Well, they were to be towed by proper tugs (450) and 150 freighters (averaging 4.000 tons displacement). Simply to ensure an orderly and timely advance of the various landing parties.
Yes, at 2-3 knots. A nice, slow moving relatively tightly packed, long strung out column, crewed by a mix of experienced and inexperienced personnel. At night, being attacked by the RN it would have been carnage. Tugs being shot up and sinking – taking the barges with them in some cases – or visa-versa. Tow ropes being lost and the barges sitting ducks and drifting. As more and more tug/barge combos become held up in the melee so the situation becomes more and more confused. One word; Carnage.
In a way they had. The RN had pulled completely out of the Eastern part, there were some destroyers based in the Western part which had standing orders not to venture out in daytime without fighter escort (we know how that worked out in those days). There was a reason for that curfew. RAF Fighter Command had their hands full recuperating from the daily Luftwaffe onslaughts which, as soon as the Sealion go-ahead (10 days before S-day) was given would have been switched back from the irrelevant London missions. Bomber Command was allergic to anti-ship missions. Oh, yes – they did a nice job night-bombing the stationary targets on the French coast. Unfortunately, the German margins in transport were such that it had little practical importance.
Apologies but I simply do not understand the point you are making here. The RN had pulled out of nowhere. Here is a list of ships (not including the hundreds of small craft – patrol boats, minesweepers etc – the only smaller vessels noted are MTB’s). All of these are easily within reach of the Channel – remember the Germans have a 24-30 hour crossing!
Dover – 2 x MTB
Harwich – 6 DD, 11 MTB
Portsmouth – 1 CL, 14 DD, 5 x TB 6 x MTB
Southampton – 2 x DD
Sheerness – 2 x CL, 18 x DD
London – 1 x MTB
Lowestoft – 1 x TB, 1 x MTB
Portland - 2 x MTB
Plymouth – 1 x BB, 1 x CA, 1 x CL, 11 x DD
The Humber – 3 x CA, 5 x DD, 11 x MTB
Milford Haven – 1 TB
Rosyth – 2 x BB, 2 x BC, 2 x CL, 1 x CLAA, 17 x DD, 1 x TB
Liverpool – 3 x DD
Dundee – 3 x TB
Belfast – 3 x DD
Clyde – 1 x CA, 10 x DD
Scapa Flow – 1 x BC, 1 x CV, 3 x CA, 1 x CLAA, 7 x DD
Others – 10 x DD, 1 x TB
Note: All the above are readily available in September i.e. there are no units above undergoing repair or otherwise out of action. No allowance has been made for vessels used for convoy purposes – which of course can be recalled in extremis. Finally I have referred to the Town-class as CA (the 6-inch/8-inch distinction was blurred by then).
You also seem to be confusing sound tactical decisions by both the RAF and the RN (in order to husband forces for other purposes) with what would happen in the event that an invasion was underway.
Then there are the sweeping statements that, of course apply only one way: Bomber command was allergic to anti-ship missions – what about the FAA? And the Luftwaffe was full of anti-ship experts? Attacks on naval vessels off Dunkirk and Norway suggested otherwise…. In terms of overall shipping lost at Dunkirk – over 200 – once again it’s all one way. The Luftwaffe was able to inflict those losses (with the help of mines) on the Allies, but the RAF could not possibly do the same come the invasion? That statement simply has no basis in fact.
“RAF Fighter Command had their hands full recuperating from the daily Luftwaffe onslaughts” If you are going to ignore the parlous state of the Luftwaffe by September 1940 then this is a pretty pointless exercise.
“Unfortunately, the German margins in transport were such that it had little practical importance”. This is simply wrong. The barges and tugs were irreplaceable.
quote:
Warspite wrote: As I have said before, Hitler is simply not going to see Barbarossa compromised for an operation with such a slim chance of success.
Leandros wrote: We shall all be happy he showed such blatant misjudgement. That said, that isn’t really the subject, is it?
Sadly this is very much the subject and to ignore this is to simply fail to understand what WWII – at least as far as Europe was concerned – was all about. We can argue back and forth all we like about ships, aircraft, barges and whatever. One FACT is known; Barbarossa was Hitler’s raison d’etre. A quick win against a beaten Britain? Maybe, but an operation like Sealion, with a miniscule chance of success (read none unless absolutely everything went right for the Germans) – no. But as an exercise in what-if, we can park this.
Oh, yes – the Mother Country, Back Against The Wall syndrome. No more said about that…
Presumably you mean something by this – sadly I have no clue….
Warspite wrote: The German can be stopped pre-invasion. In the highly unlikely event they land, they need to be cut-off.
Leandros wrote: Exactly what is it you mean, please? They would be cut off because they needed to be cut off? The Germans wouldn’t have any say in that?
Sealion would have been carnage for the Germans because they would never have landed – or if some units did, they would be in such disarray that they would easily have been mopped up. However, this comment was in response to the fanciful notion that if, by some miracle, the Germans had landed, then the RN would not have thrown everything at the invasion forces, they would not seek to have them cut-off. Instead they would have sailed for Canada!!!
I recommend Peter Schenk’s Landung in England. It’s the best book on the German transport fleet.
My point was really to show that barges, which can be many things, aren’t necessarily as unseaworthy to the degree they are often portrayed in Sealion discussions. They weren’t. As for manning the Kriegsmarine vessels some here may well have concluded that they could not be sufficiently manned, but those persons have obviously not conferred with the Kriegsmarine as that institution didn’t know that. Or, rather, according to General Halder’s diary, the Kriegsmarine was on top of it. If they hadn’t the operation could maybe have been cancelled because of this….Or maybe it was…?
As far as I can tell the book has not been translated into English. However that is not really the point. The inadequacies re the barges and tugs have been made repeatedly*. You say the Kriegsmarine were unaware that they had insufficient experienced seamen to man the vessels. This is the same Kriegsmarine that did not believe this operation was possible? Halder? Come now Leandros, you are intimating that the army and the navy actually spoke to one another about this operation! Basically the army said what they wanted, Raeder said it was impossible and so Hitler agreed with the army at a meeting Raeder was not even present at.
But of course as you say re planning for the operation “the German staffs and personnel didn’t need that”……..
*Aside from the pitifully slow speed that the tugs and their barges would be travelling at you have not mentioned how exactly these barges were supposed to land the troops and the need for the tugs to wait around to link up with them so they could be taken back for follow-up waves (all this time the British are doing nothing of course). You have not mentioned the fact that the Germans has ONE very small scale practice at landing against an uncontested beach and that this practise session went very badly – but as you say, the Germans didn’t need planning and preparation…..
The subject can be found on Wikipedia. Of course, the Thames barges were built in the UK and therefore superior to the Dutch, French, Belgian and German.
I assume that is sarcasm?
Warspite wrote: The Sealion invasion force was stronger than that employed at D-Day? How exactly?
Leandros wrote: I wrote relatively seen. Enough said…
Er… okay.. but makes no sense relatively or otherwise.
Warspite wrote:…and, far more importantly, is not backed up by what actually happened before and after the potential Sealion operation date.
Leandros wrote: If that is your opinion I would love to hear what actually happened before and after the potential Sealion date that gives substance to such an allegation. But, not the one that Hitler decided not to go through with it. We know that. And we are not sorry for it.
Again this was a response in to the earlier comment that the British would not throw everything at the Germans in the event that the invasion looked like it was succeeding. As I said, “That scenario simply beggars belief. Yes the Senior Service will risk losing battleships to assist a Division or so off Norway, a corps off Crete, to save the island of Malta, to save the colony of Malaya/Singapore - but the UK? No way.....”