Matrix Games Forums

Dang! This seems like a lot of work. How did all you primadonnas stand working with each other? [:D]

Waypoints, repair queues, 40 mile hexes, mid-course intercepts, battallion-sized units (some).....droools. How about USO tours to improve morale..can we have some...huh?

I hope you guys do hold the line on things that will make turn prep take too long. Stalker girl already requires burdensome servicing. She is going to be ticked if she finds out I was late because I was setting "flak vectors" [X(]

ORIGINAL: treespider
as it would have to represent manpower shortages

You’re taking one snippet of information and making a huge assumption that there was some kind of drastic manpower shortage in the US during the war.

According to The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison, the US labor pool increased steadily throughout the war until a drop in 1945 as wartime production was scaled back. Here’s the data given in table 3.10 on page 100:

The composition of increases in the United States supply of labor, 1939-1948 (percent changes over 1938)

1. Increase in number of workers
2. Increase in average hours
3. Reallocation effort

………….. 1………. 2………. 3
1939….. 3.0……. 1.5……. 1.0
1940….. 6.7……. 1.8……. 2.1
1941….. 15.4…. 2.6……. 5.7
1942….. 24.2…. 4.6……. 8.9
1943….. 33.5…. 7.4……. 12.7
1944….. 35.3…. 8.0……. 13.4
1945….. 32.8…. 4.1……. 12.9
1946….. 23.9…. -0.3….. 10.2
1947….. 24.5…. -1.8….. 10.3
1948….. 26.1…. -2.8….. 10.7

Page 101 table 3.11 gives employment figures. It’s a huge table so I’m not going to give all the details, but suffice it to say the work force steadily increased throughout the war until 1945 when production was scaled back. But even at its peak in 1944 with an employed population listed at 65,370,000, there were still 670,000 people on the unemployment rolls still looking for and unable to find work.

Page 104 table 3.13 breaks down the division of labor into three industrial groups. Group I is durable goods manufacturing, which in wartime provided the foundations of the munitions industry. Group II consist of workers in agriculture, mining, government, transportation and public utilities the ‘essential’ sectors. Group III consists of workers in non-durable manufacturing, construction, finance and services – the ‘inessential’ trades.

Britain’s war economy saw as many workers as possible reallocate from Group III to Group I to increase war mobilization. The US saw a remarkable increase in Group I, but group II remained constant and Group III fell slightly, but only in the peak years 1943 and 1944.

Composition of United States labor force by industry group, 1939-1948 (thousands)

………. Group I……..……. Group II……..……. Group III
1939. 4,715………………. 16,515……………… 18,119
1940. 5,363………………. 16,619……………… 18,849
1941. 6,968………………. 17,106……………… 20,695
1942. 8,823………………. 18,023……………… 21,368
1943. 11,084…………….. 18,695…………….. 20,717
1944. 10,856…………….. 18,633…………….. 20,263
1945. 9,074………………. 18,386…………….. 20,634
1946. 7,742………………. 18,445…………….. 23,415
1947. 8,385………………. 18,589…………….. 24,900
1948. 8,326………………. 18,813…………….. 25,732

So we can gather from this data that the US made no major sacrifices in consumer goods production during the war. They maintained Group II at current levels throughout the war and made no major effort to reallocate labor force from Group III to Group I as the British did.

This dramatically demonstrates that there was still a very large untapped pool of labor available to put into Group I if needed, but it simply was not needed. I’m sure there were occasional shortages in specific instances as the armaments industry grew, but on a whole the US never suffered labor shortages that would have affected overall production capacity.

In fact I’d go as far as to say they never even came close to their full production potential during the war. Had massive reallocations taken place, the US could have easily doubled Group I manufacturing abilities.

Jim

As far as I know, in the entire first two years of the war, they tried it twice. Both times at Guadalcanal, both times using only two BB's, once successfully, once not. Once per year sounds pretty "limited" to me. Compare those totals to the average AAR, and I think you will find that "twice" is the "severly limited" version of what is occuring in the game.

There were actually 3 attempts at Guadalcanal: two of which were intercepted by surface fleets and thus completely aborted (12-13 Nov and 14-15 Nov).

7 March 1942:
BatDiv 3/2 bombards Christmas Island with DesDiv 17's URAKAZE and HAMAKAZE...

I'll look for others.

Did the BB's even use their main armament in this epic attack on the "fortress" there?
The Combined Fleet TROM doesn't waste a lot of letters describing this bombardment. The October mission against Henderson Field involved using a new type of shell apparently brought in to production quite recently and unavailable in March. And IIRC the fortress there consisted of 1 six incher and 40 odd men. I would be quite surprised to learn that the gun was of 20th century manufacture. Most likely it was put there in the 1890s as a sort of tripwire against claims on the island by other colonial powers. (Was it even operable?)

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
If the Japanese couldn't and didn't engage in a host of "bombardment missions" due to real physical limitations, I think the game should reflect that limitation.

I agree with this... I don't agree on some arbitrary code limitation that says the Japanese shall only conduct 6 bombardments in the game with BB's.

Perhaps the supply of naval fuel should be severly cut back or make BB's fuel hogs...perhaps ships should incur greater system damage when bombarding...perhaps there should be a small chance of catastrophic failure when using the big guns...etc etc.

Adding to the CV build discussion, the Fore River Shipyard built the USS Massachusetts, and I think may have built one or two others.  I am at the office and my reference books are at home.  The yard is up a fairly tight river, so a really long ship might have been a problem, but maybe not.  It was a major yard in its day, shut down in the early 80s if my memory is correct.
 
On the barrel liner question, relining was a job for a mill, but swapping the guns themselves is a shipyard job.  Not saying it was easy, just saying that it was planned for and well understood. 
 
If the Japanese had wanted to do a lot of shore bombardment they certainly could have.  However I doubt thier naval staff would have allowed the bulk of thier BB fleet to be used that way.  My feeling (based on lots of reading, but no quotes) is that they sent the Kongos into harms way in part because they were fast, but also because they were weak.  Losing them did not wreck the main strength of the battle line.
 
But I don't think the game should require us to run the war as foolishly as the Japanese did.
 
On the surface combat system I'm disapointed, but I cannot blame Joe for the decision.  The game obviously works for most people, and we surface gunnery fanatics will have to live with it.  Hopefully WITP II will have a different system.
 
Good luck to the team working on this.
 
Tom

Hi all,

Guys don't dispar - there are several things that will change the current WitP to much more realistic thing in "WitP AE"! [:)]


I (and many others) asked for that for years and was told that it will be in "WitP AE":

#1
Ammo for all guns can't be loaded in any port (right now you can reload any kind of ammo in any port)

#2
Port sizes will dramatically impact reloading times and berthing capacities


With those two items above it would mean that there will no longer be "endless cycles of shore bombardemets"!


Leo "Apollo11"

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

Page 104 table 3.13 breaks down the division of labor into three industrial groups. Group I is durable goods manufacturing, which in wartime provided the foundations of the munitions industry. Group II consist of workers in agriculture, mining, government, transportation and public utilities the ‘essential’ sectors. Group III consists of workers in non-durable manufacturing, construction, finance and services – the ‘inessential’ trades.

Britain’s war economy saw as many workers as possible reallocate from Group III to Group I to increase war mobilization. The US saw a remarkable increase in Group I, but group II remained constant and Group III fell slightly, but only in the peak years 1943 and 1944.

Composition of United States labor force by industry group, 1939-1948 (thousands)

………. Group I……..……. Group II……..……. Group III
1939. 4,715………………. 16,515……………… 18,119
1940. 5,363………………. 16,619……………… 18,849
1941. 6,968………………. 17,106……………… 20,695
1942. 8,823………………. 18,023……………… 21,368
1943. 11,084…………….. 18,695…………….. 20,717
1944. 10,856…………….. 18,633…………….. 20,263
1945. 9,074………………. 18,386…………….. 20,634
1946. 7,742………………. 18,445…………….. 23,415
1947. 8,385………………. 18,589…………….. 24,900
1948. 8,326………………. 18,813…………….. 25,732

So we can gather from this data that the US made no major sacrifices in consumer goods production during the war. They maintained Group II at current levels throughout the war and made no major effort to reallocate labor force from Group III to Group I as the British did.

This dramatically demonstrates that there was still a very large untapped pool of labor available to put into Group I if needed, but it simply was not needed. I’m sure there were occasional shortages in specific instances as the armaments industry grew, but on a whole the US never suffered labor shortages that would have affected overall production capacity.

In fact I’d go as far as to say they never even came close to their full production potential during the war. Had massive reallocations taken place, the US could have easily doubled Group I manufacturing abilities.

Jim

Appears to me that the table belies the narrative.. According to your figures employment figures began to drop after a peak in 1943.

It's also curious in the Oxford Companion there is an interesting chart on page 1182 that shows that from 1943 on with every increase in military personnel there was a corresponding decrease in the Labor Force.


In addition in Global Logistics and Strategy pages 546-551 discusses "Strains on Manpower and Production", this section contains the following quotes:

"The critical shortages the Joint Logistics Comittee noted in the Pacific in October 1944 were a measure of the strains full-scale war on two fronts was imposing on US military resources, particularly on military manpower, cargo shipping, and Army supplies."

"Practically no significant adjustments could be made in these programs to meet the immediate situation, regardless of the theoretical capacity for further expansion of war production."

"The effects of heavy drafts for the military services and the tendency of individual members of the labor forces in 1944 to seek employment offering greater security and permanence produced increasing labor shortages in key war industries (23)"

"...the European theater calculated that it would be short something over 150,000 service troops. The War Department was unable to make up this deficit, despite ETOUSA pressure. The theater finally agreed to sacrifice ten heavy artillery battalions in order to get the equivalent in service troops, but a substantial shortage remained and nade necessary more extensive use of civilian and prisoner-of-war labor."

There is no dispute that the United States was a prodigous manufacturer of war material. However by 1944 the US had started to hit a wall...

ORIGINAL: spence

But suffice it to say that these barrels, and I am no expert on naval affairs of WWII, could have been kept in short supply so that when a BB came in to have relining done it didn't have to wait it could just change into a new set and be off.

This was actually addressed in a thread (regarding "nuclear bombardments") a long time back. IIRC somebody actually dug up info that indicated the Japanese had what amounted to one extra barrel for each BB gun at the start of the war. Again IIRC, the same source indicated that the Japanese did not produce a single BB caliber gun/gun liner during the war. So for Japan the statement above is true to a limited extent. I don't remember whether stats were found regarding US heavy gun production but I think it's safe to say it was not as limited as the Japanese figures.

I'm not sure how valuable such a piece of info is to this discussion. First, how reliable can negative information actually be, i.e. that something was not made? Second, even if no liners were made IRL, had liners been needed would it have been impossible for them to be made? I don't think so.

Three attempts to bombard Lunga. One success, two failures. What was the main factor that led to the failures? Opposition by American surface forces. In the game, mega-bombardments are invariably unopposed by SCTFs.

I think that making major-calibre ammo much harder to replenish, with multiple significant replenishment advances available to the Americans later on, will do much to make bombardments less commonly abused.

I don't like the idea of bombardment adding to sysdam, as sysdam reduces speed; it doesn't make sense. Perhaps bombardment should have a chance to destroy gun mounts....

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
If the Japanese couldn't and didn't engage in a host of "bombardment missions" due to real physical limitations, I think the game should reflect that limitation.

I agree with this... I don't agree on some arbitrary code limitation that says the Japanese shall only conduct 6 bombardments in the game with BB's.

Perhaps the supply of naval fuel should be severly cut back or make BB's fuel hogs...perhaps ships should incur greater system damage when bombarding...perhaps there should be a small chance of catastrophic failure when using the big guns...etc etc.

I agree it shouldn't just be an "arbitrary number". If I remember accurately, the two "historical bombardments" at Guadalcanal used a "special limited production run" of high explosive incindiary shells. Might be a way of dealing with the issue..., make the Japanese spend some production effort to "support" a BB bombardment mission. To me the big issue is to slow down the runaway Japanese use of BB bombardments to something more limited and realistic...

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
If the Japanese couldn't and didn't engage in a host of "bombardment missions" due to real physical limitations, I think the game should reflect that limitation.

I agree with this... I don't agree on some arbitrary code limitation that says the Japanese shall only conduct 6 bombardments in the game with BB's.

Perhaps the supply of naval fuel should be severly cut back or make BB's fuel hogs...perhaps ships should incur greater system damage when bombarding...perhaps there should be a small chance of catastrophic failure when using the big guns...etc etc.

I agree it shouldn't just be an "arbitrary number". If I remember accurately, the two "historical bombardments" at Guadalcanal used a "special limited production run" of high explosive incindiary shells. Might be a way of dealing with the issue..., make the Japanese spend some production effort to "support" a BB bombardment mission. To me the big issue is to slow down the runaway Japanese use of BB bombardments to something more limited and realistic...

For that matter, production of all major calibre shells, as well as of torpedoes, should have production impact on IJ.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
If the Japanese couldn't and didn't engage in a host of "bombardment missions" due to real physical limitations, I think the game should reflect that limitation.

I agree with this... I don't agree on some arbitrary code limitation that says the Japanese shall only conduct 6 bombardments in the game with BB's.

Perhaps the supply of naval fuel should be severly cut back or make BB's fuel hogs...perhaps ships should incur greater system damage when bombarding...perhaps there should be a small chance of catastrophic failure when using the big guns...etc etc.

I agree it shouldn't just be an "arbitrary number". If I remember accurately, the two "historical bombardments" at Guadalcanal used a "special limited production run" of high explosive incindiary shells. Might be a way of dealing with the issue..., make the Japanese spend some production effort to "support" a BB bombardment mission. To me the big issue is to slow down the runaway Japanese use of BB bombardments to something more limited and realistic...

It was actually a mix of Type 3 and Type 1 rounds...From Wiki - "Kongō fired 104 1,378 lb high-explosive Type 3 "Sanshikidan" 14 inch shells, 331 1,485 lb. Type 1 armor-piercing 14 inch shells, and 27 6 inch shells. This was the first time she fired the Type 3 shells."

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

I don't like the idea of bombardment adding to sysdam, as sysdam reduces speed; it doesn't make sense. Perhaps bombardment should have a chance to destroy gun mounts....

Will Sys Dam still affect speed in AE...I forgot...you guys have to remember that so many things are changing in AE that the same old same ole - won't be anymore...

Earlier Posted by T -

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

Is the ship damage & effects routine going to be modified from current stock?



Definitely. Brand new damage and effects routine; I can't go into real deep detail at this point, but it's being extensively remodeled.

For that matter, production of all major calibre shells, as well as of torpedoes, should have production impact on IJ.

Managing IJ's industrial plant should be close to a zero sum game with limited potential for expansion. More production of one thing should generally negatively impact production of another thing.

ORIGINAL: treespider
Appears to me that the table belies the narrative.. According to your figures employment figures began to drop after a peak in 1943.

You’re confusing industrial employment with total employment. The peak employment year in the US was 1944. Here’s the total employed population by year in thousands:

1938…. 44,482
1939…. 46,108
1940…. 48,060
1941…. 51,970
1942…. 57,720
1943…. 63,490
1944…. 65,370…. Civilian employees…. 53,960…. Armed forces…. 11,410
1945…. 64,250
1946…. 58,700
1947…. 59,402

These figures are drawn from US Bureau of the Census (1975), D5, D8, D30, D36

ORIGINAL: treespider
It's also curious in the Oxford Companion there is an interesting chart on page 1182 that shows that from 1943 on with every increase in military personnel there was a corresponding decrease in the Labor Force.

I don’t know if the author assumed his trends in your source or if he was referring to just armed forces figures, but the figures above were taken directly from US census source data, so I have to assume they are the accurate figures.

The chart from table 3.10 in my first post shows a continually growing labor force until 1945 when it began to drop due to production cutbacks. Granted the labor force only grew from 33.5% of 1938 levels to 35.3% between 1943 and 1944, but it was still growing.

ORIGINAL: treespider
imposing on US military resources, particularly on military manpower, cargo shipping, and Army supplies

I have no doubt there were shortages for short periods of time as things were continually ramping up and demands for everything from resources to manpower needs were constantly in flux. But these were addressed and eventually sorted out, not permanent shortages.

Also the US military is just a small part of the overall picture. While the military may have been having production issues due to manpower shortages, the US as a whole was not.

The overall picture was that the US never even came close to maxing out its potential production.

Jim

ORIGINAL: spence

For that matter, production of all major calibre shells, as well as of torpedoes, should have production impact on IJ.

Managing IJ's industrial plant should be close to a zero sum game with limited potential for expansion. More production of one thing should generally negatively impact production of another thing.

Definitely agree; although it is costly of supply, it nevertheless seems far too easy to expand production simultaneously in all areas, particularly in shipbuilding.

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns


You’re confusing industrial employment with total employment. The peak employment year in the US was 1944. Here’s the total employed population by year in thousands:

1938…. 44,482
1939…. 46,108
1940…. 48,060
1941…. 51,970
1942…. 57,720
1943…. 63,490
1944…. 65,370…. Civilian employees…. 53,960…. Armed forces…. 11,410
1945…. 64,250
1946…. 58,700
1947…. 59,402

These figures are drawn from US Bureau of the Census (1975), D5, D8, D30, D36

I found the work you ascribe to...care to explain why the civilian work force declined from 54,470,000 in 1943 to 53,960,000 in 1944? During the height of the war? Because the US had to draw upon the civilian labor force to fill out military requirements to raise military employment from 9,020,000 to 11,410,000 - thus creating the aforementioned shortages.

ORIGINAL: treespider
I found the work you ascribe to...care to explain why the civilian work force declined from 54,470,000 in 1943 to 53,960,000 in 1944? During the height of the war? Because the US had to draw upon the civilian labor force to fill out military requirements to raise military employment from 9,020,000 to 11,410,000 - thus creating the aforementioned shortages.

It’s not such a simple black and white issue, you have to take the work in in its entirety. Table 3.13 on page 104, shows that Group I industry fell from 11,084 in 1943, to 10,856 in 1944, or by just a little over 200,000 people. If you look at the liberty ship production cutbacks after 43, that alone could account for most of the shift.

By 1943 the US had won the attrition war at sea and in the air. Industry in those areas was scaled way back, but that doesn’t mean there was a severe manpower shortage, as the OVERALL labor pool continued to grow as shown on table 3.10.

Jim

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

We're just looking at it from different viewpoints. I agree on the game being "the ultimate what if", but I favor limiting the basic game to the "what if's" that are historically accurate. What can you accomplish using what your historical counter-parts had available? If the Japanese couldn't and didn't engage in a host of "bombardment missions" due to real physical limitations, I think the game should reflect that limitation. Some "modder" will soon supply a more "wide open" version.

Allied planning and doctrine never envisioned the need for ultra-long-ranged land-based Torpedo Bombers, so they Allies shouldn't have anything equivelent to the Nell or Betty running around in the game. They don't, so historical accuracy is preserved in play. Would the Allied player like to have some? Probably..., but he didn't have them in real life, so he shouldn't have them in the game. Some "modder" might create some for his "version", but they don't belong in the basic game.

I do appreciate the level of cordiality that's been maintained in this discussion. It's nice to discuss different opinions vehemently and vociferously, without the "violently".

We both agree that the game as packaged should be limited to things that are historically accurate. However, there are things not in the base game already that are historically accurate, for instance the loading of 16.1-inch Type 3 "Sanshikidan" incendiary shells that carried submunitions to be used in the anti-aircraft role. These shells were loaded on board Mutsu the day she blew up in port. The game itself certainly doesn't allow the use of these shells, as the big guns are not given DP capability. And I'm fine with that because sometimes we sacrifice strict historical accuracy in favor of balanced gameplay.

Personally I believe these issues like bombardments are best handled in PBEM by setting some house rules before you start your game. A simple house rule to limit Japanese bombardments would be to agree that the Japanese player can use no more than 1 bombardment per month, limiting them to 12 per year for instance.

Of course, there could always be a simple toggle added to allow for both types of player to be satisfied...similar to the sub doctrine switches. The toggle could be to do extra systems damage when the Japanese player performs the bombardment mission, so that with it set to on, bombardments would double or even triple operational system damage if the bombardment mission is performed.

I am also pleased with the fact that this has remained a civilized discussion. [:)]

Seems to me the real reason the IJN didn't come down the slot every 2 days and bomb the crap out of Henderson wasn't the lack of main gun ammo or barrel wear, it was chiefly the risk of getting their battleships sunk. Barrel wear is accelerated underwater.

BTW...HMS Warspite had her gun barrels replaced after 3 heavy days of use during the Normandy invasion. I am not sure what kind of shape they were in before the assignemnt.

Hmmm..maybe I was wrong above. According to one source, British 15” C42 Mk1 guns could only fire 330-340 rounds at full charge before needing relining.