Matrix Games Forums

9/7/44

Annotated Map: For your viewing pleasure.

The top is cut off...[:(]

Well, I fixed it. Quit grumbling. I've already served you well by providing timely and pithy information about the great egrets of North America.

Upon reconsideration they ain't so great, they're just average. [:'(]

9/8/44


Battle of Shikuka: The peaceful interlude ends; hope fades; I gird up my loins; from whence shall my help come?

Even though it is not realistic, you always see engagement of mine fields in the combat report. Even sweeping of mines. If you haven't seen it, it hasn't happened.

Questions: Bombers set to range 0 will fly vs. targets in their hex? Fighters set to escort range 0 will escort within that hex?

I'm sure the answers are "Yes," but every time I answer sensibly, Alfred ends up pointing out things that make me feel ignorant, foolish, and unworthy.

9/8/44

CVEs: Given my current perilous state, each day feels like it's measured in dog years.

9/4/449/4/

BB Pennsylvania: The AI seems unusually non-bullish on how long the war is going to take.

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Questions: Bombers set to range 0 will fly vs. targets in their hex? Fighters set to escort range 0 will escort within that hex?

I'm sure the answers are "Yes," but every time I answer sensibly, Alfred ends up pointing out things that make me feel ignorant, foolish, and unworthy.

Definitely yes.

I'd guess a typo on the BB PA upgrade, but man is that punitive.

range zero still has me confused. I am given to thinking the range of zero will only
work over that airfield only on defense, ergo will not CAP the port etc.. On offense
I am completely confused on this. Lokasenna, you sure on that??

Been thinking a lot over the past few days about the weak points of the operation and what lessons can be learned.

Not sure if I am correct, but I believe Toyahara is on the west side of the island and the route to it from Shikuka runs dangerously close to Wakkanai and many large IJ air bases.

A secondary port for TFs to run to replenish seems essential. I'm thinking that a port in the Kuriles is really necessary since Toyahara really doesn't fill the need.

I also wonder at the need to keep the B29s holding at a coastal base vulnerable to bombardment when they weren't doing much.
B29s have an incredible transfer range. They could have been pulled out when the carriers left and returned when the opportunity for use presented itself.
Yes the transfers create hardship as fragments get left behind and it can take several days to fully reassemble squadrons, but did that seems minor in comparison to the risk of loss to bombardment.

As soon as the American carriers were forced off station the opportunity for bombardment opened up. I'm thinking that at that point all non-anti nav bombers should have been pulled out as well.

Not every Japanese player is going to go all in the way that Obvert has, but his doing so highlights the operations weak points.
It's worth study and discussion in my mind.
I'm not doing this to trash Dan by pointing out his mistakes, but pushing for an open analysis we all can learn from.

The two major weak points I see are the lack of a secondary port for replenishment and succor and the retention of a vulnerable, valuable asset on site that was mostly just in a holding pattern.

Toyohara can only be entered by ships from the NE and E hexsides.

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Been thinking a lot over the past few days about the weak points of the operation and what lessons can be learned.

Not sure if I am correct, but I believe Toyahara is on the west side of the island and the route to it from Shikuka runs dangerously close to Wakkanai and many large IJ air bases.

A secondary port for TFs to run to replenish seems essential. I'm thinking that a port in the Kuriles is really necessary since Toyahara really doesn't fill the need.

I also wonder at the need to keep the B29s holding at a coastal base vulnerable to bombardment when they weren't doing much.
B29s have an incredible transfer range. They could have been pulled out when the carriers left and returned when the opportunity for use presented itself.
Yes the transfers create hardship as fragments get left behind and it can take several days to fully reassemble squadrons, but did that seems minor in comparison to the risk of loss to bombardment.

As soon as the American carriers were forced off station the opportunity for bombardment opened up. I'm thinking that at that point all non-anti nav bombers should have been pulled out as well.

Not every Japanese player is going to go all in the way that Obvert has, but his doing so highlights the operations weak points.
It's worth study and discussion in my mind.
I'm not doing this to trash Dan by pointing out his mistakes, but pushing for an open analysis we all can learn from.

The two major weak points I see are the lack of a secondary port for replenishment and succor and the retention of a vulnerable, valuable asset on site that was mostly just in a holding pattern.

The enemy was left across the lines of communication, one or two of the Kurile Islands should have been taken. This can slow your offensive momentum or even reverse it.

ORIGINAL: BillBrown

Toyohara can only be entered by ships from the NE and E hexsides.

Then couldn't it have served as a secondary re-armament port? When his depleted ships were blocked from re-entry by the masses of enemy TFs, having Toyahara as an alternative would have helped.

However, Toyahara is in easy bombardment range of the Home Fleet, so a port in the Kuriles would still have been a better option for secondary replenishment.

It's too early for a post-mortem, though not too early to learn lessons.

The first things that's necessary in the analysis of where I am is how I got here. I think some of the comments indicate that readers weren't following as this operation unfolded - for instance, the unawareness that the Kuriles were (and still are) targets, but that the carrier battle re-shaped everything, forcing some radical changes.

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

It's too early for a post-mortem, though not too early to learn lessons.

The first things that's necessary in the analysis of where I am is how I got here. I think some of the comments indicate that readers weren't following as this operation unfolded - for instance, the unawareness that the Kuriles were (and still are) targets, but that the carrier battle re-shaped everything, forcing some radical changes.

Not at all. Was not a critique of your strategy. Only as how things are in the present state. Like energy in a chemical process the pathway does not matter only the beginning and end states. Regardless of who, how, when... the enemy has presence across lines of communications. While not a major threat itself, it can influence actions in other areas.

I wasn't referring to your comments in particular, MakeeLearn. There have been a number of comments made suggesting that the readers are newcomers, or relatively so, that aren't aware of how things unfolded.

But this isn't a chemical process. The unfolding of things shapes the end results in ways that are totally unpredictable, ensuring that no plan survives contact with the enemy.

That's what happened here. The operation was massive and pretty well-thought-out, IMO. But I missed some things. Then other things I had to abandon.

For those who are new, here's a brief synopsis. After the successful invasion of Sikhalin, which was massive and pretty successful, I detached about 40% of my empties to make the trip back to the Aleutians. Death Star was to escort them to just beyond the Kuriles. If no opposition was encountered, the merchants would detach and steam ahead while DS would return to Shikuka. On the turn that DS and the Herd exited past the Kuriles, the great carrier battle took place, leaving me with a bunch of damaged carriers, including two that were crippled and seemed almost certainly gonners. DS was beat up, hobbled by cripples, and exposed to utter destruction. So I had to drop everything to pull the ships together and try to get them to safety. Somehow it worked beyond my wildest dreams. All the carriers made it (and all but one will be online in 2.5 weeks, the other needs another 50 days).

So instead of having DS at Shikuka, primed to lead the invasions of the Kuriles, the Shikuka was left under-protected by a relatively modest force of combat ships. The invasions in the Kuriles were postponed until the carriers could be repaired.

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
But this isn't a chemical process. The unfolding of things shapes the end results in ways that are totally unpredictable, ensuring that no plan survives contact with the enemy.

Of course no plan survives contact with the enemy [intact]. But a plan without significant deficits is likely to be able to withstand the vagaries of war better than one significant oversights. Your plan for a "kitchen sink" coup de main onto Sakhalin while forsaking the Kurile LOS noose (for now) was intentional. And risky-in its own way.

We don't yet know if you will be able to parlay your festung Sakhalin into an Allied abscess in the Japanese north. It may work out for you in the strategic or tactical sense. Certainly your OOB surfeit is in your favor. But the assumption that you could wait to take some or all of the Kuriles to secure your LOS has yet to be borne out.

I agree with MakeeLearn.

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
The invasions in the Kuriles were postponed until the carriers could be repaired.

Wasn't it in your plan to wait for the invasion of the Kuriles until "later" anyways? Or are you saying that you only delayed the Kurile action until after the carriers sustained damage and you elected to fully repair them?

If you had intended to invade the Kuriles in a more timely fashion, what forces did you have earmarked in theater for such an action and what was your erstwhile timeline before sustaining carrier damage?

Edited: See the next post that further clarifies the second question. In any case, 'about 30 days' jump off for LCUs on Sakhalin to be used on the Kuriles was probably 'optimistic'.