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So in Glantz opinion, Soviet HQ's were not suffering from command and control problems in mid to late 1942? That seems very difficult to believe, especially considering the lack of initiative lower HQ's were supposed to show according to Soviet military doctrine.

If Glantz says so, and can prove it, that would basically declare every other historical analysis about the summer/autumn 1942 campaign null and void.

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

So in Glantz opinion, Soviet HQ's were not suffering from command and control problems in mid to late 1942? That seems very difficult to believe, especially considering the lack of initiative lower HQ's were supposed to show according to Soviet military doctrine.

If Glantz says so, and can prove it, that would basically declare every other historical analysis about the summer/autumn 1942 campaign null and void.

The truth is more complex than that and not something easily summarized in a few lines of text here. I recommend you read TO THE GATES OF STALINGRAD and then if you are still un-convinced we can continue this conversation in private emails. I honestly think you'll find the book an eye opener. I know it was for me.

The truth is more complex than that and not something easily summarized in a few lines of text here.

Well said, if that were possible why need to publish the thick, sometimes expensive books?

It is also hard to find out what really happened, victors and loser always have different angles of viewpoints. Plus some "facts" remain so for years only to be revealed as false years later. See Shattered Sword the battle of Midway as an example.

I enjoy reading history books but am no expert of most of the facts, I try to read the books as a recreational side to my computer gaming. Esp when having to have my summer holidays on the beach. Gf does not want a laptop near me, so I can read the books and we are both happy.

But always glad to hear of a book title that is worth reading.


Mat

How does intelligence work in this game? Just wondering how much fog of war affects what you can see and what a player can do to reduce it. I've noticed from the 1942 AAR Pyledriver is doing that the German intel is very incomplete. (This is a good thing, not a criticism, mind you.) Or, vice versa, what a player can do to hide his forces from an opponent. (Although I understand the AI is not affected by fog of war rules.)
 
 

Or, vice versa, what a player can do to hide his forces from an opponent.

Stay out of the clear terrain. Place your units further from enemy units. Intercept enemy recon flights.

Does urban terrain increase the fog of war? (This is of some interest to me with regards to the 1942 AAR.)
 
Also, is intel gathered only through explicit air recon, or can any air mission reveal hidden units as they fly over enemy terrain?

Air missions will report back info on things they bombed, but not what they fly over. Best way to increase detection level is to have combat units adjacent to the enemy with good ground recon assets. Attacking them will also increase their DL, but that could be very painful. [:)]

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

So in Glantz opinion, Soviet HQ's were not suffering from command and control problems in mid to late 1942? That seems very difficult to believe, especially considering the lack of initiative lower HQ's were supposed to show according to Soviet military doctrine.

If Glantz says so, and can prove it, that would basically declare every other historical analysis about the summer/autumn 1942 campaign null and void.

There is much discussion by Glantz in To the Gates of Stalingrad about the lack of C&C on the Soviet side. While he disputes many of the long held views on the overall Russian strategy and performance he most certainly identifies C&C issues within the partiicpating armies. This is particularly so with respect to Soviet counterstrokes and their use of armored formations.

ORIGINAL: The SNAFU

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

So in Glantz opinion, Soviet HQ's were not suffering from command and control problems in mid to late 1942? That seems very difficult to believe, especially considering the lack of initiative lower HQ's were supposed to show according to Soviet military doctrine.

If Glantz says so, and can prove it, that would basically declare every other historical analysis about the summer/autumn 1942 campaign null and void.

There is much discussion by Glantz in To the Gates of Stalingrad about the lack of C&C on the Soviet side. While he disputes many of the long held views on the overall Russian strategy and performance he most certainly identifies C&C issues within the partiicpating armies. This is particularly so with respect to Soviet counterstrokes and their use of armored formations.

You're quoting a conclusion that ComradeP jumped to which was never attributed to Glantz by me. Based on TO THE GATES OF STALINGRAD, I was taking issue only with the notion that the Soviets retreated in the summer of '42 either intentionally or in panic. Glantz presents a convincing case that this "strategic" retreat never in fact took place.

I might add that what really took place could better be described as a reluctant fighting withdrawal which still understates the determination of Soviet resistance.

Perhaps the best analogy is a "beaten" boxer who keeps coming back for more and occasionally getting in a punch or two.

Perhaps the best analogy is a "beaten" boxer who keeps coming back for more and occasionally getting in a punch or two.

Very nice way to put jaw.

[:)]

forgot to put a smiley in there, it's hard to see tone and facial expressions...

In the GE '42 AAR, there is a ss about artillery losses.
At the very bottom of the ss, there are lines for two kinds of dumps.

What are these and how are they used, how do they function, etc?

/g

These are supplies and fuel stored at HQs.

Based on TO THE GATES OF STALINGRAD, I was taking issue only with the notion that the Soviets retreated in the summer of '42 either intentionally or in panic.

No, you clearly took issue with the command and control issues I mentioned too, as you said the accounts of German radio interception units and other intelligence assets, who noted that the battle for Kursk was the first larger operation where the Soviet HQ's were not more or less panicking at the start, were self serving. I never commented on the Soviets as a whole, only their HQ's.

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

Based on TO THE GATES OF STALINGRAD, I was taking issue only with the notion that the Soviets retreated in the summer of '42 either intentionally or in panic.

No, you clearly took issue with the command and control issues I mentioned too, as you said the accounts of German radio interception units and other intelligence assets, who noted that the battle for Kursk was the first larger operation where the Soviet HQ's were not more or less panicking at the start, were self serving. I never commented on the Soviets as a whole, only their HQ's.

German sources are self-serving. Compare PANZER LEADER to any objective account of the battles around Smolensk. I'm not disputing that the Russians had command and control problems, just the "conventional wisdow" (German account) of what happened in the summer of 1942.

The truth on 42 will never be known precisely for various reasons.

a) there is always bias in any account, even if unintentional. The more 'professional' histories are, the more on guard one must be
b) As much as they hate to admit it, those participating on the Axis side of the offensive were bewildered by Sovier reactions.
c) the Soviets rolled with the punches especially since they were wrongfooted at the begining of the offensive in the south
d) most of the German accounts were at division/corps/army level-very hard to get the full picture unless you see it all
e) Soviet history writing leaves much to be desired. It is rewritten over and over again depending on who was in power (vide Kruschev)

In practice stories became longer in the telling on both sides.

Self serving, biased? Yes of course to some extent. But on many levels the various accounts by the participants are much more about their limited perspectives than they are about being self serving or biased. Panzer Leader was written by the man while in prison and only a few years after the war. What real knowledge did he have with respect to the Soviet side of the conflict.

I think it is quite possible today, particularly in the wake of the first two installments of the Glantz trilogy, to write an accurate account of events on the Eastern Front in 1942 or any period of the war for that matter. Using battle reports and other accounts from units of both sides, much of which just recently made available from the Russians, an accurate analysis can and has been written.

Of course that is just my opinion and you know what they say about opinions!

I hope everyone is well. Based on the various forums, it looks like there is lots of great work going on. I have a question about the production/replacement concept associated with the game. My understanding is that the production/replacement concept is based on historical #s. Is that correct? If so, how is the game influenced by events that occur within the game (i.e. the taking of a city that adds additional production/replacement capability)? Is there going to be a way to influence the units that are produced/replaced (i.e. there are more armor losses vs. infantry losses)?

Thanks

Keep up the great work!
[&o]

German sources are self-serving. Compare PANZER LEADER to any objective account of the battles around Smolensk.

There's a flaw in your thought process regarding this issue: no account of a battle is objective. The archives Glantz read were written by the Soviets and may or may not have actually been written during the battle. Is there any way to verify precisely what happened at Smolensk or elsewhere?

Not really, as historians automatically end up with two (or more) versions of what happened, depending how many sides took part in the battle/conflict. I am a historian myself, so I'm painfully aware of the problem. Ask a few people how the accident they just witnessed happened and see how many different replies you get, whilst they were all there and should in theory all give the same reply.

There's also no way you can accurately determine whether a part of an account about a battle where Guderian was on average mostly kept up to date with detailed information about events in his own sector, written/completed about 9 years after the battle is "self serving" or if Guderian might not remember all the details correctly. Sure, everyone is "self serving" in a way, but (having the description of the Smolensk battles in Panzer Leader on the table in front of me currently) I don't really see how Guderian accounts differs too greatly from what we know now when it comes to the important details:

-German casualties were fairly heavy at various stages.
-There were a lot of Soviet counterattacks.
-Counterattacks by cavalry severely disrupted parts of the German supply train.
-Logistics were a nightmare in general.
-Soviet units could in many cases make an orderly withdrawal and were generally not destroyed in large encirclements (Guderian mentions how troops escaping from encirclements wreaked havoc on the German supply train which had already passed them).
-Due to a mixture of Hitler's poor strategic decisions, German losses, the failure to destroy most of the Soviet troops in the area and logistical difficulties, the German offensive halted a short distance to the East of Smolensk.

Dude, is this a question? Please help us out if you post stuff like this...We have to keep some order...Start a new thread....Jim works his ass off, as the rest of us, post a new thread...Please...