have to neutralise US capabilities to ensure that their access to DEI resources are not interfered with.

Which means that war remains inevitable. And almost certainly occurs earlier that December 1941 rather than months later.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
What the IJ planners didn't counter for was just exactly how much the surprise undeclared attack (OK so admittedly the declaration was supposed to have been delivered simulatenously at 1 pm Washington time but was actually 40 minutes late) really ticked off the US, both politicians and jo public. From then on the US were in it for the long-term, no matter how long it took, and Yamamoto was dead right when he said I can think of nothing that would infuriate the Americans more. All we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.

As you correctly point out, some of the Japanese commanders had a pretty fair idea of what the US response would be.

IIRC when the Embassy staff from their Washington and UK embassies were repatriated early in 1942 the Japanese set them aside to "wargame" the course of the war ... and wouldn't believe the results that they were handed. Even assuming allied production rates about half of what these experts stated were reality as a precondition, the Admiral in charge of the "Alled" forces had wiped the board of the IJN within a couple of "years" and the Ambassador and his staff had refused to even consider negotiation while successfully fobbing off the Japanese players who remained clewless.

So what did High Command do when they received the results (a decisive allied victory)?

They refused to accept them and professed to believe (and evidently did believe, a lot ... most ... of them, or so it seems) that "bushido" would prevail.

It didn't, of course.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
Or, putting it another way ... it wasn't access to resources that lost Japan the war, it was their inability to move those resources back to Japan that lost them the war

For what was basically a recently industrialised island society, Japan never ever realised just how dependant its economy and industries were upon shipping to move said resources and raw materials back to the HI. They never ever set up a convoy system, ASW varied from haphazard to non-existant until '44, and there were insufficient tankers and oilers to move the most precious commodity of all (fuel and oil) back to the HI. In fact in Dec '41 all of Japan's big tankers and oilers were actually purchased or leased from abroad, and incredibly during the conflict precious few further tankers and oilers (of any size) were built at the shipyards...
[/quote]

Not enough to replace losses.

A lot of the POL they moved around had to be loaded into 44 gallon drums and then loaded on regular merchant ships ... not quite as "efficient" [:D][:D][:D] as loading them into Me-263 Gigants to transport by air from Italy to North Africa, but close [:D][:D][:D]

While nothing is certain in alternate history, the logistics problems facing Japan are not solved, or even significantly modified, by wishing that the DEI is magically made a Japanese possession without any significant allied opposition ... and posters who aren't aware of the problems in those areas should make themselves familiar with them.

Well, that's my .02 Pacific Pesos worth, anyway [;)]

Phil

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 12:07 pm**

There was also the China Lobby who were pushing for increased pressure on Japan. Besides people seem to forget that with the fall of the Netherlands, the US had a great than usual say re DEI. America did put pressure on local authorities not to supply Japan with oil and its refined derivants. Also the DEI supplied large quantities of rubber, tin, various woods and other resources, which were necessary for Japanese industry as a whole. In essence the DEI represented the necessary treasure house for Japan. If one wants to stretch the point, America dictated what happened in DEI more than is appreciated nowadays. It should be understood that the British were all for appeasing Japan and Australia was wary of all that was happening in its backyard. Basically the situation was that all parties wanted to avoid war but made some of them weren't ready to back off more than necessary.
 
One last thing. We normally ignore the Japanese dimension. Japanese politics are key to understanding their march to war. Yet their politics were frequently misunderstood outside of Japan since they were conducted behind closed doors and by a select group of politicos attached to either the Imperial palace, one of the armed services or the civil service. All shared the vision of a greater Japan, being a power equal to any greater power, but all differed at the price to be paid in the pursuit of such a goal. the change of government which occured before the PH attack should have been an indication as to what was afoot.
 
As to America actively seeking war with the Axis, it is certainly true. But America was mostly concerned with Germany rather than Japan. This had a basis both in the bias that Americans had regarding what was potentially the greatest threat and also in the reality of Japan. Japan was bogged down in a never ending war in China. It had just recieved a bloody nose at Khalin Gol from the Soviets. It had a dire financial situation and an industry which was not really comparible with any western country. And in point of fact, all this was borne out during WWII with Japan making a number of initial victories with relatively few forces but it proved harder for them to defend themselves when the counterattack began. In fact America did not percieve Japan as a mortal enemy but rather as a local competitor in the Pacific... 

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 12:18 pm**

What the IJ actually needed was a longer version of PLUTO, stretching all the way from the DEI to the HI. That would have negated the need for a large well-protected tanker fleet. And once they had access to all the rubber in S E Asia, they then had the means to actually build a very long PLUTO

One last thing. We normally ignore the Japanese dimension. Japanese politics are key to understanding their march to war. Yet their politics were frequently misunderstood outside of Japan since they were conducted behind closed doors and by a select group of politicos attached to either the Imperial palace, one of the armed services or the civil service. All shared the vision of a greater Japan, being a power equal to any greater power, but all differed at the price to be paid in the pursuit of such a goal. the change of government which occured before the PH attack should have been an indication as to what was afoot

Agreed. The civilian governemtn was totally bottled up and just rubber-stamped the demands/ideas/plans of the army and navy generals/admirals, who held all of the top governmental jobs anyway and didn't talk to one another whatsoever (what else is new in politics?). To this day, the role and actual real power of the Emperor is hotly debated - how much he knew, could he have done something if he new, dared he do something? etc
Also, whilst a lot of the more level-headed planners realised the awesome industrial power and might of the US once it got itself properly into gear, the fall-back was always 'Bushido', ie respect for ones elders, and the superior fighting spirit of the common Japanese soldier, sailor or airman, which was considered far superior to anything the West had to offer.
Interestingly, few war planners who actually came to rely on the sense of Bushido actually had to do any fighting themselves...

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 12:32 pm**

ORIGINAL: tocaff

RUBBER

That's right, rubber. If Japan held the DEI without a fight in 1941, or even 1940 the US would've been in trouble as it wasn't until 1943 that synthetic rubber was being produced in decent quantities. The US never rationed gasoline because of it being in short supply, rather they saw it as a way to limit rubber consumption by the public given the military's needs.

FDR was looking for ways to get the USA into the fight against Germany and the Japanese were bound to offer him the chance. The Japanese would never pull out of China and the US and Commonwealth were bound to conflict with Japan's ambitions. Sooner or later the Pacific war was inevitable.

"In 1940, Franklin Roosevelt, calling rubber a “strategic and critical material,” creates the Rubber Reserve Company (RRC), to stockpile natural rubber and regulate synthetic rubber production. Firestone, B.P. Goodrich, Goodyear, and U.S. Rubber agree to work together to solve the nation’s wartime rubber needs." -- National WW2 Museum information sheet.

"At this time, the United States had a stockpile of about one million tons of natural rubber, a consumption rate of about 600,000 tons per year, and no commercial process to produce a general purpose synthetic rubber." -- United States Synthetic Rubber Program, 1939-1945 (ACS Chemistry for Life website)

From memory there were relatively new (1926 onwards) rubber plantations in Liberia started by Firestone ... and they provided a big chunk the remaining 10% of world supply of natural rubber (along with bits and bobs in South America, Ceylon and a few other places), just enough to keep things running till the increasing production of synthetic rubber took up the slack.

"In 1942, 3,721 tons of GR-S are produced, and that increases to 182,259 tons in 1943. In 1944, the year of peak demand, production triples to 670,268 tons, and by 1945, production had increased to 756, 042 tons." -- http://pslc.ws/macrog/exp/rubber/synth/asrrp.htm

The speed with which this was achieved was because the technology basic were already known, all that had to be done was to build the plants.

As you can see, the stockpile on hand was enough for 20 months at peacetime rates of consumption, presumably more with civilian use rationed, but by the time that stockpile was theoretically exhausted the US alone was producing about 1/4 of its pre-war needs.

Not an insurmountable problem, but it could have been for a country without the infrastructure and scientific and economic capital of the US ...

Fortunately we are talking about the US [:)]

Phil

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 1:32 pm**

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
For what was basically a recently industrialised island society, Japan never ever realised just how dependant its economy and industries were upon shipping to move said resources and raw materials back to the HI. They never ever set up a convoy system, ASW varied from haphazard to non-existant until '44, and there were insufficient tankers and oilers to move the most precious commodity of all (fuel and oil) back to the HI. In fact in Dec '41 all of Japan's big tankers and oilers were actually purchased or leased from abroad, and incredibly during the conflict precious few further tankers and oilers (of any size) were built at the shipyards...

Well, they did study Mahan, but it seems they missed some of the deeper parts. However, in terms of merchant tonnage, Japan began the war with 94 purpose-built oil tankers (401,000 GRT), out of a total of 1,962 ships (6,094,000 GRT). All the tankers were Japanese registered ships and most (iirc about 87) were constructed in Japanese yards.

In 1942, Japan constructed 81 ships (242,740 GRT) of which 8 (20,344 GRT) were purpose-built oil tankers. In 1943, Japan constructed 238 ships (664,911 GRT) of which 58 (266,099 GRT) were purpose-built oil tankers. In 1944, Japan constructed 675 ships (1,632,765 GRT) of which 211 (653,895 GRT) were purpose-built oil tankers. The majority of the remaining 980,000 tons (approximately 280 ships and 810,000 GRT) were of the std A, B, and C types which were easily and routinely converted, on the ways, to tankers.

Japan had substantial and sufficient liquid lift capability. The problems were lack of convoy and ASW technique, and gross scheduling inefficiency; route scheduling was taken from the merchant sector and placed in the hands of an IJA Transport Committee in mid 1943.

Oh .. forgot:
Showa kokusei soran, "Nihon shosen no sempukuryu"
Kindai Nihon yuso shi, "Sempaku kenzoryo"
sorry about that.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 1:48 pm**

The bank accounts are not that big a deal ... They were using strong arm tactics anyway -

Japan's need for oil and the Embargo (1940-1941)

On September 12th 1940, a numerous Japanese delegation of 24 men, headed by their Minister of Trade and Industry, Ichizo Kobayashi, arrived in Batavia to "renegotiate" political and economic relations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies. Among the visitors were also six high-ranking military officers, one of them was Rear-Admiral Tadashi Maeda, who would later became a commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy forces in the occupied Dutch East Indies. The Dutch Embassy in Japan did not actively co-operate in this negotiations, although the Dutch Ambassador in Tokyo, J.C. Pabst, received the first list of Japanese economic demands already in June 1940. It was later, however, decided that all further negotiations were to be conducted via Dutch colonial administration in Batavia, and naturally with a help of the Japanese Consulate General in Batavia, led by Consul-Generals Matatoshi Saito (before 1941) and later by Yutaka Ishizawa.

Their first demand was an increase of oil exports to Japan from the existing 570.000 tons in 1939 to 3.750.000 tons, about 50% of total Dutch East Indies production. The Dutch answer was that existing obligations would only permit an increase to about 1.800.000 tons. Kobayashi initially accepted this proposal but was soon recalled to Japan on October 20th, 1940.

In November a new head of the Japanese delegation was appointed, Kenkitshi Yoshizawa, a member of the Japanese Upper House and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who arrived late in December with a new set of demands. The first was purely political and thus probably deliberately unacceptable:
- adherence to Japans vision and policy in South East Asia, while other demands from the list were:
- unrestricted rights to explore and exploit minerals all over the Dutch Eeast Indies
- unrestricted fishing and shipping rights in all the waters of the Dutch East Indies
- unrestricted rights to start all sorts of commercial enterprises
- Japans export to the DEI must be increased to more than 80% of all imports of the Dutch East Indies
- the existing demand for oil was slightly increased to 3.800.000 tons
- airline and telegraph connections between Japan and the Dutch East Indies

He was awaited by a strong Dutch delegation, led by Hubertus Johannes van Mook, than promoted to deputy minister of Economic Affairs, K.L.J. Enthoven, director of Justice, and prof. Hoessein Djajadiningrat, director of Education and Religions. The negotiations, however, dragged on and remained unsuccessful when Yoshizawa suddenly announced his plan to depart and asked to be received by the Dutch Governor-General Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer on June 17th, 1941. The latter was worried and even contemplated the possibility that he might receive a declaration of war but to his relief Yoshizawa only handed him a draft declaration of both countries stating that the negotiations had ended without an agreement.

On July 21st 1941, the French Vichy Government accepted Japanese demands for air and naval bases in Southern French Indochina. Four days later President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the embargo, including a freeze of all bank transfers. Great Britain followed the USA with the same measures the next day and on July 26th, the Dutch government in exile in London joined the embargo. Van Starkenborgh in Batavia had suggested to his government in London to ask for guarantees from the USA and Great Britain in case this embargo would lead to war with Japan but his suggestion came too late. On Monday, July 28th, 1941, the authorities in Batavia published a set of measures that resulted in fact in a stop of all trade with and payments to Japan. Two Japanese tankers, that had just finished tanking at Tarakan Island were allowed to leave but a third one that was entering the port was sent away.

Note the DEI Joined the embargo while there was no official guarantee if it led to war it would be directly the US and the UK responsabiliity and they would have a moral responsability to assist the DEI .

The bank accounts are an inconvenience , they can pay via a 3rd party bank like the swiss , with gold or use a 3rd party company to manage the exchange. Also there was still trade between Japan and other countries inclduing the US / Australia in 1940 - 1941 the Embargo was only against strategic materials ( Australia stopped oil).

Now if the Dutch in this proposed scenario caved into the earlier September Japanese demands above ( i cant see them agreeing to the later November demands) or even more unlikely do a Vietnam ( and allow occupation) why on earth would Japan bother attacking the US /UK ? And why would the US attack if the Dutch agreed to it , id like to see that one go through congress . Now if the DEI joins teh embargo gets invaded and then the US does a DOW i think you may get taht pass congress since then the US action of the Embargo caused the DEI to be invaded.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 2:20 pm**

Maybe because it sensed an opportunity to demolish all colonial empires at one go, at the same time creating its own. If the US had become embroiled in war with Germany, it was even better. Fact is that Japan was committed at breaking the status quo in Asia from 1931 onwards and they wouldn't have changed their path. Sooner or later, they would have come into the war becaus blackmail can get you only so far....

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 2:53 pm**

..."blackmail can only get you so far"...

Tell that to North Korea.  Blackmail works very well against politicians who fear getting involved in more than words.  Didn't somebody return from Munich declaring "peace in our time" after meeting with Herr Hitler?

Japan was up against it because she was going to bump heads with the British and US eventually, no matter what, as they were in the way.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 3:12 pm**

don't forget the timing. Imperial GHQ opted for war at the time it did in large part because it was felt that it was their best chance to carve out their sphere of influence. (Germans at high tide....Russia reeling etc) They were well aware of the odds, hence the need to optimize their chances.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 4:10 pm**

ORIGINAL: bklooste
Now if the Dutch in this proposed scenario caved into the earlier September Japanese demands above ( i cant see them agreeing to the later November demands) or even more unlikely do a Vietnam ( and allow occupation) why on earth would Japan bother attacking the US /UK ? And why would the US attack if the Dutch agreed to it , id like to see that one go through congress . Now if the DEI joins teh embargo gets invaded and then the US does a DOW i think you may get taht pass congress since then the US action of the Embargo caused the DEI to be invaded.

The whole world was in a state of depression, flux, change, and madness in the decade before the holocaust. The political winds were howling gales that shredded the artificial post War-I social order into mutually opposing philosophical extremes; blowing people into their final corner of intellectual comfort. From our safe, comfy, armchairs, we ain't got a frikkin clue; we can't even conceive how these people thought and what impelled their decisions. Back then, things were more personal (more immediate, more forward, more personal); not at all like today with its data driven, robot like, analysis.

Queen Wilhelmina would never, ever, ever, acquiesce to dealings with a fascist regime. De Geer maybe would taken the path of least resistance, but if so, Madam would have kicked his brookie into Tuesday and replaced him with Gerbrandy long before she actually did so.

Things back then things weren't facts, figures, and cyphers: they were people and attitudes and positions against the whirlwind.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 4:23 pm**

ORIGINAL: JWE
ORIGINAL: bklooste
Now if the Dutch in this proposed scenario caved into the earlier September Japanese demands above ( i cant see them agreeing to the later November demands) or even more unlikely do a Vietnam ( and allow occupation) why on earth would Japan bother attacking the US /UK ? And why would the US attack if the Dutch agreed to it , id like to see that one go through congress . Now if the DEI joins teh embargo gets invaded and then the US does a DOW i think you may get taht pass congress since then the US action of the Embargo caused the DEI to be invaded.
The whole world was in a state of depression, flux, change, and madness in the decade before the holocaust. The political winds were howling gales that shredded the artificial post War-I social order into mutually opposing philosophical extremes; blowing people into their final corner of intellectual comfort. From our safe, comfy, armchairs, we ain't got a frikkin clue; we can't even conceive how these people thought and what impelled their decisions. Back then, things were more personal (more immediate, more forward, more personal); not at all like today with its data driven, robot like, analysis.

Queen Wilhelmina would never, ever, ever, acquiesce to dealings with a fascist regime. De Geer maybe would taken the path of least resistance, but if so, Madam would have kicked his brookie into Tuesday and replaced him with Gerbrandy long before she actually did so.

Things back then things weren't facts, figures, and cyphers: they were people and attitudes and positions against the whirlwind.

Thank you so much for saying this JWE. I have been reading posts and biting my tongue over this Holland going fascist nonsense. You make it have sense. And all this what if nonsense is just having nonsense.

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 11:50 pm**

ORIGINAL: JWE
Well, they did study Mahan, but it seems they missed some of the deeper parts. However, in terms of merchant tonnage, Japan began the war with 94 purpose-built oil tankers (401,000 GRT), out of a total of 1,962 ships (6,094,000 GRT). All the tankers were Japanese registered ships and most (iirc about 87) were constructed in Japanese yards.

In 1942, Japan constructed 81 ships (242,740 GRT) of which 8 (20,344 GRT) were purpose-built oil tankers. In 1943, Japan constructed 238 ships (664,911 GRT) of which 58 (266,099 GRT) were purpose-built oil tankers. In 1944, Japan constructed 675 ships (1,632,765 GRT) of which 211 (653,895 GRT) were purpose-built oil tankers. The majority of the remaining 980,000 tons (approximately 280 ships and 810,000 GRT) were of the std A, B, and C types which were easily and routinely converted, on the ways, to tankers.

Japan had substantial and sufficient liquid lift capability. The problems were lack of convoy and ASW technique, and gross scheduling inefficiency; route scheduling was taken from the merchant sector and placed in the hands of an IJA Transport Committee in mid 1943.

Japan had 49 Tankers in 1940, of c. 350,000 tons capacity.

She imported 3.68 million tons in the last full year before the war.

However, according to ...

"Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy" by David C. Evans, Mark R. Peattie

"Nevertheless, by the late 1930's, Japan's skyrocketing need for oil ... left the size of the civilian tanker fleet of 49 ships inadequate for the nation's needs ..." -- Kaigun, pg. #397 or thereabouts (my original notes are slightly unclear)

Most of the slack was taken up from the US (80%) and the credit financing for which was from the US and which was shipped, perforce, in US hulls.

"Although Japan had well over 300ktons of tanker capacity at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Navy required 270,000 tons of that [having ceased to build AOs in the 1920s], leaving only about 30000 tons for nonoperational purposes ...

... Early in the Pacific War it became clear that ... Japan would have inadequate Tanker resources to transport the oil resources that were the chief object of its strategic ambitions in 1940-41 ..." -- Kaigun, pg. #405

"As it turned out, it was indeed oil from SE Asia that both literally and figuratively fuelled the Navy's operations during the Pacific War. By 1943, however, the Combined Fleet had become tethered to its SE Asian oil spigot ... " -- Kaigun, pg. #410

Around 70ktons left over after naval needs are covered (the navy had ceased to build AOs in the 1920s and had subsidised the building of civilian TKs instead ... and expected to, and did, use them exclusively during the war) ... I'd guess most of remaining 70ktons or so were used mostly for moving POL around for the army ... to China, to the PTO etc.

So how did the Japanese move fuel around for the Home Islands?

Well, they captured some tanker tonnage in the initial moves (unlikely if there is a buildup of "peaceful" tension that leads to a "peaceful" occupation of the DEI ... and impossible to get UK/Allied/US tonnage if, as the extreme position goes, it all remains "peaceful") and this enabled them to stagger on till 1943 when, as noted above, they basically stationed as much of the IJN near the DEI or Borneo as possible because that is where the oil was. This freed up some of their operational requirements for shipping stuff back to the Home Islands ... at the expense of limiting their operational deployment options severely.

For the rest? Well, as I noted in a previous post, they loaded the fuel into 44 gallon drums and shipped it around on standard merchantmen ... about the single most inefficient way of transporting POL in bulk short of using air transport to do it [:D]

Nowhere near "substantial and sufficient" by any measure.

Phil

Posted: **Fri Jul 09, 2010 11:52 pm**

ORIGINAL: JWE
Things back then things weren't facts, figures, and cyphers: they were people and attitudes and positions against the whirlwind.

Don't forget the dismal science (Economics) and Logistics, which is where the above run into a brick wall and are, perforce, shaped by.

Phil

Posted: **Sat Jul 10, 2010 12:44 am**

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: bklooste
Now if the Dutch in this proposed scenario caved into the earlier September Japanese demands above ( i cant see them agreeing to the later November demands) or even more unlikely do a Vietnam ( and allow occupation) why on earth would Japan bother attacking the US /UK ? And why would the US attack if the Dutch agreed to it , id like to see that one go through congress . Now if the DEI joins teh embargo gets invaded and then the US does a DOW i think you may get taht pass congress since then the US action of the Embargo caused the DEI to be invaded.
The whole world was in a state of depression, flux, change, and madness in the decade before the holocaust. The political winds were howling gales that shredded the artificial post War-I social order into mutually opposing philosophical extremes; blowing people into their final corner of intellectual comfort. From our safe, comfy, armchairs, we ain't got a frikkin clue; we can't even conceive how these people thought and what impelled their decisions. Back then, things were more personal (more immediate, more forward, more personal); not at all like today with its data driven, robot like, analysis.

Queen Wilhelmina would never, ever, ever, acquiesce to dealings with a fascist regime. De Geer maybe would taken the path of least resistance, but if so, Madam would have kicked his brookie into Tuesday and replaced him with Gerbrandy long before she actually did so.

Things back then things weren't facts, figures, and cyphers: they were people and attitudes and positions against the whirlwind.

Though i agree about the positions i disagree in that
1. Even today peoples attitudes and positions matter eg the Neo cons , Chaney & Bush on Iraq
2. Not sure about this the Dutch not negotiating...They negotiated with Germany . They wouldnt agree to the November demands but the DEI can't beat Japan and they would rather ship some oil at a bad price or in exchange for Japanese goods than face attack unless the US & UK agree to help. It looks like they delayed the negotiations . Then when the US declared the embargo it was a good time because if the DEI was attacked because of the embargo the allies would have some moral compulsion to assist.

Posted: **Sat Jul 10, 2010 1:13 am**

[font="times new roman"]History:

On July 21st 1941, the French Vichy Government accepted Japanese demands for air and naval bases in Southern French Indochina. Four days later President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the embargo, including a freeze of all bank transfers. Great Britain followed the USA with the same measures the next day and on July 26th, the Dutch government in exile in London joined the embargo. Van Starkenborgh in Batavia had suggested to his government in London to ask for guarantees from the USA and Great Britain in case this embargo would lead to war with Japan but his suggestion came too late. On Monday, July 28th, 1941, the authorities in Batavia published a set of measures that resulted in fact in a stop of all trade with and payments to Japan. Two Japanese tankers, that had just finished tanking at Tarakan Island were allowed to leave but a third one that was entering the port was sent away.

Assumption for the scenario:

The US Isolationist force Roosevelt hand and or the State Department fails to get the word the Dutch Government does not receive the guarantee from the United States, Britain not will to act alone withdraws theirs due to over extending the forces.

The Japanese Government after the occupation of French Indochina believe the Dutch Government to be cowed and shortly thereafter represent the November 1940 demands to the Dutch Government with added stipulation of basing rights.
- adherence to Japans vision and policy in South East Asia, while other demands from the list were:
- unrestricted rights to explore and exploit minerals all over the Dutch East Indies
- unrestricted fishing and shipping rights in all the waters of the Dutch East Indies
- unrestricted rights to start all sorts of commercial enterprises
- Japans export to the DEI must be increased to more than 80% of all imports of the Dutch East Indies
- the demand for oil of to 3.800.000 tons
- airline and telegraph connections between Japan and the Dutch East Indies
- occupation and basing of Japanese forces for the protection of the Dutch colony.

The Dutch abandoned by the British and the American Governments succumb to the demands of the Japanese Government.

Having accomplished their immediate goal of securing resources and oil, the start of the War in the Pacific is delayed by four to six months, or Japan seeing how effete the west is continues to make demands on the western powers and over reaches herself starting the war six months earlier - Your Choice.

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