Matrix Games Forums

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Subchaser
It wasn’t a flaw, it was trade off. Problem was not in tanks, tank doctrine was spoiled and this doctrine generated stupid requirements for tanks to be use under it. Only now there is model which is somewhat better. Black Eagle MBT, order is already placed, but there are only 2 examples in frontline service. Turret is and crewless now.

Interesting... judging from pic the ammo is now stored behind turret (like Western tanks did for decades).

Nonetheless I doubt that Russia has money to buy it (I think that they didn't buy tanks in quantity in past 10+ years).

I knew that 34s are still fighting, but M-10s?!? Who was using them?

Croatians (my side) used few of them I think (we got them from one of the strategic depots where older equipment was kept).

BTW, for certain I know that battery of 203 mm howitzers (US WWII models) was used and they played vital role in defense.


Leo

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Interesting... judging from pic the ammo is now stored behind turret (like Western tanks did for decades).

Right. Here is rear view

Nonetheless I doubt that Russia has money to buy it (I think that they didn't buy tanks in quantity in past 10+ years).

There were some purchases of the new stuff, but primary for trials, order for BE tanks lists only 32 machines.

Croatians (my side) used few of them I think (we got them from one of the strategic depots where older equipment was kept).

BTW, for certain I know that battery of 203 mm howitzers (US WWII models) was used and they played vital role in defense.

jeez what else do you have in that your strategic depots!?

IIRC, after the war the US Army decided that the optimum mix of tanks would be 3 or 4 M4s with the 105mm howitzer (or even the 75mm gun) to each 1 with the 76mm. Infantry support missions were found to be more important, and more frequent, than anti-armor missions, and the 75 and 105 were better for that role - leaving most of the tank killing to the TDs, artillery, and tac air. So maybe, just maybe, all this discussion of which tank is a better TD is a bit of a red herring, because that wasn't really the tank's role in US doctrine.

Another interesting note: the most effective tank killer in the US arsenal during WW2 may well have been the B-26. Not by bombing tanks, but by bombing rail marshalling yards - forcing German tanks to travel under their own power or not at all. The famous reliability of the exquisitely-engineered German machines did the rest.

PzB

[:)]

Actually, what would have happened if the IJN had been shrewd enough to attack everything but US possessions on 12/7
(Ie, PH, Wake, Guam and Philippines).....
Guam and Philippines would have been isolated and it would have been much harder to rally the US for war....

Opinions....

It might be the most interesting of the historical "what if's". Though it's doubtful
the US would have remained on the sidelines very long in face of this new Japan-
ese aggression (public opinion was coming around to the notion that the Axis
was going to HAVE to be stopped somewhere---and Japan was not very popular
already), the real historical difference would have been the lack of a "remember
Pearl Harbor" rallying cry to inflame the entire population.

US production would still have peaked far beyond anything the Axis could hope
to match, and Madison Avenue would still have whipped out plenty of Pro-War
material at the Governments bequest, and every American who wanted one
could have found a high-paying job. But "the Draft" is never popular, and the
massive flood of recruitement that resulted from PH wouldn't have been there.
Americans can usually be whipped up to fight for a "Good Cause" (there was
no PH in WW I) and helping "plucky little England" and others against "the Yellow
Peril" and that "ranting lunatic with the funny mustache" would do..., especially
as the Axis Powers kept doing well-publicised "rotten things" like bombing civil-
ians in Rotterdam and Nanking and waging "unrestricted submarine warefare"
and generally being "Un-American" about things.

But it would put the American and the Japanese player in an interesting quandry.
How long can you wait? What happens if America steps in and "guarantees the
safety" of Australia and New Zealand by sending troops (happened with Iceland).
Guam and Wake are lost causes, but another couple of convoys to the Philippines
could make the Japanese supply lines South vulnerable. As the US, do you risk
those assets? As the Japs, do you let them arrive? All kinds of military/political
quandries to wrestle with. Problem is, programming them into the game would
take another year---and nobody wants to wait.

lets take a look at production numbers
Germany
IVH:3774
IVJ:1758
VG+VA:2000 (A), 3126 (G)
VIE:1354
VIB:489
STUGIIIG:8600
JP 38t (Hetzer):2500
JP IV:769
JP IV/70:1200
JP V:390
JP VI:77
Russia
T 34 M 40:1000
T 34/76 total: 35000!!
T 34/85:29500!!
M4/76 (LL):2095
KV 1:3000
KV-1s:1232
IS-2:3800
US
M4 (all types): 49234!! (30600 equipped with 75 gun)
M4:6748
M4A1:6281
M4A2:8052 (almost all Lend-Lease+ Marines //Diesel Engine)
M4a3:1690
M4A3(75)W:3071
M4A3E2:254 (Jumbo)
M4A1(76)W:3426
M4A3(76)W:4542
M26:700 up to VE day with 310 in europe (pershing)
M10:4993
M18:2507
M36:1413

Sherman VC (Firefly):2136

Hi, This subject has been around for quite a while (I think there is a thread in the Pac War forum on this strategy for Pac War)

Speaking strictly from the point of view of someone tasked with making a Japanese war plan for taking over the SRA while avoiding USA assets and areas I can only say it would be taking the nightmare and making it three times as scary.

As the planner I want some of the bases I now have to avoid.

It is critical for people to understand one thing. If Japan omits the Pearl Harbor Strike and does not go to war with the USA on Dec 7 1941 then she had better never go to war with USA at all. How this is to going impact events in the SRA is a major question. Allied non USA ships in USA waters or ports. USA air and naval units observing Japanese movements.

Because Japan forgoes aquiring certain airfields and refueling locations the Japanese CV have to provide the air support needed. This means they are not available for covering the Central/South Pacific should war begin unplanned with the USA. Combine this with the USN retaining it's fleet and base undamaged and it is possible for the USA to undertake some kind of punitive response should war begin.

If Japan does not declare war and the USA is unable to provoke them then Japan of course is in a much improved position once the SRA operation concludes. But they better always avoid war with the USA.
If it begins because of the isolated nature of PI and surrounding areas
Japan will once again win the early battle. However it is really a matter of what the USA has done in the interm that will impact the first 6 months-1 year of conflict. I would expect PI to hold out longer and inflict more damage given this extra time to prepare.

Would New Calodonia be occupied by the USA?
Would Britian turn over all bases in South Pacifi-Central Pacific because she is unable to defend them?

I really can't see the USA not decalring war. (at some point and I don't think Japan would have much time past Feb 42) The boycott was the result of Japanese take over in Indo-China. Something more provocative would result from Japans declaring war on Allies of the USA.

Well, on the one hand - you don't have the PH experience to drive the nail through the battleship as the final arbiter of naval warfare, but you do let the US observe the effectiveness of the Kido Butai in action - plus all of those additional ships coming off the ways as part of the "Two-Ocean Navy" bill passed by Congress in 1942.

The Japanese Navy had long considered the United States to be the only enemy that mattered in the Pacific (whereas the Japanese Army was looking at Russia) & from the strategic point of view it would make little sense to leave huge numbers of US & Allied bases intact along the lines of communication to the SRA - when war did come, think of all of that land-based air in range of vital Japanese shipping lanes & the huge intact Pacific Fleet coming out of Pearl Harbor.

It would have taken a complete change in Japanese perception at the time to prevent them from bringing the US into the war immediately with strikes against at least Wake, Guam, the PI, etc. The attack on Pearl Harbor was also necessary (in their minds) to cripple the one naval power (specifically the battleships, since even Japanese admirals at the time felt BBs were the most important assets afloat) that could interfere. Their entire warplan was built around the idea of war with the United States.

Another good point Mogami - the vast majority of steel for Japanese industry came from the United States, and with the US embargo on Japan, this too would put a huge crimp on the Japanese economy.

Hi, There is a very popular perception that it was the Japanese Army that caused the war with the USA while the leadership of the IJN was against such a war and only went to war reluctantly.

The truth is the IJA was interested in expanding north from Manchuria and securing China and had no real interest in fighting the British/Dutch and Americans.

Prior to 1930 the IJN had been opposed to war with the USA but as it modernized it's fleet from coal burning to oil burning the Navy began looking for means of acquiring a secure supply of oil. It was the Navy that required the drive south rather then further attempts versus the Soviets.
(War with the Soviet Union could provide many raw materials but only a limited addition to Japanese oil supply)

The Army limited the number of combat formations it could provide for the drive south. Their real interest still pointed north.
The lack of IJA planning for a war against Britain and USA became evident once the SRA was secured. The expanded role the IJN forced onto the IJA is the main reason for the IJA's estimate of 1.5million tons of shipping being too low. There is a large supply requirement for preparing the defensive bases along the Central/South Pacific perimeter. Maintaining large troop formations and aircraft also carried a high demand. In the event Japan was never able to conduct anything close to adequate preparations. Often you have a "just in time" troop deployment that is hindered by lack of time to finish defensive improvements and stockpile supplies. It had been envisioned that the IJN would provide the defense of these islands long enough for the IJA to get ready. I think the USA was at least 1 year ahead of the Japanese planning estimates.

Rough sketch of Japanese War Plan

Dec 41-May 42
Expansion into SRA
May 42-May 43
Prepare defense
May 43-May 44*** (or until USA gave up and came to settlement)
Fight defensive battles that cost more then enemy was willing to pay

The Doolittle Raid also disrupted Japanese plans. Resulting in operations beyond the scope of original plan.
Port Moresby operation that led to Coral Sea battle was not part of original plan but was added to try to exploit then current situation.

THere is a fascinating book on the subject of the options available to the Japanese in the first 6 months of the war by H.P. Willmott called "The Barrier and the Javelin" I highly recommend this book to anyone who has not already read it. The Doolittle raid was particularly significant in that it disrupted Japanese strategic planning, leading them away from an operation they were just beginning to plan (conquest of New Caledonia/Fiji/Samoa) that might have caused the Allies serious problems, to one (Midway) that resulted in disaster for Japan. The title refers to the role of the Combined Fleet in IJN strategic planning; would it be the barrier that would stand between the USN and the newly-conquered SRA and its approaches, or would it be the javelin that would strike deep into the heart of the USN and rob it of its strength? The javelin idea was the more attractive, as success would mean that the massive reinforcements the USN had in the pipeline would then arrive as replacements for fleet units already sunk, thus buying Japan more time. Nice idea, bad plan, terrible execution.

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, This subject has been around for quite a while (I think there is a thread in the Pac War forum on this strategy for Pac War)

Speaking strictly from the point of view of someone tasked with making a Japanese war plan for taking over the SRA while avoiding USA assets and areas I can only say it would be taking the nightmare and making it three times as scary.

As the planner I want some of the bases I now have to avoid.

It is critical for people to understand one thing. If Japan omits the Pearl Harbor Strike and does not go to war with the USA on Dec 7 1941 then she had better never go to war with USA at all. How this is to going impact events in the SRA is a major question. Allied non USA ships in USA waters or ports. USA air and naval units observing Japanese movements.

Because Japan forgoes aquiring certain airfields and refueling locations the Japanese CV have to provide the air support needed. This means they are not available for covering the Central/South Pacific should war begin unplanned with the USA. Combine this with the USN retaining it's fleet and base undamaged and it is possible for the USA to undertake some kind of punitive response should war begin.

If Japan does not declare war and the USA is unable to provoke them then Japan of course is in a much improved position once the SRA operation concludes. But they better always avoid war with the USA.
If it begins because of the isolated nature of PI and surrounding areas
Japan will once again win the early battle. However it is really a matter of what the USA has done in the interm that will impact the first 6 months-1 year of conflict. I would expect PI to hold out longer and inflict more damage given this extra time to prepare.

Would New Calodonia be occupied by the USA?
Would Britian turn over all bases in South Pacifi-Central Pacific because she is unable to defend them?

I really can't see the USA not decalring war. (at some point and I don't think Japan would have much time past Feb 42) The boycott was the result of Japanese take over in Indo-China. Something more provocative would result from Japans declaring war on Allies of the USA.

MOGAMI You have summed it up admirably. The USA will be coming into the war, the
only question is when and from what stance and degree of preparation. You also do a
nice job of bringing up some of the political and military quandries the Japanese would
face in trying to avoid immediate US involvement.

Japan had already "bitten off more than she could chew" in her expansion in the 1930's
The IJA viewed the USSR as their primary threat, but had unfortunately learned in the
Manchurian border clashes thet the Red Army could "kick their teeth in" any time it
wanted to. Thus they viewed Russia's involvement with the Germans as an ideal "win-
dow of opportunity" for them. The IJN had struggled for years to try to get some parity
with the USN (whom they regarded as their great potential rival); only to see their ef-
forts swept away in a single day with the passage of the "Two Ocean Navy" Bill. American
shipyards were already laying down the hulls that would sweep Japan's fleet back into
the ranks of the "also rans". For Japan, it was "go now, or give it up forever". They
were forced to make what they saw as a "desperate choice". Too bad all around that
they weren't realistic enough to see that it was a hopeless choice as well

That is quite interesting...the Germans were able to run all over the Russians in the east, but in the west, the Russians could "kick in the teeth" of the Japanese.....it does make sense, but it also may say that the Japanese were ill suited for large protracted land battles on open plains.......this would make the invasion of the US much more difficult!

Jeff

Along the line of What if varients, I've always wondered why the Japanese didn't try to shut down the Panama canal in concert with their attack on PH. A merchant ship loaded with diesel and fertilizer detonated in the locks would appear to have done the job. Based on pre-war exercises the US Navy feared an attack on the canal, albeit of more conventional nature.

ORIGINAL: stljeffbb

That is quite interesting...the Germans were able to run all over the Russians in the east, but in the west, the Russians could "kick in the teeth" of the Japanese
Jeff

I think your directions are mixed up. The Germans were to the West of Russia and the Japanese were to the East, but I understood what you meant.

ORIGINAL: Blacksheep
Along the line of What if varients, I've always wondered why the Japanese didn't try to shut down the Panama canal in concert with their attack on PH. A merchant ship loaded with diesel and fertilizer detonated in the locks would appear to have done the job.

Wow, that is a fantastic plan. I've never even thought of such an attack. Based on what a truck bomb does when loaded with diesel fuel and fertilizer I can imagine the massive destruction a freighter full would cuase. It seems more like a modern day terrorist plan than a WW2 strategy, but hey, whatever works.

Wow, that is a fantastic plan. I've never even thought of such an attack. Based on what a truck bomb does when loaded with diesel fuel and fertilizer I can imagine the massive destruction a freighter full would cuase. It seems more like a modern day terrorist plan than a WW2 strategy, but hey, whatever works.

You do not have to imagine. Something of the sort pretty much wiped out Halifax Harbour in WW I with what amounts to obsolete stuff by WW II standards. Had Japan wanted to pull a stunt like that, they certainly could have completely destroyed the locks for at least a couple of years.

Hi, I hope WITP when complete produces a workable system for generating logical and historically feasible outcomes when the forces involved are not repeats of historic encounters. (I would hope when historic actions were set up the outcome was close to what occurred historically)
So no matter what the final system evolves into I will still fight the war following a plan I devise to take into account the game system.
I think the Japanese player (using hindsight) can do much better. The same is true for the Allied player. The game will begin to depart from history on day one and by day 1665 we should look back on a war that has produced it's own history.
The Japanese player will have to accept negative loss ratios in air to air. He can compensate to a degree be having a numerical advantage prior to opening combat. He has that advantage in the SRA so he only needs to insure he carries it with him where ever he goes.

I don't think we need to "balance" the game. I think we need to just make it accurate and let the players "balance" the game by their planning. The Japanese player has to highlight his strengths and hide his weakness.

It is very important to keep in mind the Japanese player is not trying to win the war. He is trying to win the game. He does that by not surrendering prior to Aug 15 1945. Even if the Allied player achieves the auto victory in Feb 1946 the best he can do is a draw. The Japanese player does not kill Allied material for their VP but to deprive the Allied player of their use. Japan does not care about VP. (except to avoid allied auto victory before Aug 1945)

The Allied player has to be a better resource manager compared to the Japanese. He needs to use assets over again. The Japanese player allots resources to defense knowing they will be gone when the battle is over. The only considerations for him are
Is this the "Great" battle I am waiting for? If not Do I really want (need) to fight here? How much do I want to extract as payment? How much can I afford to commit while still retaining the force I am preserving for the "Great" battle?

The war was rather one sided all things considered I expect the game to also be rather one sided. However that does not discourage me from wanting to play both sides. The great burden of victory has been lifted from the Japanese and placed squarely on the allied player. Japan only has to expand early (guaranteed unless Japanese are totally inept) and then be careful where they fight while setting up for one spectacular try at a tactical victory. The course of the war will still be interesting and fun to play. 1941-1943 the Allied player will in essence be trying to do exactly what the Japanese player is going to try from 1943-1946. Catch the enemy and administer a spanking from which the enemy cannot recover from without a prolonged period of rebuilding. The Allies hope to exploit this period by launching their own offensives and the Japanese hope to end the Allied re-conquest.

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

Wow, that is a fantastic plan. I've never even thought of such an attack. Based on what a truck bomb does when loaded with diesel fuel and fertilizer I can imagine the massive destruction a freighter full would cuase. It seems more like a modern day terrorist plan than a WW2 strategy, but hey, whatever works.

You do not have to imagine. Something of the sort pretty much wiped out Halifax Harbour in WW I with what amounts to obsolete stuff by WW II standards. Had Japan wanted to pull a stunt like that, they certainly could have completely destroyed the locks for at least a couple of years.

Not a far fetched or modern idea at all and very easy to see the effects as shown by HMS Campbeltown, (Ex- USS Buchanan DD 131) and her role in putting out of commission the gate to the dry-dock in the St. Nazaire raid of 42.

Hi, The Japanese would have to be willing to risk war with the US earlier to close the Canal. The US had closed the canal to Japanese shipping in July 1941 I believe. So first the war would begin before July 1941 with this attack. Once the canal is closed the Japanese would have to use a ship of another flag to make the attack.

Since the canal is not on map in WITP it is not something the Japanese player can target.

ORIGINAL: Mogami
I don't think we need to "balance" the game. I think we need to just make it accurate and let the players "balance" the game by their planning.

Not encouraging words from a person who will be a beta-tester. I thought the whole point of beta-testing was to balance the game.

It is very important to keep in mind the Japanese player is not trying to win the war. He is trying to win the game. He does that by not surrendering prior to Aug 15 1945. Japan does not care about VP. (except to avoid allied auto victory before Aug 1945)

MOgami, you may have a massochistic streak in you but most people don't. Most people playing a gameDO care about winning. They DO care about victory points and they do care about trying to win based on the auto-victory conditions. I'm sure you've won several UV games based on the auto-victory conditions. For most people, if they don't win based on the auto-victory they realize they have lost; it is only a matter of time until they see how much they have lsot by.

Hi, I think you may be missing my point. Victory for the two players in WITP is different. The Allies have to force the enemy to surrender.
The Japanese have to force nothing. They have to avoid surrender.
The difference may seem petty but it is what in the end "balances" the game.
Forcing your enemy to surrender means you must be the active driving force in the contest. Avoiding surrender requires you only to be able to prolong the conflict past a certain preordained date.

It is this difference that makes the two sides styles interesting. The Allied player will try to avoid material loss because this impacts his getting the ratio for auto victory by making it harder. The Japanese player will wiegh the impact on auto victory before comitting to the defense of any point. As long as he gets a certain ratio in return for his investment he is fine. Because he gets a fairly high starting ratio during the first 6 months he has a lot of room later on.

Japanese players who insist on trying to destroy the allies and win military victory are going to be the ones that give the Allies the early auto victory.