Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Does your unit also have the exact same number of trucks as the real unit as well?

Of course not. Most of the unit's trucks are for logistical purposes. You know that.

No. Design for effect. Best solution would probably be a modified .exe whereby your AT+ squads and Jeeps are passive defenders.

Again, what's wrong with the effect that I achieved? The scenario works pretty well. I've explained my philosophy about the need for more than just the immediate frontline equipment for those situations where the forces are going to fight beyond the point where the frontline elements have been lost, and where major encirclements are going to take place. France 1944 was one of those situations.

Really? Because it strikes me that the loss rates of soft equipment in this scenario are so high that it almost breaks the scenario. Perhaps if there weren't so many squads to kill, you wouldn't have to skew the game to kill them.

Here's the "Final Statistics" table from the AAR. German squads were lost at a 60.64% pace, AFVs at a 57.93% pace. A difference of 2.71%. Allied squads were lost at a 46.32% pace, AFVs at a 74.07% pace. A difference of -27.75%. Clearly, the loss rates weren't higher for soft equipment.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Anyway, clearly not what you've done in France 1944. You'd need British rifle squads of 22 men or something ludicrous.

I believe I clearly stated: "Forgetting France 1944 for a minute...".

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

However, you now have 47 squads where Norm would have had only 36 squads.

Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent.

I'm not denying your solution isn't valid. I'm not even saying it's not the best choice -- given the situation you describe. I'm merely pointing out it can't be denied that it will skew the density.

Absurd as usual. My way reflects the true density of the unit. Its 36 squads consist of 468 men. The other force's 36-squad unit consisted of 288 men. Clearly neither should have the same density as a unit with 360 men. Norm's formula for density wasn't based on semantics ("a squad is a squad no matter what size"), it was based on real equipment density.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

However, you now have 47 squads where Norm would have had only 36 squads.

Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent.

I'm not denying your solution isn't valid. I'm not even saying it's not the best choice -- given the situation you describe. I'm merely pointing out it can't be denied that it will skew the density.

Absurd as usual...

So charming. Anyway, it's obviously not absurd. Norm formulated his density requirements based on a certain way of constructing units. If you come up with another way that increases the amount of equipment in a given unit by 30% over what Norm would have chosen, you've obviously thrown off the density. Density penalties will kick in with a 30% lower concentration of units than Norm assumed they would.

I'll sin here and refer back to your Normandy scenario. Conveniently, there is also a disc Normandy scenario dating back to when Norm was designing TOAW. Also conveniently, Ben has noted the number of squads and active defender vehicles you have in the 231st Brigade.

Ben counts 231 squads and 145 active defender vehicles in your 231st Brigade. The disc 231st brigade has 153 squads and 39 active defender vehicles.

And you think it's 'absurd as usual' to say that your approach will skew the density effect from what Norm intended. That you do so reflects on you, not me.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

So charming. Anyway, it's obviously not absurd. Norm formulated his density requirements based on a certain way of constructing units. If you come up with another way that increases the amount of equipment in a given unit by 30% over what Norm would have chosen, you've obviously thrown off the density. Density penalties will kick in with a 30% lower concentration of units than Norm assumed they would.

Right. Whether it has 1 man or 1,000 men, a squad is a squad is a squad. And all squads have the same density. I can see you're going to stick to this lunatic nonsense to the bitter end. And you had the gall to accuse me of never admitting I'm wrong.

I'll sin here and refer back to your Normandy scenario. Conveniently, there is also a disc Normandy scenario dating back to when Norm was designing TOAW. Also conveniently, Ben has noted the number of squads and active defender vehicles you have in the 231st Brigade.

Ben counts 231 squads and 145 active defender vehicles in your 231st Brigade. The disc 231st brigade has 153 squads and 39 active defender vehicles.

And you think it's 'absurd as usual' to say that your approach will skew the density effect from what Norm intended. That you do so reflects on you, not me.

Stop confusing what I'm doing in France 1944 with the technique I listed in post #76. That was only about how to model the 36 frontline squads. France 1944, on the other hand, does have extra elements added intentionally. That is a completely separate issue. What is included in the unit is not the same as how to model whatever is included.

And, of course, the disk Normandy 44 scenario was designed, not by Norm, but by the same team that designed the disk France 40 scenario. Care to discuss about how well that was designed? The disk scenarios aren't any sort of standard to follow.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I've explained my philosophy about the need for more than just the immediate frontline equipment for those situations where the forces are going to fight beyond the point where the frontline elements have been lost, and where major encirclements are going to take place. France 1944 was one of those situations.

I want to expound on this a bit more regarding encirclements. Earlier, I discussed how it was important to have more than just the frontline elements modeled if it was expected that rear-area elements were going to get involved in the fighting.

But the additional expectation of encirclements adds another justification: It adds a reward for achieving the encirclement. If all you model are the frontline elements, then an encirclement only traps those elements. That's not enough reward for the cost of driving the pincers through the enemy defenses and closing them on the pocket.

It also makes it unrealisticly easy to rebuild the trapped forces once destroyed. By losing only the frontline elements, the forces have not lost any more than they would have lost due to just having their frontline elements decimated via frontal assaults, etc.

It also makes it unrealistically easy to reduce the pocketed forces, since they lack all those rear-area elements - and won't be getting them via replacements while pocketed.

So, when modeling a topic that is sure to get wild, the need for modeling more than the frontline elements becomes important.

The 231st Brigade had three combat battalions, right?  Even at 45 squads per battalion, that's only around 135 squads for the Brigade, right?

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

So charming. Anyway, it's obviously not absurd. Norm formulated his density requirements based on a certain way of constructing units. If you come up with another way that increases the amount of equipment in a given unit by 30% over what Norm would have chosen, you've obviously thrown off the density. Density penalties will kick in with a 30% lower concentration of units than Norm assumed they would.

Right. Whether it has 1 man or 1,000 men, a squad is a squad is a squad. And all squads have the same density. I can see you're going to stick to this lunatic nonsense to the bitter end. And you had the gall to accuse me of never admitting I'm wrong.

I'll sin here and refer back to your Normandy scenario. Conveniently, there is also a disc Normandy scenario dating back to when Norm was designing TOAW. Also conveniently, Ben has noted the number of squads and active defender vehicles you have in the 231st Brigade.

Ben counts 231 squads and 145 active defender vehicles in your 231st Brigade. The disc 231st brigade has 153 squads and 39 active defender vehicles.

And you think it's 'absurd as usual' to say that your approach will skew the density effect from what Norm intended. That you do so reflects on you, not me.

Stop confusing what I'm doing in France 1944 with the technique I listed in post #76. That was only about how to model the 36 frontline squads. France 1944, on the other hand, does have extra elements added intentionally. That is a completely separate issue. What is included in the unit is not the same as how to model whatever is included.

And, of course, the disk Normandy 44 scenario was designed, not by Norm, but by the same team that designed the disk France 40 scenario. Care to discuss about how well that was designed? The disk scenarios aren't any sort of standard to follow.

None of this addresses the actual point I am making; that your method for deciding how many squads to put into a unit, whatever its other merits, is going to skew the density equation away from what it would seem reasonable to assume Norm anticipated.

ORIGINAL: vahauser

The 231st Brigade had three combat battalions, right?  Even at 45 squads per battalion, that's only around 135 squads for the Brigade, right?

It would depend how you look at it. Curtis' posts outline the rationale for doing otherwise fairly clearly. Go back to about where he and I start throwing china at each other, look around carefully, and you'll find them.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I've explained my philosophy about the need for more than just the immediate frontline equipment for those situations where the forces are going to fight beyond the point where the frontline elements have been lost, and where major encirclements are going to take place. France 1944 was one of those situations.

I want to expound on this a bit more regarding encirclements. Earlier, I discussed how it was important to have more than just the frontline elements modeled if it was expected that rear-area elements were going to get involved in the fighting.

But the additional expectation of encirclements adds another justification: It adds a reward for achieving the encirclement. If all you model are the frontline elements, then an encirclement only traps those elements. That's not enough reward for the cost of driving the pincers through the enemy defenses and closing them on the pocket.

It also makes it unrealisticly easy to rebuild the trapped forces once destroyed. By losing only the frontline elements, the forces have not lost any more than they would have lost due to just having their frontline elements decimated via frontal assaults, etc.

It also makes it unrealistically easy to reduce the pocketed forces, since they lack all those rear-area elements - and won't be getting them via replacements while pocketed.

So, when modeling a topic that is sure to get wild, the need for modeling more than the frontline elements becomes important.

I find your argument that the rear echelon elements can wind up fighting of some merit; the one for the need to reward encirclements less so. Encircling the enemy is plenty beneficial as it is.

However, you don't address the big problem; rear echelon elements normally don't fight at all if the unit is intact and at something approaching full strength. In fact, in many cases, they haven't fought even under other circumstances.

With your approach, they will fight all the time -- from day one. So I tend to see it as a matter of your approach being not necessarily an improvement. After all, if I.R. 381 fought twelve engagements, and the rear-echelon elements only participated in three of those engagements, it would seem that we represent it less rather than more accurately if we include the rear-echelon elements.

So whether adding the rear echelon elements would improve matters would depend on the answers to several questions:

1. In the decisive engagements, did the rear-echelon elements participate frequently enough to have a significant effect? It's much less important if they only joined in when the cause was already lost. In general, is the average combat power of the unit best represented with or without the rear-echelon units? The mapping section of the US 34th Infantry division may have once taken up arms -- but on the 383 other occasions when the division entered battle it did not. We're not going to improve our representation of the division if we put in two light rifles to represent the mapping section -- we'll make it worse.

2. Will the added fidelity -- if any -- of modeling these elements outweigh the distortion to the density paradigms induced by dumping in so much extra equipment?

3. Did the rear-echelon elements fight well enough to make a big difference? My three year old son might well help me unload the truck; how much help he's providing is another matter.

Before you fly off the handle, note that I am not pre-judging the answers to any of these questions (there are probably some others I haven't thought of). It's just that whether adding in the rear echelon elements is a good idea will depend on the answers to them -- and the answers in turn will depend on the specific case being considered.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

None of this addresses the actual point I am making; that your method for deciding how many squads to put into a unit, ...

Again, the technique in post #76 is about how to model whatever squads anyone may want to put into a unit. Forget what I'm doing in France 1944.

whatever its other merits, is going to skew the density equation away from what it would seem reasonable to assume Norm anticipated.

Whatever assumption you make about Norm, it still can't support treating all squads as if they have the same density, regardless of size.

Let's take your line in post #80:

"Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent."

Let's just assume that you're right and there is actual basis for assuming Norm meant for 13-man squads to be the standard (unlikely). But that means that if the squads are 10-man, then that 36-squad unit must now be modeled as 360/13 = about 28 squads. And if they are 8-man, then it must be modeled as 288/13 = about 22 squads.

There is still no way you can fit modeling all three different sizes as if they were equal density into any logical system. The unit sizes are 288, 360, and 468. They can't have the same density.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

None of this addresses the actual point I am making; that your method for deciding how many squads to put into a unit, ...

Again, the technique in post #76 is about how to model whatever squads anyone may want to put into a unit. Forget what I'm doing in France 1944.

Note that I granted at the time that this approach has considerable merit. I just don't feel obliged to follow it myself.

Where I differ more sharply is on the wisdom of representing rear-echelon elements. I have already listed the problems I see with this.

whatever its other merits, is going to skew the density equation away from what it would seem reasonable to assume Norm anticipated.

Whatever assumption you make about Norm, it still can't support treating all squads as if they have the same density, regardless of size.

Let's take your line in post #80:

"Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent."

Let's just assume that you're right and there is actual basis for assuming Norm meant for 13-man squads to be the standard (unlikely). But that means that if the squads are 10-man, then that 36-squad unit must now be modeled as 360/13 = about 28 squads. And if they are 8-man, then it must be modeled as 288/13 = about 22 squads.

There is still no way you can fit modeling all three different sizes as if they were equal density into any logical system. The unit sizes are 288, 360, and 468. They can't have the same density.

You're managing to insert an assumption that Norm employed the same rationale as you do about how to determine how many squads a unit should have.

He didn't. From the available evidence, it would seem the historical Jesus/Norm Koger felt otherwise. I remember his posts rebutting criticism of his original TOAW. The argument was over its supposed inability to model the success of the British counterattack at Arras. He pointed out that the designer had used great big regiments for the little German 'Schutzen regiments' -- and asserted that these regiments should contain only 81 squads. Inasmuch as the 'squads' in this case were two-MG sections with fourteen men apiece or something, if we are to attempt to delve into Norm's mind, it would seem that he adhered to the Colin Wright school that a squad is a squad, no matter how small (or large).

The POINT -- which you are rather predictably failing to concede -- is that dumping in additional squads, whatever the rationale, will throw off the original density ratios.

This doesn't disturb me unduly -- but only because I don't think those density ratios are particularly sound to begin with. However, to the extent that there can be any one correct ratio, Norm's ratios probably err on the side of forcing excessive dispersion as they stand, and so dumping in still more equipment will make a bad situation worse.

Now, as I noted, the importance of this will vary, and in certain circumstances it may well be justified. However, it's not an unqualified win-win. What you gain in accuracy in one respect, you lose in another. It's a question of balance -- and where that balance will fall depends on the particular situation in question.

...

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I find your argument that the rear echelon elements can wind up fighting of some merit; the one for the need to reward encirclements less so. Encircling the enemy is plenty beneficial as it is.

If you just happen to find some isolated forces to encircle it will be. But if you're having to slash two pincers through the enemy front to achieve it then I don't think it is. I first noticed this in Grigsby's War in Russia. All he modeled were the frontline elements. As a result, it was far more efficient strategy to just atrit away those frontline elements by frontal assaults than the far more expensive task of driving pincers through the enemy defenses to create a pocket. What ended up in the pocket was rarely enough to justify the cost. And, despite massive pocketed forces, they were rebuilt almost immediately, since their losses amounted to no more than the frontline elements.

So whether adding the rear echelon elements would improve matters would depend on the answers to several questions:

1. In the decisive engagements, did the rear-echelon elements participate frequently enough to have a significant effect? It's much less important if they only joined in when the cause was already lost. In general, is the average combat power of the unit best represented with or without the rear-echelon units? The mapping section of the US 34th Infantry division may have once taken up arms -- but on the 383 other occasions when the division entered battle it did not. We're not going to improve our representation of the division if we put in two light rifles to represent the mapping section -- we'll make it worse.

In the case of France 1944 there is no question that, for the Germans, the answer is yes. By the time of Cobra, multiple divisions that had started out at 9,000 - 12,000 men had been reduced to 2,000 men or less. Clearly, far more than just the official frontline combat elements ended up fighting. Furthermore, the bulk of the extra stuff is in rear-area units (AAA, Art, HQ, Eng, etc.). So most of it isn't fighting from the start.

2. Will the added fidelity -- if any -- of modeling these elements outweigh the distortion to the density paradigms induced by dumping in so much extra equipment?

As I pointed out earlier, if both sides are modeled by the same standard, then they are equally affected. So then the adjustment to the Attrition Divider (set by test runs) effectively scales the density too. Had there been less density, they resulting AD would have ended up lower.

3. Did the rear-echelon elements fight well enough to make a big difference? My three year old son might well help me unload the truck; how much help he's providing is another matter.

Since I'm modeling only a fraction of the rear-area elements, their impact is effectively de-leveraged. Allied divisions may have had 14,000 non-frontline men in them. I've probably modeled less than 5,000 of them. Without some modeling of the rear combat elements, breakthroughs wipe out the artillery, HQs, etc. like they were civilians. It's unrealistic.

Again, I would simply submit the performance of France 1944 as experimental verification of the theory.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

You're managing to insert an assumption that Norm employed the same rationale as you do about how to determine how many squads a unit should have.

I'm only assuming that he was a rational being. If he wasn't then why would we care what he assumed? There is no way anyone - be it you or Norm - can justify the same density for units composed of 288, 360, and 468 men each. Whatever density level TOAW may be tuned for, such units must be modeled with different quantities of squads to have their density correct.

This is actually kind of fun. I've somehow manuvered you into a hopeless situation. And since you can never admit you're wrong, you can't vacate it.

Let's just keep going with it. Explain again how units with 288, 360, and 468 men must have the same density.

The POINT -- which you are rather predictably failing to concede -- is that dumping in additional squads, whatever the rationale, will throw off the original density ratios.

Actually that POINT pertains to what I was doing in France 1944 - a completely different subject. But I predict you'll continue to attempt to inject it into this issue. Misdirection is you're only real option.

Well, here is one way.  The area of a 5km hex is 21.65 sq. km.  The area of a 50km hex is 2165 sq. km. 
 
What is the 'average area' of a squad of 10 men?  If the average frontage is say, 10 meters per man (which I don't think is unbelievable), then a 10-man squad will occupy 1000 sq. meters.  1 square kilometer is 1,000,000 square meters. So, the area of a 5km hex is 21,650,000 square meters.  Thus, 21,650 10-man squads will "fill up" a hex at 10 meters frontage per man.
 
If the average frontage is 31.6 meters per man, then a 10-man squad will occupy 10,000 sq. meters.  And at this frontage only 2,165 10-man squads will "fill up" a 5km hex.
 
But, what happens when we are dealing in 'generalities' (and generic squads) and suffering density penalties when talking about only 216 squads?  At that point (100,000 sq. meters per 'squad') it doesn't matter much whether 14 men or 10 men or 8 men are filling that space (100,000 sq. meters).  The density difference of 14 men occupying 100,000 sq. meters and 10 men occupying 100,000 sq. meters is not terribly significant. 

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Since I'm modeling only a fraction of the rear-area elements, their impact is effectively de-leveraged. Allied divisions may have had 14,000 non-frontline men in them. I've probably modeled less than 5,000 of them. Without some modeling of the rear combat elements, breakthroughs wipe out the artillery, HQs, etc. like they were civilians. It's unrealistic.

You've added rear area elements to the combat units as well, though. How else would you get to over 200 squads for a British infantry brigade?

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Since I'm modeling only a fraction of the rear-area elements, their impact is effectively de-leveraged. Allied divisions may have had 14,000 non-frontline men in them. I've probably modeled less than 5,000 of them. Without some modeling of the rear combat elements, breakthroughs wipe out the artillery, HQs, etc. like they were civilians. It's unrealistic.

You've added rear area elements to the combat units as well, though. How else would you get to over 200 squads for a British infantry brigade?

Don't think of that unit as a peice of cardboard on a hexgrid. Think of it as a unit just as complicated as the division or corps, and the hex not as a hex, but as a huge tactical map. So, if the division can have its rear-areas affected, the brigade can, in a similar way - within the hex.

Let's just consider two different situations:

First, a division is ordered to assault the enemy front lines. It does so for some time, until its entire frontline combat elements have been destroyed. At that point it is withdrawn from the frontline to the rear for re-fitting. It's lost about 4,000 combat troopers.

Second, a division is cutoff and surrounded behind enemy lines by enemy maneuvers. Trapped, every man must fight. But it's hopeless, and eventually the entire division is destroyed. All 18,000 men in the division are lost - including vast numbers of specialized, highly-trained officers, etc.

Now, consider that only the frontline elements were modeled in a TOAW scenario for this. In game terms, both results are exactly the same! In both cases, the division has been entirely destroyed. In both cases, the amount of equipment that had to be eliminated was the same. In both cases, the loss penalties awarded the enemy player are the same. In both cases, the replacement equipment needed to rebuild the division is the same.

But in the real world, those two situations are vastly different. In the first case, the division only needs some grunt replacements and it's ready to rejoin the fight. The really valuable parts of the division weren't damaged at all. Whereas, in the second case, the division must be rebuilt from scratch, with lots of very expensive equipment and personnel needed to be able to do so.

That's why I continue to believe that, if the situation is going to get wild or desperate, you've got to model the rear-areas.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




This is actually kind of fun. I've somehow manuvered you into a hopeless situation. And since you can never admit you're wrong, you can't vacate it.

Believe that if you wish. As before, your conviction is only a comment upon yourself.

You do realize that your position boils down to claiming that adding equipment will not affect density? I mean, you do realize that, don't you?