Page 5 of 7
Map Question
Posted: Thu Jul 24, 2003 7:43 am
by pad152
China Map Bmp
What are the yellow and green squares that I see on both land and sea hexes?
Posted: Wed Aug 13, 2003 5:28 am
by Tristanjohn
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Nikademus
Mike,
I never said it was "easy", what i said was that the Japanese army was "capable" if it so desired. Big difference. More importantly still, i said "to what purpose?"
Unlike the Southern Advance, what would a limited/full scale offensive bring Japan in China? Capitulation? no. Valuable resources? no. Spent resource and further dispersion of their troops? Yes.
As to their not being "able" to do it. I've never read anywhere that they wern't. Again it comes down to a question of "why" and "for what purpose" If no concrete objective or goal is pervalient, and the empire decided to go with the "southern advance", i would logically expect the Japanese to sit tight in China while these other operations, including the subjegation of Burma (and it's lifeline to China) unfold in the hopes that they would 'solve' the China problem themselves.
The reality is the Japanese Army, which came to rule and chart its country's course, never had the capability to subjugate the Chinese to the extent necessary (utterly) to enforce Japan's idea of "peace" within the context of Hakko Ichiu (basically, that the strongest country, Japan, would rule all others in the world).
Japan was up against it for the very reason that it had invaded China and now found itself in an all too very real sense stalemated. Japan's only way out of the hole it had dug for itself was 1) retreat (and lose face? dream on), 2) work out a deal with America to connive in its subjugation of China through a reinstitution of the trade of the raw materials and other stuff of war which Japan needed to further pursue its current war policy (fat chance--though at the time there were plenty of "well-meaning" Americans who were none too eager to "antagonize" our little Japanese cousins), or 3) try to take and hold those island areas of greater Asia south of Japan which contained the raw materials Japan desired and in fact needed in order to "mix it up with the varsity" (i.e., America). Japan (not unexpectedly and wholly unwisely) chose the latter option . . . and soon enough the country had its Kodo-Ha head handed to it on a platter stamped "Made in USA."
End of story.
Posted: Wed Aug 13, 2003 5:53 am
by TIMJOT
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
Originally posted by Nikademus
Mike,
I never said it was "easy", what i said was that the Japanese army was "capable" if it so desired. Big difference. More importantly still, i said "to what purpose?"
Unlike the Southern Advance, what would a limited/full scale offensive bring Japan in China? Capitulation? no. Valuable resources? no. Spent resource and further dispersion of their troops? Yes.
As to their not being "able" to do it. I've never read anywhere that they wern't. Again it comes down to a question of "why" and "for what purpose" If no concrete objective or goal is pervalient, and the empire decided to go with the "southern advance", i would logically expect the Japanese to sit tight in China while these other operations, including the subjegation of Burma (and it's lifeline to China) unfold in the hopes that they would 'solve' the China problem themselves.
The reality is the Japanese Army, which came to rule and chart its country's course, never had the capability to subjugate the Chinese to the extent necessary (utterly) to enforce Japan's idea of "peace" within the context of Hakko Ichiu (basically, that the strongest country, Japan, would rule all others in the world).
Japan was up against it for the very reason that it had invaded China and now found itself in an all too very real sense stalemated. Japan's only way out of the hole it had dug for itself was 1) retreat (and lose face? dream on), 2) work out a deal with America to connive in its subjugation of China through a reinstitution of the trade of the raw materials and other stuff of war which Japan needed to further pursue its current war policy (fat chance--though at the time there were plenty of "well-meaning" Americans who were none too eager to "antagonize" our little Japanese cousins), or 3) try to take and hold those island areas of greater Asia south of Japan which contained the raw materials Japan desired and in fact needed in order to "mix it up with the varsity" (i.e., America). Japan (not unexpectedly and wholly unwisely) chose the latter option . . . and soon enough the country had its Kodo-Ha head handed to it on a platter stamped "Made in USA."
End of story.
Tristanjohn,
Nobody was claiming that Japan could have subjugated all of China. The post you quote was refering to the ability of the IJA to go on the "offensive" in China in 1941. Clearly the IJA had the ability to go on a limited offensive on the mainland as they demonstrated in 1944.
.
Posted: Wed Aug 13, 2003 9:38 pm
by Tristanjohn
Originally posted by TIMJOT
Tristanjohn,
Nobody was claiming that Japan could have subjugated all of China. The post you quote was refering to the ability of the IJA to go on the "offensive" in China in 1941. Clearly the IJA had the ability to go on a limited offensive on the mainland as they demonstrated in 1944.
Hi, TIMJOT. Thanks for responding.
Not exactly. The thrust of the argument was that Japan not only had the ability to "go on the offensive" in 1941 but to
slice up nearly a fourth of the country not previously under its control and then put all of this newly conquered territory under its Imperial heel. That's what was argued, with the "proof" being tendered as to the historical viability of these (if I may say so incredible) results through means of a wargame study conducted using the
WitP model as the platform.
The question was asked: how reliable could this model be in this respect in lieu of Japan's seeming (actually definite) lack of ability to conduct any such offensive historically?
By 1944 things had changed. It was a new world militarily speaking. China wasn't the same country, the ground had changed. Chinese were fighting Chinese as well as Japanese and the war had dragged on for another three long years.
But let's set 1944 aside and address the seminal question, which is not what Japan
might have done militarily in 1941 but more to the point what did Japan
need to do immediately just to keep the head of its economy (especially with regards to its reserves of petroleum products) above water.
The answer is: Japan needed to find a supplier of the raw materials and resources of war its country lacked domestically, and these things were never going to be found in China. America had them in abundance, had in fact been Japan's chief supplier, but Japan was now on our S-list. Another source was needed. This source was easy enough for Japan to find; it lay to the south and that is precisely where Japan headed for what it needed.
The plan (thinking, if you will, as far as sober thought was allowed to guide the actions of the ruling military junta) was to gobble up SE Asia's archipelago of resource-rich islands, particularly Java, consolidate this acquisition, develop it, meanwhile hold off America until our country's leaders sued for some sort of acceptable "peace" based on a "compromise" to be dictated by the warlords then in control of all things Japanese. Then (and only then) Japan would be able (might be able) to turn once again to the problem of China and deal with that mess (there is no other word for it and the Japanese did not kid themselves on this score) at its relative leisure. And even at that Japan's fanatical rulers (the Army) realized clearly (if there was ever "clarity" within the collective head of this single-minded group) that it would not any longer be a question of ruling the "eight corners of the world" but more like three or four of the closest and most convenient corners of greater Asia . . . maybe . . .
if everything fell perfectly into place along the way.
I'm sorry, but I must agree with the gentleman who has come to question the veracity of the
WitP model as it stands at this date, based on representations made in this forum.
The truth is Japan was idiotic to pursue its historical course for the reason it never enjoyed a snowball's chance in hell of succeeding in its aims for world, or even southeast Asian, hegemony. If the
WitP model at this juncture implies otherwise then I put it to you that that model stands in need of substantially more (and better) work.
By the way, in this I am not surprised. Parts of the model in
UV are off to an extent that distresses me. Japanese air assets, especially carrier-borne, just for example, are entirely too effective, while its USN counterpart is too weak. At least in the early going. (I haven't gotten past October 1942 yet to know how the model behaves later on.)
Tris
Posted: Wed Aug 13, 2003 11:22 pm
by TIMJOT
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
Not exactly. The thrust of the argument was that Japan not only had the ability to "go on the offensive" in 1941 but to slice up nearly a fourth of the country not previously under its control and then put all of this newly conquered territory under its Imperial heel. That's what was argued, with the "proof" being tendered as to the historical viability of these (if I may say so incredible) results through means of a wargame study conducted using the WitP model as the platform.
The question was asked: how reliable could this model be in this respect in lieu of Japan's seeming (actually definite) lack of ability to conduct any such offensive historically?
By 1944 things had changed. It was a new world militarily speaking. China wasn't the same country, the ground had changed. Chinese were fighting Chinese as well as Japanese and the war had dragged on for another three long years.
Tris
Tristanjohn,
Huh

I beg to differ and since I was a part of the original debate I will attempt to clarify.
The debate started when a poster questioned the success as well as the viability of the tester's offensive in China in 1941. Specifically the capture of the bases of Wuchow, Ichang, and Homan. How you translated this into 1 fourth of the country is beyond me. All those bases roughly parallel the front lines and are within 1 or 2 hexes away.
As you said Japan chose to go in another direction, but the attack on the SRA in itself did not preclude going on the offensive in China as well. The fact that they did not had to do more with the decision to defeat China obliquely and the realization that simply captureing more territory would not in itself not result in victory and would in fact simply soak up more resources for little gain.
You are right things changed in 1944. Specifically China was in fact stronger and Japan was weaker. Yet Japan managed an offensive that captured considerably more territory than was being debated in the WitP test. The most important thing that changed however was that there was now a reason to capture that territory. Specifically the capture of allied bomber bases that threaten Japan and to open up a land supply route to the SRA that in 1944 was being all but cut off by the US sub blockade.
If Japan could have forseen the future they would have undoubtedly secured this land bridge to SRA sooner.
Regards
Re: Re: I guess what I'm asking is...
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 3:24 am
by Tristanjohn
[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
Mike,
In the spring of 1944 the IJA launched the ICHIGO offensive and and succeeded in connecting occupied China with Indo-china and in the process conquer more territory than they had the preceding 4 years and totally defeating the American trained and equiped Z force to boot. This was done after significant amount of forces had been witdrawn to defend the NG, PI, Formosa, ect.....
This is what happened.
Operation Ichi-Go (as it was code named) kicked off on 18 April 1944. At that time the situation in China boiled down to this: the Chinese Army was mostly demoralized but had nevertheless been victorious recently in Burma. The population as a whole suffered the morale-plunging effects of rampant inflation and even more corrupt/inept governmental administration than ever before, and disarray reigned militarily (with General Stillwell's recall not far off--he couldn't get along with Chiang Kai-shek).
The objectives of this Japanese renewed offensive were to forestall U..S. bombing of Japan from bases in Kweilun and Liuchow, restore operation of the nouth-south transcontinental railway and generally to destroy what the Japanese considered to be the backbone of the Chinese Army, thus creating more pressure on the Chungking government.
First order of business: the Peiping-Hankow railway, which was accomplished by mid June. The capial of Honan province, Loyang, fell in the process.
Secondly, the Japanese staged a two-pronged pincer movement Hunan province, Changsha falling on 18 June 1944, with the railway center of Hengyang captured directly afterward. The latter site was besieged by six full Japanese divisions, defended by some 15,000 plus Chinese (aided by Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force) and after 46 days (8 August 1944) this prize, too, slipped into the hands of the Emperor.
By early 1945 the Japanese are in control of the Hankow-Canton railway.
Meanwhile, reinforced (eventually to a force of around 400,000) they mount yet another westerly drive to take Kweilin and Liuchow by 11 November and by early December Tuyan and Kweiyang in Kweichow province go into the bag as well.
So far so good, though please keep in mind that none of this made any sense at all with respect to Japan's overall war situation and also that it was achieved against a worn-down (remember, this is in 1944, not 1941) and demorilized Chinese Army.
But things were about to change. General Wedemeyer (Stillwell's replacement) assumes command 31 October 1944 as an "adviser" and right away bends himself to two tasks: the defense of Kweilin airfield and of Kunming.
An airlift of fresh troops helped to stem the Japanese advance in Kweichow province while General Fu Tsoyi was simultaneously ordered to engage the Japanese in northern China, thus denying them the ability to reinforce the Kweiyang area.
Briefly: efforts were made to improve conditions for Chinese solders, the defense of Kunming was established (Operation Alpha) along with plans to open China's eastern seaports (Beta and Carborando), and by and large the skies over China had brightened somewhat come the spring of 1945. The Japanese Army met misfortune in the Hunan-Hupeh area (losing airfields there originally gained during their earlier offensive) and saw their Chihchiang campaign in western Hunan come to less than nothing when all was said and done (the 80,000 men they started out with ended up behind their jumping-off points).
By this time the Chinese Army enjoyed the initiative for the first time in the war, for whatever it's worth (though how any of that might, or could, impact what went down in 1941 I do not know).
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 5:03 am
by Snigbert
I'm sorry, but I must agree with the gentleman who has come to question the veracity of the WitP model as it stands at this date, based on representations made in this forum.
Just a reminder, WitP is still in Alpha mode and any reports/AAR you read on the forum are not necessarily a reflection of what is planned for the released product.
THANK YOU., Tristanjohn
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 5:12 am
by Mike Scholl
My original point was that it seemed unlikely to me that the
Japanese would have the ability to go on the offensive in China
in December of 1941 (when they had just launched an offensive
committment all over the Western Pacific Basin) when they hadn't
seemed to feel they could do in in the preceeding year (without
major committments everywhere else). My worry was that rules
designed to allow for Japan's rapid advance against the
suprised and ill-prepared Western Powers were being used in
China to achieve a-historic ends.
It's nice to see someone clear-headed enough to understand
the distinction. I'm tired of "Japan did it in '44---therefor she
could have done it in '41!" Makes as much sense as "the US
dropped A-Bombs in '45---therefor they could drop them in '42!"
We're going to get hammered..., because a lot of players
WANT Japan to be a "super power" in 1941 so they can "win" the War. That she was a low rung 2nd rate power making a glorious
but ill planned "last ditch effort" to hang on to that status is just
not acceptable to them.
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 5:48 am
by Tristanjohn
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
I'm sorry, but I must agree with the gentleman who has come to question the veracity of the WitP model as it stands at this date, based on representations made in this forum.
Originally posted by Snigbert
Just a reminder, WitP is still in Alpha mode and any reports/AAR you read on the forum are not necessarily a reflection of what is planned for the released product.
Isn't that pretty much the implication of what I wrote?
Allow me to say this. A person who has stayed on top of doings over here for the past couple of years with regard to the development and publication of
UV informs me that much of what I've found to be worringly wrong in that simulation stems from just the sort of input Matrix (according to him) received in threads quite a bit similar to this one. I don't judge, wasn't there myself and I'm willing always to give the benefit of the doubt, but I know a couple of things: there's stuff being bandied about in this thread that isn't exactly what you could call "useful" to anyone interested in a serious reading of WWII history, and that fellow I mentioned who has more experience than I re the doings of
UV impresses me as sober.
I go back to the beginning with Grigsby's games (or for that matter the work of Billings) and I've always found his titles to enjoyable to play at the least, some of them nothing short of outstanding. I'm pro Grigsby. But the thing is I've now played to a modest extent the "first part" if you will of the greater
WitP project and while it's loads of fun it also lacks in certain areas of the combat (especially air combat) model. Now I don't know, but the impression I get is that there seems to be some misappreciation within the development team of just went down in WWII in the South Pacific and
why it happened to go down that way--again, this based on my examination of the system to date. That, or the problems I allude to are known and recognized but for whatever reason haven't been addressed in patches thus far--and I find that to be unlikely given how far along
UV is as I write this. (I mean, afterall, it stands at v2.30 and if anyone knew and/or cared about the problems I cite then you'd suppose the corrections would have already been made.)
Fact is, I'm advised that these problems are pretty much known (if not in every case "recognized," that is to say actually acknowledged to be problems) but along the way, for better or worse, Matrix has chosen to listen to the squeaking wheel rather than make it "right," and if you want to know the more I read these boards the easier it is for me to believe that.
For my part, all I want is the best WWII naval simulation possible. I guess my message here is that the best course in pursuit of that end would be to follow history and let it be the ultimate guide. As soon as one deviates from that known path and begins to take this what-if stuff seriously error always ensues. Or to put it another way, an historical simulation by definition attempts to model history as closely as possible. Getting "creative" only leads everyone astray.
Anyway, the reason I interjected my thoughts here was only to voice agreement with the man who advised caution re the accuracy of the
WitP alpha model with regard to what the Japanese ought to be able to do in China and what they oughtn't, this based on his study of the period. I found his position to be sound and attempted to explain why. That's all.
Re: THANK YOU., Tristanjohn
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 6:07 am
by Tristanjohn
Originally posted by Mike Scholl
My original point was that it seemed unlikely to me that the
Japanese would have the ability to go on the offensive in China
in December of 1941 (when they had just launched an offensive
committment all over the Western Pacific Basin) when they hadn't
seemed to feel they could do in in the preceeding year (without
major committments everywhere else). My worry was that rules
designed to allow for Japan's rapid advance against the
suprised and ill-prepared Western Powers were being used in
China to achieve a-historic ends.
It's nice to see someone clear-headed enough to understand
the distinction. I'm tired of "Japan did it in '44---therefor she
could have done it in '41!" Makes as much sense as "the US
dropped A-Bombs in '45---therefor they could drop them in '42!"
Exactly so, Mike. What else can I say?
We're going to get hammered..., because a lot of players
WANT Japan to be a "super power" in 1941 so they can "win" the War. That she was a low rung 2nd rate power making a glorious
but ill planned "last ditch effort" to hang on to that status is just
not acceptable to them.
This worries me more than anything else. Not the getting "hammered" part. I can take it, have for years. No, what worries me is that I've already been advised that Matrix apparently listens to this crowd and allows the development of the model (or at least previously this was the case in re to
UV) to be molded (however subtly) according to these lights. Although this is somewhat of an exaggeration, and I do not wish to seem unfair, still one might well typify the logical result of this sort of meddling, however well-meaning, in the form of those super IJN CV TFs which currently sail the Coral Sea in
UV.
On balance, not especially good.
IJN Super Aircombat TF's
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 6:32 am
by mogami
"those super IJN CV TFs which currently sail the Coral Sea in UV."
Hi, In the actual war the 6 Fleet Carriers stayed together from Dec 7th 41 to Apr 9th 42. They attacked PH sailed into the Indian Ocean and bombed Darwin. Japan didn't lose a single battle until they split up. (2 to Coral Sea and 4 to Midway)
You will see super CV TF's. And this is historical. I also guess we will see USN super TF's (There are going to be a few monster carrier battles)
Re: IJN Super Aircombat TF's
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 7:02 am
by Tristanjohn
Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, In the actual war the 6 Fleet Carriers stayed together from Dec 7th 41 to Apr 9th 42. They attacked PH sailed into the Indian Ocean and bombed Darwin. Japan didn't lose a single battle until they split up. (2 to Coral Sea and 4 to Midway)
You will see super CV TF's. And this is historical. I also guess we will see USN super TF's (There are going to be a few monster carrier battles)
By "super" I did not mean large but rather much better endowed of fighting capability than their historical counterparts. While Nagumo's Strike Force enjoyed some success at Pearl Harbor (not much on balance when all was said and done, and at that most of the planes which did score hits did so on the wrong targets--not the fault of the pilots, by the way, but rather the planners of that attack) and more or less did what it pleased off Darwin, there is nothing in either episode to sugest that IJN carriers ought to be modelled in the way
UV does so. The planes of these TFs are entirely too accurate with ordnance, fly into their targets (as a rule) in one coordinated mass, thus placing an ahistorical load on USN CAP, seem (the bombers) pretty much oblivious (at times) to interception, and for some reason which I cannot understand fail to take much damage from flak. Granted, early in the war USN flak wasn't what it would soon enough become, but it was more than equal to what the IJN afforded its ships, yet Japanese planes, nowhere near as well-built as the American models, take fewer casualties to flak. (Let's be clear about that: relatively flimsy Japanese planes against heavier flak take fewer casualties than heartier--make that
much heartier--American planes flying into lighter flak. What's wrong with that?)
Exacerbating these errors in game mechanics is another problem general to the system: spotting is too accurate to begin with, and from what I can tell no account has been taken in the inability of both sides, at least through the early months of 1942, to get the actual spotting information they did gather to the right people in a timely manner.
Another issue: the weather model is poorly conceived and in any event doesn't seem to operate as intended, so while there's a chance that a weather "front" (an unknown concept to
UV and this a terrible shame as the warfare we speak to here was quite a bit about weather in general and at times
weather fronts in particular) might aid one side or the other in a CV TF-on-CV TF battle this would be the exception.
On the other side of the coin one could pretty much tick right on the down the list of sins made with re to the Japanese model and simply reverese these to end up with what we have re the USN in
UV. It's planes don't hit much, if anything at all, even if they are fortunate enough to survive Japanese CAP and flak, and the result of equal carrier battles leaves an historian with the following question: how could the USN have achieved the results it did achieve at Coral Sea and Midway if
this is an accurate model of the respective fighting qualities of the two navies?
My impression is some of this (how much I don't know) might be laid at the doorstep of the arbitrary pilot ratings assigned. Whatever, I wouldn't give a whole lot for USN chances of achieving anything like historical results against the IJN in
WitP unless some fundamental changes are made in how that model works with respect to the model
UV sports.
Thanks for responding. I appreciate your input.
Re: Re: Re: I guess what I'm asking is...
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 7:09 am
by TIMJOT
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
By this time the Chinese Army enjoyed the initiative for the first time in the war, for whatever it's worth (though how any of that might, or could, impact what went down in 1941 I do not know).
Tristanjohn,
Thankyou for the dissertation on the "Icho-go offensive", but it really wasnt neccessary. (BTW nothing in it contridicts my post on the subject)
The point was to simply demonstrate the ability of the IJA to go on the offensive in China and conquer large amounts of territory even when its position was weaker than it was in 1941, while China's was stronger with the advent of the 14th airforce and the American trained and equiped Y force.
Its a misconception that Japan was deadlocked and incapable of any initiative on the mainland by 1941. Again we are not talking total subjugation of China here. We were discussing what amounted to a series of limited advances that captured a few bases in a test run of opening phase of the campaign of WitP.
The arguement "if they could of, why didnt they?" doesnt fly. Quite simply they saw no pressing need or advantage to at that time. They had already conquered the richest parts of China and where quite content with what they had. There was no need to capture more territory in the vast mostly poor interior. Which would only soak up precious resources in an unwinable guerrilla war.
Besides contrary to what many may believe the IJA was not static in China. Throughout 42-43 they mounted a series of the so-called "Rice Offensives" Which were designed to give new formations battle expirence against weak opposition and to seize the rice crop from previously unoccupied areas. Why waist men and resources occupying and guarding rice paddies in the interior, when you can simply march in at harvest time, take the crop and withdraw until the next harvest.
Now back to the main point. Again nobody is suggesting that the IJA should be able to run amok in China, but is it your position that the IJA was totally incapable of even limited advances in 1941? Because that is the crux of the arguement. Thats were the AAR ended. There was no unstopable all conquering advance that swept through China. All that happen, was a tester had the audacity to go on a very limited offensive in China in 1941 and this was somehow construed as evidence of a broken game engine simply because it didnt model the sacred cow of the forever static China front.
Now I will admit that in the test the advance perhaps was too easy and too swift, I would attribute that to its being only an Alpha test. As it stands there it certainly does seem there is a lot of room for improvement in land movement, disembarkations and land combat on a whole.
P.S I am not "hammering" I am just attempting to clarify the positions.
Regards
Oil
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 11:32 am
by mogami
Hi, I was looking at the map and I noticed a USA base on North Sakhalin Island. (called Ohka) I recalled the Island was divided following the 1905 Japan-Russia war with Russia getting the northern half. (At the time the Japanese thought it was worthless only good for reindeer.
Well in 1923 the Soviets began discovering oil there. (They've been finding fields ever since) In 1996 6.1billion barrels remained to be pumped out (It is one of the largest field systems around)
What if?
Japan had kept the whole Island after the 1905 war. (6 large fields were operating there by 1935)
Or what if Japan had decided to take the northern Sakhalin fields following Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union.
If Japan does not go to war with USA et al the Navy will not consume so much oil. These fields were more then enough to support the Japanese econmy.
Now, I know the Japanese knew these fields were producing so I was wondering if anyone knew of any plans in this direction.
Was it simply the 1939 drubbing the Soviets gave the Japanese?
Were the Japanese miffed at the Germans so much they ignored the request to invade? (Japan had been embarrassed by German-Soviet relations several times The Germans signed the non-aggression pact with Stalin in 39 right when the Soviets had destroyed a Japanese division. Then Germany did not disclose their plans to attack the Soviets in 41
If I was Japanese during this period my attention would have focused on North Sakhalin.
Ah never mind. After further study I find Japan occupied the whole Island between 1920-25 and gave back the northern half after the Soviets gave the Japanese oil and coal consessions. (So they were already getting resource from here.)
Re: Re: IJN Super Aircombat TF's
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 2:27 pm
by ADavidB
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
By "super" I did not mean large but rather much better endowed of fighting capability than their historical counterparts. While Nagumo's Strike Force enjoyed some success at Pearl Harbor (not much on balance when all was said and done, and at that most of the planes which did score hits did so on the wrong targets--not the fault of the pilots, by the way, but rather the planners of that attack) and more or less did what it pleased off Darwin, there is nothing in either episode to sugest that IJN carriers ought to be modelled in the way UV does so. The planes of these TFs are entirely too accurate with ordnance, fly into their targets (as a rule) in one coordinated mass, thus placing an ahistorical load on USN CAP, seem (the bombers) pretty much oblivious (at times) to interception, and for some reason which I cannot understand fail to take much damage from flak. Granted, early in the war USN flak wasn't what it would soon enough become, but it was more than equal to what the IJN afforded its ships, yet Japanese planes, nowhere near as well-built as the American models, take fewer casualties to flak. (Let's be clear about that: relatively flimsy Japanese planes against heavier flak take fewer casualties than heartier--make that much heartier--American planes flying into lighter flak. What's wrong with that?)
Exacerbating these errors in game mechanics is another problem general to the system: spotting is too accurate to begin with, and from what I can tell no account has been taken in the inability of both sides, at least through the early months of 1942, to get the actual spotting information they did gather to the right people in a timely manner.
Another issue: the weather model is poorly conceived and in any event doesn't seem to operate as intended, so while there's a chance that a weather "front" (an unknown concept to UV and this a terrible shame as the warfare we speak to here was quite a bit about weather in general and at times weather fronts in particular) might aid one side or the other in a CV TF-on-CV TF battle this would be the exception.
On the other side of the coin one could pretty much tick right on the down the list of sins made with re to the Japanese model and simply reverese these to end up with what we have re the USN in UV. It's planes don't hit much, if anything at all, even if they are fortunate enough to survive Japanese CAP and flak, and the result of equal carrier battles leaves an historian with the following question: how could the USN have achieved the results it did achieve at Coral Sea and Midway if this is an accurate model of the respective fighting qualities of the two navies?
My impression is some of this (how much I don't know) might be laid at the doorstep of the arbitrary pilot ratings assigned. Whatever, I wouldn't give a whole lot for USN chances of achieving anything like historical results against the IJN in WitP unless some fundamental changes are made in how that model works with respect to the model UV sports.
Thanks for responding. I appreciate your input.
You've hit the nail on the head. This is the same problem that occured in Pacwar and was continued in UV.
What GG and friends need to do is to be open about this and give the players a "switch" in the game settings. One setting would truly be "historic" and would accurately model the reality of 1941-1945. The other would be "even-steven" and allow the Japanese the "edge" that exists in UV today ( and existed in Pacwar ).
This way both sides of the argument could be happy.
Dave Baranyi
FLAK
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 3:02 pm
by Rainerle
Actually, IMO Kates and Vals die like flies in allied TF FLAK.
Re: FLAK
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 5:26 pm
by TIMJOT
Originally posted by Rainerle
Actually, IMO Kates and Vals die like flies in allied TF FLAK.
They are Roman candles in my games as well. I Have to wonder if any who expound this supposed IJN invincibility has ever actually played as the IJN.
Re: Re: FLAK
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 7:21 pm
by Tristanjohn
Originally posted by TIMJOT
They are Roman candles in my games as well. I Have to wonder if any who expound this supposed IJN invincibility has ever actually played as the IJN.
I didn't say or mean to imply that IJN carrier assets are invincible in
UV, just that the combat model diverges to a considerable degree, for the reasons stated, from history. What the gamer is left with as a result of the sum of these errors is a simulation severely challenged to reproduce historical results in all too many instances, and this is especially the case when it comes to the air-combat module.
Plainly, this is a serious failing for any historical wargame; given this particular title's pedigree (we're talking about a third-generation game system here for all intents and purposes, third-and-a-half if you include
UV and fourth-and-a-half if you throw in that blatent knock-off some ten years ago

) one might be excused to have held out hope for closer historical scrutiny this many years along the collective development track.
To be frank, I cannot fathom resistance to anything I've noted. Indeed, it all strikes me as so perfectly obvious as to be something not requiring voice. But then, somehow, that never seems to be the way it shakes out in the real world, now is it?
Re: Re: Re: FLAK
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 8:26 pm
by bilbow
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
To be frank, I cannot fathom resistance to anything I've noted. Indeed, it all strikes me as so perfectly obvious as to be something not requiring voice. But then, somehow, that never seems to be the way it shakes out in the real world, now is it?
After reading your comments I have to wonder what game you have been playing- not the UV I play. Over about 10 PBEM games several currently in mid-43 time (Scenarios 15 and 17) I have seen exactly the opposite of what you describe. I see the Jamanese carrier air strong early on, with higher experience against Allied airgoups with lower experience and starting the May scenarios with incomplete airgroups. As the game progresses I see Allied quality increasing and Japanese quality decreasing so that come 1943, the Japs have a very difficult time of it. Then the Corsair comes into play and the air battle is very one-sided.
I see allied flak ripping apart the Jap squadrons, even in the early going, and with increasing effectiveness as the game progresses. By mid 43 it's very difficult for a Japanese strike to survive never mind hit anything.
Coral sea and Midway? Coral Sea was argueably a defeat at the tactical level. Midway was a fluke; we got very very lucky. Midway can happen in UV but it's very unlikely, as it should be.
I could understand you comments if you were playing against the AI as the Allies- with the very hard setting. The Japs would be getting a cheat. But if you are playing PBEM which is where UV really shines, your comments frankly make no sense.
Re: Re: Re: FLAK
Posted: Thu Aug 14, 2003 8:39 pm
by TIMJOT
Originally posted by Tristanjohn
.
To be frank, I cannot fathom resistance to anything I've noted. Indeed, it all strikes me as so perfectly obvious as to be something not requiring voice. But then, somehow, that never seems to be the way it shakes out in the real world, now is it?
I guess, because we do not all agree on your premise. I for one agree that naval search is far too efficient for both sides. As it is its almost an all seeing eye in the sky. I would also agree that the weather model is poor, although as I understand it is being revamped for WitP.
I do not agree that the aircombat model is seriously broken in V2.3. If played correctly I regularly get 1 for 1 combat at 1:1 odds in 1942. This rises drastically in favor of the allies in 1943 as it should.
I would caution not to label the game seriously flawed simply because it doesnt always model verbatim historical results.
I wouldnt expect to see many Midways unless the allied player plays with the FOW off and the IJN with it on. The allied attack is launched while the IJN CV TF is attacking a land base and protected by LBA. That being said it can and does come close from time to time. I once had a US 3 CV TF ambush a IJN 4 CV TF while it was busy pummeling a surface TF. I ended up sinking 3 of the CVs outright and badly damageing the 4th, with the loss of only 1 CV. Very Midwayesque.
I would say most of the unhistorical results are due to unhistorical circumstances ie; no Midway allowing for the so called 6 CV super TF. We simply do not know the effect of such a TF would have had in SOPAC historically.
I do not agree that inorder for a game to be considered a historical war game it must follow historical precedent, ie; no China offensive allowed in 1941 because there wasnt one historically. Its like saying no defence of the Malaya barrier can last beyond March 6th 42 because it didnt historically.