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ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Where he was good (able to wage a war of maneouvre) he was very good

Just making sure you don't get accused of wanting to say Patton never did anything good...

Regards
33

ORIGINAL: diesel7013

Just a simple former military officer here to offer his humble opinion...
...
Patton may not have been the best general of all time or even the best general of WWII - but we certianly deserves to be the considered one of the greatest of all time

You point out something here. So far this discussion has compared Patton vs US/UK commanders. It would be interesting to compare him against german commanders and soviet commanders. Does anyone really believe Patton would have a chance against a Manstein/Rommel/Meyer/Shukov etc faced same strength and logistic?

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Since Von Rom seems unable to discuss Patton's tactics in the Lorraine campaign I can only presume he's folded on the issue. The two studies that I quoted from - one from the Combined Arms Research Library in Ft. Leavenworth, Texas ( http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... gabel3.asp ) and the other from the US Army Quatermaster Museum ( http://www.qmfound.com/pol.htm ) concluded that Patton allowed his logistical problems in late August/early September to deteriorate to a much higher degree than a commander of his experience should. By focussing on fuel to the detriment of his ammunition stocks, particularly medium and heavy artillery shells, when forced into a more defensive mode Third Army could not supply the kind of artillery support necessary and so incurred heavier casualties than would otherwise have been the case. Despite the defeat of the German Panzers (or what was left of them) at Arracourt and the capture of Nancy it is difficult to see the first phase of the Lorraine campaign as anything but a setback in the overall campaign in the ETO. However the failures here pale into insignificance compared to what happened at and around Metz. Resupplied with fuel and ammunition Patton decided to take Metz by storm in early November 1944 (his motives are questionable but I will deal with that shortly) using XX Corps. But instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive breakthrough, as he had done at St. Lo according to his orders, he instead dispersed his troops across the battlezone seemingly attempting to be strong everywhere but obviously ending up strong nowhere. The German command in the region were much relieved as they were able to inflict heavy casualties on the attackers before withdrawing in reasonable order back to the Siegfried Line. But why take Metz by storm anyway? Von Rom suggests that Metz was an important transport hub yet with Nancy in American hands, there was no reason why supplies could not have been brought up by various alternative and none too torturous routes. Patton had an emotional link with Metz having been awarded a 'Liberation Medallion' in 1918 for his part in the freeing of the city from German rule. However, there is a a clue an article dealing with the oral history of Bill Breckinridge. Whilst supportive of Patton he is more critical of the commander of XX Corps, especially over his desire to take Metz.

From - http://www.wood.army.mil/2-10IN/History ... gehead.htm (I know this one works[:D], apologies for the 'internal' one that didn't[:(])

"Asked "Why did you attack Metz? Why didn't you by-pass it?" Bill first hesitated, saying he probably shouldn't say exactly what he thought. Then he said ".. We had the Second Coming of Napoleon as our Corps Commander, and he had already decided that he might be the first man in history to capture Metz by force. . We could have by-passed it very easily and it would have been very much better because it would drop like . . . eventually it would just have starved to death. But, no, we had to attack it." Bill felt that more divisions ought to have been available for such-an assault, when "all we had were five divisions, and this was the most strongly fortified city in the world, and recognized as such. You can't count on bombing or anything like that because the damn forts had walls that were ten feet thick, concrete. . . reinforced concrete completely covered for years with turf and grass and what have you. . I've seen a pretty good sized bomb hit that stuff and just bounce. And it wouldn't penetrate. The only way you can get into those forts was to get up to the firing slits. . aside from that they were surrounded by an iron picket fence. . you can shell an iron picket fence until hell will have it, but how in the hell can you make a hole in it? . . . when the damn shells explode it shakes a little but that's all. They were solid steel. So when your riflemen get up to the fort they got to go through that picket fence, which was a little difficult." He said the l0th was "a 'little down in strength," after fighting across France and then losses crossing the Moselle. It would have been "a much, much better thing to bypass it."149 But it was clear that the 5th Division was pointed to that objective."

So here we have an alternative, that it was Major-General Walker (XX Corps commander) who developed an unhealthy and ultimately costly obsession to take Metz. Even so, Patton was in charge at the operational level and so was responsible for the command decisions.

In conclusion, the Lorraine campaign reveals Pattons weaknesses as a General. Unable or unwilling to use his preferred battle tactics he lacked the capacity to come up with an alternative plan and so resorted to the kind of trench warfare he was familier with from WW1. He knew that any casualties incurred by Third Army could be replaced far more easily than those suffered by the Germans and so could afford to wage a battle of attrition. It's the failure to adapt to the demands of a changing battlefield that mean that Patton can not be given the epithet 'great'. Where he was good (able to wage a war of maneouvre) he was very good but outside of this he was found wanting.

Kevinugly

Since Von Rom seems unable to discuss Patton's tactics in the Lorraine campaign I can only presume he's folded on the issue.

Right. . . [8|]

You only wish. . .

Let's see if we can sort through that mess you call "analysis", shall we?

First:

That quartermaster link, in which you so depend, and which Ironduke so lavishly praised you for:

You do realize of course that what that fellow wrote has mostly been PLAGERIZED (without credit) from an article by the Staff and Command School.

Although the info in that article was PLAGERIZED, the fellow who wrote it left out a great deal that HURTS both his case and YOURS.

As a PLAGERIST, therefore, his article and the link you provided carry NO WEIGHT.


The Oral History of the 10th

This is another link to a website you gave.

The source and credits you use is from an interview from ONE soldier. You rely on the testimony of ONE soldier (out of 250,000) in Third Army, instead of historians, military professionals, etc.

As such, with regard to tactics, and the overall strategy, HIS EVIDENCE CARRIES NO WEIGHT.

He cites NO evidence or sources, but instead uses HIS OWN OPINION.

That is like basing what went on at Bataan or at the Battle of the Bulge, and the stratgey involved, based on the evidence of ONE SOLDIER. [8|]


Application of Force

Third Army at Lorraine

Heavy rains fell in Lorraine in November that not only made the roads difficult to travel on, but it made using the airforce impossible, and the Moselle River very difficult to cross.

Contrary to your assertion, Third Army STILL suffered from supply problems throughout the campaign:

On 25 September, Third Army operations came to an abrupt halt. Even with the Red Ball Express running at full capacity, logistical support was inadequate to sustain operations by all of the Allied forces on the Continent. Accordingly, GEN Eisenhower decreed that the main Allied effort would come from the British 21st Army Group, which received transportation priority. The 12th Army Group, including Third Army, was to bold its present positions until the logistical crisis receded.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... gabel3.asp


The shallowness of your so-called "analysis" is clearly indicated by YOU stating that Third Army should have concentrated more:

Do you really think 250,000 men could have crowded together in one location in the rain-soaked fields, hills and woods?

Do you really think that 250,000 men and vehicles could have crossed a rain-swollen river and mud-covered roads without massive problems in movement, supply, crowding, accidents, etc?

Do you really expect that 250,000 men and vehicles would not have been strung out for 50-100 miles on mud-soaked roads, washed-out roads, swollen rivers, etc that would have made easy targets for German artillery?

Where were all these men expected to live? How were they going to be supplied?

Have you EVER bothered to even look at a picture of the terrain in Lorraine or the terrain around the Moselle River?

What Patton's critics fatally fail to see in the Lorraine Campaign is that TERRAIN and WEATHER dictated the TACTICS.

the Germans were about to obtain a valuable ally in the form of the weather. Seven inches of rain fell in November, about twice the normal amount. Twenty days that month had rain. Lorraine suffered from its worst floods in 35 years. On two different occasions, floodwaters washed out the Moselle bridges behind the Third Army in the midst of heavy fighting. Almost all operations were limited to the hard roads, a circumstance that the Germans exploited through the maximum use of demolitions. Third Army engineers built over 130 bridges during November.

The weather virtually negated American air superiority. The XIX Tactical Air Command, which had flown 12,000 sorties in the golden days of August, flew only 3,500 in November. There was no air activity at all for 12 days out of the month.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... gabel3.asp



I could go and on. . .

But clearly, you did not even know that the reason why Metz was attacked was for its road and rail networks.

Despite the weather, rain, floods and other problems, Patton did use Combined Arms effectively at Metz:

on 8 November in weather so bad that MG Eddy, XII Corps commander, asked Patton to postpone the attack. Patton told Eddy to attack as scheduled or else name his successor. Despite the total lack of air support, Eddy attacked on the 8th and throughly surprised the defending Germans, who believed that the weather was too bad to allow offensive operations. The most massive artillery preparation in Third Army history preceded XII Corps' attack. All of XII Corps' artillery plus 5 battalions borrowed from XX Corps--for a total of 42 battalions and 540 guns--poured 22,000 rounds on the stunned Germans. At 0600, XII Corps jumped off with three infantry divisions abreast and two armored divisions in corps reserve.

Third Army achieved surprise at Metz:

General Walker's XX Corps made its main attack across the Moselle in the Metz sector on 9 November, one day after XII Corps. It, too, achieved surprise. The 90th Division and 10th Armored Division had shifted to assembly areas north of Thionville in great secrecy. A detachment of special troops maintained radio traffic and manned dummy guns in the vacated zone. There was no artillery preparation so as not to disclose the imminent attack. The Moselle flooded out of its banks, which complicated the crossing operation but had the side benefit of inundating the German minefields on the east bank and lulling the defenders into a false sense of security. Finally, 95th Division staged a demonstration south of Thionville that involved crossing a battalion to the east bank, thus drawing attention away from the main effort farther north.

NEW and EFFECTIVE techniques were used by Third Army at Metz:

Then, XX Corps created another threat by converting 95th Division's demonstration at Uckange into a major effort and reinforcing it with armor. Given the designation Task Force Bacon, this battle group fought its way toward Metz in mobile columns led by tanks and tank destroyers that shot up all possible centers of resistance, to the extent of using 3-inch antitank guns to knock out individual snipers. All of the forces closing on Metz employed new techniques in dealing with fortified areas. Frontal assaults were avoided. Instead, strongpoints and forts were surrounded, bypassed, and systematically reduced with high explosives and gasoline. Task Force Bacon entered Metz from the north on 17 November, the same day 5th Division reached the city from the south and 95th Division neared the Moselle bridges to the west. As street fighting ensued in Metz itself, XX Corps' artillery laid interdiction fire on all German escape routes east of the city.

In fact Metz WAS bypassed and surrounded and it surrendered:

On 19 November, 90th Division and 5th Division linked up east of Metz, completing the encirclement of the city. Although some of the forts held out for two more weeks, the commander of the German garrison in Metz surrendered on 21 November. Thus, XX Corps was the first military force to capture Metz by storm since 451 A.D.

Therefore, Metz fell in NINE days

Source for ALL above quotes from:

The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944 originated at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Gabel, Christopher R. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... gabel3.asp


So, contrary to your poor analysis, Patton and Third Army despite losing half the army and airforce at the start of the campaign; despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign; despite the poor weather, terrain, flooding and rain; despite having to pause for ALL of October; and despite only being allowed to attack starting November 8-10, Patton and Third Army achieved ALL of their objectives.

RESULTS:

From September through November

Third Army inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy.

Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties (18,000 of these were due to trench foot and other illnesses). So in actuality Third Army suffered 32,000 casualties.

Thus, Germany suffered 180,000 casualties vs Third Army's 32,000 casualties (odds of 5:1).

All this despite Third Army's deficiencies, its being halted for all of October, and the fact it attacked the most heaviliy fortified place in Europe in the worst rains and flooding in years.

Again, Patton and Third Army WON the Lorraine Campaign.

Therefore, your argument has been completely DEMOLISHED.

von Rom,
Would you please be so kind as to explain me why an point gets better and better if you make it several times?

I only wonder why you tell the same stuff over and over and over again.

As a conclusion of all the hick hack in this thread I found that Patton did not invent anything new. He hadn´t any new ideas about strategy. He hadn´t any new ideas about logistics.
He only managed to win battles in which his forces were very very much stronger than his enemie´s.

He was a competent worker given the resources he had. He had his off days and he had his good days. So why do you try to lift him on a podest? Yes, he was the best Allied general. No he wasn´t THAT great compared to other generals of his time.

1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts.

2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that

despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign

is yet another of your blatent falsehoods.

3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site.[:D] Attack the facts not the sources.

4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time.

5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'[:D]. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result.

ORIGINAL: Frank

von Rom,
Would you please be so kind as to explain me why an point gets better and better if you make it several times?

I only wonder why you tell the same stuff over and over and over again.

As a conclusion of all the hick hack in this thread I found that Patton did not invent anything new. He hadn´t any new ideas about strategy. He hadn´t any new ideas about logistics.
He only managed to win battles in which his forces were very very much stronger than his enemie´s.

He was a competent worker given the resources he had. He had his off days and he had his good days. So why do you try to lift him on a podest? Yes, he was the best Allied general. No he wasn´t THAT great compared to other generals of his time.

Frank:

I have already explained the reason for the re-postings:

Kevinugly, in his laziness, only gave me a link which led to dozens of posts. Not knowing which post he was referring to, I decided re-post a few posts from that link.

Hopefully, in the future Kevinugly won't be so lazy again.

As to your opinions about Patton:

Obviously, you already had your mind made up about Patton even before you read anything in this thread.

Nothing I, or anything anyone else, can write, will EVER change your mind on the matter.

Yet, much of what the critics have written about Patton is fallacious to the extreme.

Try looking at all the early German victories from Sept/39 to Jan/42, and let me know about the brilliance of these German victories against much inferior forces.

Given that I apologised for the lousy link, calling me 'lazy' (didn't David Heath warn us about 'name calling'? Don't be silly and get yourself banned on my account) isn't going to get you very far.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts.

2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that

despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign

is yet another of your blatent falsehoods.

3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site.[:D] Attack the facts not the sources.

4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time.

5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'[:D]. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result.

1) All info I gave is from that article you, yourself posted! It is from the Command and General Staff College. What is YOUR source for the 700 tanks?

2) The sheer shoddiness of those articles you posted is again indicative of your very poor analysis. So you own a dictionary. Next time spend more time on doing research, and less time on playing with your dictionary.

3) All quotes for my analysis above is from the article YOU posted. It's YOUR source. Heheheh It alone completely demolishes your argument. Completely!

4) Contrary to you and most of the other critics who try their best to trash Patton at Metz and in the Lorraine Campaign, your so-called analysis simply CANNOT hold water.

THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

In just NINE days, from the start of the offensive on November 10, until November 19th, and in spite of poor weather, flooding, rain, bad roads, river flooding, and attacking the most heaviliy fortified place in Europe, Metz fell to Third Army.

It achieved victory.

Your argument has been demolished.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Given that I apologised for the lousy link, calling me 'lazy' (didn't David Heath warn us about 'name calling'? Don't be silly and get yourself banned on my account) isn't going to get you very far.

Being lazy is a BEHAVIOUR not a CHARACTER TRAIT.

Being LAZY has nothing to do with who you are; just how you perform an action. . .

So, if you don't want me to re-post multiple posts again, give me links and posts properly.

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts.

2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that

despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign

is yet another of your blatent falsehoods.

3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site.[:D] Attack the facts not the sources.

4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time.

5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'[:D]. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result.

1) All info I gave is from that article you, yourself posted! It is from the Command and General Staff College. What is YOUR source for the 700 tanks?

2) The sheer shoddiness of those articles you posted is again indictative of your very poor analysis. So you own a dictionary. Next time spend more time on doing research, and less time on playing with your dictionary.

3) All quotes for my analysis above is from the article YOU posted. It's YOUR source. Heheheh It alone completely demolishes your argument. Completely!

4) A person would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe most of what you try to pass off as analysis.

5) Contrary to you and most of the other critics who try their best to trash Patton at Metz and in the Lorraine Campaign, your so-called analysis simply CANNOT hold water.

THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

In just NINE days, from the start of the offensive on November 10, until November 19th, and in spite of poor weather, flooding, rain, bad roads, river flooding, and attacking the most heaviliy fortified place in Europe, Metz fell to Third Army.

It achieved victory.

Your argument has been demolished.

Those quotes do indeed come from my source, the same source criticising Pattons conduct in Lorraine, The Command and General Staff College. Since you're quoting from their study I can only presume that you regard them as an unimpeachable source! You must therefore agree with their findings.[&o]

Game, Set and Match[:D]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

GENERAL PATTON NEVER LOST A CAMPAIGN

I like this one.

Neither did Monty (MG was a battle), neither did Bradley. Neither did Ike. Neither did Alexander. I don't think Clark did either, which is saying something. Neither did Hodges, neither did Simpson. Devers, there's another one. Dempsey, Crerand, about two dozen Admirals and Air Marshalls, oh then there's Leese, whoever ran the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and I don't remember John Wayne losing one either.

It just goes to show you what a winning team the Allies had.

Patton made everyone look good: in Sicily, in France, in the Bulge. . .

Von Rom,
I'm going to leave the discussion with you to others. After re-reading a few recent posts I came across this. I was planning to finish my dealings (with you at least) by posting why I was dissappointed with your methods and tactics and agenda. However, since we're on a warning from the moderators; it's clear from the interventions of others that nothing has gone unnoticed, so I'd be enlightening no one; and I felt this post summed up your angle in all this far better than anything I could say. I leave your own words with you, wish you well in Patton Land, and hope the weather where you are turns quickly and permanently into something more to your liking.

Regards,
IronDuke

(P.S. I checked the Patton sites and have not seen Patton credited anywhere with a share of the credit for winning the Battle of the Atlantic, nor for directing Harris's air campaign over Germany, nor for hunting down and sinking the Bismark; nor for arranging final victory in Italy from his command post in Germany.
I would write a book, because this new claim is a revelation).

ORIGINAL: Frank

von Rom,
Would you please be so kind as to explain me why an point gets better and better if you make it several times?

I only wonder why you tell the same stuff over and over and over again.

As a conclusion of all the hick hack in this thread I found that Patton did not invent anything new. He hadn´t any new ideas about strategy. He hadn´t any new ideas about logistics.
He only managed to win battles in which his forces were very very much stronger than his enemie´s.

He was a competent worker given the resources he had. He had his off days and he had his good days. So why do you try to lift him on a podest? Yes, he was the best Allied general. No he wasn´t THAT great compared to other generals of his time.

If you get an answer to this, I'd appreciate an e-mail telling me.

As for your analysis, I'd disagree about logistics, I think he was good at logistics, just never accepted that if they were in poor shape, the best policy was to rein in your ambition.

I'd agree he was competent, much of the Allied High Command was this much, what he did offer over and above everyone else was a drive and style that other more cautious Commanders didn't have. That said, his drive was fast, but only possible against a beaten and demoralised enemy. I don't think he driove as cleverly as others did. I don't think he would have outmanouevred the early Africa Corp on a one for one basis in the wide open desert, and I don't think he would have fared too well in Russia. However, he wasn't asked to, so I'd baulk at criticising for not being good at something he was never asked to do, it'd be speculation.

Regards,
Ironduke

ORIGINAL: diesel7013

Just a simple former military officer here to offer his humble opinion...

We all know that a knowledge of supply and logistics seperates the great generals from the merely good ones...
We also know that great generalship is more than strategy, tactics, operational control, ect.. it is also inspiring your men to reach inside themselves and perform at a higher level than they themselves though possible
And finally, great generalship is creating an environment ( and I mean an environment that changes based upon weapons, tactics, time frame, ect.. ) where your army, division, company, whatever where your men can accomplish a mission even without your direct input at all times...

Now - to General Patton and why I think he was a fine and great general....

1. Over time, he did begin to understand the relationship between logistics and strategy and their balance - he never lost focus on movement and risk...
2. Patton came into Africa and rebuilt an army that had not performed as well as was hoped and though force of will, personality, and planning, put into effect that changes neccessary to turn the army around and make it successful in Africa and Sicily - In neither Africa nor Sicily was the outcome so far concluded that a lessor man could have accomplished what he did...
3. His staff learned to plan ahead in a way that most amatures of the time could not do - to plan for other contengincies that may arise ( the Bulge counter-attack ) He forced his people to be better than they thought they could be....

Patton may not have been the best general of all time or even the best general of WWII - but we certianly deserves to be the considered one of the greatest of all time

diesel7013,
Thanks for your thoughts.


I think a good General is more than this, though. Your absolutely correct that a good General must understand logistics, no argument. However, I don't think Patton understood them so well it governed his actions like it should have done. In other words, faced with logistics issues in Lorraine, he does well to husband his supplies for the November assaults, proving innovative and open to ideas, but what are we to make of the logistical impossibility that was his desire to drive through the West Wall and take Germany alone?

Whilst Patton never lost focus on movement and risk, I just don't see that focus being all that clever. Much lies in what he wanted to do, as much as what he did, but I see no great encirclements in the dash across France. Germans troops that were encircled were effectively finished the minute they were told to stop and retreat into the ports to deny them to the Allies, not by any move from Patton.

In terms of risk, this is Patton's achilles heel. I think it is wrong to suggest (as his supporters have suggested here, before you intervened) that movement takes care of the flanks, or that tactical air power can protect them for you. This sort of movement only works against beaten and retreating forces. When the forces facing you are still dangerous and well organised, it is foolhardy, (as Von Manstein illustrated at Kharkov) to advance hard and deep with no thought for your flanks. Patton displays this style of manouevre as early as 1941 in field excerises, so it was not merely a case of horses for courses in 1944.

Again, you make very perceptive points about what separates good generals from great ones, but the basics you mention, shared by all the good ones are the bedrock of Command. You mention them yourself, Strategy, tactics, operational control. Faced with fixed defences, Patton had no more idea than any other Allied Commanders about how to concentrate and defeat them. The drive on the Bulge looks to me like a dissipation of force. Three divisions strung out across 25 miles, facing three enemy divisions. 3:1 is an overly simplistic rule of thumb for the attacker, but attacking everywhere not only weakens your assault, but spreads out the supporting assets (air, artillery) that do so much to make the breakthrough possible. This is not a drive that would be taught as an illustration of how to do it.

I generally try and imagine how someone would have fared had you taken him from his command and put him elsewhere, perhaps even in an opposition command. If I can see him performing well, then there is a chance for greatness. Great Generals are also (IM very HO) comfortable with most or all the aspects of command. It is why I would judge Kesselring only good (for example), because whilst clearly very competent defensively, there is little evidence (apart from a brief spell in Africa) to judge him on the attack.

If Patton had changed places with Dempsey, I see nothing to suggest the attacks on Caen would have been any less costly. Patton displayed no talent for breaking fixed defences in depth. Had he changed positions with Bradley, I think the carnage in the Bocage would have been worse, because Patton occasionally displayed a tendancy of persisting in the face of failure, as if effort and will alone would see him home. Tired, demoralised troops losing a man per yard in the drive on St Lo would have been asked to persist longer, and been driven harder, with predictable results.

In Russia, I see no evidence Patton would have possessed the quality of movement in the expanses to perform better than Guderian et al. In the environment of 1941, he might have driven as hard and as far as Guderian (he had the necessary qualities), but his tendancy to attack and drive on a number of differing angles would have left his forces unconcentrated when the time came to close the jaws behind Russian Armies in the field, and seal them off.

On the plus side, he offered things no other Allied Commander could, but I think he needed supervision, because his lust for glory was apt to make him throw Military logic out the window in the rush for action and glory. Palermo is an example for a number of things, but Bradley despaired at this drive, and I think it illustrates why he was perhaps best as a Corp Commander.

Had I been Bradley in Normandy, I'd have taken 2nd Armoured and the Big Red One off Hodges, added
them to the growing performance of Wood and 4th Armoured, and given them all to Patton. I would then have ordered him to attack on as narrow a front as possible towards my key objective. It might sound surprising, but I can see Patton ending the war in 1944, but only had he commanded XXX Corp on the drive to Arnhem. I think he would have been in his element, would have drove the men into the ground to get there in a few days, and would most likely have driven into Arnhem in time to save Frost's command and take the town.

From there, I'd have aimed him at something else...

Many thanks for your intervention. Things were getting a little stale around here. You also remind me that there is more to consider than the books I occasionally get buried in. I have never served, so suspect I lack the insights about reality on the ground and the nature of command that will be second nature to you. That said, I don't doubt you're read plenty yourself as well (which makes you a dangerous opponent [:)])

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts.

2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that is yet another of your blatent falsehoods.

3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site.[:D] Attack the facts not the sources.

4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time.

5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'[:D]. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result.

1) All info I gave is from that article you, yourself posted! It is from the Command and General Staff College. What is YOUR source for the 700 tanks?

2) The sheer shoddiness of those articles you posted is again indictative of your very poor analysis. So you own a dictionary. Next time spend more time on doing research, and less time on playing with your dictionary.

3) All quotes for my analysis above is from the article YOU posted. It's YOUR source. Heheheh It alone completely demolishes your argument. Completely!

4) A person would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe most of what you try to pass off as analysis.

5) Contrary to you and most of the other critics who try their best to trash Patton at Metz and in the Lorraine Campaign, your so-called analysis simply CANNOT hold water.

THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

In just NINE days, from the start of the offensive on November 10, until November 19th, and in spite of poor weather, flooding, rain, bad roads, river flooding, and attacking the most heaviliy fortified place in Europe, Metz fell to Third Army.

It achieved victory.

Your argument has been demolished.

Those quotes do indeed come from my source, the same source criticising Pattons conduct in Lorraine, The Command and General Staff College. Since you're quoting from their study I can only presume that you regard them as an unimpeachable source! You must therefore agree with their findings.[&o]

Game, Set and Match[:D]

Oh, brother [8|]

Here is the link to that article you posted from the Command and General Staff College:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... gabel3.asp

It states that Third Army caused 180,000 German casualties while suffering 50,000 casualties itself. These figures have NOT been disputed.

Where on earth did you get that figure of 700 tanks being destroyed? What's your source?

Yes, Third Army did get re-supplied during October, but it was NEVER at FULL supply. Most of the supplies Third Army got was from their own scrounging. Third Army achieved enough supply for 4-5 days for a full offensive:

Third Army was relatively dormant from 25 September to 8 November. Patton's forces utilized the time to carefully husband resources and build up reserves for future operations. Stringent gasoline rationing went into effect on 3 October, and although gasoline receipts for the month were only 67 percent of requested amounts, Third Army managed to amass a small reserve. The larger calibers of ammunition were also strictly rationed. To take the place of silent artillery tubes, tanks, tank destroyers, and mortars were surveyed in for use as artillery. Extensive use was also made of captured German ordnance. One time on target (TOT) fired in XX Corps' zone was executed with captured German 105-mm howitzers, Russian-made 76.2-mm guns and French 155-mm howitzers (also captured from the ' Germans), and German 88-mm antitank guns. Eighty percent of the artillery ammunition expended by XX Corps in the last week of October was of German origin.

By the time full-scale operations resumed in November, Third Army's program of rationing and local procurement had resulted in the establishment of substantial reserves. On the average, each division held 4 days of Class I and 5 days of Class III supplies when the eastward advance was resumed. Except for heavy artillery shells, the ammunition shortage was no longer critical.

So even though Third Army was NOT at FULL supply by Nov 8, it still had enough to WIN a DECISIVE VICTORY by taking Metz in just NINE days, using Combined Arms, maneuver, infiltration, surprise, armour breakthrough, and bypass operations.

So, even though Third Army started the Lorraine Campaign with half its troops and planes taken away; even though it had little gas and supplies; even though the rains, terrain and flooding caused severe hardships; even though it had little air cover; even though it never had full supplies; and even though it attacked the MOST heavily fortified place in Europe; even with ALL of this against it, Third Army STILL achieved a DECISIVE VICTORY in Lorraine.

So what on earth are you arguing? [8|]

You have had all the time in world to do your research, and this is the best you could do?

You did not have 4 or 5 people attacking you as I have had to contend with these past two weeks. You had lots of time to find evidence to show how terrible Patton did in Lorraine.

Yet, the FACTS PROVE OTHERWISE

So, please this is a waste of time. . .

Why are you even bothering. . .

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: IronDuke



I like this one.

Neither did Monty (MG was a battle), neither did Bradley. Neither did Ike. Neither did Alexander. I don't think Clark did either, which is saying something. Neither did Hodges, neither did Simpson. Devers, there's another one. Dempsey, Crerand, about two dozen Admirals and Air Marshalls, oh then there's Leese, whoever ran the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and I don't remember John Wayne losing one either.

It just goes to show you what a winning team the Allies had.

Patton made everyone look good: in Sicily, in France, in the Bulge. . .

Von Rom,
I'm going to leave the discussion with you to others. After re-reading a few recent posts I came across this. I was planning to finish my dealings (with you at least) by posting why I was dissappointed with your methods and tactics and agenda. However, since we're on a warning from the moderators; it's clear from the interventions of others that nothing has gone unnoticed, so I'd be enlightening no one; and I felt this post summed up your angle in all this far better than anything I could say. I leave your own words with you, wish you well in Patton Land, and hope the weather where you are turns quickly and permanently into something more to your liking.

Regards,
IronDuke

(P.S. I checked the Patton sites and have not seen Patton credited anywhere with a share of the credit for winning the Battle of the Atlantic, nor for directing Harris's air campaign over Germany, nor for hunting down and sinking the Bismark; nor for arranging final victory in Italy from his command post in Germany.
I would write a book, because this new claim is a revelation).

Von Rom,
I'm going to leave the discussion with you to others. After re-reading a few recent posts I came across this. I was planning to finish my dealings (with you at least) by posting why I was dissappointed with your methods and tactics and agenda. However, since we're on a warning from the moderators; it's clear from the interventions of others that nothing has gone unnoticed, so I'd be enlightening no one; and I felt this post summed up your angle in all this far better than anything I could say. I leave your own words with you, wish you well in Patton Land, and hope the weather where you are turns quickly and permanently into something more to your liking.

Bye.

How many times is this you said you were leaving this thread?

I lost count. . .

My methods and agenda? [8|]

For the past two weeks I have been forced to deal with at least 3 or 5 to one odds in this thread.

I have been called many derogatory names; my character has been attacked; and people have tried their best to drive me from this thread.

Patton has been attacked in a number of ways, which subsequent research has shown to be totally false.

And yet, poor little 'ol me is accused of being the bad boy? [8|]

Please, if that statement wasn't so pathetic, it would be laughable.

I have yet to be allowed to just debate only one person at a time. Usually, it is several at a time, throwing multiple posts at me.

Again, bye. . .

P.S. I checked the Patton sites and have not seen Patton credited anywhere with a share of the credit for winning the Battle of the Atlantic, nor for directing Harris's air campaign over Germany, nor for hunting down and sinking the Bismark; nor for arranging final victory in Italy from his command post in Germany.
I would write a book, because this new claim is a revelation).

[8|]

Have you been smoking something?

We are dealing only with Patton and his battles. He never lost a campaign.

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: diesel7013

Just a simple former military officer here to offer his humble opinion...

We all know that a knowledge of supply and logistics seperates the great generals from the merely good ones...
We also know that great generalship is more than strategy, tactics, operational control, ect.. it is also inspiring your men to reach inside themselves and perform at a higher level than they themselves though possible
And finally, great generalship is creating an environment ( and I mean an environment that changes based upon weapons, tactics, time frame, ect.. ) where your army, division, company, whatever where your men can accomplish a mission even without your direct input at all times...

Now - to General Patton and why I think he was a fine and great general....

1. Over time, he did begin to understand the relationship between logistics and strategy and their balance - he never lost focus on movement and risk...
2. Patton came into Africa and rebuilt an army that had not performed as well as was hoped and though force of will, personality, and planning, put into effect that changes neccessary to turn the army around and make it successful in Africa and Sicily - In neither Africa nor Sicily was the outcome so far concluded that a lessor man could have accomplished what he did...
3. His staff learned to plan ahead in a way that most amatures of the time could not do - to plan for other contengincies that may arise ( the Bulge counter-attack ) He forced his people to be better than they thought they could be....

Patton may not have been the best general of all time or even the best general of WWII - but we certianly deserves to be the considered one of the greatest of all time

diesel7013,
Thanks for your thoughts.


I think a good General is more than this, though. Your absolutely correct that a good General must understand logistics, no argument. However, I don't think Patton understood them so well it governed his actions like it should have done. In other words, faced with logistics issues in Lorraine, he does well to husband his supplies for the November assaults, proving innovative and open to ideas, but what are we to make of the logistical impossibility that was his desire to drive through the West Wall and take Germany alone?

Whilst Patton never lost focus on movement and risk, I just don't see that focus being all that clever. Much lies in what he wanted to do, as much as what he did, but I see no great encirclements in the dash across France. Germans troops that were encircled were effectively finished the minute they were told to stop and retreat into the ports to deny them to the Allies, not by any move from Patton.

In terms of risk, this is Patton's achilles heel. I think it is wrong to suggest (as his supporters have suggested here, before you intervened) that movement takes care of the flanks, or that tactical air power can protect them for you. This sort of movement only works against beaten and retreating forces. When the forces facing you are still dangerous and well organised, it is foolhardy, (as Von Manstein illustrated at Kharkov) to advance hard and deep with no thought for your flanks. Patton displays this style of manouevre as early as 1941 in field excerises, so it was not merely a case of horses for courses in 1944.

Again, you make very perceptive points about what separates good generals from great ones, but the basics you mention, shared by all the good ones are the bedrock of Command. You mention them yourself, Strategy, tactics, operational control. Faced with fixed defences, Patton had no more idea than any other Allied Commanders about how to concentrate and defeat them. The drive on the Bulge looks to me like a dissipation of force. Three divisions strung out across 25 miles, facing three enemy divisions. 3:1 is an overly simplistic rule of thumb for the attacker, but attacking everywhere not only weakens your assault, but spreads out the supporting assets (air, artillery) that do so much to make the breakthrough possible. This is not a drive that would be taught as an illustration of how to do it.

I generally try and imagine how someone would have fared had you taken him from his command and put him elsewhere, perhaps even in an opposition command. If I can see him performing well, then there is a chance for greatness. Great Generals are also (IM very HO) comfortable with most or all the aspects of command. It is why I would judge Kesselring only good (for example), because whilst clearly very competent defensively, there is little evidence (apart from a brief spell in Africa) to judge him on the attack.

If Patton had changed places with Dempsey, I see nothing to suggest the attacks on Caen would have been any less costly. Patton displayed no talent for breaking fixed defences in depth. Had he changed positions with Bradley, I think the carnage in the Bocage would have been worse, because Patton occasionally displayed a tendancy of persisting in the face of failure, as if effort and will alone would see him home. Tired, demoralised troops losing a man per yard in the drive on St Lo would have been asked to persist longer, and been driven harder, with predictable results.

In Russia, I see no evidence Patton would have possessed the quality of movement in the expanses to perform better than Guderian et al. In the environment of 1941, he might have driven as hard and as far as Guderian (he had the necessary qualities), but his tendancy to attack and drive on a number of differing angles would have left his forces unconcentrated when the time came to close the jaws behind Russian Armies in the field, and seal them off.

On the plus side, he offered things no other Allied Commander could, but I think he needed supervision, because his lust for glory was apt to make him throw Military logic out the window in the rush for action and glory. Palermo is an example for a number of things, but Bradley despaired at this drive, and I think it illustrates why he was perhaps best as a Corp Commander.

Had I been Bradley in Normandy, I'd have taken 2nd Armoured and the Big Red One off Hodges, added
them to the growing performance of Wood and 4th Armoured, and given them all to Patton. I would then have ordered him to attack on as narrow a front as possible towards my key objective. It might sound surprising, but I can see Patton ending the war in 1944, but only had he commanded XXX Corp on the drive to Arnhem. I think he would have been in his element, would have drove the men into the ground to get there in a few days, and would most likely have driven into Arnhem in time to save Frost's command and take the town.

From there, I'd have aimed him at something else...

Many thanks for your intervention. Things were getting a little stale around here. You also remind me that there is more to consider than the books I occasionally get buried in. I have never served, so suspect I lack the insights about reality on the ground and the nature of command that will be second nature to you. That said, I don't doubt you're read plenty yourself as well (which makes you a dangerous opponent [:)])

Regards,
IronDuke

Ironduke:

I thought you were leaving?

Oh, well. . .

1) Logistics:

Patton didn''t know logistics?

Give me ONE example.

2) Maneuver:

Patton and Third Army has been credited with a brilliant drive through France. NO ONE, except you disputes this.

ONLY Bradley's timidity allowed 100,000 Germans to escape from the Falaise Gap.

3) Flanks:

In war you take risks. In France Third Army's XIX Tactical Air Command flew 12,000 sorties in August alone covering Patton's flanks. I have produced two very well researched articles that call the coordination between Third Army and its Air Command one of the most perfectly coordinated operations of the war.

4) The rest of your post deals with hypotheticals that have no relevance to the discussion.

5) Speaking of good/bad generals and good/bad operations, I'm STILL waiting to read your analysis of the so-called brilliant German blitzkrieg operations between Sept/39 to Jan/42.

Show us all how Germany won superior victories against little Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Fance, etc. . .

You criticize Patton on every tiny detail.

Well, let's see how well you do with the German General who was in command of Army Group Centre when it stalled outside the gates of Moscow in 1941, and how that army was driven back by the Soviet counterattack.

Patton is cool b/c he sunk the Bismark

It states that Third Army caused 180,000 German casualties while suffering 50,000 casualties itself. These figures have NOT been disputed.

It says 'claims' 180,000, don't you understand the difference! The article also prints the following -

At the end of the week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks destroyed.

Yet we know that the number of tanks in Lorraine at the time was only in double figures.

So, please this is a waste of time. . .

Why are you even bothering. . .

Because I'm right!

Oh and Chicken (sorry, 'UndercoverNotChickenSalad', my mistake) he didn't just sink the Bismarck, he shot Hitler too[:D]

Von Rom wrote

I have yet to be allowed to just debate only one person at a time. Usually, it is several at a time, throwing multiple posts at me.

If you didn't issue multiple challenges and were prepared to stick with one issue at a time this would be less of a problem for you[:-] This is a 'public forum' so stop whingeing about it. If you really want to debate with one person at a time you could do it via e-mail or 'private messaging', it's not difficult.

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

It states that Third Army caused 180,000 German casualties while suffering 50,000 casualties itself. These figures have NOT been disputed.

It says 'claims' 180,000, don't you understand the difference! The article also prints the following -

At the end of the week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks destroyed.

Yet we know that the number of tanks in Lorraine at the time was only in double figures.

So, please this is a waste of time. . .

Why are you even bothering. . .

Because I'm right!

Kevinugly:

It says 'claims' 180,000, don't you understand the difference! The article also prints the following -

I know what it says.

However, in my research I have found that usually Patton was correct in what he did, and that he was a strict disciplinarian and was strict about everything being done in his army. He trained his men hard and demanded efficiency from them. He set very high standards for his men and demanded their best.

So, the more I dig, the more Patton and Third Army can be relied upon for what they say and do.

At the end of the week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks destroyed.

You said:

Yet we know that the number of tanks in Lorraine at the time was only in double figures.

Not so.

As I mentioned I have come to have more and more faith in Patton and Third Army the more research I do.

What I have is that the numbers given by 4th armoured Division is fairly close. I had to do some digging, but this is what I found:


The Fourth Armored Division Official History:

The Fourth Armored Division: 4th Armored Division in WWII from the Beaches to Bavaria. Considered General Patton's "steady" armored division, the 4th Armored Division missed only one of the Third Army's 281 days of combat. Captured 90,354 Nazis, killed est'd 13,600 & destroyed 579 German tanks. 6,000 men of the 4th Armored Division received Purple Hearts. An Official U.S. Army Division History First published in 1946, this outstanding history has 295 pages, 102 superb photos and illustrations, and 2 maps. Chapters include initial combat in Normandy, the breakout and dash across France, the battles for the Moselle River, the Battle of the Bulge, and the final operations deep in Germany. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia. 1,356 KIA; 4,551 WIA

http://www.military.cibmedia.com/main-s ... ode=BP-04A



The Following has been found in Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.



[NOTE: M = Mellenthin]

German Loses: 19-30 September 1944, Nancy

Initial tanks - 10

Sept 18 - 50 tanks destroyed - M, p.377-78

Sept 20 - no number specified - 113th Pz Brigade (89 tanks)- M, p.378#

Sept 22 - 47 tanks/TDs destroyed - 111th Pz brigade (7 tanks left) - M, p.378*

Sept 24 - no number specified - VGD, 11th Panzer Div & 106th Panzer Brigade (50 Tanks) - M, p.380

Sept 26-29 - no number specified - 11th pz, 58th pz corps, VGDs, M, pp.380-81

Nov - 140 tanks could be mustered - M, p.385


What I have found by piecing the info together from Mellenthin's book as well as the OoB of a couple of German units in Lorraine at the time, is that there were at least 253 German tanks and tank destroyers present during the week that I have been able to find. This is a rough estimate. But it is far higher than the double digit numbers you gave.

The Battle of Arracourt was one of the largest tank battles on the western front.

There were many more German tanks and tank destroyers than this because the following German military organizations were also in Lorraine at the time and so would have contributed more armour and TDs as well as armoured cars and half-tracks:

First Army, Nineteenth Army, and Fifth Panzer Army, panzer grenadiers (mechanized infantry divisions) and elements of Waffen SS units, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, just arrived from Italy, VGDs, etc, etc. . .

And even after all the tank battles in October, according to Mellenthin's book, the Germans could still muster 140 tanks (p.385).

Therefore, if we take into account German tanks, tank destroyers, armoured cars, TD half-tracks, plus many more armoured units that could have easily been in the area, then 4th Armoured Division's number of 285 German armoured vehicles destroyed could very well be an accurate (or close to accurate) number. This is a rough estimate.



*********************************************

111th Panzer Brigade+

OoB 9/18/44

1 HQ JagdPanzer IV/70
3 pltns of 3 JagdPanzer IV/70 each (9)

2 x MkIVH

3 MkIV companies each with--- (6)
1 coy HQ
2 x MkIVH

3 MkIVH Pltns each with (12)
4 x MkIVH
1 AA company
1 20mm AA pltn w/4 Moebelwagens (20mm quad mount)
1 37mm AA pltn w/4 Moebelwagens (37mm sing mount)

4 x Pz V

3 Pz V companies,each with-- (6)

1 coy HQ

2 x Pz V

3 Pz V pltns , each with (12)

4 Pz V

http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:de ... lr=lang_en

*********************************************************

113th Pz Brigade#

OoB - 9/18/44

113th Pz Bde (Commander Saeckendorff)

Bde HQ ASSETS
- Bde staff 1/2 track mounted
1 251/6
2 251/3 -radio
- signal pltn (Opel Blitz truck)
- motorcycle (Kettenkrad) messenger pltn


113th PzGren Pioneer co.(motorized)
- 2 rifle pltns (6 LMG each)
- 1 Hvy Wpns Pltn
- 2 81mm mortars
- 2 HMG teams

113 recon Co. (remnants of 58th Recon Bn)
- Armored Car Pltn
- 3 SdKfz 222
- 2 SdKfz 234/1
- Half-track Pltn
- 1 SdKfz 250/10 (37mm AT)
- 2 SdKfz 250/1 (each with foot recon section)
- 2 SdKfz 7/1 quad 20mm AA

Arty Support 1198 Arty Bn attached for Arracourt (1/2 track towed)
- 2 3-gun batteries 152mm (ex-Soviet)
- 1 4-gun battery 150mm German

INFANTRY ASSETS

2113 Pz Gren Regt

- signals pltn (Opel Blitz)
- motorcycle (kettenkrad) pltn
- towed AT pltn
- 3 50mm AT - towed, truck
- HW company
- 1st Pltn - 3 150mm inf guns-towed, truck
- 2nd pltn - 3 75mm Inf guns-towed.truck
- 3rd pltn - 4 120mm mortars,truck
- AA pltn-towed,truck
- 8 20mm Flak 38 single barrel

- I & II Bn-motorized
- Administrative staff
- 3 rifle companies
- 3 rifle pltns with 6 LMGs each
- 1 HW pltn with 4 HMGs and 2 81mm mortars
- 1 HW company
- 3 75mm At,towed,truck
- 4 120mm mortar

ARMOR assets

- 2113th Pz Bn ( Pz Replacement Bn 35 )(45 Mk IV)
- Bn Hq/recon section
- 3 Pz Mk IV
- 3 MkIV kompanies 14 Pz IV each

- I Bn/130 Pz Lehr (44 Mk V)
- Bn Hq/recon section
- 2 Pz Mk V
- 3 Pz V kompanies 14 Mk V each

- Armored AA company
- 4 20mm WirbelWinds
- 4 37mm Flak/Pz IV Moebelwagen

- Workshop units
- Light workshop co.
- Hvy workshop co.

NOTES:

Armor Bns must be attached to Infantry battalions for communications--the
tanks did not have compatible radios to talk to Brigade HQ.


DEPLOYMENT for Battle orders 9/18/44

KG BROSE

- 2113 Pz Bde Hq(including the commander 113th Pz Bde)
- 2113 Bde Signals co.
- I Bn 2113 PzGrenReg
- I/130 Pz Bn (MkV)
- 1st Pltn Pioneers
- 1st Pltn HW co.(105mm Inf Guns)
- 1st section towed AA guns (4 20mm)

KG FEISS

- 2113th PzGrenReg Hq
- II Bn/2113 PzGrenReg
- 2113 Pz Bn (MkIV)
- 2nd Pltn Poineers
- 3rd Pltn HW co.(120mm mortars)
- 2nd section towed AA co.

RESERVE

- Recon co.
- HW pltn Pioneer co.
- 2nd Pltn HW co.(75mm Inf Gun)


Here is the list of commanders of the 113th Pz Bde as of 9/18/44-- (just
before the Battle for Arracourt)

113th Pz Bde Col Freiherr von Saeckendorf (KIA 9/21/44)

2113th Pz Gren Reg Col Brose
I Bn Capt Schrader(Capt Kirschner during battle)

1 kompanie 1st Lt Winkler
2 kompanie 1st Lt Mauff
3 kompanie 1st Lt Lange
4 kompanie 1st Lt Rebel

II Bn Capt Feisse

5 kompanie 1st Lt Sadder
6 kompanie 1st Lt Schmidt (9/22/44-Lt Rausche)
7 kompanie
8 kompanie 1st Lt Dietrich (captured 3hrs into battle
9/19/44)

Pioneer kompanie 1st Lt Maier

http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:vg ... lr=lang_en

*****************************************************

Because I'm right!

Sorry to disappoint you.

The number is closer to 4th Armoured Divisions, than to your estimate of there being just a double digit number of tanks in Lorraine.

The number appears to be closer to between 400 to 500 German armoured vehicles in Lorraine.