Page 5 of 6

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 4:33 pm
by Mike Solli
ORIGINAL: House Stark

If the Japanese player chooses to let the Allies build up Palembang in order to cut it off later and destroy more troops, wouldn't that risk Palembang being heavily damaged?

It depends on the actions of the Japanese player. If he does a lot of preparation of the battlefield (ie. air and/or ground bombardment), he'll increase Allied disruption thus increasing chances of capturing the infrastructure intact. Also, if he brings a lot of engineers to the fight, that will increase the chances of capturing the infrastructure intact as well.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 5:35 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: USS America

What's the Cliff's Notes version of the parallel issue in WitE?


Two parts to it. The first is of course the hindsight problem. Like AE, WiTE provides a serious dose of micromanagement control which allows the defending Player 2 (aka Soviets) to immediately avoid most of the issues/mistakes/directives that contributed to the rout of 41. Since the player "is" Stalin/Stavka there are no consequences or checks in place. Hindsight and detail control continue to be the bane of the modern Grigsby style game. The 2nd part is related to the first.....that being that SO detailed and controllable is the Red Army that crafty and dedicated Player 2's can tailor and build a Red Army structure that is optimized to take maximum advantage of the game's mechanics. Player one is restricted mainly to the historical OOB. In the older game you could just build new divisional units for both sides. Now.....oy. You can litterally build a Russian army from scratch right down to the support units. Sounds great on paper. Not so good in practice in my opinion.

Long and short is that, as shown in a number of AAR's, its nearly impossible for Player one to even match the objectives taken/reached by the historical counterpart. Soviet counter-offensives tend to occur sooner and with more frequency. This leads to complaints and preposals for house rules and fixes. Alot of angst in general.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 5:54 pm
by USSAmerica
Thanks, Nik.  I own WitE, but haven't yet spent any time with her.  [:)]

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 6:19 pm
by Mynok

Agree with all the Nik said. In addition, I am playing a 43 scenario game which is now in summer of 44. Where the Germans were still pretty deep into Russia and about to lose army group center, my line runs from south of Königsberg to Budapest. Needless to say, a much worse situation.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 8:25 pm
by JeffroK
Generally speaking,
 
In wargaming I have found that players do not have to make the same mistakes as in real life, the help of hidsight, the ability to "wargame" the situation (I mean to work out the results outside the game)can dramatically change one side or the other.
 
Would a gamer put in an effort like japan at Midway, shift the offensive from Moscow to Kiev, attack Alam el Halfa, Medinine, Anzio or try a Market-Garden?????
 
Unless both players slavishly follow historical lines of approach (or have strictly limited movement capability a la Chess) you are liable to get twisted versions of history.
 
Might make for a better game, but it isnt a simulation of the conflict. (Used to have a lot of fun with Avalon Hills made up land using WW2 type forces. Blitzkrieg???  Then you have no history to recreate)

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 8:53 pm
by Ketza
Its been fun working through the various changes of WITE and it has come a lomg way since the first version.

The Pacific keeps calling however....

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 8:59 pm
by Canoerebel
I wish Q-Ball would transition back to AE.  I know he's probably a key member of the WitE community, but he's missed here.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2011 9:02 pm
by Nikademus
ORIGINAL: JeffK

Generally speaking,

In wargaming I have found that players do not have to make the same mistakes as in real life, the help of hidsight, the ability to "wargame" the situation (I mean to work out the results outside the game)can dramatically change one side or the other.

Your missing the point. The argument isn't that players either are required to repeat mistakes or repeat exact historical battles. The argument is that the true situation be represented, otherwise it is in fact more game than "simulation" as you've defined it. It would for example, be silly to compare oneself in terms of choice/leadership skills when you have instant nearly unrestricted control of units down to the detail level vs. a real life commander who was constrained by chain of command and/or political considerations.

This same misunderstanding plagues threads like this on the WitE forum too. The old "If i want to replay history exactly, i'll watch a movie" counter-argument. Thats not what's being said. Past wargames have achieved a reasonable amount of variation in different gambits and situations whilst preserving the overall feel of the actual campaign. In this age of powerful home computers, that art is being lost to a degree because so much control and layers of detail can be programmed.


RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 12:25 am
by pwarner328
isnt that a tiny bit "crude"??

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 4:20 am
by ChezDaJez
I have to call BS on this. Supposedly Chez is in this position because he plays a more historically based game style. Really? because historically the Japanese did ignore the western SRA while they set off to invade, oh say, Samoa. Chez hasn't played historically because if he had we wouldn't be having this conversation. He would have focused soley on the SRA until it was totally secured. In RL, the Japanese didn't consider expanding their perimeter before the beginning of May. Every action prior to that was soley focused on securing the SRA or Burma


Actually, Japan did advance in several Pacific areas while simultaneously advancing through the SRA... Guam, Wake, Tarawa, Rabaul... these are all places that come to mind that Japan took during the first two months. Plus they invaded New Guinea in March capturing Lae and Salamuea.

Let me eplain something about playing a "historical" game. Just because a player restricts himself to historical tactics doesn't mean he must also restrict himself to the historical strategy. And just because he does not follow historical strategy to the letter does not mean that he doesn't recognize the political and military limitations inherent to implementing any strategy. And it is those limitations that I especially will attempt to adhere to within reason. I will admit that I do tend to ignore the political divisions between the IJA and the IJN. I ignore it much like the allied player ignores the bitter disputes between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese leaders.

I believe my strategy pretty much followed the historical Japanese strategy in advancing through the SRA. I don't understand why you think it didn't. My objectives in taking the SRA did follow the historical planning pretty much. I planned on securing the PI reasonably quickly and then advancing with the PI forces in a double pincer movement towards the SW. One prong advancing down Borneo taking Tarakan and Balikpapn, the other advancing towards Kendari and Ambon. These forces would then turn northwards to invade southern Java. This happened IRL.

At the same time, my Malayan forces would move down the eastern side of the peninsula by land and leapfrog by ship down the west coast of Malaya before the final assault on Singapore. Malaya pretty much went as planned though the process took much longer than needed. With the exception of landings at Kauntan and Mersing, I again followed historical strategy. I also sent forces marching towards Burma, just as the Japanese did IRL. Unfortunately Dan had other ideas about Burma and quickly forced a retreat.

The problem with Singapore was that not only did Dan manage to delay its capture but he also greatly whittled down my air forces in doing so. This allowed Dan to move ships in and out of Singapore pretty much as he wanted without much threat of air attack. My surface ships still posed a threat but many of those required significant yard periods before long.

Where I did not follow historical strategy was in the central Pacific after Rabaul had fallen. I deviated by planning to advance through the Solomons into New Caledonia and then eastward towards Fiji and Pago Pago. I did not use any troops that were assigned to take the SRA to accomplish this. It wasn't until I landed at Pago Pago did I encounter any significant difficulty with securing the place. Dan's stalwart and very aggressive defense ensured that progress would be slow and that I would have to leave enough forces behind to guard the place, a place lesson that required learning a couple of times. But the Central Pacific had nothing to do with the issues encountered in the SRA.


FatR said:

"Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest."

This is easily the defining difference between a gamer and a simulator. A gamer will look at your statement and say, "Yeah, absolutely, that's what you have to do to win." A simulator looks at your statement and thinks, "What? Are you crazy? That would never work IRL!"

One point to make here about the game mechanics. The Japanese player gets a mega-move for certain preordained TFs on the first turn. Mess with the destinations of those TFs and they revert to normal speed. No mega-move allowed. Good luck getting to Sumatra now before the allies reinforce.

And I believe that anyone who contemplates moving on Sumatra without Singapore and northern Java in his hands has committed a fatal error much worse than my arriving too late to take Palembang. He may be able to prevent Dutch land forces from moving into Sumatra from Java but he can not stop allied reinforcements from landing anywhere they chose on Java, Sumatra or Malaya. Nor can he stop the Dutch air force from redeploying to Sumatra. And if the Japanese player has ignored Java and Malaya, where are all those great air bases going to be located that will allow the Japanese player to interdict allied reinforcements?

Anyways, there is nothing wrong with anyone's style of play. Just because someone doesn't play the way you do dosen't mean the other person is playing a bad game. And when two players of different camps oppose each other, it can actually be fun. And it has been fun to play Dan. In a way, playing Dan helps me understand what the allied generals must have thought in 1940 France. I'm sure they were thinking, "What the hell was that?" as Guderian abd his blitzkrieg went screaming by.

Chez

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 4:23 am
by ChezDaJez
ORIGINAL: oldman45

After reading this thread, I am confused about where the mini KB was during the allied rush to fortify Sumatra? That and the land based air should have sunk a number of transports. Am I wrong about this?


Mimi-KB was blasted during the invasion of Java. 1 was sunk east of Batavia, 2 were sunk SW of Java by allied CVs while attempting to interdict fleeing allied ships.

I also lost 2 fleet carriers trying to interdict ships leaving Oosthaven a couple of months later. I retrospect I should have brought all of KB to bear.

Chez

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 6:03 am
by obvert
quote:


FatR said:

"Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest."


This is easily the defining difference between a gamer and a simulator. A gamer will look at your statement and say, "Yeah, absolutely, that's what you have to do to win." A simulator looks at your statement and thinks, "What? Are you crazy? That would never work IRL!"

Chez


I guess the problem is we would never know what would have happened IRL if the Allies had 'played' the war differently. This is the problem with the idea of simulation as you state it. The Japanese might have come up with all kinds of daringly innovative means of acquiring the resources they were desperate to have if the Allies had reinforced Palembang or some other critical point. They actually did for the most part by-pass the PI. The Dutch airforce is pitiful and not worthy of concern until the Hurricanes show up, so most arguments about why one couldn't take and hold Sumatra early, even IRL, don't hold water. Palembang itself makes a fine defensive airfield. The japanese in the war didn't seem nearly as concerned with protecting their forces and limiting casualties as you are either, witnessed by the Malaya campaign in particular. Scenario 2 is also completely outside the possibilities of the Japanese IRL at the time, mostly based on political and economic conditions. It is completely based on saying 'what if' these conditions had not existed? But it does make for a better game! [:)]

We simply don't know 'what would have or would not have worked IRL' because only one course can be taken, but that is exactly why this game is fun. Games are about innovative and creative problem solving. The Japanese probably played through many of these courses before deciding on the strategy they took to conquer the SRA. They most likely had contingencies set up for other possible Allied reactions. We get to have contingencies for what our opponents decide to do in the game. We all seem to have some limitations as well based on what might have been possible, and have a code of ethics that lets us stay within the grounds of what is fair to our opponent. By all means the game can be used for all kinds of different ends and played in numerous different styles. I just think these things need to be very clearly stated before the game begins to make sure opponents are on the same page more or less, and can deal with the places where they are not.

Your game has been fun not only for you and for CR but for the rest of us to watch in his AAR. I just wish we had had your side of the story throughout so we could have understood many of the reasons you were making the moves you did. That said, having started an AAR myself, I know it takes a LOT of time.

I hope in future you play an opponent who wants to simulate and we get to read what this would look like. I may yet be convinced that the game could accomodate this kind of limitation. It would be a fun read anyway.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 1:32 pm
by bradfordkay
Actually, Chez does play an opponent who is more into "simulation" (or, as I put it, "prosecuting a war" as opposed to "playing a game"), but neither of us have the time to write an AAR.

We started several years ago with CHS and played that one until August 1944 when a massive alien abduction of a third of our pilots occurred. We are now into May 1943 in our AE game. His aircraft had slaughtered the Malaya air force in our game, and so he was able to dominate the skies around Singapore. I thought about bringing the UK 18th Division into Sumatra, but decided against it since I couldn't guarantee that they would make it through the air attacks. In our CHS game the Dutch engineers laid waste to the Palembang oil fields (I had concentrated all the eastern Sumatran forces at Palembang), in this game the same troops barely scratched them.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 2:27 pm
by Miller
One thing against Chez is that he is playing with PDU off. I would rather play Scn 1 with this on than Scn 2 with it off.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 4:30 pm
by crsutton
ORIGINAL: Mike Solli

Ahh, I missed the part about the carrier aircraft. I still think it's doable with land based air. The 23 Air Flotilla has 126 fighters, including the crack Tainan daitai, along with 54 Betties. That's more fighters than KB can muster. I'm convinced that the Japanese have the appropriate tools early in the war to counter anything the Allies can dream up.


And when you consider the absoutely pitiful replacement rate for Allied carrier aircraft early in the war, then a good Japanese player should be able to exploit this as well.

Fortress Palembang will work a few times vs new or unexpecting Japanese players but any alert Japanese player can and should deal with it pretty easily.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 4:36 pm
by Alfred
Festung Palembang is not a war winning exercise in itself for either side. Like everything else in this game, this particular ploy benefits the stronger player, be they in control of the Allied or Japanese forces.

Alfred

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 4:50 pm
by Icedawg
ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

One point to make here about the game mechanics. The Japanese player gets a mega-move for certain preordained TFs on the first turn. Mess with the destinations of those TFs and they revert to normal speed. No mega-move allowed. Good luck getting to Sumatra now before the allies reinforce.

Are you sure about this? I have changed destinations for the * TFs and they move at the advanced rate just fine. Is this some recent change in one of the unofficial patches?

The only thing that I've noticed that messes with the * TF bonus movement is moving planes to or from ships. Once, I tried to add some more planes to KB prior to sending them off to Pearl and they only traveled four hexes, barely getting out of home waters. Needless to say, I had to start the whole turn over! A solid month of 6+ hrs per day down the tubes! [:(]

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 5:36 pm
by SuluSea
I agree with Icedawg here.
I have numerous plans with bonus move transports having altered plans.
Rarely are any of the bonus move transports untouched whether it be a adding/removing loaded ships, their destinations or both, also if you change a bonus move TF to another type say surface combat to amphibious you'll still get a bonus move and it's a good way to get extra transports down to the Palaus to help with pace of action.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 5:41 pm
by Mike Solli
Same here. Identical to what SuluSea wrote.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2011 5:47 pm
by Icedawg
ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I agree with Icedawg here.
I have numerous plans with bonus move transports having altered plans.
Rarely are any of the bonus move transports untouched whether it be a adding/removing loaded ships, their destinations or both, also if you change a bonus move TF to another type say surface combat to amphibious you'll still get a bonus move and it's a good way to get extra transports down to the Palaus to help with pace of action.

I do the same thing with the transports. I use the small DD TFs in Japan. I turn them into amphibious TFs full of xAKs and send them off to Babeldoab.