RE: Slowing Things Down...
Posted: Thu Feb 17, 2011 2:00 pm
When we were testing I recall this being the subject of much debate, and their were many many ships not included in the that were built during the war for Japan, of course most of the woden hulled merchant fleat is totaly absent, amounting to over a million tons of shipping, but a great many steel hulled ships were left out as well.
Part of the problem of course is that their size was smallish, even the steel hulled ships would of amounted to literly hundereds of more ships in game and they would of been dificult to manage to be shure.
In game terms what this means of course is that while the number of hunters is more or less the same, Allied subs and aircraft being very acurately represented, the number of targets for them has been greatly reduced.
................
Below is a passage from The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2, in the Chapter "Rumbling Down the Way's" I don not regreatable have a compleat listing of all the ships built withen the following classes, though I hope to aquire a source with more specific data withen the month... (Edit- I did get this book, Ugly Ducklings it coveres the War time built standaradised merchants.)
p.164:
"In late 1942, therefore , the Navy General Staff ordered a magor reorganization of the industry. The Authorities first implemented an upgrading of the shipbuilding facilities inspection system. Coal steal and other related industries also received more carefull quality controle and study. The formost change howeaver was the navys assumption of Jurisdiction over all shipbuilding plans and scheduals (except for woden hull construction) from the ministery of communications. This authority passed to the technical buero of the Navy Ministery, which accordingly opened a special section for merchant ship management and expanding its powers to include materials allocations among shipyards. As in the past , the goverement held the real authority and left execution to a private agency, the industrial equipment corporation. But with the Navy directly involved, the harried communications ministrys administration of the shipbuilding program gave way to direction that was more streamlined, organised, and forcefull.
The impact was immediate and dratmatic. Most private idustries began to experance decreased allocations as the navy funneled more resources into merchant shipbuilding. At a glance the monthly yen input figures will readly confirm this. In the fifteen months up to and including October 1942, the average monthly input to shipbuilding was just under 25 Million yen. But for the Next 15 months the average was 82,385,000 yen, including the wartime pinicle of 162,278,000 yen reached in January 1944. Monthly input did not drop bellow the 150 million yen mark untill very late in the year."
Thier is an acomping chart and it indacates that not till November/Dec is thier an apricable drop.
"The navy used some of this mony and material to expand facilities in old yards and to build several new and efficient specilised shipyars, but the majority of resources went into merchant ship construction. This accounts in large meashure for the fine preformance of the shipbuilding industry in 1943 and 1944, when it grew from the 10th to third largest employer among all manufacturing types, behind only Aircraft and Ordance production. Power consumption withen the industry had nearly doubled by then too.
Their were howeaver some other factors worthy of of partial credit for the unexpectedly high wartime productivity of Japans shipyards. Heading the list was the standization of various merchant ship designs. With an eye toward the obvious advantages of componet interchangeability, simpler construction, and incerased efficiency through repetition, several yards had already developed their own standard specifications for various hip types before the war. Early in 1942 the ministry of Communications studied some of these designes and made minior modifactions, and accepted a dozen of them as national standards. When the Navy ministrys technical beauro assumed authority for the industry soon after, it eliminated five of the standard types, added two otehrs, and substantialy reworked the remaining designs to simplify construction.
The standard designs included five freighter types (A,B,C,D, and E) ranging from 530 to 6,400 tons, three tankers (TS,TM and TL) of from 1,000 to 10,000 tons, and a 5,400-ton ore carrier (Type K). All nine varities crused at 10 Knots or more (the TL could steam efficiently at over 16 Knots0 and had maximum speads of about 3 knots higher. A transport (Type M) and a railroad car fery (W), and another freighter (F) were among the original standard types but the Ministry of comunications never awarded any contracts for them.
"Their can be no question that standarization stimulated tonnage production beyond what would have otherwise been achieved. The standard 6,600 ton cargo vessel, for example , averaged ninety days from keel laying to outfitting in 1942. But during the course of the war, the Japanese yards turned out 121 of these vessels, and so the delevery times droped impresively, one yard even managed to finish one in 36 days. It is imposable to calculate how many extra merchant men that the standardization allowed the Japanese to turn out, but since standard ship types acoounted for three out of ever four wartime tons launched and all new tonnage after 1943, undoubtedly the gain was substantial."
For example the book quotes that nearly 400 Type E tankers were built during this time frame(aprox 870 tons, they could be sunk with one torpedo).
It should be noted that many of the above types were not built with double bottoms and transverse bulkheads, and some had engine relability issues, Typicaly the Private sector made use of the standard types, and the Military almost always used the prewar types.
.................
Thier is also a lot of confushion over what the term Civilian Controle constituted for the Japanese:
p. 38 The Japanese merchant marine in WW2:
"Providing Japanese estimates of the nations shipping needs were accurate, adaquate maritime transport existed for all these roles. At the time of pearl harbor, the merchant fleet amounted to 6.4 million tons. There were in adation, approximatly 1.2 million tons of wodden vessels as well.
The Civilain slice of the pie:
" Coal transportation would occupy 1.8 million tons, while the movement of Aragrcutural products and suplies (450,000)and steal making materials(300,000) would absord the rest."
p.34
"Japanese farmers grew about 80% of what it took to fead the home islands"
"Japan imported about 3 million tons of Husked grains,other food stuff's, fertilizers,and livestock."
The Japanese ecenomy also ran on caol, not oil.
p.33 "Coal imports exceaded 2 million tons per month at the time of Pearl harbor"
"40 million tons of coal were produced anualy" Withen Japan proper.
"Manchuria and China suplied the bulk of the heavy Indistrual coal"
So as you can see the Civialan controeld shiping acounted for the movement of the suplys that fueled the empires war machine, the Military ships were largerly and soly ocupied with the movement and sustaining of troops in the field.
Tankers almost soly suplied the Militarys neads, and thusly should be almost interly considered as Military:
"Every year of the war the nation would use from 4 to 4.5 million tons and the Military would account for the bulk of this total"
Part of the problem of course is that their size was smallish, even the steel hulled ships would of amounted to literly hundereds of more ships in game and they would of been dificult to manage to be shure.
In game terms what this means of course is that while the number of hunters is more or less the same, Allied subs and aircraft being very acurately represented, the number of targets for them has been greatly reduced.
................
Below is a passage from The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2, in the Chapter "Rumbling Down the Way's" I don not regreatable have a compleat listing of all the ships built withen the following classes, though I hope to aquire a source with more specific data withen the month... (Edit- I did get this book, Ugly Ducklings it coveres the War time built standaradised merchants.)
p.164:
"In late 1942, therefore , the Navy General Staff ordered a magor reorganization of the industry. The Authorities first implemented an upgrading of the shipbuilding facilities inspection system. Coal steal and other related industries also received more carefull quality controle and study. The formost change howeaver was the navys assumption of Jurisdiction over all shipbuilding plans and scheduals (except for woden hull construction) from the ministery of communications. This authority passed to the technical buero of the Navy Ministery, which accordingly opened a special section for merchant ship management and expanding its powers to include materials allocations among shipyards. As in the past , the goverement held the real authority and left execution to a private agency, the industrial equipment corporation. But with the Navy directly involved, the harried communications ministrys administration of the shipbuilding program gave way to direction that was more streamlined, organised, and forcefull.
The impact was immediate and dratmatic. Most private idustries began to experance decreased allocations as the navy funneled more resources into merchant shipbuilding. At a glance the monthly yen input figures will readly confirm this. In the fifteen months up to and including October 1942, the average monthly input to shipbuilding was just under 25 Million yen. But for the Next 15 months the average was 82,385,000 yen, including the wartime pinicle of 162,278,000 yen reached in January 1944. Monthly input did not drop bellow the 150 million yen mark untill very late in the year."
Thier is an acomping chart and it indacates that not till November/Dec is thier an apricable drop.
"The navy used some of this mony and material to expand facilities in old yards and to build several new and efficient specilised shipyars, but the majority of resources went into merchant ship construction. This accounts in large meashure for the fine preformance of the shipbuilding industry in 1943 and 1944, when it grew from the 10th to third largest employer among all manufacturing types, behind only Aircraft and Ordance production. Power consumption withen the industry had nearly doubled by then too.
Their were howeaver some other factors worthy of of partial credit for the unexpectedly high wartime productivity of Japans shipyards. Heading the list was the standization of various merchant ship designs. With an eye toward the obvious advantages of componet interchangeability, simpler construction, and incerased efficiency through repetition, several yards had already developed their own standard specifications for various hip types before the war. Early in 1942 the ministry of Communications studied some of these designes and made minior modifactions, and accepted a dozen of them as national standards. When the Navy ministrys technical beauro assumed authority for the industry soon after, it eliminated five of the standard types, added two otehrs, and substantialy reworked the remaining designs to simplify construction.
The standard designs included five freighter types (A,B,C,D, and E) ranging from 530 to 6,400 tons, three tankers (TS,TM and TL) of from 1,000 to 10,000 tons, and a 5,400-ton ore carrier (Type K). All nine varities crused at 10 Knots or more (the TL could steam efficiently at over 16 Knots0 and had maximum speads of about 3 knots higher. A transport (Type M) and a railroad car fery (W), and another freighter (F) were among the original standard types but the Ministry of comunications never awarded any contracts for them.
"Their can be no question that standarization stimulated tonnage production beyond what would have otherwise been achieved. The standard 6,600 ton cargo vessel, for example , averaged ninety days from keel laying to outfitting in 1942. But during the course of the war, the Japanese yards turned out 121 of these vessels, and so the delevery times droped impresively, one yard even managed to finish one in 36 days. It is imposable to calculate how many extra merchant men that the standardization allowed the Japanese to turn out, but since standard ship types acoounted for three out of ever four wartime tons launched and all new tonnage after 1943, undoubtedly the gain was substantial."
For example the book quotes that nearly 400 Type E tankers were built during this time frame(aprox 870 tons, they could be sunk with one torpedo).
It should be noted that many of the above types were not built with double bottoms and transverse bulkheads, and some had engine relability issues, Typicaly the Private sector made use of the standard types, and the Military almost always used the prewar types.
.................
Thier is also a lot of confushion over what the term Civilian Controle constituted for the Japanese:
p. 38 The Japanese merchant marine in WW2:
"Providing Japanese estimates of the nations shipping needs were accurate, adaquate maritime transport existed for all these roles. At the time of pearl harbor, the merchant fleet amounted to 6.4 million tons. There were in adation, approximatly 1.2 million tons of wodden vessels as well.
The Civilain slice of the pie:
" Coal transportation would occupy 1.8 million tons, while the movement of Aragrcutural products and suplies (450,000)and steal making materials(300,000) would absord the rest."
p.34
"Japanese farmers grew about 80% of what it took to fead the home islands"
"Japan imported about 3 million tons of Husked grains,other food stuff's, fertilizers,and livestock."
The Japanese ecenomy also ran on caol, not oil.
p.33 "Coal imports exceaded 2 million tons per month at the time of Pearl harbor"
"40 million tons of coal were produced anualy" Withen Japan proper.
"Manchuria and China suplied the bulk of the heavy Indistrual coal"
So as you can see the Civialan controeld shiping acounted for the movement of the suplys that fueled the empires war machine, the Military ships were largerly and soly ocupied with the movement and sustaining of troops in the field.
Tankers almost soly suplied the Militarys neads, and thusly should be almost interly considered as Military:
"Every year of the war the nation would use from 4 to 4.5 million tons and the Military would account for the bulk of this total"