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ORIGINAL: Szilard

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


That is true. However, if we are to grant Germany hindsight, immediately starting to plan on invading Britain once the Battle of France had been decided would have provided Germany with one of her best chances to definitively win World War Two.

...I suppose the other would have been to begin conscienciously pursuing a blockade/peripheral strategy against Britain while awaiting a Russian onslaught. Then Britain is progressively isolated and asphaxiated. When Russia attacks Finland or something in 1941, Germany takes leadership of the forces of 'Western Civilization' against the Asiatic Jewish-Communist menace. Britain (and the United States) is left in a morally dubious position as Hitler leads the German-dominated forces of Western Europe eastward to win the war against that era's 'terrorism'. It all ends with Germany in Europe as a power analogous to the United States in the New World. The Nazi model of the ideal society becomes what 'secular democracy' is to the West of today.

This latter strategy might actually be better for Germany in the long run than even a successful Seelowe. Seelowe tends to open the door to a Europe ruled by Germany simply through force. The relatively passive strategy of the second approach leads to Germany taking up her new position with the consent of much of the governed. France, Spain, Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria have all more or less voluntarily been co-opted into a new German-dominated order -- and Holland, Denmark, and Norway would probably be allowed to join their ranks. This is a system much more likely to last. One could even visualize a Britain eventually occupying a position vaguely analogous to that occupied by Russia with respect to the West today.

This would have worked even better if Hitler hadn't attacked Poland and started WWII either.

That's probably true. However, in that case, we confront a distinct shortage of scenarios.

It does raise an interesting point. Just about every great revolution seems to find it necessary to embark upon a course of violence about a decade after its initial triumph. This can be externally directed -- as with the French of the 1789 revolution embarking upon Napoleon's course of conquests beginning about 1799 and Hitler's Germans of the 1933 seizure of power then turning to conquest and the Holocaust beginning in 1939. It can also be internally directed, as with the sequence of purges and manufactured famines beginning in the Soviet Union of the 1917 Revolution about 1928 and the Chinese of the 1949 Revolution beginning with the 'Great Leap Forward' of 1958 and culminating in the strange spectacle of self-mutilation in the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1972.

Revolutions seem to generate a need for enemies. Doesn't matter whether they're perfidious Albion, Jews, or Capitalist Roaders. They're out there -- and must be vanquished. If Hitler hadn't had Jews, he would have had to invent them. More to the point, it would follow that Hitler could no more have staged the Nazi revolution and then refrained from embarking on World War Two than one can get married and then refrain from having sex.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

More to the point, it would follow that Hitler could no more have staged the Nazi revolution and then refrained from embarking on World War Two than one can get married and then refrain from having sex.

He could have kept all the energy focused on persecuting internal "enemies", I guess. But on the other hand, Germany seems to have been pretty much on the verge of bankruptcy by 1939, due to the economic incompetence of the regime, so without some quick wins & booty & slaves flowing back from them, the no-war strategy maybe wasn't that great either as it may very well have led to unrest & overthrow. At any rate, Hitler was nervous about this kind of thing, particularly in the early stages of the war. For an incompetent evil madman he was a pretty good domestic politican, hard to dismiss as a Nervous Nelly.

I think you have to look at the possible scenarios mainly from this domestic political viewpoint. Surely Hitler's agenda was to establish himself as the new Super Bismark by recovering the old borders & extending them, and taking out the French even more decisively than in 1871. In the generally addled German worldview of the time, that was the big national dream and by doing it he gained an absolute domestic mandate. If you zap Hitler with a lightning bolt in 1939, the result is either extended domestic chaos or the emergence of another leader/group with the same agenda - presumably the Wehrmacht.

IMO, that's the most interesting what if, because the most plausible. Replace Hitler with a Wehrmacht leadership in 1939, and what happens? I think they would be driven by much the same pressures and agendas: a state with serious economic structural flaws; a deep shared belief in war as the preferred solution to political problems (since at least 1871); a short-term military opportunity to get an absolute mandate by zapping the coridoor and taking out France at a (barely) acceptable risk level.

But after taking out France - what then? Where would the mandate lead a Wehrmacht-led state? I think you can be sure that it would continue to be diplomatically & grand strategically mediocre, but not as inept as Hitler. It's doubtful that it would pre-emptively strike Russia. But what else?

ORIGINAL: Szilard

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

More to the point, it would follow that Hitler could no more have staged the Nazi revolution and then refrained from embarking on World War Two than one can get married and then refrain from having sex.

He could have kept all the energy focused on persecuting internal "enemies", I guess. But on the other hand, Germany seems to have been pretty much on the verge of bankruptcy by 1939, due to the economic incompetence of the regime, so without some quick wins & booty & slaves flowing back from them, the no-war strategy maybe wasn't that great either as it may very well have led to unrest & overthrow. At any rate, Hitler was nervous about this kind of thing, particularly in the early stages of the war. For an incompetent evil madman he was a pretty good domestic politican, hard to dismiss as a Nervous Nelly.

I think you have to look at the possible scenarios mainly from this domestic political viewpoint. Surely Hitler's agenda was to establish himself as the new Super Bismark by recovering the old borders & extending them, and taking out the French even more decisively than in 1871. In the generally addled German worldview of the time, that was the big national dream and by doing it he gained an absolute domestic mandate. If you zap Hitler with a lightning bolt in 1939, the result is either extended domestic chaos or the emergence of another leader/group with the same agenda - presumably the Wehrmacht.

IMO, that's the most interesting what if, because the most plausible. Replace Hitler with a Wehrmacht leadership in 1939, and what happens? I think they would be driven by much the same pressures and agendas: a state with serious economic structural flaws; a deep shared belief in war as the preferred solution to political problems (since at least 1871); a short-term military opportunity to get an absolute mandate by zapping the coridoor and taking out France at a (barely) acceptable risk level.

But after taking out France - what then? Where would the mandate lead a Wehrmacht-led state? I think you can be sure that it would continue to be diplomatically & grand strategically mediocre, but not as inept as Hitler. It's doubtful that it would pre-emptively strike Russia. But what else?

Two ideas:

1. German thrust towards the Middle East through North Africa and through Turkey.

2. Russian attack on Germany around 1944 or 1945.

For potential alternative history scenarios of course. Though the plausibility and potential problems with the second one are boundless.

ORIGINAL: Szilard
I think you have to look at the possible scenarios mainly from this domestic political viewpoint. Surely Hitler's agenda was to establish himself as the new Super Bismark by recovering the old borders & extending them, and taking out the French even more decisively than in 1871. In the generally addled German worldview of the time, that was the big national dream and by doing it he gained an absolute domestic mandate. If you zap Hitler with a lightning bolt in 1939, the result is either extended domestic chaos or the emergence of another leader/group with the same agenda - presumably the Wehrmacht.

There were plans for a coup d'etat and i believe also for an assasination of the gröfaz by a group around Beck, Halder, v.Witzleben and other high rank Wehrmacht officers already in 1938. They wanted to remove him from power if he would go to war with the west and/or the soviets over Checheslovakia.
Unfortunately there was the Munich agreement; and Checheslovakia was sacked without a single shot, so they abandoned the plan due to the Gröfaz's popularity and the general euphoria in the population.
So i would not be that sure that a Wehrmacht group around Halder would have continued the Reich's aggressive foreign policy. If they intended to reestablish the republic i don't know, but i think this is rather unlikely.
Probably there would have been domestic unrest, civil war like conditions or something in that direction (comparable to the early twenties) that would have lead to a general opinion among the population that under Hitler at least there was order and civil peace.

See here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Resistance ,quite interesting, unfortunately no attempt was successfull.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
It's all very interesting. One factor that is hard to evaluate is the effect of German confidence and elan, which after France were sky-high.

Also not to be overlooked is the British equivalent. Whilst defiant, the average soldier was certainly intimidated by the German performance in France.

Of course, such factors will only take you so far. You can't mount 150mm guns on them and use them to escort invasion barges.

Churchill was being foolish when he wrote that he had hoped the Germans would try an invasion; he would have been running a very grave risk if they had.

Well, he made those remarks in late September or something. Then the Germans would have been in for a rougher time.

ORIGINAL: Szilard

He could have kept all the energy focused on persecuting internal "enemies", I guess. But on the other hand, Germany seems to have been pretty much on the verge of bankruptcy by 1939, due to the economic incompetence of the regime,

My understanding is that this was largely wishful thinking on the part of the appeasers- that Germany's economic recovery was built on the narrow base of rearmament and would inevitably collapse.

It's true that Germany was in dire straits economically in 1939 and 1940- but this had been the case since 1929, and things had been a lot worse.

ORIGINAL: Telumar

So i would not be that sure that a Wehrmacht group around Halder would have continued the Reich's aggressive foreign policy.

I'm pretty sure the army was planning on a military solution to the problem of Germany's lost territories. When Hitler came to power and began thinking about rearmament, the Reichswehr was able to present him with a long-drawn up plan for a tripling of the size of the army.

The difference would be that the army would never have taken the series of risks Hitler took in such quick succession. The war would have come in 1942 or 1943 when they were good and ready- and so were the Allies.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

I'm pretty sure the army was planning on a military solution to the problem of Germany's lost territories. When Hitler came to power and began thinking about rearmament, the Reichswehr was able to present him with a long-drawn up plan for a tripling of the size of the army.

Doubtable. One of the reasons why they planned a coup d'etat was, besides some strong anti-nazism, that they believed that a war against France, Britain and eventually the soviet union could not be won. Read the wikipedia article posted earlier.

Regarding the small size of the pre-Nazi Reichswehr (100.000 men), one shouldn't be wondered that plans existed to expand the army size rapidly in the case of a sudden crisis i.e. The rest is hypothesis and guess work.

Regarding the treaty of Versailles it should be clear that germany and the former entente powers should sooner or later come to some kind of 'solution', wether politcal or military depends on the abilities of the politicians. That the prussian educated officers are less likely to go to war than such doubtfull characters like Himmler, Göring or Sepp Dietrich (to go to the lower ranks) should also be clear.

ORIGINAL: Telumar

Doubtable. One of the reasons why they planned a coup d'etat was, besides some strong anti-nazism, that they believed that a war against France, Britain and eventually the soviet union could not be won.

Yeah. As I understand it the idea was to accept status quo (see Locarno) in the west and make their gains in the East. But then Hitler would have been content with the same.

Regarding the treaty of Versailles it should be clear that germany and the former entente powers should sooner or later come to some kind of 'solution', wether politcal or military depends on the abilities of the politicians. That the prussian educated officers are less likely to go to war than such doubtfull characters like Himmler, Göring or Sepp Dietrich (to go to the lower ranks) should also be clear.

Oh quite. However, that the Germany army establishment wasn't stocked with fanatical nazis doesn't mean they didn't approve of the direction they were being taken. This would be why all the numerous army schemes for a coup never came to fruition- at least not until 1944. At every turn Hitler seemed to be holding his luck and taking Germany along a pleasing path to national greatness. Had he slipped from that path the axe might have fallen- but this doesn't change the desire of the Wehrmacht for national aggrandisement, if necessary (and it would have been) by military means.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Oh quite. However, that the Germany army establishment wasn't stocked with fanatical nazis doesn't mean they didn't approve of the direction they were being taken. This would be why all the numerous army schemes for a coup never came to fruition- at least not until 1944. At every turn Hitler seemed to be holding his luck and taking Germany along a pleasing path to national greatness. Had he slipped from that path the axe might have fallen- but this doesn't change the desire of the Wehrmacht for national aggrandisement, if necessary (and it would have been) by military means.

Sure, we're not talking about Gandhi. But if they had removed Hitler and the Nazi party, other societal forces (sorry, no native speaker - gesellschaftliche Kräfte) like the (exile) SPD i.e. or more conservative burgeois fractions would have appeared on the screen. Which impact and influence who would have had, if any (less likely with the SPD), is another question. You are somehow right, with the soviet union under Stalin and a rearmed self conscious germany under a military government the danger of an armed conflict would be high. But not with the west.

ORIGINAL: Telumar

You are somehow right, with the soviet union under Stalin and a rearmed self conscious germany under a military government the danger of an armed conflict would be high. But not with the west.

I'm not sure the west could have stood by. The problem is that before getting to Russia the Germans go via Poland- and that's not going to happen peacefully. France of course has a comittment to Poland.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Telumar

You are somehow right, with the soviet union under Stalin and a rearmed self conscious germany under a military government the danger of an armed conflict would be high. But not with the west.

I'm not sure the west could have stood by. The problem is that before getting to Russia the Germans go via Poland- and that's not going to happen peacefully. France of course has a comittment to Poland.

Or the russians go via Poland or both, Russia and Germany decide to divide Poland. They have experience in that..[:D]

ORIGINAL: Telumar

Or the russians go via Poland or both, Russia and Germany decide to divide Poland. They have experience in that..[:D]

Well if Russia is good enough to attack Poland then obviously Germany becomes the shield of Western Civilisation and we busy ourselves with restraining Japan and Italy (whilst probably selling arms to Germany). If they divide Poland... well, that's what happened.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
I'd argue- and in due course so too would Colin- that the reasons why Barbarossa failed are far more trivial than the reasons why Seelowe was never attempted.

That doesn't change my point that the risk and cost tolerances Germany had in 1940 had been radically increased by 1945. What had seemed too risky or too costly in 1940 would have looked very different from the perspective of Manstein's memoirs.

Barbarossa played to Germany's strengths, more or less. Seelowe would have seen her relying most heavily on her weakest suit.

In hindsight, that's debatable. Barbarossa turned out to rely on several German weaknesses - manpower, industrial capacity, motorization, logistics, Winter combat, etc. Add all those up and she may have been in a better position to invade Britain than the USSR. And we know how the War in the East turned out in the end. We don't know how Seelowe would have turned out.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That doesn't change my point that the risk and cost tolerances Germany had in 1940 had been radically increased by 1945. What had seemed too risky or too costly in 1940 would have looked very different from the perspective of Manstein's memoirs.

I think I misunderstood you- you're just explaining Manstein's position?

In hindsight, that's debatable. Barbarossa turned out to rely on several German weaknesses - manpower, industrial capacity, motorization, logistics, Winter combat, etc. Add all those up and she may have been in a better position to invade Britain than the USSR. And we know how the War in the East turned out in the end. We don't know how Seelowe would have turned out.

Germany's manpower, industrial capacity, motorisation, logistics and winter combat were all far better and far more easily built up than was her naval situation in 1940.

If one is to speculate how things might have gone if Germany had gone ahead with Seelowe, I don't see why it's inadmissable to speculate how things might have gone differently in Russia, too. That war was winnable for Germany. They certainly made it look that way for the first year, anyway.

ORIGINAL: Szilard

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

More to the point, it would follow that Hitler could no more have staged the Nazi revolution and then refrained from embarking on World War Two than one can get married and then refrain from having sex.

He could have kept all the energy focused on persecuting internal "enemies", I guess. But on the other hand, Germany seems to have been pretty much on the verge of bankruptcy by 1939, due to the economic incompetence of the regime, so without some quick wins & booty & slaves flowing back from them, the no-war strategy maybe wasn't that great either as it may very well have led to unrest & overthrow. At any rate, Hitler was nervous about this kind of thing, particularly in the early stages of the war. For an incompetent evil madman he was a pretty good domestic politican, hard to dismiss as a Nervous Nelly.

Hitler was hardly incompetent -- at least through 1942. He was a decisive voice for panzers, a large air force, the 'Sichelschnitt' plan for the attack on the Western Allies, forming a temporary alliance with the Soviet Union, and increasing the troops assigned to Barbarossa. All vital to Germany's initial success. Moreover, with the exception of increasing troop strength for Barbarossa, all were revolutionary moves.

On the other hand, he opposed allowing the SA to supercede the regular army, opposed Seelowe, and opposed the 1942 plan to invade Malta. All dubious ideas that were best left unimplemented.

Now let's look at some of those actions usually described as errors that he committed prior to 1942.

Going to war in 1939. He'd hardly have benefitted by waiting. In 1939 Germany was far more prepared for war relative to its opponents than it would have been later. As to going to war at all, while you see economic reasons for the necessity, and I see the an inernal revolutionary dynamic as forcing the move, we seem to agree that Nazi Germany had to go beat up somebody.

Not destroying the B.E.F. at Dunkirk. This was hardly Hitler's error alone. Rundstedt and Goering played a vital role -- and the magnitude of the error was seen by few until it was too late. On the whole, an interesting little chapter in the history of civil-military relations and considerations of internal politics -- but certainly not a purely military blunder simply committed by Hitler.

Not invading Britain. As was said at the time, Seelowe would have been a desperate move for a desperate situation -- and Germany was not in a desperate situation. It would have acquired phenomenal foresight in the Summer of 1940 to realize that Geramny was in fact in a desperate situation. This is not the same as to say Hitler couldn't have decided to go for Seelowe anyway -- but it was hardly incompetent to refrain. The equivalent would be to label Eisenhower as 'incompetent' for insisting on a broadfront advance in 1944.

Invading Russia. The consensus was that Russia would be a pushover -- and why not? In World War One, Germany had beaten her while losing to the French and British in the West after four years of trying to prevail. She's just beaten the French and British in six weeks -- and moreover, the Red Army has just demonstrated staggering incompetence in her 1939 advance into Poland and her attack on Russia. Why shouldn't Russia be a pushover? It's a bit like if I've just beaten the Seattle Seahawks 70-0: I can pretty well figure on being able to handle the local college team.

Kursk. Similar to Dunkirk, really. Zeitzler and others were really the big fans of this. Hitler admitted the idea of the attack 'made him sick.' He'd been talked into it, but he also could have been talked out of it: it was hardly his error alone.

I could go on, but the central point is Hitler was NOT militarily incompetent. He was actually a pretty good generalissimo. It's very doubtful if Germany would have enjoyed anything like the military success she did absent his contributions.

I think you have to look at the possible scenarios mainly from this domestic political viewpoint. Surely Hitler's agenda was to establish himself as the new Super Bismark by recovering the old borders & extending them, and taking out the French even more decisively than in 1871. In the generally addled German worldview of the time, that was the big national dream and by doing it he gained an absolute domestic mandate. If you zap Hitler with a lightning bolt in 1939, the result is either extended domestic chaos or the emergence of another leader/group with the same agenda - presumably the Wehrmacht.

IMO, that's the most interesting what if, because the most plausible. Replace Hitler with a Wehrmacht leadership in 1939, and what happens? I think they would be driven by much the same pressures and agendas: a state with serious economic structural flaws; a deep shared belief in war as the preferred solution to political problems (since at least 1871); a short-term military opportunity to get an absolute mandate by zapping the coridoor and taking out France at a (barely) acceptable risk level.

I doubt it. First, until Poland went off without French and British intervention, OKH was absolutely terrified of the prospect of going to war -- and so were the German people. One could argue that Germany was headed for war eventually -- but in 1939, it was Hitler pushing a reluctant family out the door and into the car.

Similarly with the plan that producing lightning victory in the West. Hitler was the decisive voice for adopting Manstein's plan -- indeed, he been advocating something like it off his own bat. Drop Hitler and the wise voices of conservatism probably have their way.

But after taking out France - what then? Where would the mandate lead a Wehrmacht-led state? I think you can be sure that it would continue to be diplomatically & grand strategically mediocre, but not as inept as Hitler. It's doubtful that it would pre-emptively strike Russia. But what else?

It's also doubtful that Russia would docilely sit still and do nothing. The consensus seems to be that she would have finished off Finland in the Summer of 1941 and then had a go at Germany herself in 1942. Given that now her army is requipped with T-34's and that now it's hardly going to be surprised, it's doubtful that Germany would be better off than she was historically. It's also very questionable if the revolutionary Nazi state would have docilely accepted a conservative military dictatorship that was quite out of sympathy with the Nazi programme for social change.

ORIGINAL: Telumar

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

I'm pretty sure the army was planning on a military solution to the problem of Germany's lost territories. When Hitler came to power and began thinking about rearmament, the Reichswehr was able to present him with a long-drawn up plan for a tripling of the size of the army.

Doubtable. One of the reasons why they planned a coup d'etat was, besides some strong anti-nazism, that they believed that a war against France, Britain and eventually the soviet union could not be won. Read the wikipedia article posted earlier.

Regarding the small size of the pre-Nazi Reichswehr (100.000 men), one shouldn't be wondered that plans existed to expand the army size rapidly in the case of a sudden crisis i.e. The rest is hypothesis and guess work.

Regarding the treaty of Versailles it should be clear that germany and the former entente powers should sooner or later come to some kind of 'solution', wether politcal or military depends on the abilities of the politicians. That the prussian educated officers are less likely to go to war than such doubtfull characters like Himmler, Göring or Sepp Dietrich (to go to the lower ranks) should also be clear.

I think a central difference would be that while the Prussian generals would have shared many of Hitler's foreign policy aspirations, they would not have shared his eagerness for war.

So they would have worked to obtain them peacefully -- or relatively peacefully. Poland might have been addressed: but it might have been diplomatically isolated first. Alternatively, in the winter of 1939-40, the Germans might have opened negotiations with the French on the basis of a partial German restoration of Poland in return for peace. Given everyone's horrific memories of World War One, it's doubtful if a general cataclysm would have taken place -- the great powers would have worked to accomodate Germany.

However, it's really all along the lines of wondering how the war would have gone if Germans had all been eight feet tall with two heads. It wasn't just Hitler: Germany was a revolutionary quasi-socialist state with an ideology of egalitarianism and violent action -- it wasn't going to suddenly decide the thing to do was to submit to rule by a lot of reactionary Prussian aristocrats with a distaste for social levelling and a belief that beating up Jews was if not actually wrong, at least unseemly.

ORIGINAL: Telumar

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Oh quite. However, that the Germany army establishment wasn't stocked with fanatical nazis doesn't mean they didn't approve of the direction they were being taken. This would be why all the numerous army schemes for a coup never came to fruition- at least not until 1944. At every turn Hitler seemed to be holding his luck and taking Germany along a pleasing path to national greatness. Had he slipped from that path the axe might have fallen- but this doesn't change the desire of the Wehrmacht for national aggrandisement, if necessary (and it would have been) by military means.

Sure, we're not talking about Gandhi. But if they had removed Hitler and the Nazi party, other societal forces (sorry, no native speaker - gesellschaftliche Kräfte) like the (exile) SPD i.e. or more conservative burgeois fractions would have appeared on the screen.

Oh I dunno about that. 'Conservative bourgeois factions' would have been all well and good, but the Prussian Junkers would have brought the SPD back to the German political scene with about the alacrity that New Orleans is gathering back in her ghetto Blacks -- that is to say, the tacit consensus would have been good riddance.

However, and again it's extremely doubtful that had Hitler fallen by the wayside that the Junkers would have been the one to take up the reins. It's a bit like imagining that because Lenin has died the Tsar is going to come back. No...not the Tsar. Germany by 1938 or whenever you're going to stage this coup was a thoroughly Nazified state -- and this included much of the younger ranks of the officer corps. The last thing they're going to accept is a reactionary state ruled by an aristocratic elite.

Indeed, and in this connection, it's worth pointing out that in some respects Hitler was the compromise candidate. In 1933, the spectrum had run to include Ernst Rohm. That was what had scared the Junkers -- and that's who they had accepted Hitler in preference to.

Which impact and influence who would have had, if any (less likely with the SPD), is another question. You are somehow right, with the soviet union under Stalin and a rearmed self conscious germany under a military government the danger of an armed conflict would be high. But not with the west.

But Germany's not going to have this government -- not for long. These guys just have no ideological basis for holding power. We might as well discuss the role that that secular democratic Iraq is going to play in the Middle East over the next decade.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That doesn't change my point that the risk and cost tolerances Germany had in 1940 had been radically increased by 1945. What had seemed too risky or too costly in 1940 would have looked very different from the perspective of Manstein's memoirs.

I think I misunderstood you- you're just explaining Manstein's position?

In hindsight, that's debatable. Barbarossa turned out to rely on several German weaknesses - manpower, industrial capacity, motorization, logistics, Winter combat, etc. Add all those up and she may have been in a better position to invade Britain than the USSR. And we know how the War in the East turned out in the end. We don't know how Seelowe would have turned out.

Germany's manpower, industrial capacity, motorisation, logistics and winter combat were all far better and far more easily built up than was her naval situation in 1940.

If one is to speculate how things might have gone if Germany had gone ahead with Seelowe, I don't see why it's inadmissable to speculate how things might have gone differently in Russia, too. That war was winnable for Germany. They certainly made it look that way for the first year, anyway.

I've always felt that Germany came very close to winning [i}Barbarossa[/i] in the fall of 1941. There was panic in Moscow in October 1941, and there seems to have been some shooting.

A military decision going the other way, Stalin panicking a bit more completely, some division commander deciding to take matters into his own hands...Germany was on the cusp as it was.

Compare and contrast with Seelowe. The Germans were in the position of carrying out the space program as a summer project. They had to build an amphibious invasion fleet from scratch, develop the doctrine to go with it, train their troops in it, AND figure out what the hell to do about the largest navy in the world when they had virtually none themselves.

That they even accepted the problems involved and went a good way towards solving them is testimony to their frame of mind that Summer. However, Seelowe was not something that Germany was prepared to undertake. There was no comparison with Barbarossa.

Let's put it this way. I make my living running a one-truck moving company. Now suppose you come to me and want me to move the contents of your palatial estate to that beachfront property you've bought in Costa Rica. This would be a formidable undertaking -- but I am geared to be able to do things along those lines. I do have the rudiments of the skills and equipment. I can see the blanks spaces in the plan and start filling them in right away. Gimme a week here....

That's Barbarossa. Now come to me and tell me you want me to convert your computer systems from Windows to Linux.

What the F____? That's Seelowe.

Historically, what everyone tended to do in the face of Seelowe was decide that the hard bits would be someone else's problem.

The army spent a month perfecting the details of a thirteen-division assault that would land across a two-hundred mile front. How this was to be got across was the navy's problem.

The navy looked at the landing craft it could hope to improvise and the width of the corridor it could hope to secure against mines and light craft. Six divisions landing on a front of about forty miles. Too bad if this won't do as far as the army goes: it's what they can have. As to protecting the landing from the major units of the Royal Navy -- well, talk to the air force about that.

The air force simply ignored the whole project completely. Late in the game the army and the navy did start working out their differences -- but the point is that Seelowe did present these insurmountable problems that tended to be dealt with simply by deciding that someone else was going to surmount them. The operation presented problems of a whole difference order of magnitude from Barbarossa. One can go to Moscow -- it's just a long trip. One can't just drive across the English Channel -- it's full of water.