RE: another run on BoB
Posted: Sun Nov 05, 2006 11:14 am
about the P-39
I'm researching this as a part of my PhD research on the UK/US aircraft supply. The Airacobra 1's were all P-400's, similar to the P-39D except with a 20mm Hispano cannon firing through the spinner instead of the 37mm cannon, and .303 MG's replacing the wing-mounted .30in MGs. The RAF had serious problems with it when 601 Sqn used it, mostly down to spares availability (which was a common problem with the introduction of all US types to RAF service, including the Mustang I and Tomahawk I which was a chronic issue) and compass deviation. They were used for some low-level "Rhubarbs" across the Chanel, but while the CinC of Fighter Command was prepared to see the problems worked out, the Air Ministry specifically selected the rest of the Airacobra I contract and subsequent lend-lease P-39 supplies to meet the requirement for the 200 fighters per month the British had to supply the Russians from September 1941 to June 1942. The CinC of FC was offered Spitfires in exchange for the P-39's actually in service with 601 Sqn in February 1942 by the Air Staff, and jumped at the chance. Hence the end of the Airacobra in RAF service. While the RAF recognised that it was a good performer low down, the spares and equipment problems (shortages of engines and propellers were to remain a problem for P-39 production for some time) plus the poor performance at altitude made it expendible, and it wasn't regarded as a comparable replacement for the Hurricane or Spitfire. The RAF had no significant reports of spinning problems with the Airacobra, and when the USAAF investigated it in late '42/early '43, they traced the problem of "tumbling" to a few incidents reported by the 31st FG while they were using the type in spring '42 during training.
The P-36 and P-40 had been delivered in the second half of 1940 (deliveries starting in August and October, respectively) but neither was regarded as a successful interceptor, and equipment problems delayed the combat evaluation of the P-40 until January-March 1941. Almost all the better-equipped Tomahawk II's were shipped directly to the Middle East from spring 1941 onwards, while stocks of those delivered to the UK were used for Army Co-Operation Command and then shipped to Russia at the end of the year to meet the Soviet supplly Protocol requirements. Shortage of replacements, equipment and spares severely limited the operational capability of the P-40 in the UK.
I'm researching this as a part of my PhD research on the UK/US aircraft supply. The Airacobra 1's were all P-400's, similar to the P-39D except with a 20mm Hispano cannon firing through the spinner instead of the 37mm cannon, and .303 MG's replacing the wing-mounted .30in MGs. The RAF had serious problems with it when 601 Sqn used it, mostly down to spares availability (which was a common problem with the introduction of all US types to RAF service, including the Mustang I and Tomahawk I which was a chronic issue) and compass deviation. They were used for some low-level "Rhubarbs" across the Chanel, but while the CinC of Fighter Command was prepared to see the problems worked out, the Air Ministry specifically selected the rest of the Airacobra I contract and subsequent lend-lease P-39 supplies to meet the requirement for the 200 fighters per month the British had to supply the Russians from September 1941 to June 1942. The CinC of FC was offered Spitfires in exchange for the P-39's actually in service with 601 Sqn in February 1942 by the Air Staff, and jumped at the chance. Hence the end of the Airacobra in RAF service. While the RAF recognised that it was a good performer low down, the spares and equipment problems (shortages of engines and propellers were to remain a problem for P-39 production for some time) plus the poor performance at altitude made it expendible, and it wasn't regarded as a comparable replacement for the Hurricane or Spitfire. The RAF had no significant reports of spinning problems with the Airacobra, and when the USAAF investigated it in late '42/early '43, they traced the problem of "tumbling" to a few incidents reported by the 31st FG while they were using the type in spring '42 during training.
The P-36 and P-40 had been delivered in the second half of 1940 (deliveries starting in August and October, respectively) but neither was regarded as a successful interceptor, and equipment problems delayed the combat evaluation of the P-40 until January-March 1941. Almost all the better-equipped Tomahawk II's were shipped directly to the Middle East from spring 1941 onwards, while stocks of those delivered to the UK were used for Army Co-Operation Command and then shipped to Russia at the end of the year to meet the Soviet supplly Protocol requirements. Shortage of replacements, equipment and spares severely limited the operational capability of the P-40 in the UK.