Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Out of interest: Anyone know a good strategic/operational level WW3 wargame? I used to play a fair bit of Decisive Action ( albeit that I found it very Western in what it allowed you to do ) but the more this discussion goes on the more I yearn for the plains of Northern Germany

The Next War or the Central Front series. NATO Division Commander.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Out of interest: Anyone know a good strategic/operational level WW3 wargame? I used to play a fair bit of Decisive Action ( albeit that I found it very Western in what it allowed you to do ) but the more this discussion goes on the more I yearn for the plains of Northern Germany

The Next War or the Central Front series. NATO Division Commander.

I think the best quote about NATO Division Commander is: "It is a game that was discussed far more than it was played". In other word it was unplayable. I played the Next War Series Central Front game once against my old gaming partner Dr. Bob (pHD in astrphysics). I was the Sovs and almost got my breakthrough. Unfortuanately that system was highly morale based and the BAoR had "8" ratings vs the best Sov/East German Divs had "7" ratings. So I had the BAor pinned at Hanover but could not dislodge them. If I had to do it over again I would either pour every air asset I had in the game against the Brits on turn 1 and 2 to reduce them or use weaker units to pin them then swing past on my right (their left) into the North German Plain.

Just a note in that I feel that logistics is being somewhat ignored here. A large portion of NATO strategy was hinged on its own "Deep Battle" plan which was to use its superior air assets to hit the second echelon units in road march behind the MBA. With that, there were plans to hit bridges and supply depots far to the rear again to slow/stop the advance by denying the forward units supply and especially fuel.

Vettim,

Air Land Battle was a brilliant doctrine when facing another western army with a long logistics tail which fought using a system which fought didn't use echelons but rather tried to maintain units in the line for the long haul - with stints in reserve. Vs an army which advanced in echelon with an emphasis on carrying enough on board to sustain the force to the objective and until that point in time when the next echelon would pass through it and further into the enemy rear I'm not sure that its emphasis on denying forward units fuel and supplies would really have worked.

Let me give you a very oversimplified example. 5th Guards Tank Army has pushed through a gap in the allied lines just west of Kassel. It is the OMG so its tanks have long-range fuel tanks on board. For a T-80 that gives a theoretical range of about 270 miles. Lets say it only has about 200 miles of range in reality though. The distance to Duisburg via Essen along some well-developed road nets in order to get across the Rhine is a little over 100 miles. If NATO wants to bomb 5th GTAs fuel bowsers back around Gottingen ( where they were stationed whilst waiting to see which Army would create a breach for them to exploit ) then that's fine. The loss of those tankers won't stop the T-80s from reaching Duisburg. It'll complicate their refuelling afterwards but:
a) there won't be many of them left so even if you only have 20% of 5th GTA's logistics capacity remaining that may well suffice to resupply what's left and
b) so what if you have no logistics capacity left. 5th GTA is driving on the Rhine with a nice river line to guard its right flank and every opportunity to sunder the German lines.


I think what you may be getting at instead of logistics ( I think you've mentioned logistics but don't actually mean logistics ) is the NATO idea of delaying follow-on echelons such that they'd be sufficiently delayed that NATO forces could completely destroy the first echelon before the second echelon would reach them and then rinse and repeat before the third echelon reached them. The idea was to desynchronise the Soviets sufficiently that they'd never managed to hit you with the second echelon just as you had stopped the first echelon and before you're been resupplied, recovered your positions, repaired your comm nets etc. The difference here was that they were hitting the logistics etc of uncommitted elements during the approach march - basically hitting them as they moved from the strategic depth into the operational depth so as to create a gap at the tactical level/at the front - I'm mixing terminologies horribly there to get the point across.


herwin,
The problem is those are all cardboard and there aren't exactly a huge number of wargamers here in sunny Ireland [:D]. I'd be looking for something PBEMable for that reason. I did see something interesting on my searches tonight though as I looked for a wargame covering the area.... HPS has wargames covering the theatre in 1985 - Fulda Gap '85, North German Plain '85 and Danube '85 which, when combined ( as they can be ) in a single game cover the entire theatre ( Theatre Map ) at the 1 hex = 1 mile and turns = 3 hours level.

I think this puppy might actually rival AE.... With save within turn capability this would actually support multiple players per side and perform somewhat as a CPX. I think it might be unmanageable to PBEM with 1 person playing each side. It definitely looks large enough to bring the strategic scale out and it models nerve agents ( persistent and non-persistent ), partisans ( A-team inspired I presume ), tactical nuclear strikes and best of all the TO&E and OOB are editable to allow you to shift it forward and backward in time.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Vettim,

Air Land Battle was a brilliant doctrine when facing another western army with a long logistics tail which fought using a system which fought didn't use echelons but rather tried to maintain units in the line for the long haul - with stints in reserve. Vs an army which advanced in echelon with an emphasis on carrying enough on board to sustain the force to the objective and until that point in time when the next echelon would pass through it and further into the enemy rear I'm not sure that its emphasis on denying forward units fuel and supplies would really have worked.

Let me give you a very oversimplified example. 5th Guards Tank Army has pushed through a gap in the allied lines just west of Kassel. It is the OMG so its tanks have long-range fuel tanks on board. For a T-80 that gives a theoretical range of about 270 miles. Lets say it only has about 200 miles of range in reality though. The distance to Duisburg via Essen along some well-developed road nets in order to get across the Rhine is a little over 100 miles. If NATO wants to bomb 5th GTAs fuel bowsers back around Gottingen ( where they were stationed whilst waiting to see which Army would create a breach for them to exploit ) then that's fine. The loss of those tankers won't stop the T-80s from reaching Duisburg. It'll complicate their refuelling afterwards but:
a) there won't be many of them left so even if you only have 20% of 5th GTA's logistics capacity remaining that may well suffice to resupply what's left and
b) so what if you have no logistics capacity left. 5th GTA is driving on the Rhine with a nice river line to guard its right flank and every opportunity to sunder the German lines.


I think what you may be getting at instead of logistics ( I think you've mentioned logistics but don't actually mean logistics ) is the NATO idea of delaying follow-on echelons such that they'd be sufficiently delayed that NATO forces could completely destroy the first echelon before the second echelon would reach them and then rinse and repeat before the third echelon reached them. The idea was to desynchronise the Soviets sufficiently that they'd never managed to hit you with the second echelon just as you had stopped the first echelon and before you're been resupplied, recovered your positions, repaired your comm nets etc. The difference here was that they were hitting the logistics etc of uncommitted elements during the approach march - basically hitting them as they moved from the strategic depth into the operational depth so as to create a gap at the tactical level/at the front - I'm mixing terminologies horribly there to get the point across.


herwin,
The problem is those are all cardboard and there aren't exactly a huge number of wargamers here in sunny Ireland [:D]. I'd be looking for something PBEMable for that reason. I did see something interesting on my searches tonight though as I looked for a wargame covering the area.... HPS has wargames covering the theatre in 1985 - Fulda Gap '85, North German Plain '85 and Danube '85 which, when combined ( as they can be ) in a single game cover the entire theatre ( Theatre Map ) at the 1 hex = 1 mile and turns = 3 hours level.

I think this puppy might actually rival AE.... With save within turn capability this would actually support multiple players per side and perform somewhat as a CPX. I think it might be unmanageable to PBEM with 1 person playing each side. It definitely looks large enough to bring the strategic scale out and it models nerve agents ( persistent and non-persistent ), partisans ( A-team inspired I presume ), tactical nuclear strikes and best of all the TO&E and OOB are editable to allow you to shift it forward and backward in time.

I would play that game!!!! Do you happen to know if they are covered by Cyberboard, Vassal, or Aide de Camp modules?

My bad - just looked them up and they are computer games. Still it appears to be a $150 (US) investment. Not sure of that to be sure because it is not plain on the website.

ORIGINAL: vettim89

My bad - just looked them up and they are computer games. Still it appears to be a $150 (US) investment. Not sure of that to be sure because it is not plain on the website.

Actually closer inspection reveals that by buying each successive title in the series you get the "link-up" feature with all previous versions. Ergo Danube '85 allows the full map game. Cost $49 (US)

ORIGINAL: vettim89

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Out of interest: Anyone know a good strategic/operational level WW3 wargame? I used to play a fair bit of Decisive Action ( albeit that I found it very Western in what it allowed you to do ) but the more this discussion goes on the more I yearn for the plains of Northern Germany

The Next War or the Central Front series. NATO Division Commander.

I think the best quote about NATO Division Commander is: "It is a game that was discussed far more than it was played". In other word it was unplayable. I played the Next War Series Central Front game once against my old gaming partner Dr. Bob (pHD in astrphysics). I was the Sovs and almost got my breakthrough. Unfortuanately that system was highly morale based and the BAoR had "8" ratings vs the best Sov/East German Divs had "7" ratings. So I had the BAor pinned at Hanover but could not dislodge them. If I had to do it over again I would either pour every air asset I had in the game against the Brits on turn 1 and 2 to reduce them or use weaker units to pin them then swing past on my right (their left) into the North German Plain.

Just a note in that I feel that logistics is being somewhat ignored here. A large portion of NATO strategy was hinged on its own "Deep Battle" plan which was to use its superior air assets to hit the second echelon units in road march behind the MBA. With that, there were plans to hit bridges and supply depots far to the rear again to slow/stop the advance by denying the forward units supply and especially fuel.

NATO Division Commander was unfinished. Many of the game concepts were innovative but undeveloped.

Anyone ever try to play the board game Vietnam? We broke that puppy out in middle school and promptly failed player morale. [:D]

r

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Vettim,


I think what you may be getting at instead of logistics ( I think you've mentioned logistics but don't actually mean logistics ) is the NATO idea of delaying follow-on echelons such that they'd be sufficiently delayed that NATO forces could completely destroy the first echelon before the second echelon would reach them and then rinse and repeat before the third echelon reached them. The idea was to desynchronise the Soviets sufficiently that they'd never managed to hit you with the second echelon just as you had stopped the first echelon and before you're been resupplied, recovered your positions, repaired your comm nets etc. The difference here was that they were hitting the logistics etc of uncommitted elements during the approach march - basically hitting them as they moved from the strategic depth into the operational depth so as to create a gap at the tactical level/at the front - I'm mixing terminologies horribly there to get the point across.

To agree with Nemo, this is how I was trained to approach the problem as a bde, division and corps staff officer--simultanous with the close battle were deep operations to slow and attrit the 2nd and 3rd echelons. As long as the WP stuck to their doctine, it could very well have worked. Like a gridiron (American football) team with the other team's playbook. But what if the other team deviated from their playbook? To quote herwin, that "gave me the willies".

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

Anyone ever try to play the board game Vietnam? We broke that puppy out in middle school and promptly failed player morale. [:D]

Are you talking about VG's Veitnam 1965 - 1975? If so I have played the US 3 times and VC once using the updated rules including US Marines broken down into 1 combat point units occupying cultivated hexes. I thought it was an innovative look at that kind of operations. Especally reaction and asymetrical turns you move you move . I think I will move now ...

What was the game that wrapped itself around a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflcit that had three scenrarios Tatical Surprise, Operational level surprise, or strategic buildup? Mine always ended badly with a new world order [:'(] NATO had the mission to get to Reforger points and the WP had to prevent this in order to win. WP would deploy Gas, which allowed a 4 column shift on the CRT turn #1, 2 columns on turn #2 and one column thereafter. So the game was to get as many forces in contact and then use gas watching the whole front collapse. No need to stack to get 3-1 and it was all a bit of timing to get everything in contact at once then ..." shock and awe .."

Tatical suprise was the worst. Nukes were the only option since no NATO units existed on the front. Now nuclear First-strike had advantages of crushing any fixed sites, but NATO had 6 mobile sites that would be very hard to destroy (1/6yh chance) . So .. NATO first strikes WP's nukes .. leaving 1 strike per turn and the NATO always had 6 mobile launchers ... now the catch... each nuke attack the opposing player draws a chit and if it exceeds the nuclear threashold for the scenario .. game over .. it is assumed the side that started the mess should lose the game .. but of course everybody is a loser .. except for prokaryotes and some lower forms of eukaryotes like flowers and cockroaches ...[;)]

In RL if andropov would have tried the tatical surprise I have no doubt the Regan adminstration would have quickly responded with what they believed as measured force. Local commanders had ready access to 150mm nucelar shells each one a Hiroshima ...[X(] That deployment agaisnt a tatical surprise scenario I understand changed with the Clinton era ....

ORIGINAL: Crackaces

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

Anyone ever try to play the board game Vietnam? We broke that puppy out in middle school and promptly failed player morale. [:D]

Are you talking about VG's Veitnam 1965 - 1975? If so I have played the US 3 times and VC once using the updated rules including US Marines broken down into 1 combat point units occupying cultivated hexes. I thought it was an innovative look at that kind of operations. Especally reaction and asymetrical turns you move you move . I think I will move now ...

What was the game that wrapped itself around a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflcit that had three scenrarios Tatical Surprise, Operational level surprise, or strategic buildup? Mine always ended badly with a new world order [:'(] NATO had the mission to get to Reforger points and the WP had to prevent this in order to win. WP would deploy Gas, which allowed a 4 column shift on the CRT turn #1, 2 columns on turn #2 and one column thereafter. So the game was to get as many forces in contact and then use gas watching the whole front collapse. No need to stack to get 3-1 and it was all a bit of timing to get everything in contact at once then ..." shock and awe .."

Tatical suprise was the worst. Nukes were the only option since no NATO units existed on the front. Now nuclear First-strike had advantages of crushing any fixed sites, but NATO had 6 mobile sites that would be very hard to destroy (1/6yh chance) . So .. NATO first strikes WP's nukes .. leaving 1 strike per turn and the NATO always had 6 mobile launchers ... now the catch... each nuke attack the opposing player draws a chit and if it exceeds the nuclear threashold for the scenario .. game over .. it is assumed the side that started the mess should lose the game .. but of course everybody is a loser .. except for prokaryotes and some lower forms of eukaryotes like flowers and cockroaches ...[;)]

In RL if andropov would have tried the tatical surprise I have no doubt the Regan adminstration would have quickly responded with what they believed as measured force. Local commanders had ready access to 150mm nucelar shells each one a Hiroshima ...[X(] That deployment agaisnt a tatical surprise scenario I understand changed with the Clinton era ....

The Soviet Union was gone in 1991. Clinton was President in 1992. We had different fish to fry.

I was taking it from a policy standpoint. Though the enemy the Soviet Union was gone .. let us take North Korea that was in full swing at the time. Although they did not have nukes -- they have Gas to this day ....and a whole bunch of Art'y trained on Seoul .. Yet the administration gathered in one defensive option to Deep Battle. This includes centralizing the boomer authority along with say Naval strikes from carriers to Washington. Central authority exposes one to surprise like PH ...

Soooooo In the context of this thread, I am proposing examples of a policy to decentralze NCA as a repsonse to Deep Battle not so much one enemy that uses that particular strategy.

First, yes it was Victory Games' Vietnam. Actually quite a cool game but given our ages we were a little out of our depth.

Second, to return to application of Deep Battle to AE, how would y'all apply its principles to the strategic defense? Is such a thought applicable or is the player forced to rely on a different doctrine entirely? What did Deep Battle's creators have to say about defensive ops?

Hartwig,
"Isn't pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt" the essence of manoeuvre warfare. Well, yes but that doesn't mean that people use their mobile forces that way.


Blitzkrieg,
It always struck me that the differences between Blitzkrieg and Deep Battle are both theoretical and practical. What I mean by this is that while Blitzkrieg talked a strategic layer it really ended up getting bogged down in the operational zone when it met moderate to significant resistance.

Theoretically the largest difference I see is that doctrinally speaking the armoured force was often expected to both create the breach and exploit the breach in blitzkrieg whereas in Deep Battle the breaching and exploitation operations were viewed as combat operations so tactically different that in the early to mid-1930s the Soviets designed completely different classes of tanks for the breaching and exploitation phases ( actually, at one stage they also differentiated between the operational exploitation and strategic exploitation forces ). Why did they design different tank styles ( the BT series vs the tankettes vs the land battleships like the T-28, T35 etc ) for the different tasks? Well, we need to look at their view of battlefield problems as tactical-technical issues wherein the tactical problems could be best solved by designing equipment with the appropriate technical characteristics.

E.g. Need an airplane for Close Air Support ( CAS ) in the full face of enemy FlAK in the tactical zone. Well, you'll need something which is highly survivable, tough and capable of both dive-bombing and more traditional firing passes. It should also be relatively small so as not to be too easily targetted. Hey presto they designed the Ilyusha/Bark. Need an airplane for the more traditional air interdiction role into the operational depth in which case precision may be more important but you definitely need more range, more speed and a higher operational ceiling and you end up with the Peshka/Buck.

Same thing for tanks. The T35s, T28, KV-1 and 2 were definitely designed only for the breaching role, not the exploitation role while BTs and T-34s were clearly designed for the exploitation role.


Anyways, bottom line is that once your exploitation force is also the designated breaching force the odds of it getting bogged down in the breaching battle, tangling with operational reserves and generally moving too slowly to exploit into the enemy strategic depth are very high. US FMs and historical experience all clearly highlight this as one of the major dangers of the transition from breaching to exploitation. With Deep Battle and the echeloning of the attack there's a clear desire to separate the breaching and exploitation phases and forces from eachother ( obviously enemy action may prevent this but at least it isn't a case of friendly action preventing it as frequently occured in Blitzkrieg ) and so there was less likelihood for the attack to get bogged down if properly prepared. I think thats a very significant difference since both doctrines arose out of the recognition that even stosstruppen tactics and the artillery doctrine of Durchburchmueller still didn't allow the 1918 German offensive in the West to advance at a rate consistent with a strategic breakthrough and so judging them on their basis to achieve strategically decisive breakthroughs is, IMO, the best way to judge them.


Crackaces,
Prokaryotes for the win!!! [8D]


Cribtop,
Before answering that it is essential to just outline the importance of echeloning.

Echeloning not only ensures that forces have clear objectives but also ensures that you can maintain a rapid operational tempo without the lengthy pauses which often occur. Think of it this way.... Instead of hitting Midway Island with 8 divisions, leaving 1 behind to hold Midway, and then moving with 7 Divisions to take Johnson after re-organising for a couple of weeks on Midway and then moving on from Johnson to invade HIlo and Kona with 6 divisions after another 2 week operational pause - giving the enemy about 8 weeks ( allowing 4 weeks for operational pauses and another 4 weeks for travel and combat ) in which to gather forces and so on and so forth - why not just hit Midway with a single division supported by all of the aerial support available as the rest of the amphibious TFs and CVs sweep past on the way to Johnson where they land one division in the next week ( this time supported by naval bombers basing out of Midway ). As the division lands and takes Johnson Island the other 6 sweep on to Hilo and Kona and land there. The idea is that it moves so quickly that the Americans cannot redeploy to stop it in time.

This would best be envisioned as three echelons of forces. One for Midway, one for Johnson and one for Hawaii. Of course given the huge "gaps" in the front afforded by the Pacific one could easily argue that the best application of Deep Battle here would be simply to drop troops, ships and planes into Hilo/Kona directly in order to neutralise Pearl Harbour and dislocate the positions at Midway, French Frigate Shoals and Johnson Island rendering them all untenable and no longer any threat to IJN SLOCs. But that's a discussion for a different example.

Alternately you could look at the example I gave of the invasion of India. The first echelon pins the enemy forces on the Burma/India border, another echelon conducts the operational breach by landing amphibiously behind the defenders at the Burma frontier - this echelon holds the operational reserves in place at Calcutta by besieging it, dislocates the enemy front line by moving into its rear and unleashes an Operational Manoeuvre Group into the enemy's strategic depth ( this would be the third echelon which is landed across the same beaches as the 2nd echelon but with a very different mission ). Lastly, the combination of KB and amphibious shipping threatens operations into the enemy's strategic depth - this would be somewhat analogous to threatening an Inchon style landing and/or having a strategic paradrop capability.

So, echelons keep the mission clear, keep the tempo up and and avoid operational pauses whilst operational and strategic elements pin the enemy's operational and strategic reserves as you progress through their operational and strategic depth.


So, how do you defeat a Deep Battle offensive?

First things first, when facing most players here you simply aren't going to be facing anything resembling a Deep Battle. Even if they want to strike strategic targets you are likely to find them picking operational objectives and labelling them strategic level objectives or just getting bogged down in the operational level. If they do actually pick strategic objectives and maintain the discipline not to mis-allocate forces then you've got to ask yourself how many players here actually pin operationally important forces and strategic reserves at the same time as fighting the tactical battle.

PzB tries a fair bit of strategic raiding but even there he is raiding the SLOCs across the Pacific not the strategic forming up bases of the Allied behemoth. It is much easier for the Allies as they have 4-engined bombers capable of true strategic reach but even there you rarely see them undertaking focused, targeted missions designed to pin strategic reserves at the same time as twin-engined bombers pin the operational reserves and single-engined attack planes ( plus CVs ) + shipping pin everything in the tactical zone to make the jobs of the army and marines easy.


With all of that said I think that if you are trying to defend against anyone attacking you it is a good idea to create threats throughout the entire depth of his force. If you look at the recent battle in my AAR in which the Allies invaded Ishigaki and Miyako Jima in mid-October 1945 you can see that those invasions were brought about by my seizing the initiative at the beginning of the scenario and launching a hugely costly invasion of Okinawa ( cost me about 200 ships due to the massive CD defences, aerial defences and the tiny size of most of the surviving Japanese xAKLs ( 170 to 800 tons ) which allowed a single hit to obliterate them ). Why did I launch that invasion? Simple, I wanted three things:

1. To push the Allied fighter fields back to the Phillipines protecting my production centres from fighter sweeps - why? I have many fighters I can use in the anti-bomber role but many of them are utter pigs in the air which would be hacked down in droves by P-51s and P-47s sweeping. So, I need to push the fighters back so they can't sweep me so I can establish and maintain multi-hundred fighter CAPs over my main centres of production.

2. To create a trap for the Allies in which they'd have to commit the USN into combat on my terms in order to relieve the pressure on their trapped troops ( about 1500 AV ) at Naha. If the Allies landed elsewhere on the Okinawa/Phillipines axis then my plan was to stalemate them, take Naha and then turn those other islands into big POW camps begging for rescue just like Naha.... and rinse and repeat.

3. To buy time. The more time the Allies spend fighting on the periphery the better for me. That's protecting my critical vulnerability on the Home Islands for as long as possible.

Now, if you look at what happened over the past few days the Allies dropped about 6 division equivalents at Ishigaki and Miyako Jima. I think they wanted those islands to help create a "chain" to provide fighter and bomber bases from which they could support their troops at Naha and prevent me resupplying or reinforcing my troops at Naga. I might be wrong as my opponent hasn't told me his plans obviously [8D]

I stalemated him tactically by flying in troops and sacrificing the necessary bombers to reduce his AV while I was building the AV up to allow my ground troops to hold ( in the first phase ) and then begin pushing back ( the second phase which, hopefully, brings about the third phase - the Allied rescue/reinforcement push ).

Operationally my operational naval reserves ( MTBs, mini-subs, coastal subs, Shinyos etc ) which had been lurking all around the region from Formosa to China to Amami Oshima moved into position and, together with the DDs and CLs of the IJN strategic reserve ( operating from the Home Islands and ready to cover either the Okinawa or Kuriles axis depending on where the Allies came first ) overnight disrupted the landings moving so many TFs out of position that the next day my aerial strategic reserves combined with the operational kamikaze reserve ( I didn't commit the strategic kamikaze reserve since I wanted to protect against being hit by two major operations at the same time and with the IJN strategic reserve commited here I needed the kami strategic reserve available to strengthen the aerial operational reserve in the Kuriles if they became active at the same time ) were able to inflict serious losses on enemy CVs and CVLs forcing a wholesale retreat from the operational zone.

At the same time as the enemy forces in the operational zone were being forced to fall back to their strategic base ( Manilla and the Phillipines ) and I could see enemy CV TFs forming up at Manilla in order to move out and cover the escaping and heavily damaged CVs, BBs etc I focused Ki-264 and long-range kamikaze missions on those strategic reserves as they moved up.

So, over the 2nd and 3rd days of the battle we had tactical aerial and naval strikes going in to help hold the islands, the commitment of operational and strategic aerial and naval reserves against the fleeing USN TFs and also some strikes against the enemy strategic reserves mobilising from Manilla. In addition I had both operational and strategic reserves of ground troops earmarked for both air transport and naval transport ( either by FT TF or amphibious TF ) ready to respond to landings along the Ishigaki island chain and so over the last 3 days I've landed 3 Bdes of troops onto those two islands with more troops on the way.


So, while it wasn't a perfect defence against deep battle, primarily because I don't have forces with the necessary technical-tactical characteristics ( the 1500 to 2,000 4-engined bombers the US has in this scenario would come in very handy right now for obliterating Manilla and pushing his strategic hubs back from what one could argue is actually a deep-operational position to a truly deep strategic position ) it was fought by Japan with clear operational and strategic reserves in the aerial, kamikaze, naval and ground components and an attempt to disrupt the enemy's meshing together of their strategic, operational and tactical zones. I think that if you look at the USN on the first day of the battle the IJAAF and IJNAF were relatively ineffective because the USN was undisrupted. However, once their operational covering forces were disrupted gaps opened up and over the next two days they were forced into retreat and strategic reserves mobilised to rescue them. When this was seen strikes went in to prevent this strategic reserve arriving in a timely manner.


So, the Japanese defence clearly echeloned itself, had clear objectives which were helped by the phasing of the echelons and tried, at all times, to engage all enemy elements at all depths simultaneously in order to disrupt them and, through that disruption, create the openings required to destroy them. If you don't disrupt them throughout their whole depth it is just far too easy for the operational grouping to come to the rescue of the enemy's tactical grouping and the strategic grouping to come to the rescue of the operational grouping. You've got to disrupt them all at the same time so that they can't act as bulwarks for other groups which are disrupted. Obviously IF Japan had enough strength this is precisely when I'd unleash 20 CVs into the area between Formosa and the Phillipines, destroying the enemy's operational zone naval forces and tempting their strategic reserve into battle. I'd then run away with my CVs using the remaining MTBs and DDs to disrupt the enemy CV TFs whilst commiting my kamis and night torpedo squadrons in order to inflict more damage on the enemy's strategic reserve. As my CVs ran away they'd link up with amphibious forces and escort them to take the next strategically important target I have. But in 1945 my navy is outnumbered by about 15 or 20 to 1 in terms of combat power so those sorts of grand attacks through breaches aren't possible anymore. I just have to attrit him to death. Still, the principles are, I think, being somewhat followed. It is MUCH easier if you are the Allies though as they have far more planes and ground troops ( and to some extent ships ) technically-tactically suitable for employment into the enemy's strategic depth.

Oh, in other news: It looks as though buying Danube '85 gives you the entire German front... It is also editable so you can move it back in time a bit etc etc.

I'll order it ( and the Middle Eastern and Korean versions ) and see how that all pans out. I'll report back once I find out if Danube '85 gives the entire theatre.

Thanks, Nemo. A cogent explanation and the discussion of echeloning, both offensive and defensive, is adding greatly to my understanding of the principles involved.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Blitzkrieg,
It always struck me that the differences between Blitzkrieg and Deep Battle are both theoretical and practical. What I mean by this is that while Blitzkrieg talked a strategic layer it really ended up getting bogged down in the operational zone when it met moderate to significant resistance.

I agree that this is the main difference between the two doctrines.
But I think that Blitzkrieg was not a formal doctrine of the German Army, it was more dependent on the skill, aggressiveness and vision of a minority of German generals, coupled with a faster decision cycle in the opreration and tactical level, at least in the early war. As the war progressed, the way the Germans planned their offensives changed. I find the difference between "Citadel" and "Wacht am Rhein" quite telling, the latter resembling Deep Battle more than Blitzkrieg. If I remember correctly, the fact that the "Wacht am Rhein" plan used infantry divisions for the breakthrough and kept the main panzer divisions in reserve, was one of the main grievances of some German Generals (most prominently von Rundstedt). Whereas in "Citadel" the same panzer divisions that were to achieve the breakthrough were also tasked with exploiting it, with only a small proportion of forces kept in reserve. These same German panzer generals kept believing, even after the war, that the panzer division should be the "all in one" solution. If you are interested, "The other side of the hill" by Lidell Hart offers interesting insights in this matter, but chances are , you 've already read it.

Specifically Guderian (among others) argued that a panzer division should have 500 tanks in two regiments (as it was before barbarossa), have an air transport contingent of its own and better maintenance and supply train. All this in order to increase the panzer division's survivability and independence deep in the battlefield.

I think it can be argued that Blitzkrieg, applied the Guderian way, would be more strategically decisive than Deep Battle, even in the Eastern Front. I view the latter more of an operational concept than strategic, a series of operations applied in a wide front designed to produce a strategic victory in the long-term. Imagine a theoretical Barbarossa, without the constraints that OKW/OKH put to the 4 panzergroups, with all four air fleets devoted exclusively on them, panzer divisions with 400 panzers each, an air transport force capable of supplying them deep into enemy territory. I think it's not too farfetched to imagine that Leningrad and Moscow would have fallen before August.

P.S. If you want a wargame capable of depicting various operations, campaigns and wars, from Napoleonic wars to WP vs Nato, look no further than "The Operational Art of War III". Especially the scenarios made by Dr Daniel McBride.

I'd like to thank everyone for this great thread, especially Nemo for creating it. I spent the 80s and early 90s first in the artillery and then in S-2/G-2 shops at Bn, Bde and Div levels. It was interesting because I got in just when the US was transitioning to Air Land Battle and my job was to learn/think like the Soviets. I'm not sure that it worked to any great degree, but it was fun and I think I did learn a lot.

I just want to comment on a couple of things that came up about Air Land Battle as well as the history of Deep Battle. I think Nemo's discussion on the history of Deep Battle and its ties to the history, geography, and political dimensions is a great analysis. The Soviet Union had a huge size and huge resources to draw upon. One thing that always struck me about Deep Battle and the Soviet approach was the massive amount of troops that would be required. When echelons are used, forces are diluted at any one point. This means you need more of them to ensure you can spread out over the entire front and have enough punch in the 2nd and 3rd echelons to complete the mission. I think early Soviet offensives show this as they didn't have the necessary resources/training and force compositions to be truly successful.

I think it also shows where comes the US and German doctrines that focus more on force destruction and quality over quantity. Both were fighting outnumbered (whether permanently or over some ramp up time) and had to develop strategies that took advantage or minimized disadvantages. For political and geographical reasons, the US had to fight with less at the point of contact. By destroying forces, you even up the odds a bit and also force reserves to be committed to stabilize the front. This can bring about a battle of attrition, but as the qualitatively superior force, you hope your technology translates to fewer casualties on your side.

In the case of Air Land Battle, my hazy memory doesn't ever remember a focus on destroying/targeting logistics. What I remember is looking for 2nd echelon forces and identifying the OMG (as well as HQs, eng, arty units, etc). So my day as an intel analyst was spent pouring over intel reports trying to identify these targets and predict when/where they would be used. The other thing that sticks in my mind was a real focus on command, control and decision cycles. There was a real attempt to get inside of the decision loop on the Soviets to try to make decisions faster than they could respond. Rather than sit back and absorb 1st echelon attacks, the ideas was to use local offenses and counter attacks all along the front to force the Soviets to respond and to get inside their loop. There was a belief that our more decentralized command structure and greater command initiative (even down to squad level) would allow this to occur.

P.S. Do you any of the other intel guys on here remember looking for 31 tank ITBs and what they signified? Seemed to be really popular with CPX controllers.

Graymane,

Of course the problem with such extensive decentralisation was that it could lead to each sub-element finding its own "best position" and actually inadvertently leaving the sorts of gaps in the front which the Soviets were trying to plug. I think that with sub-elements manoeuvring for their own best positions it would have taken only very minor errors before some Bns somewhere ended up getting split sufficiently far apart that the Soviets identified a sufficiently large gap to introduce the Motor Rifle Division's Tank Regiment.

Also when you consider that some sources talk about the Soviets consolidating all the attack helicopters in the Army ( 5 Divisions ) into a single combat grouping and using them to blast a gap in the front line and when you consider that, in places, a Division's frontage may often have been less than 5 or 6 km ( two BMP regiments abreast, with 1 Bn each Km ) I find it difficult to believe that even in a conventional war any level of small unit brilliance could help a cross-attached Bn survive trying to hold against that sort of sledgehammer. Good thing we never had to find out one way or the other - only in CPXs and wargames .

As re: the ITB in the Tank Division. Well that'd be, depending on role, the culmination point of the offensive with the divisional commander's reserve being thrown, a critical indicator of the main effort's direction ( if thrown in earlier ) and/or a sign that the final reserve had been thrown into the defensive battle. I'm assuming though that the OPFOR COs were properly trained to fight as the Soviets would have - in which the independent Bns in the attacking divisions ( Regiments in the Armies etc ) were the commander's reserve and their primary means of reacting to battlefield events once their Regiments (or Divisions ) had been committed to their pre-determined roles.