Matrix Games Forums

Tristanjohn,

You are getting closer to the real problems with the UV air model. In fighter vs fighter combat it has all too little to do with relative experience. Whether the ratings are right or wrong they don't seem to be crucial. Fatigue and morale seem to be much more important than experience for fighter v fighter clashes.

The problem with this is that fatigue and morale can vary so wildly from day to day. A 10 or 20 experience gap is dwarfed by the other factors. Fatigue and morale also seem to be governed so much by the Squadren leader's values. Especially for recovery. I hate the fact that who commands a squadren seems so much more important than what they are flying or the quality of the pilots. This is one of the Japanese's early advantages in UV. They seem to have a few good early squadren leaders. But if you play the Japanese you will have plenty of morale / fatigue problems. And check the operational losses the Japanese are taking on their 'constant' missions. Of course your opponents may be rotating their four or so Betty/Nell squadrens and four odd squadrens of Zeros.

I think this is why you have not always been well received here. You initially focused on the experience rates. This just is not the problem and most of us who play the game realise this. If only it were! That is just a simple data fix. Yet you felt fully qualified to rubbish the game's model. The problem is NOT that fighter's experience is too far in favour of the Japanese (whether they are or not) but that in this game it does not matter anyway. In this game a squadren of relatively green pilots flying P-39s with a great CO are worth so much more than a squadren of veterans flying P-40s or Wildcats with a poor one. Simply because they can fly so much more and keep in shape. I doubt this is very historical

There have been many changes to the game since it was released and many were triggered by knee jerk reactions such as the one you initially made. Another was "The 4E bombers fly to often". Then the programmers upped the fatigue and slowed the repair rates. Then it was "My 4E bombers just sit around tired and damaged for weeks on end". etc. etc. etc.

I don't think the fatigue is different for Allies and Japanese. But the early Japanese do tend to have a lot of good squadren leaders. Resting and rotating squadrens should help and was I believe a historical strategy used by the allies. It is often better to have one squadren on a reasonable CAP % (say 50-60%) and rest the other rather than have both on constant 20-30% CAP. But in this game nothing beats a good CO for fighter squadrens

By the way the Wildcat squadrens on your CVs tend to have OK to good COs IIRC. Yet I too have noticed that these squadrens have morale and fatigue problems. Maybe there is an extra hit from being on a CV? The Japanese CV fighters also go down pretty quick. I believe that there are going to be changes lowering the fatigue / morale hit of regular CAP missions. This should help but not solve the problem.

Also I don't want to make out that experience is irrelevent. For bombers it makes a lot of difference on whether you are going to hit anything.

Tristanjohn,

You are getting closer to the real problems with the UV air model. In fighter vs fighter combat it has all too little to do with relative experience. Whether the ratings are right or wrong they don't seem to be crucial. Fatigue and morale seem to be much more important than experience for fighter v fighter clashes.

The problem with this is that fatigue and morale can vary so wildly from day to day. A 10 or 20 experience gap is dwarfed by the other factors. Fatigue and morale also seem to be governed so much by the Squadren leader's values. Especially for recovery. I hate the fact that who commands a squadren seems so much more important than what they are flying or the quality of the pilots. This is one of the Japanese's early advantages in UV. They seem to have a few good early squadren leaders. But if you play the Japanese you will have plenty of morale / fatigue problems. And check the operational losses the Japanese are taking on their 'constant' missions. Of course your opponents may be rotating their four or so Betty/Nell squadrens and four odd squadrens of Zeros.

I think this is why you have not always been well received here. You initially focused on the experience rates. This just is not the problem and most of us who play the game realise this. If only it were! That is just a simple data fix. Yet you felt fully qualified to rubbish the game's model. The problem is NOT that fighter's experience is too far in favour of the Japanese (whether they are or not) but that in this game it does not matter anyway. In this game a squadren of relatively green pilots flying P-39s with a great CO are worth so much more than a squadren of veterans flying P-40s or Wildcats with a poor one. Simply because they can fly so much more and keep in shape. I doubt this is very historical

There have been many changes to the game since it was released and many were triggered by knee jerk reactions such as the one you initially made. Another was "The 4E bombers fly to often". Then the programmers upped the fatigue and slowed the repair rates. Then it was "My 4E bombers just sit around tired and damaged for weeks on end". etc. etc. etc.

I don't think the fatigue is different for Allies and Japanese. But the early Japanese do tend to have a lot of good squadren leaders. Resting and rotating squadrens should help and was I believe a historical strategy used by the allies. It is often better to have one squadren on a reasonable CAP % (say 50-60%) and rest the other rather than have both on constant 20-30% CAP. But in this game nothing beats a good CO for fighter squadrens

By the way the Wildcat squadrens on your CVs tend to have OK to good COs IIRC. Yet I too have noticed that these squadrens have morale and fatigue problems. Maybe there is an extra hit from being on a CV? The Japanese CV fighters also go down pretty quick. I believe that there are going to be changes lowering the fatigue / morale hit of regular CAP missions. This should help but not solve the problem.

Also I don't want to make out that experience is irrelevent. For bombers it makes a lot of difference on whether you are going to hit anything.

mdiehl wrote:I don't think I was generous. One has to give balance to the Japanese losses where "Lt. X" was last seen leaving Guadalcanal in his Zeke retiring northward with so and so, or on his own, but never returned to Rabaul and was not seen to crash by his wingmates. I figure these stand a good chance of being examples where the pilot was wounded or the plane somewhat damaged, wherein the pilot or plane would have landed safely despite battle damage or injuries if he did not have that 500 mile return flight to endure. I figure a marine who lives and lands a repairable plane but had to dead stick the plane counts as a Japanese kill, because the only thing that prevented his loss was the fortuitous occurrence of a friendly airfield underneath his crashing aircraft. Move the US airfield ten miles from the scene of the engagement and you might get the pilot back, but definitely not the plane.

Mdiehl,

What was the source of your USMC figures? I've seen those that cover certain days in detail (that seperate shot down from crash-landed, damaged written-off and damaged repairable) but not for the whole campaign.

Lundstrom: The First Team at Guadalcanal. Probably the same source that you used, but I made a combat-by-combat chart. In that chart the F4F vs A6M kill ratio somewhat favors the Japanese, but all the difference is made by a single pro-Japanese bounce in late August. I also used Frank's Guadalcanal to get the total ac/ (including bombers) loss ratios, and discounted those that were lost in naval or ground attack. The sources are consistent. Something like 1.1-1.2:1 favoring the Japanese vs. USMC/USN land based F4Fs at Cactus vs. 25th AF Zekes from Rabaul, but the difference is made by a single bad day. That's using Lundstrom. Using Frank, backing out a/c lost to ground attack, P39s, bombers etc the fighter vs. fighter ratio is almost exactly 1:1. I suspect that Frank is using official numbers from the US sources, but that some of those include the dead-sticked (or whatever) American a/c that I mentioned in the previous post.

For actions prior to and including Midway involving the USN I used Lundstrom's The First Team. I completely ignored the results of the air combats vs the land based VMF at Midway, owing to the heavy proportion of F2A3s (they'd have been better off in F2A1s.. faster and more maneuverable).

I have consistently found it VERY difficult to track down good sources on a/c losses in the New Guinea campaign, and in the early going aroun Indonesia. IMO Bergerud's Fire in the Sky is anecdotally entertaining, but neither useful nor even necessarily reliable (given the emphasis given to a few surviving pilots' accounts and the lack of any critical effort to look at real numbers) for my purpose. And the pilots' victory claims and the "officially verified" claims provided by the respective combatants aren't worth the paper they are written on.

Anyhow, it's not a perfect science. But using either Frank or Lundstrom you get a casualty ratio of maybe 1:1 to 1.2:1 favoring the Japanese and ONLY counting F4Fs vs A6Ms. If you throw in all fighters lost it's almost exactly 1:1. If you throw in all aircraft it's about 2:1 favoring the US. This latter stat is interesting because it says a little about mission type. One reason why the Japanese did as well as they did in the Guadalcanal campaign was because they could engage, at times, US fighters that were in the process of attacking Japanese bombers. So it's not as though the Japanese did not lose planes at a heavy rate. It's that on some occasions the A6Ms had favorable position because the US pilots were simultasking fending away the Zekes and killing the Betties.

Hi, I've been finding that when used as tight escorts Zeros were lost at higher rates then when they were employed as loose escort or making sweeps.
Also one of the leading causes of destroyed A6M's seems to be landing on poor airfields. It seems the A6M landing gear was rather weak and prone to collapse on landing.
As the pilot quality declines we see more instance of A6M's crashing on landing (from landing gear collapse)
Both companies building A6M's used different fixes on landing gear. (The Nakajima gear appears over time to have become stronger then Mitubishi's though still subject to collapse.

Army/Navy. I've also found that the Japanese Army and Navy shared airbases quite often. Groundcrews from both branches performed service to the other branches aircraft.

Game Model: How should model be changed? WITP already has reduced fatigue compared to UV. What factors need to be included/removed.
How can model allow either side success if opposing side mishandled.

How would normal ratios for
Japan versus Singapore area
Japan versus PI area
Japan versus Java area

compare to Japan versus pre Watchtower aircombat in Port Moresby area.

In all the above areas the Japanese lost pilots. What impact did this loss have on later Japanese group quality. (In a small service low loss can still become a problem. I have noted that of the pre-Pearl Harbor pilot corps. (Approx. 500 pilots DB/Torp/Fighter) over 100 were lost prior to the opening of the South Pacific campaign.
This would have resulted in 80 percent of pilots being of the highly skilled type with 20 percent being noticeably less in quality.

The impact on UV/WITP scenarios that begin prior to Midway would be that the Japanese still field a number of above average groups. (but seeded with lower rated pilots) As the more experienced pilots are lost the decline accelerates. Post Midway scenarios should have the bulk of IJN fighter groups made up of newer pilots (with of course the exception of the Prewar landbased groups) IJN bomber crew quality will have been lowered by both loss of prewar pilots and expansion of service. As new airgroups are created they draw a percentage of more experienced pilots. So older units are diluted with new pilots to make up for transfer/loss while the newer groups have experienced leaders and new aircrews. The loss of the experienced leaders can quickly make the new airgroups lose effectiveness. I guess my point is that while Japanese airgroups in March/April 1942 might still be high quality they are very brittle. There is no depth to Japanese airforce. Routine mission loss of 5 percent can produce inferior groups in 2-3 months of sustained combat.
So at some point the Japanese results are going to flip flop. (where in May they achieved comparative easy success, by August it will take major efforts and accepting high loss to achieve the same results). At some point the Japanese will have to abandon combat in order to rebuild their groups. However the new Airforce after rebuilding will still be noticeably inferior to the prewar force. (and veteran Allied units will remain superior. This will require the Japanese to have numerical advantage in future combats. Allied airgroups of course are somewhat subject to the same effects only they are better able to replace lost pilots. (up to a point) Battered allied airgroups will require less time to regain most of their combat effectiveness.

So I guess what I'm asking is the early Japanese superiority completly a myth?
Or had normal combat and operational loss, coupled with weak support/replacement system and heavy combat eroded this prewar edge?
Had this effect already taken place in May 1942 or was the combat during the period from May to August the cause? (Coral Sea/Midway/Battles over New Guiena)
In game model if we acknowledge prewar skill, should the decline be coded or result of war? (Japanese player could maintain levels longer or lose them sooner depending on combat results) From testing I can state that simply over flying Japanese airgroups can result in their decline in just a few months. Heavy combat can not be sustain by the Japanese unless they have numeric advantage (allowing them to rotate groups in and out of action) The Allied player only has to find an area of combat where he can introduce greater numbers to eventually achive superiority.
Once achived in one area this will telegraph throughout the game.
(The Allied player will be able to transfer veteran groups to improve other areas and in any new campaign this already established superority will quickly erode the Japanese airgroups encountered.
As a result the Japanese player can not afford to become involved in long Campaigns. (It is best if he can destroy allied airgroups on the ground and deny the allies enough airbases in an area to house the required numerical advantage. Is this process a game product or a reflection of the actual events?

Mogami wrote:Game Model: How should model be changed?

It needs to be gutted, thought out again, conceived over completely and from scratch. The "model" we have is fundamentally Pacific War warmed over with more "detail." At its core UV (and one could only suppose WitP within the fullness of time) remains unchanged from that simulation design failure insofar as its model, too, was formulated from bogus premise and what appears to the designer's pro-Japanese bias (presumably to demonstrate a fruitless point along those lines that only he and other pro-Axis apologists could possibly share and/or provide a more "balanced game experience") to such an extent that the "simulation" now stands crippled, riddled with misleading data and conflicting system mechanics which render almost everything the player touches in the context of the collective model dynamic an utter misdirection of effort.

It is almost impossible to consider any individual part or portion of this model and arrive at the conclusion that it's been well thought-out or even approached intelligently in the beginning. My impression is that little effort was ever made (way back when) to arrive at a clear understanding of the overall picture of what the fight in the South Pacific was actually about in terms of greater war potentials which the two main countries involved brought to the conflict.

In a nutshell, and painting with a farmer's barn brush, this is how it went: the United States spotted Japan its early build-up of military and even let it stockpile a modest supply of war materiel purchased in the Uniterd States until pulling the plug on that pipeline, spotted the Japanese Pearl Harbor and the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies and New Guinea and the Solomons and the "threat" to Australia and New Zealand . . . and then, finally, moved itself to sit down at the war table with a reasonably serious game face on and, within the space of six months, had violently checked Japanese progress to the south and east, within a year had assumed the strategic initiative, within 18 months was waxing the floor with these crazed Orientals, and please keep in mind all this happened while the United States committed only some 20% of its aggregate war potential to the Pacific region.

In spite of Gary's flawed (because it is confused) thinking on the subject as a whole the Allies in general were not demoralized and certainly the American young men sent into the Pacific theater did not arrive "fatigued" and with "low morale" operating "inferior equipment." The United States Navy was in need of a thorough overall, that much is true, but even there the model doesn't get it right and for basically the same reason it doesn't get anything else right either: when you go to make a model you need to be clear on not only what you want it to look like but just as importantly why it's supposed to look that way, and Gary after all these years hasn't figured that out. Or, if he has, then it's simply a case of his pro-Japanese bias and/or desire to have a "good game" of it.

The bottom line remains the same: UV is a classically poor simulation of its subject, and unless a drastic change of attitude is assumed on the part of the game's design team WitP is going to be published in the same lamentable state.

WITP already has reduced fatigue compared to UV. What factors need to be included/removed.

How can model allow either side success if opposing side mishandled.

The first "factor" which needs to be removed from the catchall of "fatigue" with the air model in mind is its tortured "wedding" to the mechanical condition of aircraft. How could anyone seriously present pilot fatigue and morale as having anything whatsoever to do with, say, the total hours of flight time accumulated by aircraft engines? This is ludicrous on its face. I'm not even convinced there isn't a "switch" in there that's thrown differntly for the Japanese than the Allies when it comes to fatigue. I've described what I see ingame from my opponents, sending continuous flights of sweeping fighters and bombers from Kavieng and Rabaul in attacks over PM and Gili Gili, turn after turn, two flights per turn, for weeks on end. What's going on? Does anyone in this forum believe the Japanese had any such abilities? This is pure fantasy.

But it gets worse. No effort to intelligently present this mistaken (and impossible) synergy was made, and so, just for example, in a PBEM turn just completed by me this morning I witnessed a section of Seagulls come onto the board with a CA attached to the Wasp TF rated at 0 fatigue, 35 morale and 60 experience. After transferring this group from its CA to the port of Noumea the group stood at 19/35/60.

Now I don't know what this squadron's experience rating ought to be, though I suppose it might in game terms be well above 60 as the Wasp was not a new ship fresh out of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. While it could be that the scenario designer did some deep research and discovered these pilots were all new, I strongly doubt it. I see no other evidence of "deep research" within the game. Getting around that, however, why was this nonsense of having planes in port accrue 19 points of "fatigue" simply transferring from ship to shore allowed to stand with the publication of UV? What could a mechanic that idiotic, that dysfunctional, that simplistic on its face, hope to model from the real world?

Hello? Anybody in there?

I have to assume that through these and similar childlike means the designer hoped to impart to the average gamer a sense for his sense for the "operational friction of war," or some such malarkey. I tell you it's phoney as a three-dollar bill.

How would normal ratios for

Japan versus Singapore area
Japan versus PI area
Japan versus Java area

compare to Japan versus pre Watchtower aircombat in Port Moresby area.

Now you're ahead of yourself. Again. The model makes little enough sense at its base. That's the crux of the matter. Everything subsequently consructed off that insecure foundation will automatically suffer a hit, in its own way just become part of the overall problem itself. You don't add more detail or attempt to "tweak" a poor model. You discard the mistaken model and try to build a better model, and then proceed (hopefully with better success) from there.

[more]

2 of 2

In all the above areas the Japanese lost pilots. What impact did this loss have on later Japanese group quality. (In a small service low loss can still become a problem. I have noted that of the pre-Pearl Harbor pilot corps. (Approx. 500 pilots DB/Torp/Fighter) over 100 were lost prior to the opening of the South Pacific campaign. This would have resulted in 80 percent of pilots being of the highly skilled type with 20 percent being noticeably less in quality.The impact on UV/WITP scenarios that begin prior to Midway would be that the Japanese still field a number of above average groups. (but seeded with lower rated pilots) As the more experienced pilots are lost the decline accelerates. Post Midway scenarios should have the bulk of IJN fighter groups made up of newer pilots (with of course the exception of the Prewar landbased groups) IJN bomber crew quality will have been lowered by both loss of prewar pilots and expansion of service. As new airgroups are created they draw a percentage of more experienced pilots. So older units are diluted with new pilots to make up for transfer/loss while the newer groups have experienced leaders and new aircrews. The loss of the experienced leaders can quickly make the new airgroups lose effectiveness. I guess my point is that while Japanese airgroups in March/April 1942 might still be high quality they are very brittle. There is no depth to Japanese airforce. Routine mission loss of 5 percent can produce inferior groups in 2-3 months of sustained combat.So at some point the Japanese results are going to flip flop. (where in May they achieved comparative easy success, by August it will take major efforts and accepting high loss to achieve the same results). At some point the Japanese will have to abandon combat in order to rebuild their groups. However the new Airforce after rebuilding will still be noticeably inferior to the prewar force. (and veteran Allied units will remain superior. This will require the Japanese to have numerical advantage in future combats. Allied airgroups of course are somewhat subject to the same effects only they are better able to replace lost pilots. (up to a point) Battered allied airgroups will require less time to regain most of their combat effectiveness.So I guess I'm asking is the early Japanese superiority completly a myth or had normal combat and operational loss, coupled with weak support/replacement system and heavy combat eroded this prewar edge?

There is probably a portion of both at work there. The Japanese early successes were gained mostly against a poorly-led and poorly-equipped Chines opponent. Earlier the Japanese had their clocks cleaned versus the Russians, indeed, had become terrified of even the thought of ever having to face the Russians again.

After (during the same period) the Chinese the Japanese picked on American assets (to a small extent) in China and then when the world war started for real in the Pacific went up against poorly-equipped, under-supplied (and possibly with re to the Dutch though I don't know it) somewhat demoralized opposition as the country moved into the so-called SRA while at the same time moving into the Philippine archipelago--there it met the USA for the first time and even though planning was the pits and MacArthur was having his infamous nervous breakdown the Americans gave the Japanese a small hint of the sort of opposition they would eventually encounter, opposition in such overwhelming might and of such unbridled determination that eventually Japanese dread of all things Russian military would be supplanted by the even larger and more-dreadful-still prospect of playing at war with the United State of America on even ground. (Well, ground made as even as possible considering our country fed just 20% of its war stuff in that direction. Never forget that.)

Had this effect already taken place in May 1942 or was the combat during the period from May to August the cause (Coral Sea/Midway/Battles over New Guiena)

The Japanese got a taste of near-field reality with regards to its war with America at the Coral Sea. They consumed the full enchilada of that unhappy course at Midway. Up against a force of not very much (relatively speaking) at Guadacanal (call it a division of untested Marines supported by a mixed bag of inter-service pilots driving "inferior" aircraft) the Japanese were introduced to the word s-l-a-u-g-h-t-e-r, at least on the ground and were held, at best, to a draw in the air while doing somewhat well versus an untried and poorly-tutored USN. Guadacanal is where the Japanese found out for the third time (the first time versus the Russians, the second time versus the Chinese) that their Army was not far from invincible but in fact was incapable to fight an enemy who was the real deal for more than a week or so at a stretch without ennduring certain defeat. One might suppose the Japanese might have deduced as much from their experience on the ground versus Siberian Russians and the stalemate they found in China, but then no one ever said Tojo was a genius in his field. As it turned out he couldn't keep count.

This "effect" you continually speak to is part of the game's greater problem, a good part of the reason its model is so hopelessly far afield.

There never was any "effect." The Japanese never were superior, not even compared to the Chinese when it all boils down. They had their lunch handed to them by the Russians for pete's sake, were immediately stopped, then rolled back and soon enough crushed by American-led opposition in the Pacific. None of that happened by accident. There are reasons.

Were Japanese pilots more "experienced" than American aviators? In terms of combat experience they certainly were at start of war, but it didn't take our American pilots very long to figure out how to knock down the Zero all over the place, even given the old equipment they were first handed to drive. And how about that equipment? Were Japanese planes that superior to even the oldest planes the Allies started the war with? A case could be made that the Brewsters flown by Marines were somewhat hopeless, maybe, but you sure couldn't prove Japanese equipment superiority from the other results.

At end of day, how far did this "superior experience" and "superior equipment" take the Japanese versus the Americans and their allies? Not very far, is the answer. Another answer would be: just about 10 degrees south of the equator around the 160th meridian. At that juncture the wheels fell off the Emperor's little red wagon, anything resembling Japanese progress to the south or east came to a screeching halt, and the terrible spectre of a very grisly end indeed raised its ugly head and lurked for all and sundry things Japanese.

In game model if we acknowledge prewar skill should decline be coded or result of war?

Were the model is designed correctly to begin with there would be no room for these kinds of questions, no need for global "workarounds" of the kind you suggest.

(Japanese player could maintain levels longer or lose them sooner depending on combat results) From testing I can state that simply over flying Japanese airgroups can result in their decline in just a few months. Heavy combat can not be sustain by the Japanese unless they have numeric advantage (allowing them to rotate groups in and out of action)

The concept of squadron "rotation" in and out of theater is one Gary doesn't seem too eager to deal with.

The Allied player only has to find an area of combat where he can introduce greater numbers to eventually achive superiority.

You continue to describe a bad model. The Americans didn't need superiority in numbers to check the Japanese. They checked the Japanese with less at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadacanal. Why can't you and Gary wrap yourselves around that? Until at least Gary does there is no hope of righting the model.

Once achived in one area this will telegraph throughout the game. (The Allied player will be able to transfer veteran groups to improve other areas and in any new campaign this already established superority will quickly erode the Japanese airgroups encountered. As a result the Japanese player can not afford to become involved in long Campaigns. (It is best if he can destroy allied airgroups on the ground and deny the allies enough airbases in an area to house the required numerical advantage. Is this process a game product or a reflection of the actual events?

The only place in the world the Japanese ought to be able to do any such thing would be in SE Asia and the Philippines early in the war. If the model comes to us with yet another "super-Japanese" war potential predicated on the stupid belief that Japanese soldiers were better fighters with higher morale and Japanese airmen were better fliers with more sophisticated aircraft and Japanese naval personnel were better sailors with more modern ships to sail then WitP isn't going to make any more good sense than did PW or UV. It will amount to no more in terms of an accurate simulation of World War II in the Pacific than anything else on the market to date.

The underlying models of the games we discuss remain fundamentally flawed, probably because the man principally involved in their design does not understand the history they purport to simulate. That, or Joel's still hard at work telling one and all that a "successful" game financially speaking cannot be faithful to history if the cost of this fidelity is to lose one single customer lacking the good sense not to post public messages holding individuals such as you, Mogami, in the light of idolatry. Worse, I find people of this general description confirmed members of the WitP project--these are the people who test these game models, and yet there exist debates such as this as to why the simulations in question fail to deliver.

At this dubious intersection I don't know whether to laugh or to cry. I for sure don't hold out much hope that WitP will come out any more realistic than its forebears.

Moving right along. . .

. . . in answer to your question yesterday re the possible development of Munda in anticipation to the arrival of the Model 52: the answer is no. Munda was started well before that redesign of the Zero Model 21 ever made it into service (I'm not sure as I have little hard data on this, but I'd place the 52's nominal arrival date in theater around mid-summer or autumn of 1943, probably around August or September) and undoubtedly before most Japanese except at the highest levels of command even knew of its coming, and in any event as far as I know this new airplane didn't see concerted action until the Marianas. Munda was developed in order to provide a closer strip for fighters over the lower Solomons and to also serve as a staging field for the light and medium bombers then being forced to make that sortie in one uninterrupted leg from Rabaul.

Not that it matters all that much. In practice the Model 52 was no more proficient against Allied arms than had been the 21, lacked the former airplane's range, and was demonstrably inferior on balance to its primary combat opponent, the Grumman Hellcat. In effect, with the introduction of the Model 52 the Japanese had hopped up and down, and if you care to call that progess, do so. The game model does this all the time and gets away with it--at least in this undemanding forum.

As an aside, the A6M5 was intended primarily as a replacement for carrier-borne aircraft and the Army, as far as I know, didn't get any early the allotments. When they did receive this aircraft I'm not sure, though I suppose that information might be readily obtained by those with interest.

In hindsight it is easy enough to criticize the Japanese high command for all this--the lack of development in the Lower Solomons, the lack of more and better development on Bougainville and so forth, and this criticism is not without certain justification. But the thing is, this stuff wouldn't have made much difference in the long run. Except with consideration to the Imperial Japanese Navy (a formidable force, and the superior of its USN counterpart in all respects when it came to night surface action) the bad guys were in fact the ones saddled with inferior equipment and troops subject as the war wore on to the withering effect of lowered morale. There are lots of reasons for this, but let's just leave it here: Japan was not equipped with the infrastructure of global war, indeed, was not equipped for any kind of total war even on a regional scale which promised to last beyond twelve months; Japan was in no manner, shape or form equipped to take on the United States of America in a straight fight, and only a pack of absolute madmen would have entertained that suicidal notion for a minute. So now we have a working definition of Tojo: a madman, which isn't even to mention his criminal side.

Let the model model that.

What I propose is this. Let us all design a model to realistically simulate basic truths, a model where the Japanese do not possess demonstrably superior equipment, a model where the Japanese do not enjoy any sort of moral highground, a model where the Japanese are not particularly blessed with competent high command and are positively damned with middle- and lower-echelon command structure throughout the armed forces with the exception of the IJN (and even there it was quite possible for an intelligent and energetic Japanese admiral or captain to find himself on the beach or to simply go ppoooofff in the night for no better reason than he dared to talk up to his "betters"). Yes, by all means let's get together and party and and design that kind of simulation of World War II in the Pacific, a model where the Japanese haven't a snowball's chance in hell of doing much better than they did in real life, a model where it will take the same bad decisions and the same lousy leaders and the same lethargic start out of the blocks in the race toward toward modern war which bedeviled American interest in the beginning, to allow our virtual Japanese warriors ingame to "enjoy" what little transitory success they did in real life, and see how that sells downtown.

I can see it now. "New and Improved! Gary Grigsby's Pacific War . . . with Years-ahead Styling!" [font=Times New Roman](And now, for a limited time, only 1/2 price . . . because it's realistic.)[/font]

Hi, This is a list of number Japanese aircraft destroyed by USAAF and USAAF loss only on combat missions. In South Pacific

1942 Japan USAAF
May 36 49 1.4-1 Japan
June 33 32 even
July 18 16 even
Aug 75 24 3-1 USAAF
Sept 48 25
Oct 46 3
Nov 76 44
Dec 116 17

Numbers do not include other allied (UK/commonwealth USN USMC)

You can see the sharp increase after Watchtower commences. Prior to Aug the loss rates were even (and as far as I know no USMC/USN air combat occured so these would be totals excepting for UK/Commonwealth airgroups. many of the Japanese ac destroyed are from airfield attacks (not a result of air to air where the May June July numbers are a result of air to air for the most part)


Totals for entire war:
10,343 Japanese aircraft destroyed by USAAF. 4,530 USAAF lost on combat missions against Japanese. (not listed in total are misshaps or destroyed on ground)(I think Japanese total does include destroyed on ground. Also Other USA military (USN/USMC and allies not included)


Does anyone have data on Japanese air loss during PI campaign (Dec 7 41-Apr 9 42) I have it around 90 aircraft. (out of over 1200)
I list 66 USAAF aircraft lost
during combat missions (not counting lost on ground or mishap, abandoned)

From Dec 7 41 to Feb 15 42 I have 90 Japanese aircraft lost (out of another 1200 )and over 390 UK/Commonwealth AC lost) in Malaya


China India Burma
USAAF 1076 Japan 1913
42 35 53 1.5-1
43 217 636 2.9-1
44 532 772 1.5-1
45 292 361 1.2-1
Do the 44 & 45 figures reflect newer IJA fighters?

Hi, Does anyone know when the USN knew correctly the results of the Coral Sea Battle? I know after action reports by Fred Sherman stated that IJN had lost 2 large CV with a possible third. (Shoho was misreported (as CV Ryukaku with full air complement of 80 aircraft) and Shokaku was thought to have sunk soon after attack. (with full complement of 80 aircraft) Zuikaku was reported in possible sinking condition and retiring)(USN claimed almost 240 Japanese aircraft)

Also USN pilots claimed to have shot down at least 2 ME-109's (Did USA believe Japanese were flying these, when did they know better)
One thing that interested me in reading report was mentioning 2 CAP's
1 for divebomber at 20k another for torpedo plane at 3k (and held close to ship. Anti DB CAP was placed further out)

Today we know the Coral Sea carriers did not go on the Midway operation. My question is did Nimitz know before the Midway battle that the Coral Sea results were not as good. Could one or both of the Japanese CV been made ready and taken part. (were they ever part of the Midway plan) Did Nimitz think the IJN only had 4 CV left or did he know they had 6 with only 4 heading his way.

(I asking because I wonder when WatchTower was put together if USN thought all 6 IJN CV had been destroyed)

I often hear Shokaku was not included because of damage and Zuikaku because her airgroups needed to rebuild but the Japanese lost 43 aircraft (from CV) on 8 May (USN lost 33) So it appears that had the Japanese felt a pressing need they could have sent Zuikakau with full aircrews to Midway. (This is why I don't think they were ever part of Midway plan)

While in general I agree with most of the points made in the posts
above, there is one thing I think should be mentioned. At the beginning
of WWII, virtually every fighter pilot in the Pacific theatre in every Air
Force represented thought of Fighter Combat in terms of "dogfighting".
Air tactics were still being worked out by a few far-sighted thinkers, but
most pilots thought they were going to "mix it up" and try to get on
their opponants tail for the "kill". And while this attitude prevailed the
Japanese pilots and planes WERE markedly superior to the Allies. Their
pilots had actual combat experiance, and their aircraft were generally
more airobatic than their opposition. As long as Allied pilots were wil-
ling to "play the game" according to "dogfight" rules, the Japanese had
a clear "edge". When they came up against opponants like the "Tigers"
who had been schooled in Chenault's tactics, they were markedly less
effective. Or when faced with an opponant like a B-17 who's toughness
and armament kept agility from being a major factor in the combat. But
in general, even when the British managed to get a few "front-line" and
experianced squadrons from Europe into the fray, they were still trying
to play the "dogfight" game against Japanese opponants who were
better equipped for it.

By the 2nd half of 1942, Allied pilots had reccognized their weakness
in playing the Japanese Game by Japanese Rules---and had begun to
force the Japanese into a different Game. New tactics which made the
most of the superior toughness, dive speed, and armament of Allied
Fighters were turning the tide of air losses even before better aircraft
and pilot training began to bury the Japanese in 1943. My point is that
there IS some legitimate basis for the claims of Japanese superiority.
They WERE better equipped and trained for the fight EVERYONE thought
was to be the norm. But their very "specialization" worked against them
when the Allies smartened up and changed the nature of the combat.

Mogami for what ever it is worth Lord, in his book Incredible Victory states,

"The superb new carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were meant to be on hand, but detached for the Coral Sea affair, they had run into a little trouble. On May 17 Shokaku limped back into Kure, her flight deck shattered and her bow burnt out by American bombs. Zuikaku followed two days later, undamaged but her air group badly mauled, between them, the two ships had only 6 torpedo planes and nine dive bombers left."

Morrison states that 39 aircraft remained operational on both carriers (Shokaku and Zuikaku) after the battle with an additional 50 badly damaged and in need of major repair before they could have flown again.

Lord also states "On May 25 Rochefort gave him, (Nimitz) point by point the exact Japanese order of battle and operating plan of the Japanese striking force. Nimitz rushed a new message to Midway, giving all the details. There were only 2 bright spots: Nagumo's force no longer included Zuikaku and the date would be later than originally thought."

This seems to indicate they thought Shokaku was sunk at Coral Sea and Zuikaku damaged.

Gailey in his book, War in the Pacific also states both Shokaku and Zuikaku were both intended for Midway but detached to Coral Sea.

Tristanjohn wrote: They checked the Japanese with less at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadacanal. Why can't you and Gary wrap yourselves around that?

Tristanjohn, care to *briefly* explain exactly how do you come to the above opinion.

Regarding the rest, after reading your thesis, I really think you are fighting windmills. I do not see many here expounding marked Japanese superiorty in soldiers, pilots, sailors, weapons, planes ships or anything else. Nor do I see this manifested in the current game engine.

Air to air combat for example. Take a look back at the Lunga test. 4 different individuals posted results of very similar test and not one had better than 1:1 combat results between F4Fs and Zeros. This is what I get regularly. I think you would too, if you would remember 2 simple rules. Any fatigue over 20 is too much. Any Morale under 60 is too low.

Ground troops, where in the game do you see IJA ground troops manifestly superior to allied troops? If anything they are inferior, they lack support, engineering., hvy.arty, and vehicles.

Ships, where in the game do you see IJN ships superior to USN ships? If anything they are inferior, they have inferior damaged control, lack radar, and do not seem to use the best weapon (torps) often enough.

One last thing no matter how you feel, the game is not going to be "gutted" at this stage in development. So what exactly are you hopeing to accomplish with your proclamations of scrapping everything and starting over? Perhaps its time to resign yourself that this is not the game for you and move on.

Regards

Mike Scholl wrote:While in general I agree with most of the points made in the posts above, there is one thing I think should be mentioned. At the beginning of WWII, virtually every fighter pilot in the Pacific theatre in every Air Force represented thought of Fighter Combat in terms of "dogfighting". Air tactics were still being worked out by a few far-sighted thinkers, but most pilots thought they were going to "mix it up" and try to get on their opponants tail for the "kill". And while this attitude prevailed the
Japanese pilots and planes WERE markedly superior to the Allies.

In a way true but already broached and accounted for in this thread. None of this in any way ameliorates the weighty problems which burden this simulation, or argue for the decided Japanese bias in most things air combat, and what you note doesn't even want to address the many other problems besetting the UV system.

Valid points, though, and always worth keeping in mind.

TIMJOT wrote:Tristanjohn, care to *briefly* explain exactly how do you come to the above opinion.

Explain it? What could be simpler?

At both Coral Sea and Midway it's clear the IJN possessed the more powerful forces. I do hope that's clear. As for the Guadacanal operation, the Americans pulled it off, as it's been said, on a "shoestring." That they were able to count this coup by the good fortune of bringing all they had to bear at the crucial point at the exactly correct moment in time, meanwhile the Japanese twiddled their thumbs, has nothing to do with my statement.

TIMJOT wrote:Regarding the rest, after reading your thesis, I really think you are fighting windmills. I do not see many here expounding marked Japanese superiorty in soldiers, pilots, sailors, weapons, planes ships or anything else.

So? Do you see much of anything around here that you could call deep? This forum's a zoo. I should care if if my opinion expresses the majority view? Get real, TIMJOT.

As for bias: I've pointed out a definite bias for (or untter misunderstanding of) Japanese air assets. On the other hand, though I haven't gone into much detail I've also mentioned what I consider to be an undermodeling of Japanese surface assets when it comes to night actions. And so on.

I don't play favorites. I'm neither pro this nor anti that. All I want is a reasonably representative simulation. What we have at present is anything but on balance and sometimes silly.

TIMJOT wrote:One last thing no matter how you feel, the game is not going to be "gutted" at this stage in development. So what exactly are you hopeing to accomplish with your proclamations of scrapping everything and starting over? Perhaps its time to resign yourself that this is not the game for you and move on.

Of course it isn't going to be simply scrapped. But I hold out small hope the development team will zero-out the multipliers and at least redo this part of the model with an eye to more realistic play.

I also hope that by taking the trouble to voice common-sense concerns other serious gamers will take heart and chance to step forward (again if they have before and were ignored or shouted down the first time) and add their collective voice to my call for better product. What we have isn't nearly as good as Gary's capable of.

Tristanjohn wrote:Explain it? What could be simpler?

At both Coral Sea and Midway it's clear the IJN possessed the more powerful forces. I do hope that's clear. As for the Guadacanal operation, the Americans pulled it off, as it's been said, on a "shoestring." That they were able to count this coup by the good fortune of bringing all they had to bear at the crucial point at the exactly correct moment in time, meanwhile the Japanese twiddled their thumbs, has nothing to do with my statement.

Hi, I can't agree with your opinion on Coral Sea. The forces were pretty even. Zuikaku and Shokaku launched a full strike of 78 aircraft. Lexington and Yorktown launched a full strike of 90 aircraft. (The Japanese hit Neosho while the USN hit Shoho) While the IJN might have had more total ships they were spread out. I think the USN had more CA's in the area. The USN had a lot of luck in carrier battles in WW2. (The USN Strike over flew the Japanese CV on the way to sink Shoho but escaped punishment because the IJN was hitting Neosho and the strike could not be diverted (The IJN had found the real USN CV )


Midway The Japanese had 252 aircraft the USN had 223 on CV and 77 landbased aircraft. Once again I don't see the USN being "clearly" out numbered. BB 300 miles behind the IJN CV hardly count.
A best case scenario for the Japanese still see them "losing" the battle.
If the Allies claim Coral Sea as a stratigic victory then they would have produced the same result at Midway. (They might have lost another CV but the Japanese would not have captured Midway.) The 3 USN CV would still have hit the 3 IJN CV. The IJN CV would have retired (and depending on the damage been lost or out of war for most of the period covered by UV. )( had the IJN launched a second strike at USN CV, USN CV would have launched their second strike. So IJN still might have lost all 4 CV only they might have done more damage then in actual case. It is still a USN victory)(In every war game I have ever played covering Midway the Japanese lose more often then not) In UV when the same forces square off the Japanese lose more often then not. It is when they add Zuikaku and Shokaku and a few CVL that they become difficult to defeat. In UV the USN can lose all 6 CV and still grind out a victory.
(In fact in PBEM games I've played scen 19 the Japanese have yet to win the game when they have sunk all 6 USN CV. (In 1 auto victory the IJN CV force had suffered almost total defeat while only sinking 2 USN CV)(In the other Auto victory only 1 carrier battle had been fought and this beyond the range of the USN to respond) The USN does not always lose the 6 CV but even if they do the game is not over. I have a wide range of CV versus CV results in current games. In the best result for USN I have lost Yorktown and sunk Zuikaku, Hiryu, Soryu. I have damaged at least 2 other CV and 2 CVL (I have 1 other USN CV damaged. In every carrier versus carrier battle in this PBEM the USN has faced a larger IJN TF)
In UV/WITP carriers can provide support/protection for transports but they can not operate in range of enemy LBA for long periods. You need to capture/build an airfield to replace the CV as soon as possible. It is best if along with CV support invasions have LBA support. Because of this The loss of CV does not automaticaly produce defeat in game. The Japanese CV can not overpower Allied LBA if it is properly deployed.

A "Shoestring" to the USA translates into "overkill" for the Japanese.
Do you really contend Watchtower was risky? (Before it commenced the USN believed Japan only had 1 fleet CV)(The USN had 4)
Certainly battles resulted and not all of them were good results for USN.
However these battles HAD to be fought. Guadalcanal was as good a place as any and better then some. The Japanese under estimated the Allies and reacted piecemeal. From Aug 42 to Feb 43 they allowed their Naval Air arm to be destroyed, and many of their surface combatants were lost. Among the ground units were some the Japanese considered among their fineist. Total forces available during the campaign favor the allies.

While I don't believe UV has any "switches" or Japanese bonus I do agree it left out the "God is on our side" factor that clearly existed in WW2. One point to consider. Dispite all the alleged Japanese bias. They lose 99 percent of PBEM games. I've yet to hear of anyone who won a scenario that begins after Midway. When UV was first released scenario 17 was the hot scenario. Repeated Japanese loss has resulted in Scen 19 with added Japanese becoming one of the more often played scenarios. You've mentioned my PBEM score and called me a wanna be Yamamoto. I point out all my PBEM victories are as USN. (I was ahead in a number of games as Japan when my opponent vanished. However I think they did so prematurely so I don't claim these as victories)

I think you often mistake Japanese starting quality as a bonus. If you do not protect TF's with CAP the Japanese can hurt them. If you do protect TF's then the Japanese airgroups quickly fall apart in combat.
You have to fight the battles that produced Japanese defeat. It is not automatic. Ignoring the Japanese is the wrong approach. Even green pilots can hurt you if they are not challenged. The Allied player who is methodical will not suffer near the number of loss compared to allied player who rushes in. Play the Japanese in a few scenarios. I think you'll be more frustrated running them then as Allies. (It does not take long as Japanese to realize things are only going to get worse. The allied player always knows better days are ahead if he lays the ground work early.)

In UV it is quite easy to defeat the Japanese in PBEM in any scenario except 19 (with 200 percent Japanese) In that scenario the allied player has to survive 87 days. If he can do that he should be able to win the game. Of course if he does not know what CAP is, If he does not understand the situation and over extends, then the Japanese position can rapidly improve.

mdiehl wrote:Lundstrom: The First Team at Guadalcanal. Probably the same source that you used, but I made a combat-by-combat chart. In that chart the F4F vs A6M kill ratio somewhat favors the Japanese, but all the difference is made by a single pro-Japanese bounce in late August. I also used Frank's Guadalcanal to get the total ac/ (including bombers) loss ratios, and discounted those that were lost in naval or ground attack. The sources are consistent. Something like 1.1-1.2:1 favoring the Japanese vs. USMC/USN land based F4Fs at Cactus vs. 25th AF Zekes from Rabaul, but the difference is made by a single bad day. That's using Lundstrom. Using Frank, backing out a/c lost to ground attack, P39s, bombers etc the fighter vs. fighter ratio is almost exactly 1:1. I suspect that Frank is using official numbers from the US sources, but that some of those include the dead-sticked (or whatever) American a/c that I mentioned in the previous post.

Thanks for the reply. I'd be interested if you could post the details of the VMF combat losses for August '42.

I have consistently found it VERY difficult to track down good sources on a/c losses in the New Guinea campaign, and in the early going aroun Indonesia. IMO Bergerud's Fire in the Sky is anecdotally entertaining, but neither useful nor even necessarily reliable (given the emphasis given to a few surviving pilots' accounts and the lack of any critical effort to look at real numbers) for my purpose. And the pilots' victory claims and the "officially verified" claims provided by the respective combatants aren't worth the paper they are written on.

Agreed with the last part.

For New Guinea (Specifically for the March-May '42 period covering the air defense of Port Moresby and attacks against Lae, the historical records from the Australian War Memorial listed as follows:
75th RAAF (P-40Es) - 16 lost from air combat.
35th FS + 36th FS (P-39s) - total 13 lost from air combat.

This was the only record (from an email question sent) I found that stated total losses rather than individual battle accounts.

The actual A6M losses (not claimed) for the same period were unknown.

Anyhow, it's not a perfect science. But using either Frank or Lundstrom you get a casualty ratio of maybe 1:1 to 1.2:1 favoring the Japanese and ONLY counting F4Fs vs A6Ms. If you throw in all fighters lost it's almost exactly 1:1. If you throw in all aircraft it's about 2:1 favoring the US. This latter stat is interesting because it says a little about mission type. One reason why the Japanese did as well as they did in the Guadalcanal campaign was because they could engage, at times, US fighters that were in the process of attacking Japanese bombers. So it's not as though the Japanese did not lose planes at a heavy rate. It's that on some occasions the A6Ms had favorable position because the US pilots were simultasking fending away the Zekes and killing the Betties.

I don't have a problem with the figures but interpretations are a matter of opinion.

When you go through the accounts of the battles, the vertical intercepts carried out by the F4Fs in late Aug-Oct (initiated by Smith after the first few costly clashes) should have minimised the chance of regularly being caught in the manner you describe. It happened at times but I didn't think it contributed very heavily to the overall F4F losses (I'll go back and check when next I read Lundstrom or Frank).

My own reading of the air battles tends to be that whenever one side attacked from advantage, the other side got inevitably got hurt (duh). My understanding is that the VMFs attacked from advantage more often than not in the critical late Aug-Oct period.

I'm not taking anything away from what the Marine (and sometimes visiting Navy) flyers did but most historical works I've read recognise the priceless advantage that the coastwatcher's (and even intel's) warnings played in how the air combats would play out.

I could only see the kill ratio worsening for the Marine flyers if the forces at Guadalcanal weren't receiving those warnings, standing patrols or not. How worse, I couldn't say but given the survivability of the F4F and the abilities of the pilots, an overall ratio of 1:2 would probably be the worst.

Opinion only.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 06/05/42

Air attack on TF at 94,61

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 40

Allied aircraft
F4F-3 Wildcat x 13
F4F-4 Wildcat x 19
SBD Dauntless x 74
TBD Devastator x 28

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero x 2 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 7 destroyed
F4F-4 Wildcat x 2 damaged
SBD Dauntless x 20 destroyed
SBD Dauntless x 69 damaged
TBD Devastator x 6 destroyed
TBD Devastator x 27 damaged

PO2 U.Matsumoto of BI-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 2

Japanese Ships
CV Kaga, Bomb hits 4, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
CV Hiryu
CV Akagi, Bomb hits 1, on fire
BB Kirishima, Bomb hits 1
CV Soryu, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 1, on fire


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air attack on TF at 94,61

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 25

Allied aircraft
SBD Dauntless x 19

no losses

Allied aircraft losses
SBD Dauntless x 8 destroyed
SBD Dauntless x 7 damaged

PO2 E.Obuchi of AII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 2

Japanese Ships
BB Haruna, on fire
CV Soryu, Bomb hits 1, on fire
CV Kaga, on fire, heavy damage


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air attack on TF at 94,61

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 29

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 9
SBD Dauntless x 18
TBD Devastator x 14

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero x 2 destroyed

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 2 destroyed
F4F-4 Wildcat x 2 damaged
SBD Dauntless x 2 destroyed
SBD Dauntless x 3 damaged
TBD Devastator x 9 destroyed
TBD Devastator x 1 damaged

PO2 C.Minowa of BII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 4

LT W. Gallaher of VS-6 bails out and is RESCUED

Japanese Ships
CV Hiryu
CV Kaga, on fire, heavy damage
BB Kirishima
CV Akagi, Bomb hits 2, on fire
CA Chikuma


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Air attack on TF at 94,61


Allied aircraft
F2A Buffalo x 18
F4F-4 Wildcat x 43
SB2U Vindicator x 9
SBD Dauntless x 35
TBD Devastator x 8
TBF Avenger x 5
B-26B Marauder x 3
B-17E Fortress x 16


no losses

Japanese Ships
CV Akagi, Bomb hits 2, on fire
CV Hiryu, Bomb hits 2, Torpedo hits 2, on fire
BB Kirishima, Bomb hits 2, on fire
BB Haruna, Bomb hits 5, on fire, heavy damage
CA Tone

Attacking Level Bombers:
3 x B-26B Marauder at 6000 feet
4 x B-17E Fortress at 6000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress at 6000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress at 6000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress at 6000 feet
3 x B-17E Fortress at 6000 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air attack on TF at 94,61


Allied aircraft
F4F-3 Wildcat x 11
SBD Dauntless x 10


no losses

Japanese Ships
CA Chikuma
CV Akagi, on fire
CV Hiryu, Bomb hits 2, on fire, heavy damage


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hi, I'm testing WITP. I set up the Battle of Midway historic OOB's. I did not alter any stats for any unit except to set all airgroups to 0 fatigue and 99 morale.
The Japanese airgroups were set to hit Midway airfield.
Midways's airgroups did not attack during the AM air phase They did launch an afternoon strike.
On the day after the battle fatigue for all USA airgroups was between 6 and 9. (This would require the airgroups only to repair damaged aircraft before being able to fly full strength missions)(4 of the 11 afternoon bomb hits were by Marine Wind Indicators)(Both Torpedo hits were by the VT-8 Detachment flying TBF from Midway)(The afternoon strike was a coordinated strike from Midway and the CV TF located 1 hex NE of Midway)
Oh I should also point out that all airgroups used their Dec 7 1941 ratings.

Mogami wrote: A "Shoestring" to the USA translates into "overkill" for the Japanese.

Well of course. What did you think the central theme of my statement was?

Look, I"m not here to analyze these battles to death with regard to the ultimate balance of arms or to count angels on heads of pins and argue all that with you to brutal death into the night. Suffice to say it didn't take much in the larger scheme of things when one just takes raw numers of men and pieces of equipment and tons of war materiel into consideration to stop the Japanese cold. And keep in mind that it was an untried USA and USAAF and USN and USMC going up against a "more experienced" Japanese enemy fighting in "superor equipment" which turned this neat trick.

That essentially was my point. Deal with that. Because the game doesn't very well.