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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2016 9:52 am
by TulliusDetritus
ORIGINAL: RisingSun

Well I did though about making a mod to push right after Pearl Harbor was hit. Everything would have to push a day a head. So wasn't sure if anyone would be interesting in this?

Currently playing Sid's RHS (and before that, CHS and Big Babes), so I'm full [:)]

How's the saying? The more the merrier [8D]

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2016 2:06 pm
by US87891
ORIGINAL: Big B
Assume the following situation:
IF - the Pacific Fleet Battle Force had been deployed back to (or never left) Los Angeles in 1941.... (as both commanders before Adm Kimmel demanded),
and ... the Joint Chiefs turned down Mac Arthur's request for a heavy Philippine Islands deployment of US resources and troops in 1941 (MacArthur only won them over in the summer of 1941), - but the USA still embargoed exports to Japan - with all the consequences entailed ....
It is likely the Pacific War would still have happened, due to the economic consequences of the embargo, which was the real tipping point.

SO, ....Japan still moves to war in Malaya, the Philippines, and the DEI (the prize) - but with no fleet at Pearl Harbor - what do you think the KB would have been assigned to do? (... this is my real question here)

Curious as to what you think.

B

If Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, or if the US Pacific Fleet had remained stationed in California, it is highly likely that the Japanese carriers would have conducted the same operations that they did immediately post-PH. These operations had been planned and scheduled long in advance of the war’s outbreak and relied on close coordination and clock-work timing (whether realistic or otherwise). These operations, including forces, responsibilities, and timing, were detailed in the Imperial Conference and resulting Army-Navy Central Agreement of 2 July, 1941, following the general strategic plan outlined by the January, 1941 Planning Board Conference. The spark for detailed operational planning was the US oil boycott, announced in August of that year, but known to be coming as early as June.

In response to the boycott, the joint Army-Navy planners chose Option-4 (from the Planning Board’s smorgasbord) which provided for simultaneous attacks and advance along two axes, Malaya and the Philippines, followed by a concentric attack and seizure of the oil centers of the Netherlands East Indies. The planners accepted the problems of coordination, timing and dispersion of force, because it was the only option which compromised the views of both the Army and Navy.

Naval planning was finalized at the Naval War College exercises of 10-13 September. These plans did not include Yamamoto’s proposal for a Pearl Harbor operation, although they did include seizure of Guam and Wake Islands along with the Philippines; operations which would surely have brought the US into the conflict in exactly the manner envisioned by Navy planning and doctrine since 1929. Objections to Yamamoto’s proposals were just those set forth by BigB as the thread premise; the Pacific Fleet might have been re-stationed, and the possibility of discovery and timely preparation too great i.e., the fleet might not be in port. It was not until Yamamoto made his threat to resign that the PH operation was included in the modified plan of 20 October.

The general plan did not forsee a role for Carrier Squadrons 1 and 5, indeed ComCarDiv 5 was only activated on 14 November. CarRon 2 was originally designated as part of the cover force for the attacks on Mindanao (which clearly did not happen because of PH) and subsequently in support of seizure of the Celebes, Moluccas, and Ambon (which did happen). CarRon 4 (Ryujo) was designated as direct support for the seizure of Davao (which did happen according to plan). CarRon 5 was originally designated as cover and support for operations against Eastern New Guinea and the Northern Solomons. These operations were to have been conducted by the South Seas Detachment (Horii) immediately following its seizure of Guam, but the execution date was extended until CarRon 5 completed the PH operation. Otherwise, it went as planned.

IJN land based air assets were always intended for initial strikes and naval interdiction for Malaya and the Northern Philippines. This is why carriers were not allocated to these roles.

Matt.

Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, IV; Japanese Studies in World War II, CMH, US Army, Washington DC.
Morton, Louis, The War in the Pacific, 1941-1942, CMH, US Army, Washington DC, 1962.
Senshi Sosho, V-3, Occupation of Dutch East Indies, NIDS, Tokyo (1966)
Senshi Sosho, V-26, N.E.I.-Bengal Bay Area Naval Attack Operations, NIDS, Tokyo (1969)
Senshi Sosho, V-45, Conduct of Navy Operations .. Before Outbreak of Pacific War, NIDS, Tokyo (1971)
Japanese Monographs 160, 169, Outline of Naval Armament and Preparations, USAFFE

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2016 4:21 pm
by John 3rd
Going off of the previous Post I would do the following:

CarDiv 1 & 5 covering the Wake Operation.
CarDiv 2 & 4 positioned to hit Mindanao and operate in support of the Eastern DEI thrust.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2016 4:24 pm
by John 3rd
For me the REAL fun in this scenario falls to the American Player. Does he send the Fleet west to Hawaii? To Aussieland? What does he do with the CVs?

For the Japanese player these answers form a delightful amount of uncertainty and a plethora of options to try and 'deal' with the Pacific Fleet.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2016 11:07 pm
by Big B
(just thinking) ...What about this John:

The US CV's are based out of San Diego, the US BB's are based out of Los Angeles (both of which I believe were their home ports till 1941).. cruisers and DD's appropriately split (I haven't researched where their home ports routinely were). Put Force Z in Colombo (with escorts).

Now to give everyone headaches and uncertainty - assume that just like the US and Japanese carriers were on historical Dec 7th...all everyone knows for certain is (just like their historical counterparts) - the enemy has put to sea several days ago. In this idea, every major fleet would have the Jump-move, making whereabouts of everyone's naval forces on Dec 7th completely unknown until the game starts.

It could still feature Dec 7th Surprise ON, but Historical First Turn OFF - so each player may decide where he wants to go, Fog Of War.

I still haven't attempted to do anything to put together an alternate scenario... I just wonder what you all thought about it?


B
ORIGINAL: John 3rd

For me the REAL fun in this scenario falls to the American Player. Does he send the Fleet west to Hawaii? To Aussieland? What does he do with the CVs?

For the Japanese player these answers form a delightful amount of uncertainty and a plethora of options to try and 'deal' with the Pacific Fleet.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2016 6:08 pm
by Skyros
What will you do with the aircraft at Pearl, reassign to the West coast? I would assume a smaller presence at Pearl with most of the naval combat aircraft at San Diego and only a couple of PBY squadrons staying behind. The army formations would also be reduced with them spread over the west coast.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2016 8:26 pm
by dr.hal
I like this setup, sounds like it would be very interesting!!!!

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 2:38 am
by Buckrock
ORIGINAL: Big B
The US CV's are based out of San Diego, the US BB's are based out of Los Angeles (both of which I believe were their home ports till 1941).. cruisers and DD's appropriately split (I haven't researched where their home ports routinely were). Put Force Z in Colombo (with escorts).

I assume the USN's "Hawaiian Detachment" is also dropped? It was formed in Oct 1939 in response to Japanese naval activities and was the precursor to the shifting of the Fleet's Pacific base from California to Hawaii the following year. The detachment consisted of 9 cruisers and some 20 destroyers, support ships as well as an aircraft carrier (initially Enterprise). These ships were effectively home ported at Pearl.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 1:00 pm
by bobdina
Outstanding post. Thanks for the info.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 2:02 pm
by Lecivius
I like the setup as well. Are you planning on keeping the facilities in PH? I'm no historian, I have no clue as to when the dry docks & maintenance facilities were put in place. But historical pictures of San Diego 1940 show it was pretty rustic (half the navy base was still in tents fer cryin out loud). I would imagine PH not being in as good of shape as a forward base either, given this scenario.

Just thinking....

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 4:23 pm
by pontiouspilot
I do not believe that the US would have entered the war if the Japanese had only grabbed DEI and Malaya. To me this would have been a sounder strategic approach than that taken by the Empire. If this were coupled with a properly co-ordinated attack on USSR and broader British assets in Indian Ocean it is possible, maybe likely, that both Britain and USSR would have folded before the USA could be brought to war by Roosevelt. With this thinking in mind I am early into what will end as an AI game reflecting this. The USA may not enter until they are attacked, or until Ceylon is captured, or Australia attacked, or a USA warship is attacked by accident. In the meantime the Japanese will attack USSR in early January. I have to play both sides till US active then and then turn it to AI. I'd love someone to build a scenario that reflects something similar.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 5:39 pm
by dr.hal
One of the concerns about this forward move Lecivius was for exactly what you point out, the relatively primitive facilities at Pearl (late 1940). The docks (dry and wet) and stuff were there, but not a whole lot more, including a substantial work force. However there were command and control facilities there, as the sub command was already there if I'm not mistaken.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 5:53 pm
by dr.hal
ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot
...both Britain and USSR would have folded before the USA could be brought to war by Roosevelt.
Greetings Pontious, I would like to point out something that seems to be missed in a number of posts in this thread over the past week or so, it is simple but vital and has to do with your input. This may be as a result of those that are not familiar with the US Constitution and the status of US politics in 1940-41. You indicate the Roosevelt could bring the USA into the war. Nothing could be further from the facts. Please understand that I'm not being nit picky here, and I mean no offense (I was born in Canada just so you know) but the concept that a US President could take the country to "war" is a relatively new late 20th century concept. In 1940 it was the US CONGRESS that declared war (and still does if one wants to know the truth) not the President. He or she can only ASK for a declaration. Given the War Powers Act and other precedent set by Congress and later US Presidents, this has given way to allowing the President to send troops into harms way WITHOUT a declaration, but before 1964 (Tonkin Gulf Resolution) war was normally required (although Thomas Jefferson DID send in the Marines against North African pirates in 1803 without Congressional consent, lots of Hub Bub about that at the time - note the US Marine Corp hymn) as Congress was really the boss. Thus in 1941 or 42 Congress would have had to act, and that's VERY problematic. If you look at the representation at the time, ESPECIALLY in the House of Representatives, the PEOPLES house, the overwhelming majority were for isolation, NOT involvement. Without a Pearl style situation, that was NOT going to change anytime soon. That's why I need to say that FDR was not a unilateral actor that could do as he pleased, especially when talking about taking the country to war. Hal

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 6:04 pm
by warspite1
Well apologies if I've missed it
I would like to point out something that seems to be missed in a number of posts in this thread over the past week or so, it is simple but vital and has to do with your input. This may be as a result of those that are not familiar with the US Constitution and the status of US politics in 1940-41. You indicate the Roosevelt could bring the USA into the war. Nothing could be further from the facts.

Can you confirm who has been making this point that Roosevelt could bring the US into the war please? You say there have been a number of posts made along these lines but I am struggling to find any (Pontiouspilot excepted). And as per my post 65, although I cannot speak for Pontiouspilot I suspect that he is using 'Roosevelt' in the same way I have (as an alternative to 'the US' i.e. we all know Roosevelt wanted to get the US in the war (for all the right reasons) but that he is going to need to do this through the correct channels if the US are not declared war on. Roosevelt and his wishes are important - he is the President after all - and his realisation of how big a risk to the world Nazi Germany and Japan are is key - but no one as far as I can see is suggesting he can just declare war. I made this point clear when responding to Alfred in post 40 and elsewhere.

Thanks.

One of the concerns about this forward move Lecivius was for exactly what you point out, the relatively primitive facilities at Pearl (late 1940). The docks (dry and wet) and stuff were there, but not a whole lot more, including a substantial work force. However there were command and control facilities there, as the sub command was already there if I'm not mistaken.

Yes, and one of the reasons why Roosevelt not ordering the fleet to Pearl is just a no no for me.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 8:09 pm
by warspite1
ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot

I do not believe that the US would have entered the war if the Japanese had only grabbed DEI and Malaya. To me this would have been a sounder strategic approach than that taken by the Empire. If this were coupled with a properly co-ordinated attack on USSR and broader British assets in Indian Ocean it is possible, maybe likely, that both Britain and USSR would have folded before the USA could be brought to war by Roosevelt.
warspite1

At the risk of moving Big B’s thread in yet another direction – albeit still related – but as said previously, it is certainly one of the great what-ifs of history; i.e. what would happen if the US were not attacked.

Given what we know (and being able to use a good degree of hindsight) personally I am not sure that the USSR and the UK folding is ‘likely’.

Looking at the USSR first. The aid from the UK and the USA is still being sent to them. Interestingly of course Vladivostok was one of the ports used for lend lease – about 50% of it. If the Japanese, attacking the Soviets from the east, attempt to interfere with this, that could be enough to bring the US in – either way the Japanese have to be careful.

The Germans fell short at Moscow in December 1941. So what actually changes in this scenario you propose? Well the Japanese attacking could mean the transfer of ‘Siberian’ troops to the west may not have happened. That said, the effect these troops had on the Battle for Moscow has, according to some recent sources, been over exaggerated.

Given the performance of the Japanese against the Soviets at Nomonhan, given their lack of tanks and infantry (the war in China is still going on and you are suggesting a move into the Indian Ocean), I am not convinced the Japanese have the ability to inflict a defeat of even weakened Soviet forces in the east. There is also the vastness of the territory and we know how the Soviets reacted to the German invasion in terms of making every gain for the enemy as painful as possible. Perhaps a stalemate at best for the Japanese and maybe some territory gained - but nothing sustainable.

The lack of US aircraft in the west could mean more heavy artillery and men on the eastern front – probably a few more aircraft too - in 1942, but these are not going to make a significant difference to the fighting that culminated in Stalingrad and the push into the Causcasus.

This brings us to the UK, who are also continuing to receive US aid – nothing has changed there. The defence of the island of Malta was aided by USS Wasp after the loss of Ark Royal, but again with what we know, it is far from certain the Axis could have taken the island even if not reinforced with aircraft. The build-up of forces in the Western Desert is not majorly affected – even if (worst case) the Med is closed there is still the route around Southern Africa. The Japanese could interfere with this – but this assumes they have the troops to spare for an invasion of Ceylon (and that it is successful).

I think things are going to take longer – and it’s going to hurt more – but the Japanese don’t have the strength to really hurt the British if they withdraw (as they did) from the Indian Ocean. I think a sort of stalemate is more likely as let's face it, the British are not going to throw the Japanese back in the way the US did. At this point a lot depends on how the Soviet/Japanese war is going.

But as far as the Soviet Union and Germany are concerned, there is nothing that makes me think the ultimate outcome is radically different - just longer to achieve perhaps.

Really interesting though. Not least because without a second front in the west - where does the USSR stop?......

Edit: Just one thing to add here. If, as is pretty certain, the British quickly rule out a second front landing in northern France, this would leave additional troops to:

1. First and foremost clear Africa completely.
2. Reinforce India and push the Japanese back through Burma.

More pressure is of course heaped on the Soviets because of this, but given what we know, I think the outcome remains as above - but timescales are pushed back.

The longer this goes on of course, the more chance of a stalemate somewhere as exhausted armies, lacking in replenishments, fight themselves to a standstill.....

Whilst its difficult to see the US coming in, its difficult to see them staying out over time!


RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2016 9:50 pm
by Big B
No worries (anyone)..
I just made a simple proposition... then let everyone have fun

ORIGINAL: warspite1

At the risk of moving Big B’s thread in yet another direction ....{snip}

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Fri Nov 04, 2016 11:20 am
by Lecivius
ORIGINAL: warspite1

The Germans fell short at Moscow in December 1941. So what actually changes in this scenario you propose? Well the Japanese attacking could mean the transfer of ‘Siberian’ troops to the west may not have happened. That said, the effect these troops had on the Battle for Moscow has, according to some recent sources, been over exaggerated.

Interesting. I'm not disputing you at all, but I have never seen or heard this. what sources did you get this from, if I may ask?

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Fri Nov 04, 2016 12:15 pm
by Rising-Sun
If Japan manage to get or captured Indo-China, I doubt if USA would goto war with the Japanese. If they attacked Hong Kong or the Philippines, they would.

RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Fri Nov 04, 2016 2:18 pm
by spence
"America has been attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this Nation.

Illinois, Alabama, California, North Carolina, Ohio, Louisiana, Texas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arkansas, New York, Virginia — those are the home States of the honored dead and wounded of the Kearny. Hitler’s torpedo was directed at every American, whether he lives on our seacoasts or in the innermost part of the Nation, far from the seas and far from the guns and tanks of the marching hordes of would-be conquerors of the world.

The purpose of Hitler’s attack was to frighten the American people off the high seas — to force us to make a trembling retreat. This is not the first time he has misjudged the American spirit. That spirit is now aroused."

Two weeks later the USS Reuben James was sunk by UBoat torpedoes while escorting war materals to England. The isolationist faction was pretty strong in the US so Roosevelt didn't get Congress to declare war.

But a skeptical mind might ask why a USN warship (with orders to shoot German ships on sight) was escorting war materials to a belligerent when the US was at peace. Perhaps Roosevelt knew that "out of sight, out of mind" applied to ships of the USN so long as the war didn't "come home" to roost.

So maybe the IJ Player should have no control whatsoever over when the US enters the war. Maybe after 200 B-17s and 500 P-40s base in the Philippines, maybe as the SBDs tip into a dive on an unguarded KB while its own planes are off merrily bombing Soerabaya, maybe long after the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Right now the IJ Player controls everything and knows everything there is to know about the Allied Player's forces as well as his own forces somewhat exaggerated capabilities (as in "all I have to do to beat China is declare war on the rest of the world"). If the IJ Player has no control of when/how the US comes in it might make the scenario worth playing for the Allied Player.


RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Posted: Fri Nov 04, 2016 3:13 pm
by TulliusDetritus
ORIGINAL: Lecivius
I have never seen or heard this. what sources did you get this from, if I may ask?

This is not really new. According to the Cold War theory Mr Miracle aka Winter + "Siberians" saved the Soviets. When the cold fact (well documented by the Wehrmacht high command, armies, corps, divisions) is that by the time Typhoon was launched the Wehrmacht was *already* crippled. The stubborn resistance of those lunatics who refused to give up had paid dividends that is.

Those fresh troops were indeed handy (but only a minor part of the reserves available), but the main factor was the exhaustion of the German war machine before the winter and "Siberians" striked. And thus we get to the exaggerated thing [:)]

But this is Witp AE [:)]