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Certainly if played as a game rather than a historical simulation, the Allied and Japanese players would execute strategies and movements based on intelligence (hindsight) not available to the historical commanders.
We cannot eliminate hindsight. Most of the players who will buy and play this game will know something about the Pacific War 1941-45. They will tend to do things in response to their knowledge of what is to happen. Unless rules or victory conditions are designed to force them to execute historically accurate or possible actions, they are going to do what they need to win, not produce an accurate political/military simulation of the war. Therefor, rather than hold in place with the forces they have in order to retain their imperial territories in the SEA and NEI and avoid loss of face among the non-white subject races under the impression that a succesful defense is possible because the Japanese are militarily less effective then "white men" or because, in the case of the NEI, they don't have anywhere else to got to, the Allied player will try to husband his resources, knowing he's going to get his *ss kicked at the start, in order to shorten the time when he will have the resources to began his counter-attack.
As I said, the best we can do is create rules or victory conditions that limit the impact of hindsight, provide a entertaining and challenging simulation which does not rehash the same outcome over and over, in which the victory conditions for the players is not how well they did in the game, but against the historical outcome and realistic alternate scenarios that allow us to go into uncharted territory not dominated by hindsight.
Again, in Dec 41, the Japanese executed a war plan they had spent a year developing despite some violent disagreements between the IJN and the IJA at IGHQs and between Combined Fleet, Navy Ministry and IJN IGHQ staffs. When they began their planning, they had essentially made the decision to go to war. The question was, execute the "Decisive Battle" plan of invading the PI in conjunction with invasions of Malayia and the NEI and then awaiting the US response, attack PH as a lead into the PI invasion along with the SEA and NEI invasions and a by-pass PI option to invade and conquer the SEA/NEI before turning to resolve their issues with the US. A fourth option was to attack the US, ignoring the SEA and NEI hoping that early victories would place pressure on the Brits and NEI to provide access to alternate resource areas. These are not just fantasies, but options advocated by elements within the Japanese government, army and navy, particularly within the IJN. The current test demonstrates if the game system can handle a non-historical scenario which is sufficiently different in context to reduce the impact on the game/simulation of hindsight.

On the other hand, given a specific set of political and military objectives, terrain, forces and logistical support, the strategy, operational plan and tactics that are adopted cannot vary to any great extent, as even genius cannot overcome time-distance factors such as are seen in the Pacific when you don't have the LSTs. If the only way to get to Guadalcanal from Rabaul without running out of fuel is straight down through Iron Bottom Sound, then you're pretty much stuck with a limited series of operational options. When the Japanese decided to attack the US, realizing that they could not conquer the US or dictate peace terms in the White House, they pretty much limited themselves in the strategies and operational plans they could execute. They would not withdraw from China, they had to watch the USSR in Manchuria, they needed the resources of SEA and NEI and the only way to do that was to eliminate the US as a western Pacific power. This dictated the time frame for hostilities initiation, the forces available, the targets for attacks, the probable enemy forces to be engaged, the geography and terrain to be moved through, between, over and around and the end state to be sought. The bottom line is that the Japanese sought to create a defensive perimeter around their conquests through which the Allies would have to fight their way and in which the attritional costs would exceed their enemies' will to win. Their options, as I pointed out before became as limited as the Allies options were in conducting their deterence and defense of NEI, SEA and the Pacific given their own political, economic, military, geographic and strategic constraints, starting with the "Germany First" orientation of Rainbow 5 and the Victory Program and moving through their denials and delusions of Japanese military effectiveness.

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, What Islands in South Pacific are US? New Hebrides? Santa Cruz? If I plot a movement in the orders post on page 5 make sure you let me know any that would attack a US held base.
(Currently there is only one flag for Allied bases in WITP. There will eventually be flags for every Nation.)

If you mean historically, just Johnston, Phoenix, Howland, Baker and Samoa. If you mean for game purposes of possible lend/lease transfers, then IMO I think The Gilberts ( actually offered by Brits in 41 but rejected by USA), Fiji and perhaps the New Herbrides. My reasons, the Gilberts could be justified as a outlying bastion of a East Pacific defense perimeter on a line roughly, Alutians, Wake, Gilberts, Samoa. Fiji could be justified as an oupost buffer for American Samoa. The New Herbrides are a little more iffy, but might be justified to ensure free trade and Navigation of teh S.Seas Ferry route. But its all conjecture and really up to you.

Mogami

Not to be critical of an obviously well thought out and logical plan, but It looks to me to be a plan based on the fore-knowlegde that the US will not attack. Certainly this would not be the case (thus my periodic die roll suggestion) contingencies would have to be made. Its really not realistic to think the Japanese would be free to use all its forces available without Taking the possibilty of US intervention account. For instance there is no reason not to use the 14th Army as you currently plan since even if the US made a sudden intervention, it would be unlikely that the PI could be invaded until your ongoing operations are completed. However prudence *might* dictate that most of the 11th airfleet and IJA 5th Air Bgd. would have to remain on standy on Formosa in case they are needed to nuetralize the PI in case of a sudden US DOW. Likewise the South Seas Detachement would in all likelyhood have to sit tight on Saipan ready to take Guam.

Thats just my 2 cents, Its your test and ultimately your decision. I look forward to reading your AAR's

Regards

Hi, I have taken a few precautions. There are 4 divisions in the home Islands that have no transport on Dec 7. I've marked them to move to reinforce 15th and 16th Armies. However they will not arrive for several weeks. If the USA declares war While they are in transit.

The 14th Army contiunes operations in South Pacific.
South Sea Detachment takes Guam.
2 SNLF held at Kwajalein capture Wake.

16th Army halts operations (HQ 16th Army should be located Balikpapan by then.) With Kendari Japan should have air control south of PI. No Airgroups HQ planned on moving from Formosa before PI secured.

16th Army takes control of divisions in transit and conducts invasion of PI. (38th Division located at Hong Kong transfers to 25th Army, 15th Army sends division south. this maintains 5 division size intended for 25th Army) 15th Army will claim a division from 25th after fall of Singapore.

Naval unit orders have not yet been issued however the fleet will basically be divided between Saigon/Pescadore and Truk/Kwajalein. With the CV being in the South. (There are several CVL moving to SRA area)

Southern Area Army is holding a Bde in reserve.

23rd Mixed Bde should be ready to move.
.

NLF units used to capture bases in NG will be relocated to Truk/Rabaul/Kwajalein and available to move on Gilberts (I am counting these Islands as US controlled at start)


All operations are to be covered by strong IJN forces. No TF will sail to base without escort unless. (I mean an escorting surface TF. The transport TF will have escort ships included)

A. Target is base behind another target base that has escort TF.
B. Target is within LBA
C. CV/CVL are providing aircover.

IJN subs are moving beyond furthest movement and setting up cordons. (all enemy approach routes will be screened by subs.
further subs will take blocking positions next to all target bases within movement range of enemy TF)

Looks like you got everything well in hand. Good luck
Admiral-san:)

Just curious though, whats your plans for the US during this period? Are you going to try to push through as much reinforcement as possible to the PI , Guam, Wake ect... or you going to hold backeverything for a later counter-offensive, or are you going to build up a defense in the Sopac, or...................????

A possible casus belli would be the US occupation of French possessions in the Pacific in line with US statements of support for the Free French.
Unfortunately, between reinforcing the PI, Alaska, Hawaii and Panama, along with Midway, Johnson and Wake Islands, I'm not sure where the assets would come from to undertake any other operations. A good question, though, given the basic indefensibility of Guam, do you allocate any ground/air forces to increase the garrison?
Historically, Japanese forces were limited by their other strategic requirements such as China, Manchuria, etc, to the point where they executed their war plan without a strategic air or ground reserve. The Kido Butai, and the Combined Fleet Main Body represented the only mobile reserve once the PH operation is complete. Their excellent planning was accompanied with amazing good luck. In the PI, their initial attacks on the defensive line at Bataan were beaten off and the available ground force reduced to near combat ineffectiveness. If the US/PA forces had been able to maintain a reserve, they had the opportunity to counterattack and severely damage if not destroy the opposing IJA units. This would have been a major impact on Japanese ops in the PI, but history shows it would have had as little impact on the rest of the Japanese plan for SEA/NEI as the historical delays imposed by the US/PA defense. The garrison would have had the opportunity for resupply, the Japanese would have reorganized and reinforced their invasion force and the PI garrison could have gained another 6 months of life. Unfortunately, the reserve had been swallowed up in counterattacks to maintain the defensive positions during the Japanese attacks.

Hi, A new build came out last night. So I am going to begin giving orders again. I will edit the page 5 post and when complete move it to new post (so it will be easier to find)

Any orders for the Japanese you feel or unlikely or over looked post. Then we will decide US reaction to war.

1. The reality of sea and land mobility limit the ability of the US to effectively interfere with Japanese operations in SEA and NEI to air power stationed in the PI, the subs and the PacFleet. The Asiatic Fleet was capable of attrition tactics (the destroyer raid at Palambang) but was too small to directly impact IJN ops. The ground forces in the PI were there to defend the air bases and Manilla Bay. There was NO assault shipping available to execute landing ops and very little sea transport available to move the mobile portion of the garrision away from the PI. The situation would not have improved as the garrision continued to receive programmed reinforcements through May 42. There was insufficient assault transport and transit shipping to move more than 20,000 marines and army troops from Hawaii or the West Coast to present any real ground threat to Japanese held areas outside the western Pacific until Aug-Sep 42. This left the PacFleet and the subs to conduct offensive ops against the Japanese in the event of war. If the Japanese maintain sufficient airpower in the areas around the PI (to include the Kido Butai) that can be redirected from their SEA/NEI/SW Pacific objectives to destroy US airpower in the PI and retain enough of the Combined Fleet in Home Waters and the Mandates to off-set the PacFleet, then the only US capability to intervene against a Japanese operation to seize SEA/NEI and SW Pacific would be the subs, and they did not become effective instruments of naval power until 1943. Any ground forces remaining in the Home Islands would represent a strategic reserve to support the reinforcement of the PI invasion force, after Phase I ops or reinforce the defensive cordon.
2. The basic position in the Rainbow plans was to secure the Western Hemisphere as a base for future ops. The Pacific portion of the Hemisphere was defined as the triangle between the Hawaiian Islands (Midway inc?), Alaska and Panama, with the West Coast on the north-south base of the triangle. This was then modified with the decision to reinforce the PI as an air power forward base as a deterrent to the Japanese. The positioning of additional forces outside these areas would be predicated on maintaining a LOC between the western Pacific defense bastion and the PI. The problem for the US is that any forces committed to maintaining the LOC or to areas outside the bastion/PI in sufficient strength to defeat a Japanese assault could seriously weaken those areas (bastion/PI) abiliy to accomplish their missions. Quite frankly, to disperse forces beyound those islands not already US possessions and vital to the defense of the bastion/PI, which the Gilberts are not, since they will not open or maintain the LOC to the PI, would be to disperse already limited forces and invite defeat in detail. "He who would defend everywhere, will find he cannot defend anywhere" to paraphrase Frederick the Great. If we disperse the US forces all over the Pacific to defend unessential areas in a form of cordon defense, we will make the same mistake the Japanese made in 1942, and which they paid heavily for in 1944. It will cost us less to retake the Gilberts when we have the resources then to try to defend them. I would say limit US bases to those that were US possesions in Dec 1941 and those islands which contribute to defense of Hawaii and the PI. As sufficient forces become available, occupy New Caledonia, the Fijis and the non-US Samoa islands. work backward to French Polynesia and then the Gilberts. This would provide a LOC to Australia if we wish to later open an offensive from that front. However, none of these islands are at all essential to a US counteroffensive through the central Pacific as predicated in War Plan "Orange" and the Rainbow plans.

Hi, Left to my own devices. Not dependant on Japan DOW or not DOW as Allied Player I would simply send everything to PH and not concern myself with any other area untill I was happy with defense there. Then I would defend first Midway then Johnson.
I would slowely creep west to build and defend any of the bases I held at wars start that were not captured.
The Australians would concentrate on their East Coast and Port Moresby. The British on Ceylon and a base north of Rangoon.
Since I think aircontrol goes before offensive action I would devote my resources to building airfields I could hold and moving air assets there. I would concentrate my carriers and wait for a target they could defeat (Japanese player splitting CV into multiple TF's with large distance in between and my intercepting movement orders far enough in advance to place my carriers.)

I would have no interest in capturing Japanese base before I was satisfied all my bases were secure and I had sufficent material to sustain an operation once began. The subs (S-boats) would be used to protect approach to my bases while other type laid mines and preformed scouting missions.

Hi, At some point after the game is released. There will be a Japanese player who counts the divisions in the Home Islands belonging to other commands (Northern Fleet, 14th, 15th, 16th, 25th Armies) And asks the question.
"Why send them where they belong. Why not move transports home and load them for a Central Pacific Operation right away.
Break 1 div down to Bde and use to capture Midway and Johnson while the other 5 move to Pearl Harbor. I can capture the South Pacific area at the same time with 2-3 Bde and a host of SNLF covered by 2 BB and a few cruiser CVL. I only need 2 BB and a few Crusiers for the SRA. leaving the bulk of the IJN to engage the USN at Pearl (hurt by 1 or 2 strikes from CV on Dec 7 and 8)

I think this will actually be the most common opening gambit for Japan since no where else can a large victory be possible so soon.
(You can grab the empty Islands without risk.)
The USN will have only the 3 CV (if the one on the West Coast can arrive before Japanese transports)(and the Japanese player can place many subs in between West coast and PH)

Does it matter if PI or Malaya or NEI require a few extra weeks to secure if PH is captured?

Basically what the GHQ staff figured out in 1940. Great minds think alike. The bottom line is you need Pearl Harbor as your forward base to conduct your defense and then from which to launch your counteroffensive and for your commerce raiding strategy with the fleet subs. Then you need to secure your LOC to the West Coast to protect your ability to sustain Hawaii and build up your forces. Everything else is non-essential. Let the Japanese capture New Guinea, NEI, SEA, Burma, PI, Wake Island, etc. They can't get any real economic benefit for their industrial capacity out of the NEI and SEA before early 43 (by which time your subs will have gotten effective enough to reduce the transport capacity), when they have the mines, wells and refineries back in operation and the tankers and freighters to move it to the Homelands or Manchuria. otherwise all these conquests just serve to disperse and absorb their forces, reducing their ability to concentrate a sufficient force at the point of attack the US selects when it counterattacks.
As far as the Japanese capturing Hawaii, they would need to establish more or less permanent air superiority over the islands to start. You can't maintain the Kido Butai off the islands for any length of time because you don't have enough tankers to do it, even without the demands of the rest of the Combined Fleet (remember there was talk of leaving 2d CarDiv behind or even abandoning them off Hawaii for lack of tankers?). So you send a transport force to invade the islands and build bases to ship a/c to. Well, there aren't enough tankers to keep the Combined Fleet and the Kido Butai in the area (much less get them there), so any force you land to build bases will be subject to immediate counter-attack once the Fleet leaves. You will soon find out that the US still has enough carrier and LBA, subs and surface fleet after your attack on PH to isolate your landing area and enough ground forces (three plus divisions) to eliminate it, especially if you trade off space for aviation. You'll also find that you've dedicated so much resources to the landing force that you don't have enough to conduct effective operations in NEI and SEA. Both sides studied the problem pretty thoroughly and came to the same conclusion, that the US PacFleet would have to be destroyed with minimal losses to the IJN before any landing could be turned into an occupation, which the Japanese could not sustain.
Still, doesn't mean you can't try. (Five divs for Hawaii, something's wrong with the game. The Japanese didn't have enough transport to move all the divisions (less than four) they needed for NEI and SEA at a time in Dec 41)

I had to read the post again. The Combined Fleet to Hawaii right behind the Kido Butai? The IJN's battleline's range was based on "Decisive Battle" to be fought in the north Marianas. They barely had the tankers to get the Kido Butai near PH, how will you get the Combined Fleet there and sustain them off Hawaii and through a major surface fleet engagement? Sorry for the concentration on sustainment logistics, but I once had to tell a Seperate Light Infantry Brigade G3 that if we executed his plan I would have to buy a bunch of concertina, paint and plywood and when we reached the end state of his OPLAN, I would put the concertina around our position and paint "***th Inf Bde (Lt) POW Camp" on the plywood signs, because we would be out of food, ammo and water, with no resupply on the horizon.

Hi, Someone has to come up with a verifable list of Japanese AP/ships capable of carrying troops) Currently there is no shortage of transports they just do not start in the right bases.
On turn 1 3 divisions begin loaded and another division and 4 Bde are at bases with enough transport to carry them. This does not even address the number of SNLF/NLF/Naval Guard units with transport available on turn 1 (still leaving plenty of transports with nothing to load because they are at the wrong base. If the Japanese player was free to place transports he could carry twice as much as loads on turn 1)

Originally posted by LTCMTS
I had to read the post again. The Combined Fleet to Hawaii right behind the Kido Butai? The IJN's battleline's range was based on "Decisive Battle" to be fought in the north Marianas. They barely had the tankers to get the Kido Butai near PH, how will you get the Combined Fleet there and sustain them off Hawaii and through a major surface fleet engagement? Sorry for the concentration on sustainment logistics, but I once had to tell a Seperate Light Infantry Brigade G3 that if we executed his plan I would have to buy a bunch of concertina, paint and plywood and when we reached the end state of his OPLAN, I would put the concertina around our position and paint "***th Inf Bde (Lt) POW Camp" on the plywood signs, because we would be out of food, ammo and water, with no resupply on the horizon.

Hi, If the Japanese do not mind being out of fuel, they can load enough TK/AO to supply this effort. What they use else where later is the question.

While PH has less then 20k supply it does begin with that 300k fuel.

If I understand what you're saying is that you will refuel the Fleet after capturing PH with its fuel supplies and from barrels of fuel carried by AK, etc? One, the US is going to allow PH to be captured intact, ie without destroying the fuel supplies, refueling systems and blocking the channel? Two, if the PacFleet sorties from PH, much of the accumulated supply will be consumed. Three, the Battleline has a range of 8,000nm at 14 knots. It is 3370nm from Osaka to Pearl Harbor, straight line. Add in ASW movement ("zig zag")(50%), engineering plant inefficiency and loss and you're at 5055nm. You now have 2945nm of fuel left, about 36% of your fuel. You are now riding higher out of the water then tactically optimum (67% fuel), exposing the areas below the belt, while reducing your steadiness as gun platforms and the effectiveness of your side protective system. Your escorting destroyers are even worse off and they still have several hundred nm of high speed manuever just to position themselves for their night torpedo attacks. You are unable to refuel your destroyers from your larger ships at sea, unlike the USN later in the war. You have to seek out and destroy the PacFleet and hope you can capture PH intact? If you don't, you're not getting back to Japan or Truk any time soon. Even the US subs of 1941 could have hit large, stationary targets like this. The Japanese took risks often in those first six months, but this is even too long a shot for them.

Is the transport available capable of assault operations or are we talking about troop carriers for port to port ops?

Also, the Japanese did not really have an opposed landing (access denial) capability. The doctrine was to recon the objective area and find undefended beach sites to conduct landings, then quickly move inland, flanking the defended positions. Racking my feeble brain, I can only think of one real opposed landing the Japanese made between 1933 and 1945, and that was Wake Island, and that was initially a fiasco.

LTCMTS, I agree with you whole heartedly.

On another note, two quick questions:

1. What equipment was required for larger ships that weren't AOs to refuel smaller ships? Was this standard or a later-war development/modification?

2. Is the Japanese player always constrained by having divisions loaded at the beginning of the scenario? Is there a way to start a couple days earlier in case I don't want those divisions loaded?

Hi, For myself (only) I would not embark on any operation not dedicated to securing the SRA before such operations were in their final stages.

However. I bet right here and now. Some bright lad/lass in their very first PBEM game of WITP sends the units starting in the Home Islands straight for PH. The Japanese do have tankers and Oilers that on day one can begin sucking all the available fuel for use in this operation. What they use else where is not the issue.
I'll run concurrent tests. One for the No US DOW the other for the immediate assault on PH. I hope both fail. (because then I would have to conclude everyone on ether side in WW2 in the Pacific was wrong/blind/incompentant.

I recognize every Japanese player seeks to invent a war plan that can win the war.
However I don't think such plans are "attack as far as possible as soon as possible"
In my own planning I limit targets to those I have LBA cover. (meaning I have to capture and built a worthless Island before moving on to the important island. I'd never send a transport TF into area solely owned by enemy air. And I am not likely to send a TF into any area not under my control after the first month of the war.