Here is some information about Patton's planning abilities:
Taken from the book:
The Unknown Patton
by
Charles M. Province
CHAPTER SEVEN
Some Misconceptions
(And Some Plain, Old Lies)
In the past, it has very often been the usual and accepted attitude of people that Patton was effective only as a field commander; that he was not suited for higher command, or for tactical and strategic planning.
The consensus of Patton's lack of ability was perhaps summed up best by Eisenhower when he once remarked to Patton, "George, you are a great leader, but a poor planner." Patton's reply was that "... except for [Operation] Torch, which I planned and which was a great success, I have never been given the chance to plan."
In the months to come, after North Africa, Patton was never "officially" asked about plans for any Allied operation. In private, though, it was a very different story. Very often, others would come to him to ask his views and ideas concerning future plans. Bradley, especially, would come to Patton to ask his opinion about impending operations. Often he would not only ask Patton's opinion, he would also "borrow" his thoughts. They would later turn up miraculously as Bradley's ideas. This situation became so bad that, eventually, Patton became fed up with Bradley receiving all of the credit for his ideas. As Patton put it, "I do not want any more of my ideas used without credit to me, as happens when I give them orally."
On the surface, this might seem to some people a selfish attitude, but a deeper study and thorough consideration of the situation will offer a better understanding. At Patton's expense, other General Officers were building their careers and gaining undue praise. Patton, himself, was being kept under wraps and he was being virtually ignored. Others of lesser ability were being promoted over him. In reality, he was pushing them up the ladder and they were taking the credit that was honestly due Patton.
Initially Patton did not mind Bradley stealing his ideas because as a soldier he realized that it would help the war effort. As time passed it became evident that the Allies would, indeed, win the war. Patton felt that he had been pushed far enough and that he had been taken advantage of too much. When Patton personally proffered his plans he was ignored. When Bradley put forth Patton's plans, as his own, they were most readily accepted for consideration.
Operation COBRA, the breakout in Normandy by Patton's armored divisions, was actually a slightly altered version of one of Patton's plans, but it was fully credited to Bradley. Actually, it was the first in a series of bold and brilliant plans devised by Patton during 1944.
The third Army staff never doubted that Bradley was making good in France by expropriating their boss's ideas. Patton's aide, Colonel Charles Codman, wrote to his wife, "As of August 1st, General Bradley has adopted practically all of General Patton's plans."
On august 14, 1944, Patton wrote in his diary regarding the St. Lo breakthrough, "It is really a great plan, wholly my own, and I made Bradley think that he thought of it."
Patton eventually became disgusted with the hypocrisy of the higher command. He stopped telling any of his plans to Bradley.
In reality, Patton was probably the best planner in the European Theater of Operations. Indeed, his knowledge of strategy and tactics were to say the least, equal if not superior to any of the high command such as Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Clark, and the British. Without exception, his intuitiveness and perceptiveness was never equaled by any of the "masterminds" at SHAEF.
Patton had worked long and hard over the years to become the competent soldier that he was. His years of dedicated study and application were not in vain. He had attended all of the Army's "command level" service schools. He not only graduated from them, but did so with honors.
In 1923, he completed the Field Officers Course at Fort Riley, Kansas.
In 1924, he was an honor graduate of the Command and General Staff College located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While at the Command and General Staff College, Patton compiled an extensive notebook which he loaned to Eisenhower when the latter attended the same school in 1926. Eisenhower graduated first in his class. He wrote to Patton thanking him for the loan of the notebook saying that it [the notebook] made all the difference in his class standing.
In June of 1932, Patton was a distinguished graduate of the Army War College at Washington, D.C. If measured by no other standard than by education alone, Patton was prepared for general officer rank.
December 12, 1917 was the date on a report entitled, "Light Tanks". It was a 58 page report written by Patton assimilating his most concise, salient knowledge concerning the new military arm then known as the "Tank Corps". His report was the foundation, the entire basis, for the whole U.S. Armored concept.
At the initialization of U. S. involvement in armor, Patton was not only the first soldier in the Tank Corps, he was the Tank Corps. He personally created the basic tank training procedures, the training instructions, the training manuals, the regulations, and the actual methods of instruction. He also created the entire Tables of Organization and Equipment for the Tank Corps. He was personally responsible for the original Tank Corps patch worn by members of the corps which was the forerunner of today's Armored Division patches.
In 1936, while stationed in Hawaii, Patton forecast a doctrine of amphibious warfare that proved to be highly, and terribly, prophetic.
After studying and observing the Japanese in the Pacific, Patton's conclusion was that they could and would utilize an air attack in the near future against Pearl Harbor. He wrote a paper on the subject in which his prophesy proved to be almost exactly the same as the actual Japanese attack on December 7, 1941.
By the time of the invasion of Sicily in 1943, Patton was regarded as one of the leading amphibious experts in the entire U.S. Army. Unfortunately, he would be excluded from any planning of European amphibious operations.
He wrote in 1936, of the Japanese, "... it is reliably reported that during the last four years three or more Japanese divisions were embarked, moved to the coast of Asia and disembarked without any military attache, consular agent, foreign press correspondent or any other foreigner living in Japan being aware of the fact until the troops were in action in Asia. Some of the Mandated Islands, about which absolutely nothing is known, are only 2,500 miles distant [from Hawaii], seven days' steaming over the loneliest sea lanes in the world. Who can say that an expeditionary force is not in these islands now?"
He warned against a surprise attack by the Japanese after participating in an annual exercise in Hawaii in 1937. He had specifically investigated the possibility of Hawaii's vulnerability to attack. He wrote, "The vital necessity to Japan of a short war and of the possession at it's termination of land areas for bargaining purposes may impel her to take drastic measures. It is the duty of the military to foresee and prepare against the worst possible eventuality."
Within four and a half years, Patton's warnings would prove themselves correct. He had made a very shrewd, perceptive estimate of Japanese planning. He was ignored.
In 1928, Patton did a study of tables of organization and equipment for an infantry rifle company, an infantry battalion, an infantry brigade, and an infantry division. He followed this with a comparison of the current division and his "proposed" division, illustrating that his recommended division would have a total strength of 9,715 men. The current division had 19,417 men. With Patton's proposed division, the firepower of the recommended organization would be far stronger, yet have 10,000 less men.
This was precisely what the "triangular" division of World War II sought to attain; more bang with less personnel.
Patton was also among the first to experiment with many new types of equipment. He used a personal command plane for reconnaissance. He experimented with radio equipment for "tank to tank" and "tank to command post" communication. He worked closely with J. Walter Christie in an attempt to create a new and better tank. He continually strove for better ways to accomplish his goal; killing the enemy. His papers, his magazine articles, his official reports, all that he studied simply reinforced his firm beliefs in the importance of mobility, speed, and surprise. He believed in the importance of the soldier rather than the machine; the importance of command, communications, and the supply line; the importance of air warfare and ground mechanization; and the continuing importance of the offensive, the attack.
He never ceased to believe that it was immensely cheaper for a nation to create and keep active a strong military organization than it was to lose, let alone fight, a war.
Had Patton's acumen been put to good use, instead of being wasted by men of lesser ability; men who had political aspirations and who suffered from great mediocrity, the war would have ended much sooner that it did, with the advantage of great savings in both lives and materials.
In WWII, alone, many examples exist of Patton's shrewdness, his "sixth sense" of combat. Both before the war and during the war he showed much farsightedness. Major errors occurred which could have been avoided in the ETO had Patton's advice been heeded.
In North Africa, the Allies were planning to attack the Germans in Tunisia on the 25th of December, 1943. Patton felt that this was, "... unwise, as, unless things have changed at the front, there is not enough force on our side to make a go of it. Nous Verrons (we shall see)."
Patton was right.
A lack of Allied strength in personnel and supplies, due to congested railroads, insufficient trucks, and mud-inducing rains, forced Eisenhower to admit that it was a mistake. He called off the attack.
General Mark Clark, in August of 1943, was preparing an invasion of Salerno, Italy. The code name for his attack was "Avalanche".
In the event that something might happen to Clark, Patton was told to familiarize himself with the plans for Avalanche. In his diary of September 1, he writes, "... I was very tactful (to General Gruenther), but could not help calling his attention to the fact that the plan uses the Sele River as a boundary between the British X Corps and the U.S. VI Corps, with no one actually on, or near the river. I told him that the Germans will attack down that river. He said that their plans provided for ample artillery to be ashore by 0630 on D Day to stop any German counter-attack. Of course, plans never work out (as expected), especially in a landing. I suggested this, but it did not register. I can't see why people are so foolish. I have yet to be questioned by any planner concerning my experience at Torch, yet Torch was the biggest and most difficult landing operation attempted so far."
True to Patton's prediction, the Germans did exactly as he said they would. Neither the Americans nor the British held the Sele River and the Germans counter-attacked down the river with such a strong drive that they came very close to completely dividing the Allied forces. The Allies position was so precarious that it almost caused an evacuation of the beachhead. Luckily, it was curtailed.
It was at this same time in the war that Bradley was chosen for the command spot of the 12th Army Group in the ETO, even though Patton was the only experienced American Army Commander in the ETO and he had more combat experience as a top field commander than anyone else, especially those above him. Bradley was chosen because, in Eisenhower's estimation, he was "balanced", "sound in judgement", and "experienced". Also because Bradley was a favorite of General Marshall. Bradley, thought Eisenhower, would be less apt to make mistakes than would Patton. Yet, Patton had not made a single mistake in judgement in the field. Another reason for not choosing Patton was because Eisenhower felt that he made "rash" or "spur of the moment" decisions. That was wholly inaccurate and a bad assumption on Eisenhower's part. As Patton puts it, "For years, I have been accused of making snap judgements. Honestly, this is not the case because I am a profound military student and the thoughts I express, perhaps too flippantly, are the result of years of thought and study."
The most probable reason for Bradley's placement above Patton was simply that General Marshall wanted it, and what Marshall wanted, Eisenhower was in no position to decline. Eisenhower was fearful of losing his lofty position.
In a letter dated September 16, from Eisenhower to Marshall, Eisenhower states, "... his intense loyalty to you and to me makes it possible for me to treat him [Patton] much more roughly than I could any other senior commander ..."
This passage offers some very enlightening insight to the personality and ego of both Eisenhower and Marshall. Patton's firm belief in loyalty from the top to the bottom, as well as from the bottom to the top, was virtually wasted on men of their caliber. It is apparent that to them, loyalty was something to be used to attain personal goals. In lieu of appreciating Patton, they chose to take undue advantage of him and his great ability, not only to use, but to abuse him and his loyalty and friendship to them.
In an entry to his diary dated February 12, Patton writes, "Ike said to me, "You are fundamentally honest on the larger issues, but are too fanatical in your friendships." This seems a strange thing to say to a friend of almost 20 years, but, then, Eisenhower was concerned more with his position and his personal ambition than he was with loyalty to an old friend.
Patton's diary entry of September 8 indicates another prediction of error. He states, "[The Italian] armistice was just declared ... I fear that as a soldier I have too little faith in political war. Suppose the Italians can't or don't capitulate? ... It is a great mistake to inform the troops, as has been done, of the signing of an armistice. Should they get resistance ... [during the landings at Salerno] it would have a very bad effect."
Again, Patton was right.
The surrender of the Italians was announced on September 8, in the evening, as Clark's 5th Army was approaching Salerno Bay. The news was broadcast over all of the ships' speakers. Immediately the troops assumed that there would be no active resistance against them during the landings and there was a letdown of fighting spirit. The officers were ignored when they warned that Germans and not Italians would be on the beaches. A great many lives were needlessly wasted by this foolish act.
Patton wrote in his diary of September 15, "... just saw a dispatch from Navy in which it seems that Clark has re-embarked. I consider this a fatal thing to do. Think of the effect on the troops -- a commander, once ashore, must conquer or die." Clark was apparently more concerned about his own safety than he was about either his soldiers lives or their morale. Nor did his actions indicate too great a concern about gaining a victory.
A diary entry of January 20 mentions the Anzio landings, code named "Operation Shingle". Patton says, "Shingle is pretty dubious as the beaches are bad and largely unknown ... It seems inconceivable that the Germans will not guess that we are coming ashore at Anzio, but they have made so many foolish mistakes that we may get ashore unopposed after all."
Patton was right. That is exactly what happened.
Sometime later, in April of 1944, Patton at least had occasion to have a chuckle to himself. One of Patton's soldiers had overheard a heated discussion between General Albert C. Wedemeyer and Eisenhower. The discussion was about Patton. The final remark of the little talk ended with General Wedemeyer saying, "Hell, get onto yourself, Ike. You didn't make Patton, he made you!" That knowledge must have been quite a piledriver blow to Eisenhower's mushrooming megalomania.
Patton entered a comment about the Falaise Gap dated August 13. He says, "This [XV] Corps could easily advance to Falaise and completely close the gap, but we have been ordered to halt because the British sowed the area between with a large number of time bombs [dropped from the air]. I am sure that this halt is a great mistake, as I am certain that the British will not close on Falaise."
On September 17th, Patton wrote in his diary, concerning Montgomery and his "Operation Market-Garden", "To hell with Monty. I must get so involved that they can't stop me. I told Bradley not to call me until after dark on the 19th. He agreed."
From all appearances, Bradley was finally coming around to Patton's viewpoint. He, too, had seen enough of Eisenhower's two-faced attitude to see the handwriting on the wall. In any case of differing viewpoints between the Americans and the British, the British invariably won. Eisenhower's strategy for getting along with the "Allies" was to give into them on each and every point, even if it meant de-moralizing, and self-defeating humiliation for, his own American forces.
Eisenhower had, on numerous occasions, shown his timidity, his inadequacy, and his inability to command or control the British. On February 3, 1943, Patton recalled that, "Ike talked in glittering generalities and then said as nearly as I can remember, "George, you are my oldest friend, but if you or anyone else criticizes the British, by God, I will reduce him to his permanent grade and send him home." So much for fair and equal justice between Americans and the British.
In April of 1943, concerning a matter of American honor, Patton writes, "It is noteworthy that had I done what Coningham did, I would have been relieved. Ike told me later that he could not punish Coningham [for calling the Americans cowards] because he was a New Zealander and political reasons forbad it. Unfortunately, I am neither a Democrat nor a Republican -- just a soldier."
Again, another "Allied" general, did the same thing. Patton writes on April 16, "Lt. General Cocran, the s.o.b., publicly called our troops cowards. Ike says that since they were serving in his corps, that was O.K. I told him that had I so spoken of the British under me, my head would have come off. He agreed, but does nothing to Cocran. Bradley, Hughes, General Rooks, and I and probably many more, feel that America is being sold out. I have been more than loyal to Ike. I have talked to no one and I have taken things from the British that I would never take from an American. If this trickery to America comes from above, it is utterly damnable. If it emanates from Ike, it is utterly terrible. I seriously talked to Hughes of asking to be relieved as a protest. I feel like Judas. Hughes says that he and I and some others must stick it out to save the pieces."
Patton says in April 27, 1944, "None of those at Ike's headquarters ever go to bat for juniors. In any argument between the British and the Americans, they invariably favor the British. Benedict Arnold is a piker compared with them, and that includes General Lee as well as Ike and Beedle Smith."
One good reason for Eisenhower to be so lacking in backbone was his fear of Montgomery, or rather, the fear of the "power" that he thought Montgomery to have. Patton's diary of May 4, 1943 states, "Bedell Smith ... says that the reason everyone yields to Monty is because Monty is the National Hero and writes directly to the Prime Minister; and that if Ike crossed him, Ike would get canned."
Still another monumental error made by SHAEF and Eisenhower is the "Battle of the Bulge". The Germans called it the "Ardennes Offensive". As early as December 12, Patton wrote about the possibility of a growing German salient in the area of Bastogne, "... The First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of them."
An interesting and noteworthy fact concerning Bastogne is that Hodges and Bradley both received a Distinguished Service Medal for their part in the defense of that small town, although their laxity in leadership and command greatly assisted the Germans in launching their offensive. Patton and his Third Army received not as much as a polite thank you for their monumental and heroic part in coming to their rescue.
On the day that Patton's Third Army had taken the German city of Trier, Bradley sent orders not to try to capture it, as Patton had only two divisions. Bradley and his planners said that it would require at least three divisions to capture the historic city.
Once again, Patton was right.
He sent a reply to Bradley, "Have taken city with two divisions, shall I give it back?" He also entered in his diary, "I have certainly again proven that my military ideas are correct and I have put them over in SPITE of opposition from the Americans."
The fact is that Patton was consistently correct in his military ideas. He was not only the best combat commander in the ETO; he was one of, if not the best strategic and tactical planners, in the ETO. Yet, repeatedly, he was ignored, though his record and opinions were continually proven to be RIGHT.
According to Patton, the basic, underlying truth in war is that strategy is actually not very important. As he so succinctly puts it, "Good tactics can save even the worst strategy. Bad tactics can ruin even the best strategy." That concept, as simple as it is, is perhaps the best strategy of all.
Any adequate general can decide where he wants to fight a battle, but the important thing is to get the needed supplies, men, and proper leadership to the right place at the right time. Then, and only then, can the enemy be annihilated. That is how a battle is won.
It is inconceivable that a man such as Patton, who studied, ate, slept, and lived the histories of war and warriors from Xenophon, Alexander, Scipio, Napoleon, to Lee and Grant, could not help but to be a great strategist as well as a great tactician.
It is pure folly and, indeed, absurd to believe that because Patton was never given the chance to plan high level strategy that he should be precluded from the ranks of the great Captains of war.
Perhaps the most unfortunate problem that plagued the Americans during WWII was the fact that the top leadership was made up of men who had never exercised command at any level and had little, if any, actual combat experience.
Lack of command experience was indeed the case with Eisenhower. Consciousness of his own lack of experience of front-line fighting led him to accept advice rather than make his own decisions. He ran SHAEF more along the lines of a board-room than a military headquarters. A Supreme Commander cannot act in the way of a chairman of the board, but must be fully in command, making all decisions firmly, decisively, and alone. The bitter truth is that Eisenhower, never really got the feel of what went on at the front end of his armies. Never having personally been through the rigors of close combat, he deferred too much to the advice of others less qualified than Patton. Patton noted in his diary about this situation, "Ike ... is very querulous and keeps saying how hard it is to be so high and never to have heard a hostile shot. He could correct that situation very easily if he wanted to. I also think that he is timid."
Later, when Patton was thoroughly fed up with Eisenhower and his pomposity, he wrote, "Ike is bitten with the Presidential Bug and is yellow." Patton's appraisal of Eisenhower's coveting of the Presidency was noted as early as 1943, in Africa. During the time that Patton was planning his resignation from the Army he wrote, "... I shall prove even more conclusively that he lacks moral fortitude. This lack has been evident to me since the first landing in Africa, but now that he has been bitten by the Presidential Bee, it is becoming even more pronounced."
The entire problem of a High Command with experience other than "theoretical knowledge", as Patton puts it, may be summed up in a further quote from Patton's diary. He says, "In this war, we were also unfortunate in that our High Command in the main consisted of staff officers who, like Marshall, Eisenhower, and McNarny, had practically never exercised command. I think it was this lack of experience which induced them to think of and to treat units such as Divisions, Corps, and Armies as animated "tables of organization" rather than the living entities that they are."
*** NEWS ITEM ***
"BLOOD AND GUTS" CREDITED; BOOK MAY BURN ARMY BRASS
New York, April 30 -(AP)-
General George S. Patton, even though dead, was right back today where he always liked to be -- in the middle of a hot argument.
Col. Brenton G. Wallace, a staff officer under "Blood And Guts", has written a book called "Patton and the Third Army", which is sure to burn the Army's brass.
Wallace claims that Patton was chiefly responsible both for the planning and execution of the famous St. Lo breakthrough, which swept on past Avranches and eventually hurled all the German armies out of France.
Battle plan credit, up until now, has gone uncontested to shrewd General Omar N. Bradley, who later commanded the 12th Army Group and many experts have laid the brilliant execution of the plan at the door of Lt. Gen. Joseph L. (Lightning Joe) Collins, a corps commander in the First Army.
But Wallace, who served as assistant chief of staff in G-3 (liaison) for the Third Army writes: "The First Army was given credit, whereas Gen. Patton planned it and executed it and used not only First Army troops but also a number of his own Third Army units."
Wallace, however, gives Bradley credit for his foresight in placing Patton "in charge of the breakthrough itself."
http://www.pattonhq.com/unknown/chap07.html
