German victory in Russia??

[matt.buttsworth]

Hi Muzrub. Good to see you are still debating.
My point of view is old fashioned here. Given the Soviet Union's superior numbers, total war footing and greater industrial capacity the only German hope of victory was the psychological crushing of the system.
This needed the good treatment of POWs and minorities during the first year of the war so that the Soviet soldiers (who surrendered in very large numebrs anyway) knew there was an alternative to fighting for a regime they did not like.
And secondly, it needed the conquest of Moscow! Sieze the capital and kill the snake. Beyond its industrial and transport importance it was also the chance to beat the Soviet army and destroy the centre of the Regime. Had it fallen I beleive the communist regime would have collapsed as well. Certainly Stalin would have been at an end.
Therefore Kiev diversion was a terrible mistake. There only hope was push on to Moscow!!!
I know this is a point many will disagree with.

[Stefdragon]

' makes sense.

(pssst...just between you and me...Why are all the Swiss women kept hidden behind those big mountains anyhow?)

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Stefdragon
(pssst...just between you and me...Why are all the Swiss women kept hidden behind those big mountains anyhow?)

Probably to protect them from Yanks like us.

[deVada]

Hi !
Nice discussion,
I would like to add a small voice explaining the motivation Hitler had while attacking USSR in VI.41.

Regarding to what Suworow claims (ex KGB officer) :

Stalin planned to launch an surprising attack on Germany just few days after 22.VI.1941. The offensive was almost prepared, land units were deployed in opening positions for attack (not for defense), ammo was transfered to USSR west border and stored on the ground (!!! - planned for quick use, the same as tons of leather shoes delivered to front units just before the Barbarossa starting), even the leaflets were ready (in three versions a) offensive war, b) defensive war, c) unknown), so on first day of war with Germany the right posters were available at once.

The Stalin's decision to start a war was proably taken in a day of signing the Russian - German non agression pact even before Germany attacked my homeland. Just after this over 100 new infantry divisions were formed (formally, and then physically) and the industry started to turn to war regime.

The stunning advances of German army in the beginning of Barbarossa operation came partially from fact that huge amounts of ammo, fuel and other equipment was captured lying on the "naked ground" in first days of fighting.

Hitler had no choice but attack USSR and make peace with England (his emissaries kept trying from IX.1939 until IV.1945, even using lifes of 2.000.000 Judes in extermination camps as an argue),
and he never believed that permanent peace between communism and the capitalist countries is possible. Churchill knew it also but unfortunately Roosvelt was "shortly seeing" or he had his own game ... Who knows ...

(btw, he knew about Japanese fleet heading for Pearl, but decided to take the blow just to convince Congress which had rather isolationist doctrine that time ...)

so the post war history revealed that Hitler was right.

Some people think that Hitler was stupid but I personally see him as an excellent politic. Sad fact for Germans, Stalin was the real lion and a fox in one person ... The biggest murderer proably in mankind's history ...

Anyway we have a joke :

[action takes place in Poland]
Son> Daddy ? If we would loose the war - shall we have as good life as in Germany today ?

Regards
Peter

Try the Suvorow books, they're worthy.

[matt.buttsworth]

Suvorov's first two books are very good and I generally support his argument. There is now enough confirming books from German and Russian historians - Thadden, Post ... - plus the publication of the Zhukov attack plan that I think the argument is not if Stalin was planning an attack, but what time in 1941 it was to be. Whether the Germans knew of the attack plans is an entirely different matter. i believe they did not and were totally stunned by the concentrations of armour, ammunition and planes they surrounded near the border.

M

I have forgotten the name of the Russian historian who published the 1941 attack plan. Others will no it or I will have to look it up.

[RickyB]

Zhukov did develop a plan of attack, but then that was his job at the time is developing plans. I would even believe he may have pushed for it to be carried out, but I am not sure about that. But there is nothing to show Stalin approved it for implementation in the near term.

Regarding massive forces deployed on and near the frontier, that is just not supported by the facts. In the center of the front, Minsk and closer to the frontier, almost no Soviet troops got away. But the encirclement only trapped 300,000+ men. All along the front, and within a reasonable distance from it, the Soviets only had about 1/3 of their forces deployed. They were calling up reservists but they were being deployed into the operational depth along the Dnepr and other rivers more than 200 Km behind the frontier. In all the Soviets had 3 echelons forming, but the forces on the frontier were only a part and not massive by any means. Just look at the losses suffered near the border compared to deeper inside the Soviet Union, and it clearly shows that only a portion of the Soviet forces were close up.

Stalin was preparing for war, but there has been no evidence to show a date was set for an attack. It was as much a response to the German buildup. "Suvorov" is not a historian and does not have access to the Russian archives that may provide more information, so no matter how well he may write, his information is suspect, along with supporting German writers that may have a position to support that Hitler was not so bad, just protecting everyone from the scourge of Communism. Of course, Mein Kempf means nothing, and his months of border flights into Soviet territory, months of planning the attack, etc. Sorry, but until some stronger proof comes along, I have very strong doubts about the "Suvarov" story.

[matt.buttsworth]

Hitler was absolutely rotten, murdering and at times idiotic. Nothing can excuse that. I just think Stalin is just as bad. I agree with Suvorov's faults. It has been discussed before. I just find some of the other historians presenting these arguments, Post, Hoffman in German, Thadden too, to be very interesting and properly qualified. Danilev was the Russian historian who first published the Zhukov plan in the Austrian Military review.
Not sure if I can totally agree with your point about the positioning of Soviet troops. They were not all at the front, they were still moving when war began. It was where they were being ordered to go which was the key point.
I recommend you look at Post and Hoffman, especially Post, for a more academic presentation of the argument. I am not sure if he is in English which is a great shame.

[Rasputitsa]

The main problem with the Barbarossa plan was that there was no agreement between Hitler and the High Command as to what would happen after the frontier battles. The Generals wanted to go for Moscow, whilst Hitler was attracted by economic factors such as Leningrad, securing iron ore supplies from Sweden and the economic value of the Ukraine. The result was that this conflict was fought out in August 41 resulting in a significant delay, with panzer units moving backwards and forwards between the Fronts (Guderian drives 200 miles the wrong way). Great victories were won, but no major stategic objectives were obtained (same thing happened in 42). Hitler takes the responsibility for the shambles of his command style. The original plans of General Marks, wnich became Operation Otto, had a more even split of forces between AGC and AGS (Hitler changed this to put move emphasis on flank objectives). With the original deployment, AGC can proceed uninterupped to Moscow, AGS has the power to deal with the Russian Kiev forces and removes the flank threat to AGC (whilst still making ground East). After the fontier battles the Army Groups can focus towards Moscow, picking up the Ukraine on the way. When Moscow falls, Leningrad is lost. Hitler always wanted divergent objectives taken all at once and spread his power, but by concentrating on the main objective the rest will come later. Blitzkrieg is supposed to be the concentration of force. Whether the Russians would have surrendered with the loss of Moscow and the Ukraine is another story. Great Game !:)

[RickyB]

Originally posted by matt.buttsworth
Hitler was absolutely rotten, murdering and at times idiotic. Nothing can excuse that. I just think Stalin is just as bad. I agree with Suvorov's faults. It has been discussed before. I just find some of the other historians presenting these arguments, Post, Hoffman in German, Thadden too, to be very interesting and properly qualified. Danilev was the Russian historian who first published the Zhukov plan in the Austrian Military review.
Not sure if I can totally agree with your point about the positioning of Soviet troops. They were not all at the front, they were still moving when war began. It was where they were being ordered to go which was the key point.
I recommend you look at Post and Hoffman, especially Post, for a more academic presentation of the argument. I am not sure if he is in English which is a great shame.

Matt,

I will see what I can find from these authors, in English unfortunately, as my German is very limited, primarily military terms. I wouldn't even try to argue which dictator was worse in historical terms, and it doesn't really matter for this subject I guess. On the Soviet reserves, I would have to dig it up, but at least one author (from the 80s though so fairly out of date possibly) said the reserve armies were ordered into positions where they entered combat as part of the second (operational) echelon, along the Dnepr, etc. His sources were in part original Soviet documents, but he may not have had the whole picture.

But as to why Hitler attacked, rather than what Stalin planned, I always think of one qoute attributed to Hitler (paraphrased from memory):

If I knew Guderian's numbers of Soviet tanks was correct (the numbers from a book by Guderian maybe???), I never would have thought to attack the Soviets.

Don't remember who qouted Hitler, but if true, not the statement someone makes when he is reluctantly launching an attack to take the initiative due to fear of an enemy attack. Interesting question, but I just don't see Hitler attacking for any reason other than to defeat his last major potential foe within reach, as he couldn't easily reach the British directly. And the Finnish war made the Soviets look incompetent, when they really did learn a few lessons from the Finns.

[matt.buttsworth]

I agree. Guderian's quotes is crucial. I think he said if he knew the Russians had 10,000 tanks ....
There is no evidence that I have seen to say Hitler attacked the Soviet Union to forestall and imminent Soviet attack. Therefore the German invasion cannot be classified as a preventitive war and the Zhukov 1941 planned attack definitely can. What Stalin's long term plans though were from 1939 were, which were probably wrecked by the speed of the German victory in France, is an entirely different and very interesting matter although difficult to prove.

[Aussie]

Hard to believe that Russia could have launched an attack on Germany in 41. There are many obvious reasons, for instance the appaling lack of competent officers due to the purges in the 30's... Why Hitler attacked Russia - living space for Germans in the East, as referred to in Mein Kampf.

[matt.buttsworth]

Agreed. Glanz especially shows how unready the Soviet army was for war in 1941. However the argument that Stalin agreed to the partition of Poland in 1939 and allied himself with Germany to trigger world war 2, and to later attack Germany in the back when Germany, France and Britain had exhausted themselves fighting each other is I think a valid one - especially in terms of expansionist Bolshevik doctrine - and is reflected in terms of Soviet massive armament plans, mobilisation plans, and development of tank and air forces. 20,000 tanks are not built for fun.
I would further argue that Soviet deployment in 1941 after the failure of their long term plans reflects there total lack of any doctrine other than attack.
Only a nation as well armed with a massive armaments industry on a total war footing could have survived the massive soviet losses from June to November 1941, rearmed, resisted and destroyed Nazi Germany.

[deVada]

Hi !
The purges in army was the last battle fought by Stalin inside Russia. That was simply necessary.
After breaking the neck of army he became a god.

The fact that there were no competent officers to fight a war is second matter, but human life wasn't specially valuable those times, especially in Russia.

Regarding to secret mobilization, I see it this way :

in 1939 first phase started,
industry switched slowly to war routine (factories became hellish places),
hundred of new divisions formed and slowly manned (take two young men from each village in Russia and You'll have an army without gaining anyone's attention),
the projectants designed many plane types mainly ground attackers and light and sleazy dive bombers (which could be produced in hundreds of thousands - the tactic was to attack airfields first with thousands of shitty planes attacking by surprise), consider the fact that program of strategical bombers was suspended (they're usible in defensive war),
100000 (!!!) people were sent to aviation schools even before 1939,

Then in second phase in 1941 armies of first echelon taken positions on the border, ammo and supplies were delivered, the second phase was formed formally ready together with 3rd and 4th wave to be fully manned after official mobilization which was planned after the beginning of war.

The two facts : changing the shoes for leather made ones and appearance of Zhukov on the border should be the alarming signals for Hitler. Anyway, if someone such clever as Stalin orders to store 'mountains' of ammo on the ground, be sure it wasn't planned to lay there for long ...

Hitler attacked 9 or 14 days (do not remember actually) before.
As I suppose - having no other choice if he wanted to gain more time and better position in peace negotiations with England, which I suppose was his main objective.

Who knows anyway ...

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by deVada

Regarding to what Suworow claims (ex KGB officer) :

...

(btw, he knew about Japanese fleet heading for Pearl, but decided to take the blow just to convince Congress which had rather isolationist doctrine that time ...)

I would love to see some evidence for this.

Try the Suvorow books, they're worthy.

Why? Because they are controversial? Because you like the message? Basically all we have is one person with this theory, with no substantial evidence to back it up. That's why Suvorow's book has been practically ignored by everyone west of Germany.

[deVada]

I'll try to find the basic materials and I'll let You know.
Keep being suspicious, it's basic value of a good historian.

Regards
Peter

[Rado]

Hi deVada,

I am very glad, that I can see some serious interest about Suvorov´s theory. I have read three books ( last is Purgratory) about preparing 2WW in Soviet union. Dont you know how many books have published by Suvorov about WW2? How many books by Suvorov were translated in Polish? You can email to radovan.prikryl@sme.cz and you can use Polish language.

[Aussie]

This Suvorov reminds me a bit of Eric von Daniken, albiet with a less outrageous theory!

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Aussie
This Suvorov reminds me a bit of Eric von Daniken, albiet with a less outrageous theory!

I actually agree that its not that outrageous in principle. Stalin was capable of just about anything. Of course, the main problem is this creates difficulties for some in regards to how Hitler and Stalin were perceived. If Suvorow is right it makes Hitler look like he was actiing in self defence. Hitler did say several times that he had to attack first before Stalin attacked him. Since Hitler has been thoroughly demonized since the end of WW2, many are uncomfortable with the idea of actually giving him a break on this issue. This is also cannon fodder for the nuts out there. When looking for info about Suvorow's theory on the Net, I ran across a neo-Nazi, white supremicist's forum where this theory was being used as you might expect.

My biggest problem with this theory is how in the world would something which would have had to have been known by many, perhaps hundreds, of people, remain unknown and "undiscovered" for more than 60 years. According to the theory the Soviet attack was to have happened sometime in July, no more than a month after the German's attack. Being just a month away, such a massive military operation, with attacks against Germany and Romania simultaneously, would have left evidence on both sides. How many were involved just in the planning? How many officers in the chain of command of all those forces would have been aware a major attack was about to be launched? What about the scuttlebutt among the troops? The paperwork, the logistics, operational orders to corps and divisions? I can't imagine the Soviets keeping this secret for 50 years, this one is too big, and I can't imagine the Nazis not parading all the evidence they found in front of world media to justify their aggression. Later on, the West would have loved to use this as political hay against the Soviets during the Cold War. This just seems to be too big to have remained secret or "undiscovered" for so long.

[matt.buttsworth]

It has remained an argument ever since 1941 and later in the Nuremberg trials. The Nazis did claim to discover much evidence that the Soviets were planning to attack. There is no secret of undiscovered evidence there.
The big discovery was by Danilev with the Zhukov attack plan which he claims was being implemented. No documentary evidence however of Stalin approving the plan. Just much circumstantial evidence in terms of movement of units and layout of forces on 22 June 1941 that could only be explained by the attack plan being implemented.
The counter argument is that unlike Hitler, Stalin never liked his signature on anything so someone else could be blamed if things went wrong ...
Suvorov and others do put forward a very interesting amount of argument and evidence.

[Gwynn Compton]

The Suvorov theory on Stalin preparing to launch an attack is an interesting one, and I doubt anyone can argue the fact that Stalin did have an interest in conquering Europe. While having not read his books, I'm somewhat doubtful on the fact that such an attack would be launched so early.

From what I've been told, Suvorov's theory rests of the movement of Soviet Divisions westwards during 1941, and war plans, and war games carried out by Zhukov. I haven't heard much more in the way of evidence, and I'm interested to hear more, as I haven't the time to read Suvorov's books (I'm currently reading Ian Kershaw's brilliant Hitler Biography, then I've got a couple of Antony Beevor books, Stalingrad, and Crete, to read as well)

When examining Soviet preparations for war in 1941, when taking a Suvorov view, the diplomatic offensives against Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania and interesting to examine. Princiaply for how one should interpret them. Noting the failure of their diplomatic attempts to gain influence in these regions, and the failure of Germany to gain influence with Turkey, I can only see the movement of Soviet forces westwards during these months as a response to their failures. Having failed to talk their enemies into concessions, the Soviet's try their own piece of gunboat diplomacy, without ever announcing so. Knowing full well that the movement of a large number of divisions (I've heard numbers between 10 & 50 divisions bandied around) couldn't be completely hidden, and that Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania would all catch wind of this, I believe that they were hoping that concessions could be gained in this respect.

I'm doubtful that, without Barbarossa interupting, had the Soviet's failed to use gunboat diplomacy to get what they wanted, that they would have gone to war for it then. With a threat from Japan still looming in the east (notably reinforcements from Siberia were delayed until Richard Sorge informed the Soviet's that the Japanese had no intensions in Siberia, hence their late arrival in Moscow), the Russian's would have been cautious to embroil themselves in a Western war against countries which Germany would have stepped into assist with.

War planning, I believe, is simply war planning, the German's planned their attack on France & Belgium in WW1 years before it took place, and I believe that war plans, and war games being run by Zhukov at the time were merely that, just planning for the eventual conflict that was to come.

However, this is only from the evidence I've heard about, I'm more than willing to listen to other bits of evidence from the Suvorov books, as it's a very interesting subject.

Gwynn