Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Rendova


Didn't the US start to use caves for fuel dumps near PH because of this (actually I think they still do)

The US was building new fuel dump facilities, but all of the 4.5 million barrels on site at the time of the PH attack were exposed above ground.

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, The game is now in Beta. It is time to stop asking for new features and concentrate on how the game performs to design. This is not a game for persons interested in playing the War in 4 hours or a week. You have to accept the fact that it will take at least 6 months for 2 humans and 3 months against the AI. (really I'd plan on a year for PBEM. I have several UV games that are over a year old but have been enjoyable)
At some point the designers had to close the door to new features or the project would never end. Prehaps 10 years from now a larger game (12 hour turns on 20 mile hexes [X(] )

Agreed, Mogami.

But as the subject is Alternative Dec. 7th Starts, it should still be possible to increase the chances of Japanese fuel and supply points hits when indicating a Port Attack for them.

I'm sure you'll accept the judgement of the operational commanders of the time?

No, not really. I don't think most of the estimates of US capability in 1941 made by commanders whose authority was primarily at the operational level really had a grasp of how much sh1t, people, and supplies the US could apply to a logistical problem in a hurry, even in December 1941.

As one British Major in the N. African campaign is said to have remarked: "Americans. They don't solve problems. They overwhelm them." He was talking logistics. Who else would have dedicated 1/3 the capacity of one of the invasion support ships to nylon stockings?

Anyway. If you want to turn the question on it's head... if attacking the tank farm was such a no brainer and so eaily done, why didn't Yamomoto/Nagumo/Kido Butai do it? After all, they knew WHAT it was for and they knew where it was located. [I can see all the AFs slapping their foreheads now. 'Doh! Shouldna opened that line of inquiry!']

Seriously. Q: Why risk so much on altered BB shells and shallow-diving torps to attack targets that may or may not sink if you can easily eliminate them all hors d'combat by eliminating their fuel supply? A: Because solving a problem caused by hits on the tank farm would have been a relatively easy task. Much easier than repairing all those BBs.

Damien -

Pascal, you must be new here.

[8D] Here comes a B-17 now.. you have a square mile to hide yourself.... [;)]... choose well!

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

If you want to turn the question on it's head... if attacking the tank farm was such a no brainer and so eaily done, why didn't Yamomoto/Nagumo/Kido Butai do it? After all, they knew WHAT it was for and they knew where it was located. [I can see all the AFs slapping their foreheads now. 'Doh! Shouldna opened that line of inquiry!']

Seriously. Q: Why risk so much on altered BB shells and shallow-diving torps to attack targets that may or may not sink if you can easily eliminate them all hors d'combat by eliminating their fuel supply? A: Because solving a problem caused by hits on the tank farm would have been a relatively easy task. Much easier than repairing all those BBs.

Warships were and still are the most complex pieces of man made machinery unit and thus obvious targets.

Nevertheless the significance of Pearl Harbor tank farm and repair shops can't be ignored.

IMHO, those should have been attacked and that would put IJN in much much much better position than it was historically.

I know that you wrote before (when we had this very same discussion last time around - perhaps 6-9 months ago) that those were irrelevant and replaceable from US in few months but I don't buy that...


BTW, Nagumo said that Yamamoto (as chief of IJN) never forgave him for not doing the follow up attacks on tank farm and repair shops...


Leo "Apollo11"

Hi all,

This is my 1000th message!


Leo "Apollo11"

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I'm sure you'll accept the judgement of the operational commanders of the time?

No, not really. I don't think most of the estimates of US capability in 1941 made by commanders whose authority was primarily at the operational level really had a grasp of how much sh1t, people, and supplies the US could apply to a logistical problem in a hurry, even in December 1941.

As one British Major in the N. African campaign is said to have remarked: "Americans. They don't solve problems. They overwhelm them." He was talking logistics. Who else would have dedicated 1/3 the capacity of one of the invasion support ships to nylon stockings?

Anyway. If you want to turn the question on it's head... if attacking the tank farm was such a no brainer and so eaily done, why didn't Yamomoto/Nagumo/Kido Butai do it? After all, they knew WHAT it was for and they knew where it was located. [I can see all the AFs slapping their foreheads now. 'Doh! Shouldna opened that line of inquiry!']

Seriously. Q: Why risk so much on altered BB shells and shallow-diving torps to attack targets that may or may not sink if you can easily eliminate them all hors d'combat by eliminating their fuel supply? A: Because solving a problem caused by hits on the tank farm would have been a relatively easy task. Much easier than repairing all those BBs.

Damien -

Pascal, you must be new here.

[8D] Here comes a B-17 now.. you have a square mile to hide yourself.... [;)]... choose well!

OK. Here goes:

1. Your point about the tank farm being an obvious target is well taken. One of the reasons I can offer for why it was NOT attacked is that the Japanese warrior code ingrained in many pushed to 'glorious' targets like BBs, CVs etc. Remember, this is the navy that built stupid units like the Yamato and Musashi, using up very valuable resources (including a large chunk of the budget). Yamamoto was one of the first naval aviation supporters to reach high rank in the IJN. Most of the senior officers, like many in the US Navy, were 'battlewagon' types. Even the submariners had not learned from the history of WWI sub operations by the Germans. They were still being trained to attack the combat units instead of the logistical units. All of these officers had been trained on the myth of Tsushima and Mahan's principles. The PH attack was actually a reversal of all major pre-war planning vs. the United States, the main threat identified since even before WWI.

Fuchida and Genda pushed for a third wave attack to 'finish off the Pacific fleet'. Fuchida specifically stated (though albeit after the war and with hindsight) that on the way back from Pearl he and his fellow officers were worried they had NOT hit the tank farm. Of course, all this is strange as the whole point of the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies was to acquire oil resources. So it begs the question of them understanding the importance of oil and logistics, other than the fact that they HOPED for a quick war with a negotiated settlement (probably one of worst underestimates of the US people's will to fight after such a start to a war; that begs the question of what the Japanese who had worked at the Japanese Embassy in the US ever learned about Americans, and Yamamoto was a naval attache in Washington in the 20's).

2. Solving the problem of a lost tank farm would have been easy? Nimitz, King et al. had little grasp of how much logistics they could apply? In a contest of who is the authority on these matters, them or you, I think I will fall on the side of the guys who actually faced the problems day in and day out and won the war for us. As I mentioned elsewhere, it would have taken 29 Cimarron tanker loads just to refill the farm back to the 4.5 million barrels. This means no use of the incoming fuel whatsoever. If you read Wildenberg's "Grey Steel and Black Oil" you will understand how UNPREPARED was the US Pacific Fleet logistics system in 1942. The US simply did not have the tanker capacity available to refill quickly AND keep ships running had they lost the tank farm. The Pacific fleets strategic flexibility would have been seriously hampered, to the point of having to return to San Diego. Adm. Richardson lost his post as CinCPac because he emphasized PH's vulnerability. And can you imagine the problems if the Japanese had been smart enough to use their submarines, loaded with their excellent torpedoes, to hamper any movements of convoys between the US and Pearl.

Sorry, but I try to back up my statements with references. Where are yours? [;)]

Congrats Apollo..... I thouht you got you 5th start at 1000 but your still at 4

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Rendova

Congrats Apollo..... I thouht you got you 5th start at 1000 but your still at 4

Let's see if post #1001 does any difference... [;)]


Leo "Apollo11"


P.S. [Edit]
It did make the difference... [8D]

Warships were and still are the most complex pieces of man made machinery unit and thus obvious targets.

Nevertheless the significance of Pearl Harbor tank farm and repair shops can't be ignored.

IMHO, those should have been attacked and that would put IJN in much much much better position than it was historically.

I know that you wrote before (when we had this very same discussion last time around - perhaps 6-9 months ago) that those were irrelevant and replaceable from US in few months but I don't buy that...

I never said "irrelevant." I said the effort required to do the job properly was incommensurate with the inconvenience it would place on the US. I'll redux the discussion short form for Pascal's sake and any other interested parties:

1. Oil tanks aren't high tech. Making one, even making good temporary ones (I'm not talking EPA perfect here, I'm talking serviceable until something permanent may be built) is not rocket science nor does it require any materials that were in short supply in the US.

2. Bunker grade is extremely difficult to set on fire. A Japanese attack would not only have to cause significant damage to the tanks (to ooze out the oil) burt also have a significant incendiary component. Kido Butai did not arm its aircraft at any time during the war with incendiaries. I don't even know (some of the folks familiar with Japanese aerial ordnance could tell us... guys?) whether or not an incendiary weapon was made that could be dropped from kates and vals.

3. The US was well equipped and trained at resupply/refueling at sea by the mid 1920s. You're not gonna have 8 USN BBs in a line easily, but you could support two and a spate of CAs and CVs and DDs.

4. Alternate ports were available. Net result is that the US Pac fleet is immediately more dispersed but not inconvenience for more than a few months.

5. Machine shops. I laugh at your suggestion. Please tell me that you do not think that a few hundred kates and vals are going to sufficiently damage machine shops in one raid when in some instances hundreds of B17s were unable to do lasting damage to machine shops in the ETO in several raids. The B17 was the BEST animal for that sort of job, being the one that carried the biggest and the mostest and dropping them with greater accuracy than anyone else. In 1941, however, even with the best bomb-sight, it was difficult to lay a heavy bomb close enough to machine tools to do significant damage. With something less than 500lb you almost had to hit the tool.

Your point about the tank farm being an obvious target is well taken. One of the reasons I can offer for why it was NOT attacked is that the Japanese warrior code ingrained in many pushed to 'glorious' targets like BBs, CVs etc. Remember, this is the navy that built stupid units like the Yamato and Musashi, using up very valuable resources (including a large chunk of the budget).

Horse Hockey. The "Warrior Code" is a myth that the Japanese invoked in order to make beaten soldiers obedient and to serve propaganda interests. They weren't so warrier as to not bayonet civilian babies, relocate and murder half the native civilian (NEUTRALS by the way) populaces of several pacific islands and enslave the rest, "strategically bomb" (ok it's a euphemism but the point is they tried) Oregon forests with balloon bombs etc. If the Japanese had thought that the oil farms were a vital target that they could have done much about they would have hit the farms as hard as they could.

They were still being trained to attack the combat units instead of the logistical units.

Another myth. IJN submarines shot at transports when they had shots at transports. They tended however to be deloyed by their superiors in different ways. In essence they had fewer shots at transports because of where they were sent, not what their skippers were willing to shoot at.

All of these officers had been trained on the myth of Tsushima and Mahan's principles.

I believe the word you want is "legend." Tsushima was no myth. And through the 1920s, the BB was indeed the ruler of the waves. Mahan has nothing to do with this. Had Lexington/Yorktown type CVs been available when Mahan was alive, he'd still espouse a doctrine of controlling the global economy through sea power, but he'd have emphasized CVs.

The PH attack was actually a reversal of all major pre-war planning vs. the United States, the main threat identified since even before WWI.

Actually, it was a "reversal" of nothing. The pre-US war plan did not involve any direct attack on the US/Hawaii at all. It involved a "decisive battle" in the vicinity of the Marianas. When the PH strike was launched, the USN CVs were an explicit priority target. They just happened not to be home at the time.

Fuchida and Genda pushed for a third wave attack to 'finish off the Pacific fleet'.

And they were wrong to do so. Nagumo had no intel on the location of the US CVs. In hindsight all the criticism of Nagumo makes sense... but only if you assume that the Japanese know that the 3 US CVs in the PTO are dispersed rather than, say, dropping bombs on your head as you re-arm for your third wave.

Solving the problem of a lost tank farm would have been easy? Nimitz, King et al. had little grasp of how much logistics they could apply? In a contest of who is the authority on these matters, them or you, I think I will fall on the side of the guys who actually faced the problems day in and day out and won the war for us.

Uh, <> that's really missing the main point by a mile. If you'd asked Nimitz in 1941 if he could imagine GM cranking out hundreds of F4s, B-24s etc a month in two years, he'd have told you you were nuts. If you'd asked him whether one of Henry Kaiser's shipyards in 1944 would be able to build more sealift capacity than the entire nation of Japan could build from 1939-1945, he'd have said you were nuts.

Do you get it yet? It's not about "can we fix it." It's about "How long will it take?"

As I mentioned elsewhere, it would have taken 29 Cimarron tanker loads just to refill the farm back to the 4.5 million barrels. This means no use of the incoming fuel whatsoever. If you read Wildenberg's "Grey Steel and Black Oil" you will understand how UNPREPARED was the US Pacific Fleet logistics system in 1942. The US simply did not have the tanker capacity available to refill quickly AND keep ships running had they lost the tank farm.

Who gives a rip? How many US ships were actually required to hold off the Japanese in 1942 and even mount a counteroffensive? Answer, not so many that they could not have been supplied from a few ports other than Pearl Harbor. Capice? In the meantime the US fixes the tanks (those 29 Cimarron tankers go ELSEWHERE cause they can't fill the tanks when they're not fixed) and also builds extra tankers (not a big challenge for the US). Within 6 months the tankers are full, there's twice as many of them, the tank farm is repaired and full, and 8 BBs are perfectly serviceable.

(Whether or not anyone would really want those 8 BBs in the CV age is a different subject. [;)])

The Pacific fleets strategic flexibility would have been seriously hampered, to the point of having to return to San Diego.

Horse hockey. The Pacific Fleet (that of it that was really necessary) had no particular toruble operating from Australia and New Caledonia. In a pinch Hilo could have been made more serviceable as well. Like I said, in the short run you won't have an 8-BB gun line. Six months maybe. But who gives a rip unless Japan is planning on invading the Hawaiian Islands? Absent that you're not going to see any huge BB duels in 1941-e1942 anyhow.

And can you imagine the problems if the Japanese had been smart enough to use their submarines, loaded with their excellent torpedoes, to hamper any movements of convoys between the US and Pearl.

Given their relative abilities to logistically sustain operations, I'd say it would have been harder for Japan to operate a large quantity of submarines between the HI and the West Coast than it would have been for the USN to base the entire PacFleet out of alternate ports in the HI.

Sorry, but I try to back up my statements with references.

Legion. Why don't you start with R.Overy's "Why the Allies Won." Then consult, for example, Janes for a list of the ships that the USN deployed (that's Navy mind you, and USCG, and not including civil transport) during WW2. Then imagine, if you are capable of it, whether or not another 30 famous tankers could have been built (you might consider the number of ships that were started and cancelled as an indicator of the underused shipbuilding capacity of the US).

Or do you imagine that a cylindrical oil tank is such a flipping complex piece of equipment that the US civil engineers would spend the next three years wondering whether or not new ones could be built or even how the old ones got there in the first place?

ORIGINAL: Pascal

Hello,

Okay. To throw another rock into the pond:

Probably the biggest mistake the Japanese made in the attack on Pearl Harbor was NOT to attack the very visible fuel tank farm, which at the time contained 4.5 million barrels of bunker fuel. This was equivalent to 29 Cimarron class AO's worth of replenishment fuel. This would have been a much more serious loss for the Pacific Fleet than the battleships. Had the fuel been mostly lost, the fleet would have had to re-base to the West Coast.

So, does the opening move allow for a more focused Port attack by the Japanese on the Pearl Harbor fuel tank farm?

Regards

Not only the fuel bumkers but the ammo.....quite a few of the attack planes flew over Kole Kole Pass enroute to Pearl(portions of the second wave that hit Schofield and Wheeler). Just the other side of that pass from Schofield was Lualualei Naval magazines....THE ammunition facility for the pacific(Okinawa is not but....). Not one plane bombed the magazine area. In my mind, that was a serious oversight.

Most of that, however, under fifteen feet of concrete was it not?

If I had to pick the one thing that Japan should have attacked other than the ships, assuming that they knew where it was and had the right kind of munition dropped by an accurate enough delivery system, I' d say it was the submarine munitions stores.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Most of that, however, under fifteen feet of concrete was it not?

If I had to pick the one thing that Japan should have attacked other than the ships, assuming that they knew where it was and had the right kind of munition dropped by an accurate enough delivery system, I' d say it was the submarine munitions stores.

Why bother with the sub munition stores when you can blow the entire Asiatic and Pacific Fleet submarine force out of the water like in Luskan and Raver's match?[:D]

By the way, Pascal, you are aware that most US oil was lifted by civil owned merchant tankers are you not? The Cimarrons were small compared to most ships in the civil merchant fleet. The famous SS Esso Baton Rouge (famous for being torpedoed by a U-Boat that is) carried almost 13,000 tons of fuel, and she was rather typical of the US civil-merchant tankers of her day.


See:
http://www.usmm.org/men_ships.html

T2 Specs:
L. 523'; b. 68'; Speed 16 knots; Crew. 42 mariners and 17 Navy Armed Guard. Capacity: 140,000 bbl (4 to 6 million gallons).

The T3 series was similar. Several were converted to CVEs.


Esso Fleet Tankers:
A. C. Bedford
Allan Jackson
Arriaga

Baltic
Beacon
Beaconhill
Beaconlight
Beaconoil
Benjamin Brewster

C. O. Stillman
C. A. Canfield
C. J. Barkdull
Calliope
Charles G. Black
Charles Pratt
Chester O. Swain
Christy Payne
Clio

Dartmouth
Dean Emery

E. G. Seubert
E. J. Sadler
E. T. Bedford
E.M. Clark
Edward L. Doheny
Elisha Walker
Esso Albany (II)
Esso Annapolis (I)
Esso Annapolis (II)
Esso Aruba
Esso Augusta
Esso Balboa
Esso Baltimore
Esso Baton Rouge
Esso Bayonne
Esso Baytown
Esso Bayway
Esso Belgium
Esso Bolivar
Esso Boston
Esso Buffalo
Esso Camden
Esso Charleston
Esso Concord
Esso Copenhagen
Esso Dover
Esso Gettysburg
Esso Harrisburg
Esso Hartford
Esso Houston
Esso Little Rock
Esso Manhattan
Esso Memphis
Esso Mont pelier
Esso Nashville
Esso New Haven
Esso New Orleans (I)
Esso New Orleans (II)
Esso Norfolk
Esso Paterson
Esso Philadelphia
Esso Pittsburgh
Esso Portland
Esso Providence
Esso Raleigh (I)
Esso Raleigh (II)
Esso Richmond (I)
Esso Richmond (II)
Esso Roanoke
Esso Rochester
Esso Scranton
Esso Springfield
Esso Trenton (I)
Esso Utica
Esso Washington
Esso Williamsburg
Esso Wilmington

F. H. Bedford, Jr.
F. Q. Barstow
F. W. Abrams
Franklin K. Lane
Franz Klasen
Fred W. Weller
Frederic R Kellogg

G. Harrison Smith
Geo. H. Jones
George G. Henry
George W. Barnes
Glen pool

H. H. Rogers
H. M. Flagler
Hanseat
Harry G. Seidel
Heinrich v. Riedemann

I. A. Moffett, Jr.
I. C. White

J. A. Mowinckel
J. H. Senior
James McGee
John D. Archbold
John Worthington
Joseph Seep
Josiah Macy

L. J. Drake
Leda
Livingston Roe

M. F. Elliott
Motocarline

Niobe

Orville Harden

Paul H. Harwood
Penelope
Persephone
Peter Hurll
Phoebus
Prometheus

R. G. Stewart
R. P. Resor
R. W. Gallagher

S. B. Hunt
Standard
Svithiod

T. C. McCobb
T. J. Williams
Thalia
Thomas H. Wheeler

Vistula

W. C. Teagle
W. H. Libby
W. L. Steed
W. S. Farish
Wallace E. Pratt
Walter Jennings
Wm. G. Warden
Wm. Rockefeller

Mission Class Tankers and relatives

Mission Alamo
Mission Buenaventura
Mission Capistrano
Mission Carmel
Mission De Pala
Mission Dolores
Mission Loreto
Mission Los Angeles
Mission Purisima
Mission San Antonio
Mission San Carlos
Mission San Diego
Mission San Fernando
Mission San Francisco
Mission San Gabriel
Mission San Jose
Mission San Juan
Mission San Lorenzo
Mission San Luis Obispo
Mission San Luis Rey
Mission San Miguel
Mission San Rafael
Mission San Xavier
Mission Santa Ana
Mission Santa Barbara
Mission Santa Clara
Mission Santa Cruz
Mission Santa Maria
Mission Santa Ynez
Mission Solano
Mission Soledad

Concho
Conecuh
Contocook

Now say to yourself in your best Jack N. voice impersonation: "Gee, Sparky, if the USN had needed to fill an oil tank farm at Pearl Harbor in 1942, do you think they could have found any ships to carry the oil?"

Why bother with the sub munition stores when you can blow the entire Asiatic and Pacific Fleet submarine force out of the water like in Luskan and Raver's match?

Yeah. But you've got to find them first![:D]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Why bother with the sub munition stores when you can blow the entire Asiatic and Pacific Fleet submarine force out of the water like in Luskan and Raver's match?

Yeah. But you've got to find them first![:D]

Did you not see the results of the attack on Cavite? Over twenty subs blown to snot by torpedoes. LOL More damage done than the "Able" test at Bikini.[:D]

100 B-24s etc a month in two years

Heck at one point Ford was making close to 200 a WEEK!![X(]

Yeah, Rendova, I didn't want to exaggerate and didn't have a figure to hand at the moment. [&o]

There is still a magazine area between Pearl and Ewa Beach that is in caves to this day and, get this, there is a civilian housing development on top of it....lol

They also used caves in Diamondhead that are now storing disaster relief stuff if I remember right.

Mdiehl,

there is so much 'Horse Hock' in much of what you've said it's useless trying to get you to understand normal logic and common sense. About 99% of your arguments wouldn't hold up to the request for hard evidence, and the 1% doesn't make up for it.

I will just make one suggestion. Actually study the history of the Pacific War and perhaps, if you can, talk with experienced naval officers before believing your God's gift to WWII. [:o]